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Abstract 
In the second half of the twentieth century, significant advances in pay, 
working conditions and labour organisation were achieved by dock workers who had 
historically comprised one of the most exploited, least powerful sectors of the British 
working-class.  State-sponsored regulation of the industry ushered in a complete 
change in the system of employment, the dynamics of workplace bargaining and 
irrevocably altered the relationship between port workers and their employers.  
However, despite considerable research into different aspects of labour organisation, 
state regulation and the system of employment on the docks, very few studies have 
explored labour relations at a specific port in order to focus on local variation and the 
nature of local workplace relationships.  This thesis has sought to redress this 
imbalance in the existing historiography by undertaking a detailed exploration of 
labour relations at the port of Liverpool between 1967 and 1989.    
The research offers an empirical analysis and interpretation of events and 
disputes at the port of Liverpool during this period.  This time-frame is chosen 
because 1967 heralded state-sponsored total decasualisation of the industry, 
introducing an official shop steward movement and signifying a watershed for labour 
relations and the modernisation of Britain’s ports.  1989 witnessed the end of an era 
for the dock industry and those employed within.  The abolition of the National 
Dock Labour Scheme after a decade of Conservative government ended the unique 
statutory protection dockers had enjoyed for many years. 
This thesis concludes that labour relations on the Liverpool waterfront 
between 1967 and 1989 were considerably more complex than previous industry-
wide studies have suggested.  While certain factors are inherent to the national dock 
industry, there is considerable variation in the organisational character and 
experiences of dock workers in different ports.  Liverpool developed its own brand 
of labour relations that was historically shaped.  Local idiosyncrasies are central to a 
proper evaluation of labour relations and workplace relationships at the port.  After 
1972, the growth of clerical organisation further complicated already-nuanced 
workplace relationships by introducing another participant to industrial bargaining.  
Locality is central to understanding the intricate and composite nature of modern 
industrial relations at Liverpool in the decades between 1967 and 1989.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the growth and development of rank-and-file, steward-
led organisation at the port of Liverpool between 1967 and 1989 and its impact on 
labour relations.  It takes a multi-faceted approach to the analysis of workplace 
relationships at the port.  Firstly, the study considers a variety of industry-specific 
factors such as the historic effect of work culture and custom and practice on worker 
perceptions, the growth of shop steward organisation, technological change and its 
impact on employment opportunities, state intervention and statutory regulation of 
the industry and how these influenced the attitudes and actions of dock workers and 
their representatives. What is presented therefore intersects with several broad 
theoretical and historiographical perspectives relating to the British dock industry, 
working-class organisation and ideologies, the influence of locality and local culture 
on labour relations and the nature and evolution of British trade unionism over the 
course of three decades.  Secondly, although broadly addressing ideas and concepts 
which have already received significant academic attention across a variety of 
disciplines, the study seeks to contribute to knowledge by examining the nature of 
labour organisation at Liverpool docks, through the prism of the structural changes 
to the industry outlined above, in order to test existing theories on industrial conflict, 
intra-union discord, the development of shop steward influence and bargaining and 
the impact of Thatcherism on trade union effectiveness.1 
Furthermore, despite acknowledgement of divisions in working-class 
organisation which are present in notions of labour aristocracy and sectionalism, 
limited research has been undertaken to specifically explore divisions within 
occupational groups or amongst those workers who work side-by-side with other 
grades or occupations in the same workplace.2  To these ends, this thesis is also 
                                                     
1 These perspectives and the relevant historiography are considered carefully in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis. 
2 For further reading on sectionalism, intra-union tension and the concept of labour aristocracy see, 
for example: Hyman, R. ‘The politics of workplace trade unionism: Recent tendencies and some 
problems for theory’, Capital & Class, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1979, pp. 54-67; Hobsbawm, E. ‘The 
forward march of labour halted?’ in M. Jacques & F. Mulhearn (eds.), The Forward March of Labour 
Halted (London: MLB 1981), pp. 1-19; Moorhouse, H.F. ‘The Marxist theory of the labour 
aristocracy’, Social History, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1978, pp. 61-88; Goldthorpe, J.H. Lockwood, D. 
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orientated towards uncovering the hitherto obscured story of emerging clerical 
organisation at the port, with an emphasis on how these workers interacted with 
employers and their more historically illustrious dock worker colleagues, while 
investigating the effect this had on labour relations. Of those studies which have 
contributed to the understanding of employment and labour relations on the docks, 
few have focused on the role that clerical labour played in the running of ports, nor 
the effect that the growth of unionisation amongst this section had on workplace 
structure and operation more broadly.3  This approach offers new perspectives on the 
intricacies of local workplace relationships and an evaluation of how this might 
change the way we think about the dock worker stereotype. 
To properly examine these intricacies and related assumptions about dock 
worker organisation, research is focused on examining a series of key disputes and 
developments relating to management of, and employment in, the local industry.  
The industrial tactics of the workers are significant because these demonstrate how 
they attempted to maintain some control over manning levels and portions of the 
labour process in the face of modernisation and rationalisation of the industry.  An 
important question arising from the research asks how the changing nature of the 
                                                                                                                                                      
Bechhofer, F. & Platt, J. The Affluent Worker Vols. 1-3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968-1969). 
3 There have been several excellent surveys of the British dock industry which consider work culture, 
labour relations and workplace organisation in their historical context see, for example: Phillips, G. & 
Whiteside, N. Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port Transport Industry 1880-
1970 (Oxford: Clarendon 1985); Turnbull, P. Woolfson C. & Kelly, J. Dock Strike: Conflict and 
Restructuring in Britain’s Ports (Aldershot: Avebury 1992); Phillips, J. ‘Decasualization and 
disruption: Industrial relations on the docks 1945-1979’, in C.J. Wrigley (ed.), A History of British 
Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 (Cheltenham: Elgar 1996), pp. 165-185; Turnbull, P. ‘Dock strikes 
and the demise of the dockers’ ‘occupational culture’’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 
May 1992, pp. 294-318.  Other studies focus upon the impact of technological change or the operation 
of the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) and other instances of state intervention in the industry 
see, among others: Wilson, D.F. Dockers: The Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana/Collins 
1972); Dempster, J. The Rise and Fall of the Dock Labour Scheme (London: Biteback 2010); Mellish, 
M. The Docks After Devlin (London: Heinemann 1972); Turnbull, P & Sapsford, D. ‘Why did Devlin 
fail? Casualism and conflict on the docks’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 
June 1991, pp. 237-257.  There are also studies which consider labour relations at a specific ports, 
though these are often London-centric see: Lindop, F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations 
Act, part 2: the arrest and release of the Pentonville Five’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 
6, 1998, pp. 65-100; Hill, S. The Dockers – Class and Tradition in London (London: Heinemann 
1976); Mankelow, R. Deregulation and Privitisation: The Case of the London Dockers (London: 
Institute of Employment Rights 1996), though with some notable exceptions: Davis, C. Waterfront 
Revolts: New York and London Dock workers, 1946–61 (Illinois: University of Illinois 2003); Davies, 
S. et al (eds.) Dock workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 
(Aldershot: Ashgate 2000); Jensen, V.H. The Hiring of Dock workers and Employment Practices in 
the Ports of New York, Liverpool, London, Rotterdam and Marseilles (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1964); Towers, B. Waterfront Blues: The Rise and Fall of Liverpool’s Dockland 
(Lancaster: Carnegie 2011). 
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dock industry and British trade unionism more broadly affected workers’ perceptions 
and their relationship with each other, as well as impacting upon their ability to 
mount effective resistance against the erosion of previously-attained concessions and 
benefits by employers and the government. 
 
Methodology 
 
Following thorough engagement with relevant secondary literature, the primary 
research for this thesis was conducted through various means: 
 
The research: Oral interviews 
 Research initially centred on a series of oral interviews with ex-dock workers 
and shop stewards.  These interviews aimed to gain an insight into work culture and 
labour relations at the port of Liverpool beyond established knowledge and the 
existing historiography.   The intention of this approach was to focus more 
specifically on the nuances of the local industry and to explore a shop-floor ‘bottom 
up’ perspective of labour relations.  However, oral history remains a contentious 
resource in the research of labour and other histories.  Some historians regard it as an 
invaluable research tool, whilst others consider evidence collected through such 
means as subjective and even misleading. 
 John Tosh in defining oral history as ‘the raw material of social memory’ 
argues that it reflects ‘an active relationship between the present and the past, 
between memory and public tradition, between ‘history’ and ‘myth’’.4  Importantly, 
dock workers’ social memories and the mechanisms by which they have been 
fashioned over time offer historians insights into past experience, the ways in which 
those experiences are recalled and the distortions often hidden in other forms of 
evidence.  In this respect ‘the first thing that makes oral history different... is that it 
tells us less about events as such than about their meaning.  This does not imply that 
                                                     
4 Tosh, J. The Pursuit of History (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Ltd 2000), p. 201. 
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oral history has no factual interest; interviews often reveal unknown events or 
unknown aspects of known events’.5    
 Oral evidence is by its very nature subjective as it is shaped by the questions 
the interviewer asks (which reflect his/her research priorities) and those factors 
which influence memory such as nostalgia, dominant collective memory and what 
Thompson has called ‘the myths we live by’.6  Therefore it could be argued that oral 
testimony ‘is not history but memory... searching not for the fact, but the truth 
behind the fact’.7  The influence of memory might manifest itself in a variety of 
ways, including the need to embellish particular moments, to highlight or play down 
perceived betrayals, to affirm status and/or to make sense of changes that have 
marked the life histories and understandings of those being interviewed.  Clearly, the 
acute and irreversible changes that have taken place on the Liverpool waterfront 
within the lifetime of those who worked there cannot but have affected how they 
interpret the past.  This is not to argue that the shaping of memory by subsequent 
experience and reflection is necessarily negative.  Instead, oral history highlights the 
complex relationship people often have to the past and the impact of historical events 
on those who live through them. 
Similarly, while emphasising the constructed nature of oral evidence, it is 
important also to acknowledge that other sources are equally so.  Documentary 
evidence such as newspaper reports, trade union documents and the minutes of 
employers’ meetings, upon which the majority of the research for historical enquiry 
are based, often provide only an abridged, even subjective account of events.  
Consequently, these caveats highlight the importance of consulting a range of 
different sources in order to provide the most complete account possible.  This 
method also presents the opportunity to use these varied resources to interrogate one 
another, forming a reciprocal relationship between documentary and oral evidence. 
At the outset it proved extremely difficult to locate or contact dockers who 
had worked at Liverpool during the time-frame of this study.  This was partly 
because none of those employed at Liverpool docks up to 1989 remained in the 
                                                     
5 Portelli, A. ‘The peculiarities of oral history’, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1981, pp. 
96-107 (p. 99). 
6 Thompson, P. R. The Voice of the Past (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), p. 275. 
7 Grele, R. J. ‘Movement without aim.  Methodological and theoretical problems in oral history’ in R. 
Perks & A. Thomson (eds.) The Oral History Reader (London: Routledge 1998), pp. 38-52 (p. 39). 
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industry.  In 1995, six years after deregulation of the industry, the entire workforce 
was summarily dismissed and locked out for refusing to a cross picket line manned 
by a handful of sacked colleagues.  The subsequent bitterly-contested dispute lasted 
twenty-eight months and although it ended with redundancy payments for most, 
management refused to re-instate any of the sacked dockers.8  This meant that the 
standard avenues for contact with workers at Liverpool docks, that is through the 
workplace itself or their union, were unavailable. 
Eventually, following extensive enquiries, contact was made with a section of 
ex-port workers through the Community Advice Service Association (The CASA), a 
public bar and offices on Hope Street in Liverpool City Centre, founded by some of 
those who had been sacked in the 1995-98 dispute.  With the help of one particularly 
approachable individual, access was gained to various activists and stewards from 
the dock workforce.9  Ultimately, ten individuals were interviewed, each on several 
occasions.  All were directly involved in industrial activism at the docks.  This body 
of evidence was supplemented by interviews with other individuals from outside the 
industry to gather a more general local perspective on life and culture in the city in 
the decades in question.  From initial introductions and informal conversations, a 
series of recorded semi-structured oral interviews were organised which sought to 
glean perspectives and opinions about several different aspects of the local 
industry.10  For example, interviewees were questioned about work culture at the 
docks in the casualised and decasualised eras, the state of union representation 
before and after the introduction of an official shop steward movement to the 
industry in 1967 and their recollections of major disputes in the sixties, seventies and 
eighties. 
 A major difficulty encountered in the collection of oral evidence lay in the 
time that had elapsed between some of the disputes featured and the research for this 
thesis.  For instance, many of the protagonists of the 1967 and 1972 disputes were 
                                                     
8 For more detail of the 1995-98 lock-out at the port see: Towers, B. Waterfront Blues: The Rise and 
Fall of Liverpool’s Dockland, (Lancaster: Carnegie 2011), pp. 290-297; Saundry, R. & Turnbull, P. 
‘Melee on the Mersey: Contracts, competition and labour relations on the docks’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol. 27, Issue 4, December 1996, pp. 275-288; Davies, S. ‘History in the making: The 
Liverpool docks dispute, 1995-96’, North West Labour History Journal, Vol. 21, 1996/7, pp. 67-72. 
9 Particular acknowledgment and thanks should be attributed to Mr. Terry Teague for this opportunity 
and moreover for sharing his knowledge and time, on numerous occasions, to provide invaluable 
insights into the complex nature of work culture and labour relations at the port of Liverpool. 
10 See Appendix I of this thesis for a list of those interviewed and their work histories and Appendix II 
for a sample list of questions asked to prompt a broader discussion with interviewees. 
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deceased.  Historically, dock-work was a dirty and often hazardous occupation and 
the handling of certain cargoes without protective clothing meant that dockers were 
particularly prone to industrial disease and premature death.11  In order to further 
enrich the oral evidence perspective of the thesis, other sources needed to be 
identified and examined.  Fortunately, in the early 1980s, as part of the research for a 
two-part journal article broadly concerned with the growth of containerisation in the 
British dock industry and the reaction of dockers to it, Professor Fred Lindop had 
undertaken a series of oral interviews with stewards and dockers around the 
country.12  This audio tape collection was subsequently deposited with the Modern 
Records Centre at the University of Warwick and proved invaluable to research for 
this thesis.  In particular, those interviews conducted with Liverpool’s first Dock 
Shop Steward Committee Chairman Jimmy Symes and Transport and General 
Workers Union (TGWU) Branch Official Lew Lloyd (both deceased), Symes’ 
successor Dennis Kelly (deceased) and interviews with leading members of 
Liverpool’s steward committee were particularly helpful.13  So, through a 
combination of the interviews conducted by the author and those of Lindop, a rich 
vein of narrative and contextual evidence was gathered which was crucial in 
providing an insight into work culture and labour relations at Liverpool and local 
perspectives on important disputes which feature in the case study section of the 
thesis. 
 
The research: Archives and documentary evidence 
 Early archival research focused on the TGWU collection at the Modern 
Records Centre.14  This exhaustive collection contains a vast array of official 
documents, letters and memoranda concerning various trade groups across the 
                                                     
11 For more detail on the occupational hazards of dock-work see Chapter 3. 
12 Lindop, F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 1: Shop stewards and 
containerisation’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 5, Spring 1998, pp. 33-72; Lindop, F. 
‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 2: the arrest and release of the Pentonville 
Five’, HSIR, 6, 1998, pp. 65-100. 
13 This collection of interviews can be found in the Modern Records Centre’s catalogue, reference 
number MSS.371.  Those with particular relevance to this study were conducted with Jimmy Symes 
and Lew Lloyd; Tony Burke; Dennis Kelly; ‘The Liverpool Stewards’ (Jimmy Davies, Jimmy Nolan, 
Larry Dowling and Tony Burke). 
14 The TGWU collection can be found in the Modern Record Centre’s catalogue, reference number 
MSS.126.  The author would like to thank UNITE (formerly TGWU) for prior permission to access 
restricted documents.  
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union’s mammoth membership, with a large deposit relating exclusively to the 
Docks section.  Of particular interest was the sizeable collection of documents 
regarding the operation and joint-union control of the National Joint Council for the 
Port Transport Industry (NJC), the National Dock Labour Board (NDLB) and 
administration of the NDLS.  Some Trades Union Congress (TUC) material is also 
deposited at the Modern Records Centre which refers specifically to containerisation 
and the 1972 strike wave in the dock industry.15  Other deposits include material 
documenting the various government inquiries, committees and employers’ 
associations concerned with regulation of the industry.16  These archives were 
extremely useful in providing an institutional outlook on major flashpoints and 
watersheds in post-war dock labour relations and modernisation.  They also 
highlighted the sometimes wide chasm in opinion and attitudes between the union 
hierarchy and its membership. 
 The institutional perspective on the industry provided by the archives at the 
Modern Records Centre was complemented by the discovery of invaluable material 
deposited at the Maritime Museum Archives, Albert Dock, Liverpool.  The archive 
holds an abundance of documents concerned with every aspect of employment at the 
port of Liverpool.  In particular, the Employers’ Association of the Port of Liverpool 
(EAPL) meeting minutes and the Local Modernisation Committee (LMC) and Joint 
Negotiating Committee (JNC) minutes contributed immeasurably to understanding 
and conceptualising the complexities of work culture, local custom and practice and 
labour relations.17  Furthermore, they offered a reliable representation of and insight 
into, attitudes amongst port employers and the union side of negotiating committees, 
by extension members of the local stewards’ committees, over certain matters.  
These meeting minutes gave a meticulously chronological overview of port 
operations, disputes, strikes and pay negotiations for the whole of the period to be 
examined by this study and form the backbone of the empirical research and 
interpretation. 
                                                     
15 Modern Records Centre catalogue, reference number MSS. 292. 
16 Modern Records Centre catalogue, reference numbers MSS. 178, MSS. 200. 
17 The LMC was a joint negotiating body between port employers and Registered Dock Workers 
established as part of the Devlin Reforms in 1967 while the JNC was a separate negotiating 
committee between clerical staff and employers, established in 1971. 
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 The chronology and detail of disputes between 1967 and 1989 was enhanced 
by the local newspaper archive at William Brown Central Library, Liverpool.  This 
archive contains every issue of the Liverpool Echo and Liverpool Daily Post on 
microfilm, from the eighteenth century to the end of twentieth.  Due to the historic 
primacy of the port in the local economy all industrial disputes and pay negotiations 
received maximum local press coverage and so newspapers were a valuable source 
of reference for the timing and detail of mass meetings, employer press releases and 
contemporary quotes from protagonists on all sides.  When combined with the 
archival material at the Liverpool Maritime Museum and the oral testimony created 
and accessed, an accurate and detailed picture of local work culture and labour 
relations at the port of Liverpool could be constructed.  In order to grasp a national 
perspective on industry-wide events and disputes over the period in question, 
national newspaper reports were also consulted.  A complete archive of every issue 
of The Times is held on microfilm at All Saints Library, Manchester Metropolitan 
University and other established periodicals were consulted through LexisNexis, a 
subscription-based online newspaper archive.18  
The four principal resources consulted and analysed in the drafting of this 
study underpinned the measured and balanced evaluation of events at the port during 
a period of considerable upheaval in the industry.  When combined with the 
conceptual dynamic of the rank-and-file movement vis-a-vis the official union 
hierarchy, rank-and-file/employer and clerical staff/dock worker relations and the 
broader institutional context, this approach provides a detailed account of the 
complexities and peculiarities of labour relations and workplace relationships at the 
port of Liverpool.  In doing so it highlights the difficulties of applying broad 
theoretical assumptions to an exceptionally nuanced and unique workplace and local 
employment situation. 
 
The historical method and the triangulation of data 
Methodologically, the investigative approach to the research took on a 
rhythm of its own.  As previously noted, the process was begun by engaging with 
existing secondary literature in order to gain an overview of the historiography of the 
                                                     
18 http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/our-solutions/academic/librarians/uk-newspapers/ 
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dock industry and broaden knowledge of theoretical perspectives relating to the 
development of British trade unionism more broadly.19  Once the context of the 
study had been established and sufficient background knowledge accrued, attention 
turned to adding workplace-specific detail through a series of interviews with ex-
dockers who worked at the port of Liverpool during the period in question.  Initial 
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form, using the general context 
gleaned from the existing studies of the dock industry to inform direction, but also 
allowing scope for interviewees to pursue and present their own perspective on 
employment at the port.  The purpose of this approach was to gain an impression of 
the actual experience of working life on the docks, how workers perceived 
themselves in relation to employers and each other and to provide a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective on labour organisation and relations. 
This preliminary research helped to define the contextual and conceptual 
framework of the study and enabled proper interrogation of archival documentary 
evidence.  The exhaustive collection of documents at the Modern Records Centre 
relating to the docks gave an excellent overview of the national industry and the 
various schemes and agreements which administered it and these formed part of the 
evidence for interpretation.  Furthermore, it gave access to the official union 
perspective on a number of flashpoints and watersheds in the industry.  The 
relationship between dockers and the dominant trade union was far from harmonious 
and it was interesting and instructive to contrast the viewpoint of those interviewed 
with the attitude and actions of the union leadership.  Similarly, the archive at the 
Maritime Museum in Liverpool also provided an important opportunity to contrast 
the institutional perspective with that of dock workers and their leaders at the port, as 
detailed in joint negotiating committee minutes.  The evidence collected from 
documentary and oral sources was fused together to create a chronological narrative 
and survey of work culture and labour relations in the industry, which was in turn 
tested against existing theoretical perspectives to examine whether the form of dock 
worker organisation at Liverpool was distinctive, or common to that found in other 
ports or among workers in other industries.  The purpose of this study ‘is not just a 
simple narrative of events, although that in itself is of historical interest, but a 
                                                     
19 For a detailed analysis of these perspectives see Chapters Two and Three. 
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rigorous analysis, interpretation and assessment of the underlying social processes 
involved’.20  
As research advanced, a close reciprocal relationship between the 
interviewer, interviewees and documentary evidence evolved.  Conflicting evidence 
provided from the various sources was revisited and ex-dock and clerical workers re-
interviewed and/or their recollections interrogated to establish where documentary 
evidence was limited or incomplete or where oral testimony erred or required 
clarification.  For example, statistics contained in the records of the National Dock 
Labour Board, available at both the MRC and the Maritime Museum archives, 
provide a detailed breakdown of strike action across the major ports – number of 
workers involved, days lost etc.  These statistics also give an official cause for each 
dispute, based on the local board’s appraisal of the nature of the stoppage.  However, 
the initial or given cause of a dispute can often obscure the underlying grievance.  
Dockers might use a minor disagreement relating to working a particular cargo to 
provoke an all-out stoppage which could really be in response to management-
inspired changes to working practices.  The statistics presented by the NDLB records 
are useful in some respects but in certain cases they cannot help to untangle the 
complex nature of labour relations on the docks.  Documentary evidence plays an 
important role in research and interpretation but oral evidence can also be integral in 
locating the story behind the story. 
The major advantage of oral history is the opportunity to re-interview 
participants in the light of new or conflicting evidence.  Indeed, ‘oral testimony will 
never be the same twice... It is often worth the trouble interviewing the same 
informant more than once.  The relationship between researcher and informant 
changes as they get to know and trust each other better’.21  Familiarity breeds trust 
which can lead to new strands emerging upon revisiting interviewees.  For example, 
initial interviews with dockers and clerical workers from the port of Liverpool 
contained only tacit hints of the tensions between the two sections of worker.  It was 
only once a degree of familiarity and trust was established between interviewer and 
interviewee that the more complex narrative of workplace relationships emerged.  As 
a result, interpretation and re-interpretation of evidence was ongoing, contrasted 
                                                     
20 Darlington, R. The Dynamics of Workplace Organisation: Shop Stewards’ Organisation in Three 
Merseyside Plants (London: Mansell 1994), p. 11. 
21 Portelli, ‘The peculiarities of oral history’, p. 104. 
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against existing historiographical analysis.  Anna Green takes a similar 
methodological approach to labour relations on the New Zealand waterfront: 
Recapturing the historical experience of working men and women can be 
extraordinarily elusive, for union records throw only limited light, and other 
documentary evidence is filtered through the prism of records left by 
employers or agents of the state.  However, for the twentieth century oral 
history can provide illuminating insights into the material struggles of 
working people.  The historian may draw upon the memories of many 
individuals, and in addition, compare the recollections of daily work with 
those parts of the documentary record which do reveal aspects of the labour 
process.  Oral evidence provides information otherwise lost, but it also makes 
it possible to re-interpret the documentary sources from a perspective 
informed by the memories of the workers themselves.22     
 
Structurally, this methodology emphasises the importance of historical 
perspective, described elsewhere as an ‘event driven’ view of history, which 
prioritises investigation across the extended time period of 1967 to 1989, 
incorporating a number of key and secondary disputes.23  This offers the opportunity 
to highlight continuities and changes that are less evident in individual analyses of a 
particular event or strike.  By emphasising the historical complexities of labour 
relations at the port, proper attention can be attributed to the historical development 
of work culture and custom and practice in the local industry, which was vital in 
informing the attitudes and actions of workers and management alike.  However, it is 
also significant that there are certain aspects of the dock industry and dock-work 
which are common to dockers throughout the country and elsewhere.  It would be 
imprudent to disregard the patterns and regularities embedded in the inherent nature 
of dock-work and the shipping industry more broadly, especially in the context of the 
tumultuous changes which occurred in cargo handling methods during the period in 
question. 
 
 
                                                     
22 Green, A. ‘Spelling, go-slows, gliding away and theft: Informal control over work on the New 
Zealand waterfront, 1915-51’, Labour History, No. 63, November 1992, pp. 100-114 (p. 102).  See 
also: Green, A. British Capital, Antipodean Labour: Working the New Zealand Waterfront 1915-1951 
(Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago Press 2001). 
23 Franzosi, R. The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Post War Italy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1995), p. 371. 
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Structure 
In terms of structure, the study is divided into two sections.  The first section 
comprises three chapters which present the contextual perspectives upon which the 
primary research is based.  Chapter Two examines contributions to historiography 
that provide theoretical frameworks relating to industrial conflict, shop-floor 
activism and the evolution of the trade union movement in Britain.  Chapter Three 
details an overview of employment in the dock industry and the historical 
development of dockland work culture and labour relations in the twentieth century 
through an analysis of existing literature and the interpretation of oral evidence, 
collected by the author and from other sources.  Similarly, Chapter Four considers 
the historical growth and development of the port and city of Liverpool, the 
ideological and cultural impact of these on local inhabitants and by extension, on 
workplace relations, work practices and attitudes. 
Having established the theoretical and contextual framework of the study, the 
second section, also split over three chapters, offers an empirical analysis and 
interpretation of events and disputes at the port of Liverpool between 1967 and 1989.  
This time-frame is chosen with good reason.  1967 witnessed state-sponsored, total 
decasualisation of the industry under the Devlin reforms, augmenting the 1947 
National Dock Labour Scheme and introducing an official shop steward movement, 
all of which heralded a significant watershed for labour relations and the 
modernisation of Britain’s ports more generally.24  Comparatively, 1989 marked the 
end of an era for the dock industry and those employed within.  After a decade of 
Conservative Party rule under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, the influence and 
role of trade unions in the economy and more broadly, across society, had been 
irrevocably altered.  The Government’s sustained assault on the influence of labour 
organisation eventually brought the abolition of the NDLS and with it an end to the 
unique statutory protection dockers had enjoyed for over forty years, much to the 
relief of port employers. 
This second section is structured as follows: Chapter Five considers labour 
relations at the port of Liverpool leading up to the Devlin Report watershed and 
beyond.  It documents the development of the dock shop steward system at 
                                                     
24 Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon Lord Devlin into certain matters 
concerning the Port Transport Industry, Cmnd 2734, August 1965. 
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Liverpool from its inception as an unofficial body through to its official 
formalisation in 1967 and its subsequent rise to prominence and activism thereafter.  
The study centres on various industrial disputes at the port and the actions and tactics 
of the increasingly-influential Dock Shop Steward Committee, in the context of the 
tumultuous changes being wrought on the industry through revolutionary advances 
in cargo-handling methods.  Industrial conflict, precipitated by a series of perceived 
threats to dockers’ employment prospects and work culture, came to a head in the 
summer of 1972 amidst chaotic scenes across the country.  The final part of the 
chapter explores this strike wave and the local and national tensions which ignited it. 
In a significant departure from other accounts of dockland industrial 
relations, Chapter Six provides an overview and analysis of the belated growth of 
clerical unionism at the port.  As previously noted, this section of the dock workforce 
remains largely neglected in academic surveys of the industry, yet it played a 
progressively influential and disruptive role in the seventies and eighties at 
Liverpool.  Interestingly, both the dockers and clerical workers belonged to the same 
union, the TGWU, albeit under the auspices of different branches and trade groups.  
As the second largest section of the workforce, the rationale for including clerical 
workers in this study is to provide a unique perspective into port-wide industrial 
relations and to emphasise the peculiarities of local workplace relationships and 
intra-union conflict. 
Chapter Seven documents labour relations in the context of the maturation of 
clerical unionism and the consolidation of the Docks section’s influence after 1972.  
As a result, employers were forced to contend with two active, well-organised trade 
groups at the port.  This is juxtaposed against the decline and escalating 
rationalisation of the dock industry more broadly under the influence of a variety of 
pressures, culminating in the abolition of the NDLS and deregulation of the industry 
in 1989.  Directly related to this is the question of how much the decline of trade 
union influence in the 1980s affected the actions and strategies of Liverpool’s dock 
workers.  As well as considering major disputes and events at the port, the chapter 
explores local relationships between port workers and employers and the sometimes 
tempestuous relationship between the dockers and clerical workers themselves. 
 This thesis offers a number of conclusions and emphasises that labour 
relations at the port of Liverpool between 1967 and 1989 were considerably more 
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complex than previous industry-wide studies have suggested.  It argues that while 
dock workers across the country faced comparable challenges relating to the 
rationalisation of the British dock industry, the historic formation of local custom 
and practice and work culture influenced the attitudes and relationships of those at 
Liverpool.  Similarly, the development and evolution of Liverpool as a city produced 
a parochial identity and local culture which contributed to dock workers’ outlook on 
labour relations generally.  The Devlin Report is highlighted as a watershed for 
labour relations at the Port, and indeed elsewhere, not only because it decasualised 
the industry but also because it saw the beginning of a power struggle on the docks 
between the TGWU Docks section and local stewards’ committees.  These 
hierarchical divisions were eventually overcome, only to be superseded by sectional 
tension at the port of Liverpool. 
Indeed, the growth of clerical organisation after 1972 brought a new dynamic 
of intra-union conflict to workplace relations.  This study demonstrates that these 
clerical workers were not typically ‘white-collar’ in their outlook and instead 
behaved and organised themselves in a much more traditionally ‘blue-collar’ 
manner.25  In addition to examining the actions and strategies of the dock/clerical 
workers and their representatives across several distinct phases in British economic 
and political history, the analysis of the empirical research will reflect upon, and in 
some cases challenge, existing assumptions relating to ‘shop stewardism’, ‘white-
collar’ organisation and the impact of Thatcherism on trade union influence and 
effectiveness. 
                                                     
25 For a traditional evaluation of the organisational and ideological tendencies of ‘white-collar’ 
workers see, for example: Crompton, R. ‘Approaches to the study of white-collar unionism’, 
Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1976, pp. 407-426; Blackburn, R.M. & Prandy, K. ‘‘White-collar’ 
unionization: A conceptual framework’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1965, pp. 
111-122; Goldthorpe et al, The Affluent Worker.  For a revisionist account of ‘white-collar’ unionism 
that emphasises some similarities between ‘blue-collar’ and ‘white-collar’ organisation see, for 
example: Cook, F.G., Clark, S.C., Roberts, K. & Semeonoff, E. ‘Are white-collar trade unionists 
different?’, Sociology of Work and Occupations, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 1978, pp. 235-245; Hyman, R. & 
Price, R. The New Working Class: White-Collar Workers and Their Organisations (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan 1985).  
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Chapter 2 
Theories of Trade Union Organisation, Industrial Conflict and ‘Rank-and-
Filism’ 
 
This chapter explores relevant theoretical perspectives and historiographies in 
order to outline relevant theoretical frameworks for the primary research-driven case 
studies in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  Of primary significance is an examination 
of the historiography of British post-war labour studies, with particular regard to the 
rise of grassroots militancy and the subsequent ‘rank-and-filist’ turn in academic 
discourse.  This will provide the context for the analysis of the dynamics of labour 
relations at the port of Liverpool 1967-1989 which is approached from a 
predominantly ‘bottom up’, ‘rank-and-filist’ perspective.  Directly related to the 
advent of rank-and-file historical enquiry is the phenomenon of democratisation of 
trade unions in the 1960s, ushering in an era of  shop steward and shop-floor 
influence which altered the character of British industrial relations more broadly.  
Due attention will therefore be directed to shop steward historiography.  These two 
perspectives will be accompanied by a brief examination of traditional theories of 
‘white-collar’ unionism and consciousness, in order to provide a theoretical prism 
with which to examine the somewhat atypical case of clerical worker organisation at 
the port of Liverpool in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
‘Rank and filism’ and labour history 
The study of British industrial relations belatedly developed beyond an 
institutional or ‘top-down’ methodology.  The traditional approach to ‘labour 
history’ focused on the policies and actions of the various centralised trade unions 
vis-à-vis employers and the State and is synonymous with the hegemony of positivist 
empiricism in British historical enquiry prior to the 1960s.1  However, as time-
honoured approaches to historical research and the concept of ‘total history’ were 
being challenged and eroded by relativism, post-modernism and cross-disciplinary 
techniques, some focus began to shift away from institutional accounts of labour 
                                                     
1 The British ‘Academy’ lagged behind its peers in Western Europe in terms of embracing cross-
disciplinary techniques.  A sociological turn was apparent in historical discourse in countries such as 
Germany and France from the end of the nineteenth/beginning of the twentieth century under the 
influence of Durkheim, Weber etc.    
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history and towards the experiences of the ‘ordinary worker’ or ‘rank-and-file’ in the 
workplace and in society more broadly.2  The emergence of this methodological 
evolution coincided with a downturn in Britain’s economic fortunes accompanied by 
an escalation of labour militancy, local shop-floor organisation and state 
interventionism underpinning a re-evaluation of fundamental pre-conceptions of 
industrial conflict and the relationship between employers, the centralised official 
union machinery, grassroots activism and local organisation.  
Indeed, ‘rank-and-file’ has become a loaded term in reference to labour 
history theory.  Initially coined as a generic phrase to describe the lay members of 
trade union membership, it has since been loosely attached to describe a sub-
discipline encompassing broader theories of ‘workplace history’ or ‘the social 
history of the working-classes’.3  The central perspective of this branch of historical 
enquiry is ‘to ask… what role the actions of ordinary workers played in the historical 
process?’4  Under related theories, industrial resistance is seen as the ‘language’ of 
the working-class, providing an outlet for expressing economic (or political) 
discontent.  Industrial action is considered a unique source of working-class leverage 
in a capitalist society and should be attributed critical importance in the study of 
social history.5  E.P. Thompson’s pioneering study is an early example of the 
broadening remit of labour relations history from the 1960s onwards.6  This ‘bottom 
up’, anti-institutional trend gained substantial support amongst contemporary 
historians.  Early incarnations such as that of Thompson’s, were developed further 
by a new generation of academics, whose perception was also coloured by the 
rapidly changing cultural, political, social and technological landscape of the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Emphasis was placed upon the ‘possibility of entry points to the study of 
the working-class other than the gateway of the institution… [this] presents the 
                                                     
2 For a sample of institutionalist accounts of British labour history see: Webb, S. & Webb, B. A 
History of Trade Unionism (London: Longmans 1894); Clegg, H. The Changing System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain (Oxford: Blackwell 1979); Fox, A. & Flanders, A. ‘The reform of 
collective bargaining: From Donovan to Durkheim’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, 
Issue 2, July 1969, pp. 151-180.  
3 Cronin, J.E. ‘The ‘rank-and-file’ and the social history of the working-class’, International Review 
of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp 78-88.  See also Hinton, J. The First Shop Stewards’ 
Movement (Surrey: Allen & Unwin 1973); Price, R. Masters, Unions and Men: Work Control in 
Building and the Rise of Labour 1830-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
4 Price, R. ‘“What’s in a name?” Workplace history and ‘rank and filism’’, International Review of 
Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), p. 63 (pp 62-77). 
5 Cronin, J.E.  Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain (London: Croom Helm 1979), pp. 8-10. 
6 Thompson, E.P. The Making of the English Working-class (London: Victor Gollancz 1963). 
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opportunity to bring labour history into a close conceptual relationship with such 
areas as the history of women and family, leisure, popular culture, popular and high 
politics’.7 
However, the evolution in cross-disciplinary methodology in the 1960s was 
by no means embraced by all breeds of historian.  This ‘social’ turn in labour history 
has predictably produced a counter-trend of neo-institutionalist enquiry and debate.  
Exponents of this school argue that ‘it is the outcome generated by a strategy or 
institution which establish its historical significance, not the unrealised intentions 
and mistaken expectations of its original promoters’.8  From this perspective, too 
much emphasis is being placed on the experience of the ‘ordinary worker’ as an 
agent of historical change by ‘rank-and-filists’.  Neo-institutionalists reject the 
notion that employer/worker relations are fundamentally antagonistic within a class 
framework, instead highlighting the various sectional concerns which bind workers 
to their employers in a relationship of conflictual cooperation.9  The Marxist 
assumption that the accommodative nature of trade unionism within the capitalist 
system causes tension and conflict between a bureaucratised leadership and a 
rebellious membership is regarded as a fatal flaw in the underlying assumptions of 
‘rank-and-file’ history.      
Another reasonable criticism of ‘from below’ labour history concerns 
problems of definition.  It is contended that there are considerable pitfalls in simple 
hierarchical demarcation between officialdom and rank-and-file.  For example, are 
shop stewards to be classified as rank-and-file even though they too are implicit in 
the process of negotiation and accommodation with management?  Moreover, there 
are complications in quantifying exactly how representative unionised workers can 
be of ‘the social history of the working-classes’ and how far said workers were 
fundamentally opposed to the capitalist order of industrial and societal 
                                                     
7 Price, ‘“What’s in a name?”’, p. 77. 
8 Zeitlin, J. ‘‘Rank and filism’ and labour history: A rejoinder to Price and Cronin’, International 
Review of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp. 97-98 (pp. 89-102); For an example of other neo-
institutionalist authors see also: Reid, A. ‘Labour and society in modern Britain’, The Historical 
Journal, Vol. 25, 1982, pp. 489-500; Gospel, H.F. Markets, Firms and the Management of Labour in 
Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992). 
9 Zeitlin, J. ‘‘Rank and filism’ in British labour history: A critique’, International Review of Social 
History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), p. 49 (pp.42-61); Joyce, P. ‘Labour, capital and compromise: a response to 
Richard Price’, Social History, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 1984, pp. 67-76; Fox, A. ‘Industrial sociology and 
industrial relations’, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, Research 
Paper No. 3, 1966, pp. 2-15. 
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organisation.10  Zeitlin argues that such an approach assumes homogeneity of 
working-class consciousness and experience which is inherently problematic when 
applied to empirical evidence.11  In short, neo-institutionalism contests the primacy 
placed by ‘bottom-up’ historians on the workplace, community, class conflict and 
consciousness in the study of labour history.  Instead it contends that ‘social 
relationships, whether in the workplace, the family or the wider community, can 
never be understood without reference to the operation of formal institutions, just as 
the latter can never be determined by reference to the objective interests of pre-
existing social groups’.12 
Despite the insinuations of neo-institutionalists, there is a good degree of 
variation in the ‘from below’ approach to historical enquiry.  Some historians of this 
school prefer to offer a synthesis of different factors as agents of change while others 
focus on one particular aspect of working-class organisation to provide new 
perspectives on labour history.  For example, Hinton concentrates on the relationship 
between working-class organisation and the idea of a socialist transformation of 
society.13  Cronin highlights the importance of ‘change, development, discontinuity’ 
on working-class consciousness and labour organisation, with emphasis placed on 
the timing and density of strikes and strike waves in relation to national economic 
and social pressures.14  Richard Price focuses on the ongoing struggle for workplace 
job control between management and workers in the dynamic of labour history, 
hence his terminology ‘workplace history’.15  Other theoretical perspectives include, 
the impact of technological change on industrial conflict and working-class 
organisation;16 a sociological approach to occupational structure and the role of the 
community in defining strike-proneness in a particular industry or locale;17 or the 
                                                     
10 Cronin, ‘‘The rank-and-file’’, p. 78. 
11 Zeitlin, ‘‘Rank and filism’… a rejoinder’, p. 95. 
12 Zeitlin, J. ‘From labour history to the history of industrial relations’, Economic History Review, 2nd 
series, XL, Issue 2, May 1987, p. 178 (pp. 159-184). 
13 Hinton, J. Labour and Socialism: A History of the British Labour Movement 1867-1974 (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf 1983), pp. viii-ix. 
14 Cronin, Industrial Conflict, pp. 11-14. 
15 Price, R. ‘Re-thinking labour history: The importance of work’ in J.E. Cronin & J. Schneer (eds.) 
Social Conflict and the Political Order in Modern Britain (London: Croom Helm 1982). 
16 Burgess, K. The Origins of British Industrial Relations (London: Croom Helm 1975). 
17 For early sociological analyses of industrial relations see: Goldthorpe, J.E. et al, The Affluent 
Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, Vols. 1-3 (Cambridge: C.U.P. 1968-69); Lockwood, D. 
‘Sources of variation in working-class images of society’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
1966, pp. 249-267; Kerr, C. & Siegel, A. ‘The inter-industry propensity to strike – an international 
comparison’, in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin & A.M. Ross(eds), Industrial Conflict (New York: 
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link between political dissatisfaction and the strike wave as a form of working-class 
protest.18  Although there is consensus amongst ‘workplace’ historians that the 
agency of ordinary workers in labour relations and industrial politics should be 
paramount, there is also some disagreement about how to examine and analyse 
labour history through this prism.  For example, Hinton criticises Price for 
attributing too much emphasis to one aspect or section of working-class organisation 
(that of work process control) in isolation from broader shifting political, social and 
economic forces and structures.19       
It is true that the ‘rank-and-filist’ approach to historical enquiry often 
highlights the structural conflict inherent in trade unions as a result of their 
contradictory role representing working-class interests within the confines of a 
capitalist society.  Fundamentally, from a Marxist standpoint, class conflict between 
employers and workers becomes moderated by the conciliatory and accommodative 
nature of trade unions in the workplace, thus providing a hierarchical division in 
interests between the official leadership and the rank-and-file.  For example, Hyman 
stresses the conflictual nature of trade unions as working-class institutions whose 
‘officials normally become committed to preserving a stable bargaining relationship 
[with employers and the state]… in opposition to which trade unions were originally 
formed’.20  Such a situation encourages rank-and-file militancy as a reaction to 
unaddressed grievances at the local and national level whereby workers periodically 
rebel against management, trade union officialdom and collective bargaining.21 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging the accommodative nature of trade 
unionism it is important not to oversimplify or politicise the relationship.  In practice 
it is evident that divisions in trade unions are sometimes factional and sectional not 
                                                                                                                                                      
McGraw-Hill 1954), pp. 189-212.  For a contemporary sociological perspective on labour relations in 
the dock industry see: Turnbull, P. ‘Dock strikes and the demise of the dockers’ ‘occupational 
culture’’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 40, Issue 2, May 1992, pp. 294-318.  
18 Tilly, C. & Shorter, E. Strikes in France 1830-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1974). 
19 See James Hinton’s review of Richard Price’s Labour in British Society: An Interpretative History 
(London: Croom Helm 1986) in Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, Vol. 51, No. 
3, 1986, pp. 36-40.  
20 Hyman, R. ‘The politics of workplace trade unionism: Recent tendencies and some problems for 
theory’, Capital and Class, No. 8 1979, pp. 54-55 (pp. 54-67); Hyman, R. ‘Rank-and-file movements 
and workplace organization, 1914-1939’ in C.J. Wrigley (ed.) A History of British Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 2: 1914-39 (Brighton: Harvester 1987), pp. 129-158. 
21 Hyman, R. Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (London: Macmillan 1975), p. 199; Zeitlin, 
‘‘Rank and filism’… a rejoinder’, pp 89-102. 
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hierarchical, while workers in some industries are traditionally more conservative 
than others in both their outlook and action.  A rudimentary conflict or latent tension 
construct, which focuses on the divisions between a conservative union bureaucracy 
and a militant grassroots membership, is a simplistic generalisation and will not 
suffice.  Moreover, such broad categorisation is difficult to impose on the dynamics 
of labour relations over different time periods, unions, industries and localities, a fact 
recognised by exponents of ‘from below’ history who often provide qualifications 
and caveats in their work.  The trend towards greater democratisation of the unions 
and subsequent devolution of bargaining power to the shop floor in the 1960s also 
renders a rigid Marxist ‘class conflict’ approach obsolete, especially as ‘economist 
militancy’ became commonplace.22   The main concern of rank-and-file history, 
despite the claims of some institutionalists, is to place the ordinary worker and his 
elected representatives at the centre of the study of labour history, not necessarily to 
emphasise ‘the fundamental division between the ‘bureaucracy’... or ‘officialdom’ 
on the one hand and those of the ‘rank-and-file’ [or] ‘membership’... on the other’.23 
The multi-faceted ‘from below’ approach described here will inform the 
analysis of rank-and-file militancy at Liverpool docks 1967-1989 in the proceeding 
chapters.  The study will be particularly attentive to traditions of union organisation 
and work culture in the industry locally and nationally, in order to accurately 
contextualise labour relations at the port against broader contemporary political and 
organisational trends.  It will be concerned with how the changing nature of cargo-
handling due to technological advances impacted on labour relations at the port and 
more generally and how the peculiarities of Liverpool’s historical development 
affected working-class consciousness and workers’ attitude towards managerial 
authority.  After 1967, labour relations at the port were strongly influenced by the 
emerging Dock Shop Steward Committee and by both this committee and the 
Clerical Port Shop Steward Committee post-1972.  In this context, the actions and 
strategies of the shop steward committees at the port will be given maximum 
consideration as the democratically-elected mouthpieces of the rank-and-file and the 
                                                     
22 Hobsbawm, E. ‘The forward march of labour halted?’ in M. Jacques & F. Mulhearn (eds.), The 
Forward March of Labour Halted (London: MLB 1981), p. 18 (pp. 1-19).  Hobsbawm identifies the 
growing trend of sectional, wage-based militancy in the post-war era as detrimental to socialist ideals 
and the socialist transformation of society.  This inclination was identified even earlier by Allan 
Flanders as ‘narrow materialism’, albeit from an opposing ideological perspective to Hobsbawm’s 
(Flanders, A. British Trade Unionism, California: Bureau of Current Affairs 1948, pp. 57-60). 
23 Zeitlin, ‘‘Rank and filism’... a critique’, p. 45. 
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dominant force in worker representation.  If labour relations at the port of Liverpool 
during the specified period were to be considered from a purely institutional 
perspective, an incomplete and account would be provided because of the virtual 
redundancy of the official machinery of the TGWU in local policy-making and 
negotiations post-1967.  This is not to exclude institutional forces altogether as these 
still played an integral part, rather to place the emphasis on local rank-and-file 
organisation in the examination of labour relations at the port.  Indeed, if either 
perspective is discounted due to an ideological pre-occupation with a ‘top-down’ or 
‘from below’ account of labour history, this is to the detriment of a considered 
evaluation – the metaphorical equivalent of ‘the sound of one hand clapping’.24 
 
Shop stewards and the democratisation of trade unions 
The trend towards the democratisation of the unions in the 1960s came from 
several sources.  One major agent for change was membership pressure.  The 
relationship between full-time officials and employers was often viewed from the 
shop floor with suspicion and injustice.  Nowhere was this more palpable than in the 
dock industry, where officers of the dominant union, the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (TGWU) were historically vilified by their dock membership for 
being too cosy with employers and unrepresentative of shop-floor opinion.25  The 
proliferation and formalisation of local, shop steward-led bargaining signified a 
watershed in British industrial relations.  Democratically-elected shop steward 
committees were gradually encouraged and empowered by a new wave of modern 
trade union leaders, who had themselves been influenced by the changing nature of 
society and industrial relations in the post-war era and modernity associated with the 
‘white heat of technology’.26  Nevertheless, rather than promoting more harmonious 
industrial relations, in some industries decentralisation of bargaining had the 
                                                     
24 Hyman, R. ‘The sound of one hand clapping: a comment on the ‘Rank and filism’ debate’, 
International Review of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp. 309-326.  
25 For more detail on the sometimes tempestuous relationship between the TGWU and its dock 
membership, particularly prior to the Devlin reforms in 1967, see Chapter 3 and 5 of this thesis. 
26 For more detail on the democratisation of the unions and the TGWU in particular see, for example: 
Jones, J. Union Man: An Autobiography (London: Collins 1986); Goodman, G. The Awkward 
Warrior: Frank Cousins, His Life and Times (London: Davis-Poynter 1979); Middlemas, K. Power, 
Competition and the State, Vol. 2 (London: Macmillan 1990), pp. 222-224; Phillips, J. ‘Democracy 
and trade unionism on the docks’ in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman & A. Campbell (eds.) British Trade 
Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 
1999), pp. 291-292 (pp. 291-310).  
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opposite effect.  A growing number of disputes and stoppages were increasingly 
initiated by local organisation.  The rise in workplace militancy, when combined 
with a decline in the national economy, prompted the then Labour government to 
commission a report into the current state of industrial relations in 1965, headed by 
Lord Donovan. 
In 1968, after many months of gathering evidence from all sectors of 
industry, Lord Donovan’s Commission finally delivered its report on trade unions 
and employers’ associations in Britain.27  One of its major contributions was to 
emphasise the changing nature of industrial relations in Britain and the existence of 
two separate systems of negotiation and representation, the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’.  
The ‘formal’ system of industrial relations highlighted in the final report related to 
the traditional institutional interaction between Union officialdom and employers or 
the State in national or industry-wide negotiations.  The ‘informal’ system was 
identified as the relatively new experience of local, shop steward-led representation 
and negotiation.  The Report recognised the growing significance and influence of 
the latter in contemporary workplace bargaining and its impact on industrial relations 
more broadly.  It also recommended the devolution of bargaining power to the local 
level, a process already being expedited by trade union leaderships, as well as 
maintenance of the British tradition of voluntarism. 
 The phenomenon of shop steward-led bargaining and representation in the 
sixties and seventies has received considerable sociological and historical 
examination in recent years.  Lane and Roberts’ account of local organisation at 
Pilkingtons and Beynon’s seminal work exploring the role of shop stewards at a Ford 
Motor Company plant in Liverpool, were amongst the first of their kind.28  Beynon’s 
notion that stewards developed a specific type of ‘factory class consciousness’, 
tailored to that particular plant through experience of dealing with management and 
their membership, is a persuasive one.  Indeed ‘they knew what their bit of the world 
was about and they were prepared to take on anyone who challenged it’.29  This is 
                                                     
27 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, 1965-1968 (Lord 
Donovan, Chairman), Cmnd. 3623 (London: HMSO 1968). 
28 Lane, T. & Roberts, K. Strike At Pilkingtons (London: Fontana 1971); Beynon, H. Working For 
Ford (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1973).   
29 Beynon, Working For Ford, pp. 80-81.  
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certainly common to the nature of shop steward-led labour organisation on Liverpool 
docks from 1967 onwards, as shall be revealed in due course. 
 In the wake of the growing influence of shop stewards in contemporary 
industrial bargaining, more and more studies followed those of Lane and Roberts and 
Beynon.  For example, Warren highlights the complex nature of the role of shop 
stewards stemming from the influence of three conflictual pressures that of 
management, officialdom and rank-and-file, an approach later expanded upon in 
Darlington’s case study examination of organisation at three Merseyside plants.30  
Darlington’s study also evaluates how the impact of Thatcherism affected shop 
steward organisation, an approach shared by this thesis.  Nicholson examines the 
nature of shop stewardism by focusing on the social and psychological dynamics of 
stewards’ attitude and behaviour.31  Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel developed the 
concept of a sophisticated shop steward system in their study.32  Their analysis took 
the view that factory class consciousness is created and cultivated by a ‘quasi-elite’ 
of ‘leader’ stewards, who educate their membership in the ideals of trade unionism 
and foster a collective solidarity based on these principles and the realities of the 
workplace.  Kelly’s mobilisation theory also highlights the vital role of workplace 
activists and representatives in framing and directing their colleagues’ perspectives.33  
However, it has since been argued that the idea that a select few stewards manage 
and control the discontent of the membership, merely replaces one version of ‘top 
down’ history with another and underplays the extent to which stewards are 
influenced and governed by the day-to-day concerns and grievances of the rank-and-
file and the actions of management.34   
 The wave of studies which accompanied the rise of trade union and shop 
steward influence and militancy in the sixties and seventies was paralleled by those 
which examined the role of the steward after the Thatcherism watershed of the 
                                                     
30 Warren, A. ‘The challenge from below: An analysis of the role of the shop steward in industrial 
relations’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1971, pp. 52-60; Darlington, R. The 
Dynamics of Workplace Organisation: Shop Stewards’ Organisation in Three Merseyside Plants 
(London: Mansell 1994). 
31 Nicholson, N. ‘The role of the shop steward: an empirical case study’, Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 7, Issue 1, 1976, pp. 15-26. 
32 Batstone, E., Boraston, I. and Frenkel, S. Shop Stewards in Action: The Organisation of Workplace 
Conflict and Accommodation (Oxford: Blackwell 1977). 
33 Kelly, J. Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves (London: 
Routledge 1998). 
34 Darlington, R. ‘Shop stewards’ leadership, left-wing activism and collective workplace union 
organisation’, Capital & Class, Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 95-126. 
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eighties.  For example, Terry’s study entitled ‘How do we know if shop stewards are 
getting weaker?’ typifies this new approach to the analysis of the changing nature of 
industrial relations.35  The accepted contemporary wisdom proposes that that the 
hostile economic and political climate of the eighties had weakened shop steward 
organisation and influence.36  However, some authors are less emphatic, instead 
highlighting continuity and a more flexible and pragmatic approach from stewards 
within the political and economic context which they found themselves.37  Others 
such as Claydon and Longstreth prefer to examine the decline of trade unionism 
more broadly during this period, while Metcalf considers the transformation of 
British industrial relations from a similarly institutional perspective.38 
 The inclusion of this brief overview of the historiography of shop stewards’ 
role in industrial bargaining provides context for the case study portion of the thesis.  
Unofficial shop-floor, or rather quayside, organisation was well-established at the 
port of Liverpool and others, long prior to the introduction of an official shop 
steward system under the Devlin reforms of 1967 and subsequently became the 
dominant force in labour relations.  In fact, Liverpool had an unofficial Port 
Workers’ Committee tacitly recognised by employers in the 1940s and instances of 
local unofficial organisation over certain matters are apparent as early as 1920, when 
the first registration scheme, albeit voluntary, was introduced to regulate 
employment at the port.39  It is interesting to note that the majority of studies of shop 
steward organisation and influence tend to focus on the manufacturing sector.  
However, the nature of shop steward-led organisation in the dock industry was 
inherently different.  One of the fundamental differences between the dock industry 
                                                     
35 Terry, M. ‘How do we know if shop stewards are getting weaker?’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 24, Issue 2, July 1986, pp. 169-179. 
36 Basset, P. Strike Free: New Industrial Relations in Britain (London: Papermac 1987); Lane, T. 
‘The Unions: caught on the ebb tide’, Marxism Today, September 1982, pp. 6-13. 
37 Darlington, The Dynamics of Workplace Organisation, pp. 2-3; Batstone, E. ‘Bureaucracy, 
oligarchy and incorporation in shop steward organisations in the 1980s’ in O. Jacobi, B. Jessop, H. 
Kastendiek & M. Regini (eds.) Technological Change, Rationalisation and Industrial Relations 
(Kent: Croom Helm 1986), pp. 137-160; Kelly, J. ‘Trade unions through the recession 1980-1984’, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 25, Issue 2, July 1987, pp. 275-286. 
38 Claydon, T. ‘Union Derecognition in Britain in the 1980s’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 27, Issue 2, July 1989, pp. 214-224; Longstreth, F.H. ‘From corporatism to dualism?  
Thatcherism and the climacteric of British trade unions in the 1980s’, Political Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 
3, September 1988, pp. 413-432; Metcalf, D. ‘Transformation of British industrial relations?  
Institutions, conduct and outcomes 1980-1990’, Centre For Economic Performance London School of 
Economics, CEPDP 151, 1993, pp. 1-53.  
39 For more detail on early unofficial organisational structures at Liverpool docks see Chapters 3 and 
5 of this thesis. 
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and others is that it was subject to statutory regulation and, as a result, joint union-
employer control at both the local and national level.  This meant that many aspects 
which would normally have been outside the remit of worker representation such as 
manning, recruitment and discipline were subject to influence from shop steward 
committees under the auspices of the local Dock Labour Board and Local 
Modernisation Committees.40  Furthermore, when combined with the unusual degree 
of control dockers enjoyed over the labour process because of the unique character, 
historical development and custom and practice of the industry it is evident that 
major dissimilarities emerge between the role and influence of dock stewards and 
those in other sectors. 
Whereas Taylorism, Fordism and the division of labour had divested 
manufacturing workers of control over their portion of the labour process dockers, 
through a combination of statutory regulation and joint workplace control, 
maintained a strong level of autonomy in the organisation and execution of work 
tasks, even after the technological revolution in the industry.  It is therefore likely 
that the collective workplace consciousness which dictated the strategies and actions 
of dock stewards were unlike those of factory stewards or the traditional shop 
steward paradigm.  Moreover, because of the unique format of labour relations in the 
industry and the perpetuation of joint control through the National Dock Labour 
Scheme (NDLS) and local dock labour boards, stewards and labour organisation 
remained relatively insulated from the broader trend towards the reassertion of 
managerial authority and the growth of ‘new realism’ in the eighties, at least until the 
abolition of the Scheme in 1989.41  Among other things, this study will seek to 
challenge and contribute to shop steward historiography by focusing on the 
character, actions and strategies of the Dock Shop Steward Committee at the port of 
Liverpool in its response to the rapidly changing technological landscape of the 
industry and its implications for manning levels and the future of employment 
therein. 
 
                                                     
40 For more detail on the unique position of union influence, both formal and informal, on workplace 
control and labour relations in the dock industry see Chapters 3, 5 and 7 of this thesis. 
41 Turnbull, P. ‘Docks’ in A. Pendleton & J. Winterton (eds.) Public Enterprise in Transition: 
Industrial Relations in State and Privitized Corporations (London: Routledge 1993), pp. 185-186 (pp. 
185-210). 
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Traditional assumptions regarding ‘white-collar’ workers 
 Chapter Six of this thesis examines the growth of clerical unionism at the 
port of Liverpool in the 1970s and how it changed the dynamics of labour relations 
thereafter.  Clerical workers, who dealt with day-to-day administration of cargo and 
shipping at the port, both in the offices of major shipping/stevedoring companies and 
on the quayside, were salaried staff.   They were not registered like dockers and did 
not fall under the remit of the NDLS, at least not in Liverpool.42  This meant that 
they were subject to the standard employment relationship with management.  Prior 
to 1969, clerical worker unionism at the port was distinctly patchy, partially because 
most employers were reluctant to recognise clerical unionism and partially because 
many staff workers were unenthusiastic, instead immersed in an archetypal ‘white-
collar’ outlook towards their relationship with their employers.  However, this 
situation quickly began to change in the seventies.  In order to provide theoretical 
context for the factors that underpinned shifting attitudes towards trade unionism and 
activism which are identified and examined below, it is necessary to document some 
typical assumptions regarding ‘white-collar’ workers here. 
 In the post-war era, the growth of clerical and administrative employment 
prompted considerable academic debate regarding the character and ideology of 
‘white-collar’ workers and their organisations.43  Even prior to this, Marx and Weber 
had accounted for the ‘white-collar’ stratum of the labour force in their pioneering 
analyses of social structure.  For Marx, the proliferation of ‘white-collar’ 
employment was a consequence of the evolving nature of advanced capitalism.44  
Unlike manual workers, ‘white-collar’ workers do not directly produce surplus value 
(profit) for the capitalist class, rather they assist in managing or administering the 
mode of production which ultimately reduces overheads, indirectly improving 
profitability.  However, Marx insists that these workers do not form a social class of 
their own despite their alternate role within the capitalist system.  Instead he 
                                                     
42 However, clerical staff were actually registered under the Scheme at the Port of London - Author’s 
interview with T.T., March 2011.  
43 For an excellent overview of the ‘white-collar’/class debate see: Levine, R.F. Social Class and 
Stratification: Classic Statements and Theoretical Debates (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1998); 
Hyman, R. & Price, R. The New Working Class?  White Collar Workers and Their Organisations: A 
Reader (London: Macmillan 1983). 
44 For a summary of the main principles of Marx’s theories of class see: Parkin, F. Marxism and Class 
Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (London: Tavistock 1979) Levine, op cit; Giddens, A. The Class 
Structure of the Advanced Societies (London: Hutchinson 1973); Tucker, R.C. The Marx-Engels 
Reader, 2nd Edition (London: Norton & Company 1978). 
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proposed that the various grades subsumed under the heading of ‘white-collar 
worker’ belong either to the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, the only two classes 
which exist in the capitalist social order, dependent on their position in the mode of 
production.45  In short, most ‘white-collar’ workers who consider themselves as 
distinct from, or superior to, their manual counterparts are guilty of ‘false 
consciousness’ and will eventually take their rightful place amongst the proletariat 
for the universal struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed. 
 Weber’s theories place more emphasis on the complexity of class structure.46  
Indeed, he acknowledged the basic division between property owners and the 
propertyless worker who sells his labour, but proposes that there is considerable 
differentiation within these categories dependent on the extent of property 
ownership/ownership of the means of production or the ‘market position’ of an 
individual, essentially the value received for the sale of labour through skill or 
aptitude.  Weber’s image of class is far less binary than Marx’s, stressing the opaque 
and variable nature of social relationships and class consciousness.  Class 
collectivism and conflict are not inevitable, instead status, prestige and ‘life chances’ 
play an important part in forming common identities and kinship and these were 
accentuated by an individual’s place in the labour market, dependent on skill or 
experience and the type of property they owned.  According to the Weberian 
tradition then, social class is a far more fragmented and nuanced concept than 
Marxists believe. 
 Most modern theories on ‘white-collar’ aspirations and ideology borrow from 
either the Marxist or Weberian traditions.  One of the earliest re-interpretations of the 
class position of ‘white-collar’ workers was firmly rooted in the Marxist approach 
                                                     
45 Without oversimplifying a complex thesis, Marx theorised that the ‘middle-class’ or was a relic of a 
bygone era.  Under modern capitalism, managerial and supervisory grades, who in effect performed a 
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ideological differentiation between these workers.  For an overview see Bain, G.S. & Price, R. ‘Who 
is a white-collar employee?’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, Issue 3, November 
1972, pp. 325-339.  Also see Giddens, op cit, pp. 177-197. 
46 For more detail on Weber’s theories see, for example: Roth, G. & Wittich, C. (eds.) Max Weber: 
Economy and Society (London: California University Press 1978); Hamilton, P. Max Weber: Critical 
Assessments 2 (London: Routledge 1991). 
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and emphasised their proletarianisation as a result of several contemporary factors – 
the general stagnation of wages compared with manual workers, the dilution of skills 
through the mechanisation of office work and the perceived loss of prestige and 
privilege that these caused.47  Later, Lockwood’s innovative study of the 
‘blackcoated worker’ sought to challenge the Marxist tradition by highlighting the 
contrasting working conditions, remuneration and benefits enjoyed by ‘white-collar’ 
workers and the influence these had on their outlook towards employers, manual 
workers and their place in the social order.48  These theoretical perspectives were 
later expanded upon by a series of sociologists who emphasised the reality of a 
permanent ‘intermediate’ stratum of workers with its own distinct ideological and 
organisational tendencies.49  In short, this perspective typically characterised ‘white-
collar’ workers as having a deferential and individualistic attitude towards workplace 
relationships because of a direct proximity with authority, often embracing a 
paternalistic association with management and conferring prestige upon the nature of 
their work as opposed to that of traditional manual work, to some extent regarding 
themselves as a ‘cut above’ ‘blue-collar’ workers.50  These attitudes are replicated in 
the social sphere where ‘white-collar’ workers tend to identify and associate with 
those from similar backgrounds and professions.51 
 The broader historiography regarding ‘white-collar’ workers and their 
aspirational and associational tendencies has prompted a related debate surrounding 
the nature and character of non-manual workplace organisation.  This debate was 
inspired by the upward contemporary trend of ‘white-collar’ trade union membership 
density.52  Historians, sociologists and industrial relations academics all sought to 
                                                     
47 Klingender, F.D. The Condition of Clerical Labour in Britain (London: Martin Lawrence 1935). 
48 Lockwood, D. The Blackcoated Worker: A Study in Class Consciousness (London: Unwin 1958). 
49 See, for example: Urry, J. ‘Towards a structural theory of the middle class’, Acta Sociologica, Vol. 
16, No. 3, 1973, pp. 175-187; Mercer, D.E. & Weir, D.T.H. ‘Attitudes to work and trade unionism 
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50 Hyman, R. ‘White-collar workers and theories of class’ in R. Hyman & R. Price The New Working-
Class?  White Collar Workers and Their Organisations: A Reader (London: Macmillan 1983), p. 4, 
pp. 14-15; Mercer & Weir, op cit. 
51 Allen, V.L. The Sociology of Industrial Relations (London: Longman, 1971), pp. 91-93; Mercer & 
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52 Bain and Price’s analysis of white collar union membership and density in the twentieth century 
demonstrated a significant rise in both during the 1970s, the highest increase since the membership 
boom after World War One.  They calculated that ‘white-collar’ union membership had reached 
5,000,000 by 1978, 43.1% of the national ‘white-collar’ workforce.  This was compared with figures 
of approximately 2,800,000 members in 1966, accounting for only 29.8% of the ‘white-collar’ 
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explain the phenomenon of ‘white-collar’ unionisation, often in the context of its 
character and how it compared with traditional accounts and theories of ‘blue-collar’ 
trade unionism.  The earliest studies of non-manual unionisation stress its distinctive 
nature.  Strauss characterised ‘white-collar’ workers as ‘essentially middle class in 
outlook’ and theorises that they perceive trade unionism in a very different manner 
from manual workers.53  He argues that ‘white-collar’ workers join trade unions in 
reaction to the erosion of job prestige or status and had no desire to be affiliated with 
the ideology or methods of manual unions.  Often clerical workers will organise into 
staff associations, deliberately avoiding the term ‘union’ and its perceived 
connotations.54  Similarly, Allen identifies prestige as a highly-valued element of 
‘white-collar’ work and proposes that contemporary economic conditions and 
technological encroachment can be regarded as the impetus behind increasing 
membership and activism.  Once again, ‘white-collar’ workers are said to eschew 
traditional methods of collective action and forms of unionism.55 
 Other studies have sought to challenge the categorisation of ‘white-collar’ 
unionism as broadly reactionary, defensive, conservative and middle class in its 
ideology.  Indeed, Cook and his colleagues dispute the idea that ‘white-collar’ trade 
unionists are individualistic and inherently different from ideologically collectivist 
‘blue-collar’ workers.  Instead they emphasise the similarities in the way sections of 
both sets of workers pragmatically approach collectivism ‘instrumentally’, that is to 
regard trade unionism as a means to an end.56  Similarly, Goldthorpe et al 
highlighted the instrumental nature of modern trade unionism more generally where 
many manual and non-manual workers have little ideological or political affinity 
with the traditional principles of the movement, instead regarding it as a vehicle for 
economic/material gain or protection, a phenomenon later described by Hobsbawm 
                                                                                                                                                      
workforce (Bain, G.S. & Price, R. Profiles of Union Growth: A Comparative Statistical Portrait of 
Eight Countries (Oxford, Blackwell 1980), Table 2.3).  
53 Strauss, G. ‘‘White-collar’ unions are different!’ Harvard Business Review, Vol. 32, Issue 5, 
September/October 1954, pp. 73-82. 
54 Crompton, R. ‘Approaches to the study of white-collar unionism’, Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1976, 
pp. 407-426. 
55 Allen, op cit, pp. 91-98. 
56 Cook, F.G., Clark, S.C., Roberts, K. & Semeonoff, E. ‘Are ‘white-collar’ trade unionists different?’ 
Sociology of Work and Occupations, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 1978, pp. 235-245.  On the subject of 
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as ‘economist militancy’.57  Mercer and Weir identify a mixture of collectivism and 
individualism amongst ‘white-collar’ workers, depending on the circumstances, 
resulting in a ‘limited instrumentalism’ approach to trade unionism.58 
 Blackburn and Prandy evolved the academic debate considerably by making 
an ambitious attempt to construct a model for measuring the character of ‘white-
collar’ organisations in terms of their ideology and activism, a concept described as 
‘unionateness’.59  Their method uses seven measures of ‘unionateness’ to establish 
the extent to which a ‘white-collar’ organisation can be considered to be 
quintessentially trade unionist in its outlook, exploring a possible link between union 
character and class consciousness.60  Blackburn later went further by describing the 
character of a union, as defined by ‘unionateness’, as ‘an index of class 
consciousness’.61  However, this approach has since been criticised by Bain and his 
colleagues.  Firstly, Bain et al have argued that the seven measures conceived by 
Blackburn and Prandy are extremely indeterminate and subjective.62  For example, 
TUC affiliation need not necessarily be an indication of any ideological commitment 
to the principles of trade unionism.  Equally, how can one union be said to be more 
prepared to be militant than another when circumstances from workplace to 
workplace and industry to industry can differ wildly?  Secondly, the character of a 
‘white-collar’ union is compared against a somewhat traditional and idyllic 
stereotype of manual trade unionism, a concept which is far too simplistic and 
homogeneous.  Both these criticisms are proceeded by a general rejection of the 
supposition that the level of ‘unionateness’ can reflect the level of class 
consciousness in a union. 
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 So, the traditional perception of ‘white-collar’ workers as individualistic, 
preoccupied with the prestige of their job and their status in society and reluctant to 
take collective action has given way to a more nuanced analysis of the market 
position of non-manual workers and the character of their organisations.  Whereas 
the academic debate once focused on the defining differences between manual and 
non-manual workers and their respective brands of unionism, the contemporary trend 
has been to examine the manner in which they differ and why this is the case, or to 
emphasise areas of similarity in the behaviour and outlook of both sets of worker.  
What most academics do agree on is that the growth of ‘white-collar’ union 
membership and density is the result of several interrelated pressures – the deskilling 
of work, limitation of promotion opportunities, increased job insecurity, general 
stagnation of wages compared with manual workers and the perceived loss of 
prestige and privilege that these have caused.63  Some of these factors contributed to 
the growth in membership and activism in the 6/567 Branch of ACTSS in its 
formative years at the port of Liverpool.  However, Chapter Six of this study also 
explores other workplace-specific influences which inspired an extremely pro-active 
approach by the clerical staff and their representatives post-1970, such as the 
location and nature of recruitment, the influence of other work groups within the 
same work environment and the contemporary trend towards unionisation and 
militancy. 
  The theoretical perspectives outlined above, together provide a framework 
within which to examine the complexities of labour relations at the port of Liverpool 
between 1967 and 1989, featured later.  By highlighting the current academic 
discourse and typical assumptions relating to ‘rank-and-filism’, the advent of ‘shop 
stewardism’ and ‘white-collar’ trade unionism, it will be possible to evaluate where 
the experience of the dock and clerical workers at the port fits, or indeed does not fit, 
into current historiography.  Attention will now turn to examining Liverpool’s 
political, social and cultural development and how this may have impacted on port 
workers’ consciousness and attitudes towards labour relations.
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Chapter 3 
Work Culture and Labour Relations in the British Dock Industry 
 
 This chapter provides an overview of the development of dockland work 
culture and labour relations from the turn of the twentieth century up to the Devlin 
reforms in 1967 and subsequent decasualisation of the industry.1  It documents the 
inherently volatile nature of employment and its effect on worker-
management/worker-union relations through an examination of the existing 
historiography and interpretation of oral evidence collected by the author and from 
other sources, as detailed in the introduction to this thesis.  The purpose of this 
approach is to present the over-arching context within which the disputes at the port 
of Liverpool, featured later, took place. 
Since the 1889 dock strike and Charles Booth’s seminal study of the plight of 
London’s urban working-class, the dock industry and its workers have been a staple 
of sociological, historical and industrial analysis.2  Typically described or 
categorised as ‘tough, inconsistent workers… inclined to strike’, an ‘isolated and 
homogeneous mass’;3 ‘irregular… less stable and less desirable men’, 
‘unemployables’;4 workers with a ‘strong proletarian social consciousness’ or ‘the 
most independent-minded, lively and bloody-minded man you can get’, just why 
have dockers historically been considered amongst the most militant and combative 
sections of British workers in the twentieth century?5  What are the various factors at 
work which are characterised by the traditional propensity for industrial militancy 
and solidarity amongst dockers? 
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33 
 
The historiography regarding labour relations in the British dock industry is 
relatively rich, partly because of its strike-prone nature.  Contemporary studies of the 
1889 and 1911 dock strikes pioneered research into work conditions and labour 
relations in the industry.6  This tendency re-emerged in the post-war era as 
academics focused more closely on the relationship between localised occupational 
communities and workplace solidarity/militancy.7  Several seminal historical 
accounts of British trade unionism have also considered the strike prone nature of the 
dock industry in the broader national context.8 
However, there were a number of deficiencies or omissions in early studies 
which were not satisfactorily addressed until the 1970s.  Kerr and Siegel and other 
early sociological analyses centred on the idea of the overlap of work and 
community, both geographically and socially, as a determinant in industrial 
solidarity.  This approach provided a new, valuable tool in analysing the nature of 
strikes and organisation in the dock industry and others such as shipbuilding and 
mining.  Nevertheless, such an approach only provided a partial theoretical 
framework within which to evaluate the reasons behind strike occurrence and 
fractious industrial relations, failing to lend necessary weight to the system of casual 
employment in the industry as a contributory factor.  This sociological perspective 
generally characterised dockers as a homogeneous mass of ‘traditional proletarians’ 
whose community was isolated from mainstream society and culture, an assumption 
that proves problematic when the historical complexities of skill and sectional 
divisions in the industry are properly considered.9  Moreover, the perpetuation of 
labour militancy in the late sixties and beyond superseded the influence of the by 
then defunct and geographically disbanded traditional dockland community 
construct, suggesting that additional factors were at work in informing the attitudes, 
                                                     
6 Smith, H.L. & Nash, V. The Story of the Dockers’ Strike (London: Fisher Unwin 1889); Booth, Life 
and Labour; Tillett, B. History of the London Transport Workers’ Strike 1911 (London: National 
Transport Workers Federation 1911); Sexton, J. (Sir), Agitator – The Life of the Dockers’ M.P. 
(London: Faber & Faber 1936).  
7 Kerr & Siegel, ‘The inter-industry propensity to strike’; Lockwood, D. The Blackcoated Worker: A 
Study in Class Consciousness (London: Allen & Unwin 1958); Goldthorpe, J.E. et al, The Affluent 
Worker (3 Vols.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1968-69). 
8 Webb, S. & Webb, B. The History of Trade Unionism 1666-1920 (London: Longman 1920); Clegg, 
H.A., Fox, A. & Thompson, A.F. A History of British Trade Unionism since 1889, Volume 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon 1964); Taylor, R. The Trade Union Question in British Politics (Oxford: Blackwell 1994). 
9 For more detail on the concept of occupational community and its potential effect on workplace 
militancy see: Lockwood, ‘Sources of variation’; Kerr & Siegel, ‘The inter-industry propensity to 
strike’; Turnbull, P. ‘Dock strikes and the demise of the dockers’ occupational culture’, The 
Sociological Review, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 1992, pp. 294-318. 
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identity and solidarity of dockers.10  Similarly, some post-war historical accounts of 
British industrial relations lend too much weight to institutional forces in the 
dynamics of labour relations in the dock industry, in some cases completely 
disregarding the vital role played by unofficial, and later shop steward, 
organisation.11 
An understanding of the historical intricacies of the casual system of 
employment and workplace organisation on the docks is vital to a proper analysis of 
the complexities of labour relations in the post-war period.  It was not until the 1970s 
that academics began to fuse the sociological perspective of Kerr and Siegel et al 
with more typical structural analyses of the casual system, workplace relations and 
occupational culture.  The concept of the traditional occupational dockland 
community was not disregarded, rather considered in conjunction with the vagaries 
of the dock employment system and the attitudes it fostered.  For example, 
Whiteside and Phillips’ aptly-named Casual Labour, emphasises the importance of 
the influence of the dock labour system in forming dockers’ occupational culture and 
workplace bonds which impacted immeasurably on modern industrial relations at the 
docks.12  This approach was shared by journalist David F. Wilson’s thorough 
examination of the relationship between escalating industrial strife and the changing 
nature of dock-work in the late sixties/early seventies.13  Later studies such as 
Turnbull’s furthered understandings of the myriad factors and influences which 
informed dockers’ attitudes and identity and hence their propensity for labour 
militancy.14  
In addition to the strong historiography regarding the casual system and its 
impact on industrial relations, several notable monographs and journal articles have 
considered the complex composition of labour relations on the docks by focusing on 
                                                     
10 Allen, P.T. ‘The class imagery of ‘traditional proletarians’’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
35, No. 1, 1984, pp. 93-111; Hill, S. The Dockers – Class and Tradition in London (London: 
Heinemann, 1976), pp. 163-177; Turnbull, ‘Dock Strikes’, pp. 295-296. 
11 See Chapter 2 for an evaluation of the trends in historical inquiry in Britain 1950s -1970s. 
12 Phillips, G. & Whiteside, N. Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port Transport 
Industry 1880-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon 1985). 
13 Wilson, D.F. Dockers: The Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana/Collins 1972). 
14 For example, see: Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. & Kelly, J. Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in 
Britain’s Ports (Aldershot: Avebury 1992); Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘A sea of discontent: the tides 
of organised and “unorganised” conflict on the docks’, Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 297-
298 (pp. 291-309); Turnbull, P. & Wass, V. ‘The greatest game no more – Redundant dockers and the 
demise of ‘dock work’’, Work, Employment & Society, Vol. 8, 1994, pp. 487-506; Turnbull, ‘Dock 
Strikes’.   
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a particular period, dispute, attempt at state regulation or technological advance.  For 
example, Mellish evaluates the impact of the Devlin Report and decasualisation on 
labour relations and productivity in the face of modernisation and containerisation.15  
Hill’s study focuses specifically on work culture and the dockers’ way of life in 
London.16  McIlroy considers ‘rank and filism’ and political allegiances amongst 
dockers in the context of the strike wave of 1945.17  Mangan examines the 
relationship between the casual system and the nature of conflict in the dock 
industry, particularly during the period 1950-66.18  Hunter provides an overview of 
the complex dynamics of labour organisation in the industry, considering the impact 
of inter and intra-union conflict on labour relations.19  Lindop’s two-part paper on 
the dockers’ entanglement with the Industrial Relations Act illustrates the primacy of 
local shop steward-led labour organisation in the dock industry as well as chronicling 
an important flashpoint in British labour history, adopting a ‘from below’ 
approach.20 
In order to examine and evaluate the ‘militant dockers’ paradigm therefore it 
is logical that an historical analysis of work culture and labour relations in the dock 
industry should be undertaken.  The process will be threefold:  first, a synopsis of the 
typical structure and stresses of dock employment as symptomatic of the 
traditionally casual nature of engagement in the industry.  Secondly, an examination 
of the dockers’ occupational culture and workplace relationships.  Finally, an 
overview of the major flashpoints and watersheds in the history of dock unionism 
and the complexities of labour organisation pre-1967.  When taken into account with 
the theoretical framework already outlined and the proceeding contextual chapters 
this method intends to provide a comprehensive contextual and theoretical basis with 
which to better understand the various processes and pressures at work in the 
disputes featured in the case studies. 
                                                     
15 Mellish, M. The Docks After Devlin (London: Heinemann 1972).  
16 Hill, Class and Tradition. 
17 McIlroy, J. ‘The first great battle in the march to socialism: Dockers, Stalinists and Trotskyists in 
1945’, Revolutionary History, Vol. 6, 2/3, p. 109 (pp. 105-159). 
18 Mangan, ‘Casual employment’. 
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20 Lindop, F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 1: Shop stewards and 
containerisation’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 5, Spring 1998, pp. 33-72; Lindop, F. 
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Working at the docks 
The dock industry is historically prone to industrial strife and this is common 
throughout most of the world.21  Fundamentally, labour relations have proven 
particularly complex and conflictual due to the unique and unpredictable 
composition of the port transport industry.  Irregular trade cycles and shipping 
timetables dictated by season, weather and economic conditions demand a large 
surplus pool of labour to cover manning requirements at maximum capacity which 
then contracts sharply in slack periods.  Employment opportunities were 
consequently at best uneven and at worst non-existent.  Casual employment was 
universal at British docks even after initial regulation of the industry in 1947, with 
recruitment on a half-daily ‘turn’ basis offering little job security.  This led 
reciprocally to casual attitudes by both workforce and management towards their 
respective workplace responsibilities.22  
Traditionally dockers throughout the country gathered at their local docks 
twice daily for the ‘call’ where any number of shipping, stevedore and dock 
companies would each occupy a stand or ‘pen’.  Most dockers assembled in their 
chosen ‘gangs’ which would then be selected by company foremen to work the 
unloading of ships.  Indeed, the gang format of recruitment was standard.  All 
dockers had their chosen work-groups, usually comprising family members and/or 
close friends/work colleagues, which were practically inseparable.23  At the call, 
company foremen would either shout the name of the gang leader or, more 
commonly, tap him on the shoulder to indicate that he and his men were selected for 
work.  This process was obviously open to abuse and bias through favouritism, 
nepotism and religious allegiance – often referred to as the ‘blue-eyed’ system by 
dockers: 
                                                     
21 See, for example: Davis, C. Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers, 1946–61 
(Illinois: University of Illinois 2003); Deery, S. ‘Industrial relations on the Australian waterfront: a 
policy of laissez-faire’, Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1977, pp. 93-97; Davies, S. et 
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University Press, 1964). 
22 Mellish, The Docks After Devlin, p. 1. 
23 Typically a gang consisted of eighteen Registered Dock Workers (RDWs) comprising eight 
holdsmen, four deckhands and six dockers on the quay.  In certain circumstances, such as work on a 
particularly dangerous or awkward cargo, the number could be increased if claimed for by the gang 
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37 
 
 
In the pen I was in there was a lot of favouritism on the call stand where you 
have lads who just worked for one particular firm... it was the blue-eyed 
system where they used to give you the tap on the shoulder – that was 
prevalent in our area.  We were known as the ‘strags’, we used to get what 
was left after everyone else had been hired.24    
 
Those who were not selected for employment went without a wage for that particular 
day and, dependent on port traffic, might struggle to earn for considerably longer.  
These were inherent traits of the industry and generations of dockers across the 
world faced the same relentless challenges ‘most notably poverty, unemployment, 
underemployment, unequal job opportunities, low average earnings, favouritism, 
bribery… and demoralisation’.25  Indeed, underemployment was symptomatic of the 
casual and subjective selection systems and was the cause of much insecurity and 
hardship amongst many dockers, their dependents and by extension the dockland 
community as a whole.26 
Dock-work is generally considered manual and unskilled employment, 
though this assumption is fraught with inaccuracies.  In fact, ‘the dockside trades… 
were riddled with numerous peculiars, which emerged from the singularity of a task 
and from familiarity with one company or work-place’.27  The casual system in 
Britain encouraged dockers to either develop a specialist skill or attach themselves to 
a particular employer in their area to improve their chances of more regular 
employment.28  There were skill/experience divisions within each gang, between 
competing gangs and between stevedores, holdsmen, porters etc.29  It is argued 
convincingly elsewhere that the pre-decasualised employment market was split into a 
three-tier hierarchy: the experienced and special-skilled ‘aristocracy’, the 
intermediate ‘ordinary docker’ and the impoverished ‘residuum’.30  Experience is the 
key word here - those with the aptitude and know-how had regularity of work and 
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income even in the most trying of times.  It was the relatively unskilled ‘residuum’ 
that was synonymous with chronic underemployment and poverty, although the 
‘intermediates’ were by no means immune when port traffic was slack.31  However, 
even the ‘irregulars’ had to have a degree of experience in the work processes 
involved, as well as some competence in the intricacies of unloading and porterage 
of cargoes suitably, while the ‘aristocracy’ were equipped to carry out their tasks 
with the utmost expediency and efficiency.  Speed of turnaround and maximisation 
of available hold space was crucial for ship-owners in the break-bulk era hence the 
most experienced men were highly sought after.  Indeed, ‘a good stevedore was 
worth his weight in gold’.32  Moreover, an ‘aristocrat’ could choose to opt out of 
work on a particular day if the job did not fall under his specialism and thus his 
specialised rate of pay, an indication of craft distinction.33  With these factors in 
mind, it is difficult to describe dock-work as unskilled.  
There was a distinct apprenticeship system in place on the docks which also 
lent to the primacy of specialisation and skill.  New recruits were often straight from 
school without any real work experience and so were restricted to simple jobs until 
they had gained some aptitude for general operations.34  After a year on the docks, 
the new docker might then have been afforded the opportunity to go ‘back to school’ 
in order to learn a specialism and advance his employment opportunities and earning 
potential, although this could also be prone to favouritism.35  It was this 
specialisation which conferred prestige, as well as precedence in the hiring queue.36  
The apprenticeship system of the semi-casualised era is colourfully described here: 
 
When we first started on the docks, you went in as a quay hand.  You’re 
working on the quay, you’re not allowed to work below [in the ships hold]…  
It’s like an apprenticeship, you serve your time on the quay and then your 
                                                     
31 Hill (p. 18) calculates that around fifteen percent could be categorised as irregularly engaged, while 
Phillips & Whiteside (p. 30) contend that the lowest stratum of dock labour may have accounted for 
around forty percent of the workforce (Hill, Dockers; Phillips & Whiteside, Casual Labour).  The 
Devlin Report, which is examined in detail in the following chapter, estimated that up to fifty percent 
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32 Author’s interview with L.D., December 2009.  
33 Turnbull & Sapsford, ‘A sea of discontent’, p. 297; Phillips & Whiteside, Casual Labour, p. 33.  
34 Although boys were often recruited straight from school, they could not become RDWs until their 
eighteenth birthdays as this was the minimum age for registration. 
35 Author’s interview with M.T., December 2009. 
36 Phillips & Whiteside, Casual Labour, p. 32. 
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aspirations are always to go down below, because that’s where everything 
happened.  It was amazing, sometimes there were men working down below 
who were seventy or seventy-five years old because there was no retirement 
on the docks then…  You were on the quay, but out of interest when you sent 
a sling aboard you’d wanna go on the ship to have a look down the hatch and 
the old fellas would say ‘Go on f**k off, what do you think you’re looking 
at?’ because they didn’t like you watching what they were doing because that 
was something they were good at, something they could do.  You’d have 
your chance, but it wasn’t your turn while they were still doing it.37 
 
The nature of dock-work prior to containerisation placed the responsibility 
for the organisation and management of specific tasks wholly in the hands of 
stevedores and dockers.  Stowing and handling of break-bulk cargoes (essentially 
loose or boxed/sacked goods painstakingly hand-loaded into a sling and winched 
into the ship’s hold) often required considerable skill to execute proficiently and 
maximise available space.  Once a gang was recruited by a foreman for a particular 
job, it was largely left to the experience and knowledge of the dockers, under 
direction from the gang leader, to decide how best to carry out the work.  This direct 
or hands-on control of the labour process fostered a strong feeling of occupational 
identity amongst the men.  Moreover, ‘gangs reinforced bonds of kinship on the 
docks as they often comprised family members who passed on dockers’ skills from 
one generation to the next’.38  The following scenario was typical – ‘Like many lads, 
I followed my father onto the docks as a registered dockworker...  It was in our 
family, my brothers were on the docks, both my uncles were on the docks so it was 
more like it wasn’t a job to us, basically it was a way of life’.39 
The gang format doubtlessly cultivated a sense of camaraderie, accentuated 
by the hazardous nature of dock-work itself and hence an ‘emotional involvement’ 
with work tasks and colleagues.40  Prior to state-sponsored regulation of the industry, 
and even thereafter, working conditions at the docks were medieval.  The casual 
system bred a lack of managerial responsibility and hence afforded little provision 
for health and safety or welfare facilities.  Cargo handling was often dirty and 
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dangerous, with high rates of industrial accidents, disease and fatalities.41  There was 
little prospect of help or arbitration for dockers working on hazardous cargoes or in 
insanitary conditions: 
 
Humping beef in a fridge ship 23 degrees freezing one day, sweating in a 
hold full of sugar – sweat and sugar acting like sandpaper on your back – a 
back covered in blood – coughing and spitting with cement and paper.  
Working your fingers to the bone on ingots of lead and copper – discharging 
wet hides and smelling to high heaven – going home smothered with lamp 
black, red ochre and oil – subject to asthma, bronchitis, rheumatism, lumbago 
– with a constant stream of casualties to the hospitals.42 
 
While the system of casual underemployment caused considerable hardship 
and irregular earnings, the harsh realities of the industry traditionally and inversely 
fostered a strong identity and collective solidarity amongst dockers in their specific 
areas and progressively on a port-wide scale.  In the British national psyche dockers 
are synonymous with industrial militancy, especially in the post-war era.  Workplace 
solidarity was regarded as the only means to secure concessions from employers 
under the inequities of the casual and semi-casual systems.43  This was despite a 
general lack of union accountability or effectiveness on the docks prior to the 
introduction of the shop steward system to the industry from 1967 onwards.  
Furthermore, the close relationship between community life and work life 
historically re-enforced the mantra of ‘one out, all out’.44   In the days when dockers 
still lived in communities around the port, ostracism and victimisation was 
potentially the penalty for breaking ranks, certainly ‘you wouldn’t scab out the fella 
who lives next door to you’.45 
 
 
                                                     
41 Between 1947 and 1974 over 500 registered dockers were killed at work, while between 1955 and 
1967 around one per cent of the registered national dock workforce was absent through workplace 
injury on any given day – Turnbull, ‘Dock strikes’, p. 315, 298. 
42 National Dock Strike Committee (NDSC), To You, The Public, We Present Our Case (Publicity 
Department NDSC, November 1945) originally cited in McIlroy, ‘The first great battle’, p. 109. 
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Labour relations and trade unionism before 1967 
In order to analyse the complex relationship between the dockers and their 
unions and the sometimes fractious nature of labour relations in the industry, it is 
important to first chart a chronology of the development of labour organisation on 
the docks. Traditionally union/labour representation had been concerned with 
moderating the effects of casual labour rather than its complete abolition – the nature 
of the industry seemed to make some degree of casualism inevitable.46  In Britain, 
relative geographical isolation and the primacy of trade made the dock industry of 
central importance to the national economy.  A dock strike could cripple the national 
economy and the 1889 strike is often heralded as a watershed in unskilled unionism, 
securing the ‘dockers’ tanner’ basic rate and giving birth to the National Transport 
Workers’ Federation (NTWF), a forerunner of the Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU).47  Nevertheless, the concessions gained by Britain’s dockers during 
the ‘great’ dock strike were quickly eroded as a combination of unfavourable 
economic conditions and an employer offensive re-established the previous status 
quo on the docks.48  It would be another twenty-one years before Britain’s dockers 
undertook any substantial industrial action against the system of employment in the 
industry in the form of the 1911 transport strike, under the leadership of Ben Tillett 
and the NTWF.49 
Between 1911 and the beginning of the First World War, in the wake of the 
success of the transport strike, Britain’s dockers earned some relatively impressive 
concessions.  Union recognition was now a given; the first registration scheme was 
introduced in Liverpool in 1912 with preference for work being given to union 
members (albeit voluntary on the part of both dockers and employers), while a 
voluntary clearing house system was implemented in several ports throughout the 
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country.50  During World War One, the Government intervened in the management 
of the ports to obvious ends.  Those dockers who were not drafted were employed 
with considerably more regularity and the major ports were subjected to compulsory 
registration schemes allied with almost complete state management.  The 
combination of registration, state control, war patriotism and ‘the legal enforcement 
of arbitration in industrial disputes’, meant that the industrial strife synonymous with 
the immediate pre-war years dissolved.51 
The cessation of hostilities in 1918 brought the wartime system of de facto 
permanence to an end.  Drafted dockers were returning home and those who had 
been relocated to other employment by government manpower management schemes 
were also flooding back into the industry.  Employers, freed from the shackles of 
state control, welcomed the re-instatement of a large surplus labour pool to 
ameliorate wage demands and weaken the position of unions.52  Although there were 
registration schemes still in place at major ports, these remained voluntary with no 
provision for maintenance pay, whilst wage rates were being eroded by the onset of 
world depression.  Changes in unemployment insurance legislation softened the 
traditional hardship associated with the erratic nature of the industry, as those 
dockers working three days or less per week could now also claim unemployment 
relief from the state.53  All these factors served to perpetuate the casual system on 
Britain’s docks throughout the interwar era and beyond.54  Nevertheless, the dockers’ 
lot had considerably improved from the pre-war state of affairs.  The Shaw Inquiry 
was set up by the Government in 1920 to evaluate union claims for a nationalised 
wage rate and maintenance pay in the absence of work.55  It found in favour of the 
proposals and went further by condemning the contemporary system of casualism 
and recommending proliferation of registration schemes and the establishment of a 
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry (NJC) to deal with wage 
bargaining in the future.  However, the global economic downturn in the twenties 
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and early thirties prevented any meaningful progress being made on these 
recommendations.  It was not until after World War Two that Britain’s dockers 
began to see any real improvement in work regularity and conditions.  In an 
important aside, employers established the National Association of Port Employers 
(NAPE) in the wake of the Shaw Inquiry to act as a lobby in their interests.56  NAPE 
and local employers’ associations were to play a central role in the industrial 
disputes of the post-war era. 
It is important at this point to disentangle the different duties performed by 
the myriad companies which are often subsumed under the generic heading of ‘port 
employer’.  Port employer describes a variety of companies involved in the loading 
or unloading of ships and transit of cargoes such as shipping lines, master stevedore 
and dock companies and wharfingers/warehousemen (who provided storage and 
anchorage for goods and ships).57  Prior to containerisation, the local Port 
Authority’s role in the employment market was minimal – it provided only the 
facilities and upkeep thereof, levying shipping and cargo-handling companies for 
their usage.  Normally, shipping companies would either recruit men directly at the 
call or use master stevedore companies to recruit for them, which were often 
subsidiaries of the shipping lines themselves.  These dockers and stevedores were 
employed on the unloading/stowing of cargo on ships.  Wharfingers and dock 
companies were not concerned with the unloading of ships, instead their 
responsibilities lay in the transportation of goods from quay to warehouse to be 
stored or sorted, repacked and labelled correctly before being transferred to the 
merchant or client for sale of the product/commodity.58  Men employed for dock 
companies and wharfingers were also generally subject to the turn call although a 
section of the workforce was staff often employed in clerical or foremen roles.  
There could be in excess of a hundred small individual employers at a major British 
port and often such companies exclusively worked ships/discharged cargoes in a 
specific area or berth and nowhere else.  This was particularly true prior to 1947 and 
even thereafter up to 1967, when the number of registered employers reduced 
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dramatically through mergers and withdrawals as part of the Devlin 
recommendations.59  The extreme fragmentation of work processes and the labour 
market served to perpetuate attitudes engendered by the casual system beyond 
complete decasualisation in 1967. 
Since World War Two, the dock industry has become synonymous with 
substantial peacetime state intervention and regulation.  Again, during the war, the 
Government intervened in the management of the ports to obvious ends.  State 
management coupled with measures introduced for compulsory registration for all 
dockers and maintenance payments for periods without work re-introduced 
decasualisation to the industry but at a cost of increased regulation, intensification of 
labour and more rigorous discipline.60  At the close of the war, a national strike wave 
broke out and the immediate post-war period witnessed an escalation of industrial 
action across the country despite the Labour government promising a complete 
review and overhaul of the system of dock employment.  The ‘Wages Strike’, which 
raged on and off for the much of 1945, prompted the Government to set up an 
inquiry headed by Sir John Foster K.C.61  The findings of the Foster inquiry coloured 
the structure of the Dockworkers’ (Regulation of Employment) legislation in July 
1947 which created the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS).  Under the new 
scheme, dockers and employers would be registered and work could only be carried 
out by registered men.  The National Dock Labour Board (NDLB) was established to 
oversee administration and adherence to the Scheme.  This was a tri-partite body 
including employer, union and independent representation.  Twenty-two local boards 
were also established across the eighty-four ports covered to manage registration, 
work allocation and disciplinary matters.62  Although dockers were still casual 
workers hired under the same draconian ‘turn’ system, the size of the registered 
labour force was now regulated by the local board, a provision which went some 
                                                     
59 When the NDLS was introduced in 1947 there were over 2000 different port employers across the 
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Dock Strike, pp. 42-43).  
60 Phillips, J. ‘Decasualization and disruption: Industrial relations on the docks 1945-1979’, in C.J. 
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way to ameliorate the perennial challenge of underemployment.63  The Scheme also 
guaranteed dockers ‘attendance pay’ (maintenance pay) for those who could not be 
employed in any engagement period, paid through the local board which levied 
employers.64 
After a series of government inquiries into labour conditions and relations in 
the industry, de-casualisation was viewed by policy-makers as the best route to more 
harmonious industrial relations.65  The new system of employment, although 
characterised by partial de-casualisation, had apparently elevated the position of the 
dock-worker from casual and underemployed to comparatively well-paid and secure.  
However, implementation of the Scheme was greeted by a rash of strikes.  The 
period 1947-1955 saw a spate of unofficial strike action during which the docks 
became easily the most strike-prone industry in the country:  
 
 
Table I: Strikes on British docks 1930-1955 
 
Industry Average number of man days lost 
annually in disputes per 1000 workers 
 
     1930-38 1947-55 
Docks        285     3134 
Shipbuilding & Repair     325      890 
Coalmining      1034      778 
Engineering & Automotive      80      162 
Construction        60       69 
Textiles      1311       22 
 
Source: Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon Lord 
Devlin into certain matters concerning the Port Transport Industry, Cmnd 
2734, August 1965. 
 
                                                     
63 Turnbull & Sapsford, ‘A sea of discontent’, p. 297. 
64 Phillips, ‘Decasualization and disruption’, pp. 166-168. 
65 The Shaw Report, op. cit.; The Maclean Committee, Report of a Committee of Inquiry on Port 
Labour (Ministry of Labour 1931); The Ammon Commission, Report of a Commission of Inquiry into 
the London Dock Dispute (Ministry of Labour and National Service, March 1945).  
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Here is a further example of the complexities of work culture and labour relations in 
the industry.  Resistance to registration under the Scheme came from two sources 
which policy makers and union officials failed to fathom.  Firstly, the aristocracy of 
dock labour, that is the highly skilled and steadily employed minority, saw the 
registration programme as a threat to their status and specialised privileges.  The 
dissolution of skill distinctions and registration as a general docker was an 
unacceptable compromise of their privileged position.66  It effectively levelled the 
playing field, doing most for the ‘residuum’ and least for the artisans of the trade.  It 
was therefore opposed most vigorously by the latter, also logically the most 
influential section of workers.   
What the aristocratic minority also had in common with a much larger 
proportion of dockers was an affinity for the flexibility of casualism.  The industry 
had operated under a casual system for so long that dockers were used to being 
selective in busy periods or to suit their specialism.  Indeed, ‘direction of labour and 
centralisation of bargaining came up against their attachment to aspects of casualism, 
the ability to pick and choose jobs, to work certain days and not others and to share 
work’.67  The flexibility of casualism, and rhythm of life that it produced, had 
apparently become entrenched in dockers’ work culture.  Moreover, opposition to 
the Scheme was characterised by a much more fundamental rejection of its essence - 
many rank-and-file dockers resented registration because there was a traditional 
objection to being ‘numbered and registered like cattle’.68  These are examples of the 
strong culture of independence associated with dock-work, where any attempt to 
impose discipline or re-organise the system of employment from outside was met 
with defensive resistance from dockers as a challenge to their perceived/actual 
control of portions of the labour process.  It is also important to note that sectional 
interests, attitudes and rivalries along skill, and sometimes religious, divides still 
played an influential role in dockers’ culture at this time.69  Experienced or skilled 
dockers with greater regularity of work traditionally formed small, sectional co-
operatives strictly concerned with pay and conditions for their skill distinction in 
their particular area.  This makes simplistic generalisations about a homogenous 
                                                     
66 Phillips & Whiteside, Casual Labour, pp. 60-61.  
67 McIlroy ‘The first great battle’, p. 108. 
68 Sexton, Agitator, p. 226. 
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rank-and-file problematic and contributed to the convulsion of strike action after the 
Scheme’s implementation.70 
Full employment in the post-war era presented Britain’s dockers with the 
opportunity to turn the new semi-casual system to their advantage.71  The traditional 
piecework system of payment, essentially a ‘by the job’ or tonnage rate plus bonuses 
and allowances (for unexpected stoppages, quick turnaround, high value 
commodities etc.), enabled gangs to manipulate manning and timescale requirements 
to earn extra money on top of the standard hourly rate, depending on the size and 
value of the cargo.72  Other unofficial ‘perks’ of the job became more common as the 
absence of the unbridled ‘surplus pool’ of labour essentially tipped the balance of 
power in favour of the docker.  For example, the dockers’ control of a portion of the 
labour process, that is autonomy in the actual planning and execution of work tasks, 
enabled gangs to participate in the ‘welt’.  The ‘welt’ involved one or more of the 
gang either leaving work early or taking a break whilst the rest cover for him/them.  
This would usually be done on a turn-by-turn basis amongst the gang, obviously 
with no loss of earnings.  Similarly, manning requirements and piece rates for a 
particular job would often be exaggerated in order to cater for unofficial bonuses for 
the gang.  The ‘welt’, playing the piecework game and occasional selective pilferage 
were seen by dockers as tools to improve their lot and demonstrate independence in 
the workplace and control over their portion of the labour process.73  Indeed, the 
historic and timeless practice of pilfering persisted until the mechanics of 
containerisation made it considerably more difficult.  Of course, ‘you never starved 
on the docks’.74  By and large, employers knew of the various exploitative schemes 
employed by dockers but generally turned a blind eye as long as work was on 
schedule and cost.75 
Increasingly post-1947, the traditional piece-rate bargaining culture was 
accentuated by full employment and the protection of the NDLS.  The nature of the 
industry meant ship-side negotiations between management and workers were the 
                                                     
70 See the debate surrounding ‘rank and filism’ in Chapter 2, particularly the argument forwarded by 
Zeitlin and the institutionalists and the quotations attributed to Kerr and Siegel, Lockwood et al at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
71 Lindop, F. ‘The dockers, pt 1’, p. 37. 
72 Turnbull, ‘Dock strikes’, pp. 300-301.  
73 Ibid, pp. 300-301. 
74 Author’s interview with L.D., December 2009. 
75 Author’s interview with T.T., July 2009; Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, p. 81. 
48 
 
most expedient method of settlement in any dispute.  Time was of the essence for 
shipping companies and they did not have scope in their tight turnaround schedule 
for the exhaustive process of official union intervention and negotiation.  Employer 
willingness to negotiate in this manner meant that ad hoc stoppages became the 
norm as a means of industrial bargaining across the industry because of inadequate 
alternatives.  The spike of industrial action between 1947 and 1955 could in part be 
attributed to these unofficial bargaining stoppages, some over minor wage or 
manning issues quickly settled, yet recorded as strike incidence.76  Again, the mantra 
of ‘one out, all out’ meant that a dispute involving one gang over a particular 
grievance had the potential to escalate into a ship-wide, company-wide or even port-
wide unofficial stoppage.77  This situation persisted even after complete 
decasualisation in 1967 and the introduction of an official shop stewards’ movement 
to the industry, precisely because quayside negotiation was an inherent and historic 
part of worker-employer relations on the docks.78 
So, although the legislation of 1947 had given the British docker a measure 
of security and regularity of income, there were a number of issues which remained 
unaddressed.  Firstly, by retaining the traditional arrangement of recruitment at the 
call stand the NDLS had failed to banish the memory and spirit of the casual system 
from the industry and consequently all pre-existing attitudes.79  The structure of the 
employer-worker relationship remained unchanged – dockers were still hired on a 
turn-by-turn basis encouraging the perpetuation of a mutual lack of responsibility by 
the two parties towards labour relations.80  Secondly, the nature of the port transport 
industry meant that quayside negotiations, and often short-term stoppages, were an 
inherent consequence of the casual system itself.  A lack of a credible official union 
movement, proper quayside representation or expedient bargaining procedure further 
encouraged uneven and unregulated gang-level negotiation and added to the strike 
prone nature of the industry.  Thirdly, by failing to consider dockers’ perception of 
the casual system, borne from the historical development of the industry and 
                                                     
76 For example between 1947-1955, 236 strikes out of a national total of 567 were attributed by the 
NDLB to piecework rates, job rates and manning levels.  However, although this numbers almost half 
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employment therein, partial decasualisation was doomed to failure as labour 
relations and strike occurrence worsened in the industry.81 
In addition to the complexities of the almost paradoxical nature of labour 
relations due to the traditional hegemony of the casual system of employment, there 
was a good degree of inter and intra-union conflict which further exacerbated labour 
relations in the industry.  The Trade and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), or 
‘White’ union, formed from the NTWF and several unions from other industries in 
1922, dominated official worker representation on Britain’s docks in the immediate 
post-war era although it often lacked control over localised militancy as activists 
considered it too centralised and bureaucratic.82  Full-time TGWU Docks section 
officers were appointed by local union district committees, not elected by the docks 
membership.  Indeed, dissatisfaction with the TGWU was widespread amongst 
dockers in Liverpool and the rest of the country in the post-war era due to the lack of 
union accountability in day-to-day labour relations on the docks.83  A significant 
number of men were non-union having withdrawn from the ‘White’ in protest at its 
perceived undemocratic nature and intransigence in previous local and national 
disputes:84 
 
They [TGWU dock delegates] didn’t want to do anything, we were upsetting 
the old system that they had enjoyed for years…  If they did come [to the 
docks over a dispute] the first thing they would do is they’d go into the 
bosses’ office to find out what was going on, instead of coming to the ship 
and seeing the lads and asking what their complaint was, they’d go to the 
employers.  They were comfortable… they were comfortable with what they 
were doing and they didn’t want to see that regime altered.85 
 
Although an official shop steward system was not introduced to the dock industry 
until the implementation of the Devlin reforms of 1967, Liverpool and other ports 
had long-established unofficial committees made up of cross-union and non-
                                                     
81 Wilson, Dockers, pp. 168-170. 
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affiliated representation which organised local strike action and were elected directly 
from the quayside.86  In fact, in the organisation of the 1945 strikes an unofficial 
national strike committee, the National Docks Strike Committee (NDSC), was 
formed to co-ordinate cross-port strategy in the dispute.87  These rank-and-file dock 
committees were increasingly hostile to the oligarchic unaccountability of the 
‘White’ union. 
The National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers Union (NASDU) or 
‘Blue’ union was formed (after several similar incarnations) in 1927 from other 
small, localised and sectional stevedoring unions.88  Its influence was initially 
limited to the London docks although its popularity and membership began to grow 
elsewhere in the post-war era.89  After a TGWU ban on Communist Party members 
holding union office in 1949, many rank-and-file members resigned in protest.  The 
ban forced Communist activists into the ranks of the NASDU in London or 
unofficial channels in other ports, highlighted elsewhere as a likely contributory 
factor to the upsurge in unofficial action after 1947.90  Already established and 
recognised at London’s docks, the NASDU began to accumulate members at other 
ports in the early 1950s.  During an unofficial strike at Hull which the TGWU 
opposed, the local unofficial committee advised a mass meeting to transfer their 
affiliation to the NASDU in protest.91  This resulted in over two thousand dockers 
(roughly half the workforce) defecting to the NASDU.92  A few weeks later, over 
ninety percent of Birkenhead’s two thousand-strong workforce also left the TGWU 
and joined the ‘Blue’.  By May 1955 somewhere up to 16000 dockers in Hull, 
Birkenhead, Liverpool and Manchester were members.93 
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The TGWU was incensed by the NASDU’s alleged member-poaching and 
reported it to the TUC for flouting the Bridlington Agreement long before the 
wholesale rebellions in Hull and Birkenhead.94  The Trades Union Congress’ (TUC) 
response was to demand that the NASDU stopped recruitment and returned its 
‘poached’ members to the TGWU, when it refused to heed the warning it was 
eventually expelled from Congress in 1959.95  However, the TGWU’s complaint 
about member-poaching was largely unfounded: 
 
The ‘Blue’ union arose its head here in Liverpool… with the intent of being a 
service to the members [of the ‘White’] that they weren’t getting because of 
the reactionary bastards who controlled our union… they were invited to 
come up here, they didn’t come and poach… I think we were all tempted to 
join the ‘Blue’ union at one time.  There was also a lot of non-union men… 
they were trade unionists but they weren’t official trade unionists… that was 
the reason they weren’t paying [their dues] because it was the reaction of the 
[TGWU] officials at the time…  There was tremendous amount of hostility 
towards them [the Union bureaucracy].96 
 
In the fifties, a growing number of stoppages at the major ports were due to 
inter-union conflict and recognition disputes.  The NASDU sought representation on 
local boards, periodically instructing their members to walk off the job in protest, 
action which could precipitate a complete work stoppage as other non-NASDU 
dockers struck in sympathy under the traditional ideal of ‘one out, all out’.97  The 
TGWU was acutely aware of the threat posed by the ‘Blue’ and fought tooth-and-
nail to defend its status as the dominant trade union in the industry.98  Through its 
capacity on the national and local dock labour boards, the ‘White’ consistently 
sought to marginalise and isolate the NASDU’s membership and influence in 
northern ports.99  In April 1955, the NDLB’s attempt to refuse book renewal to non-
TGWU affiliated dockers was met with a two-day national strike.100  It is also 
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suggested that TGWU officials used their joint-control of disciplinary action under 
the jurisdiction of the Board to remove local NASDU activists from the industry.101  
It was not until the late sixties that the TGWU began to broaden access and 
appeal by the introduction of an official shop steward movement, under influence of 
the recommendations of the Devlin Report.  When combined with a series of 
factional struggles and financial scandals in the Executive of the NASDU, the 
‘Blue’s’ influence and membership in the northern ports began to recede.102  
Nevertheless, the mistrust and mutual suspicion between the ‘White’ and its 
membership persisted.  The death of the ‘Blue’ did not necessarily mean victory for 
the ‘White’, as indeed it was the new local shop steward committees which came to 
dominate worker representation and bargaining in the industry.  Although notionally 
under the banner of the TGWU, local shop steward committees were often fiercely 
independent and democratic, as was the case in Liverpool.  Within a couple of years 
their introduction had transformed labour relations on the docks.  These events are 
examined more closely in the first case study chapter of this thesis as part of a 
broader analysis of the impact of the Devlin Report and decasualisation of the 
industry. 
So, there were a variety of pressures and influences at work in dockers’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards occupational identity, work culture and labour 
relations.  From an historical attachment to the flexible aspects of the casual 
employment system to the unique and conflictual nature of inter-union affairs, 
progressive labour relations in the industry proved near impossible even after partial 
decasualisation in 1947.  In retrospect, the Scheme was characterised by a failure to 
sufficiently banish the spectre of casualism from the industry.  Attitudes remained 
unchanged because of its inability to implement a workable alternative to the by-the-
boat culture of negotiation.  When combined with a perpetuation of the oligarchic 
‘top down’ tendency of trade union representation in the industry, the NDLS was 
fundamentally unsuccessful in appeasing the majority of British dockers and the 
surge in unofficial militancy thereafter is testament to their continual resistance.103  
Moreover, it failed to recognise that labour relations on the docks have also been 
coloured by the work culture and traditions of dock-work established over many 
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generations.  Indeed,  ‘with the passage of time the customs and loyalties of the 
workforce became an independent factor in the perpetuation of casualism; popular 
norms and traditions made their own contribution to the working of the labour 
market.  Through work and beyond, moreover, they helped to mould other features 
of the dockers’ life, and to form the special cultural identity of the waterside 
community’.104 
Despite the limitations of the Scheme, the industrial disputes of the fifties and 
early sixties were largely localised and typically economic or union-related by 
nature, with a few notable exceptions such as the NASDU recognition strike of 
1955.105  Another major attempt to regulate the industry in 1967 was proceeded by a 
considerably more militant, and progressively national, form of industrial strife 
inspired by the proliferation of containerisation.  Thereafter localised wage militancy 
gave way to a more fundamental defence of the industry, occupation and way of life, 
described elsewhere as ‘disputes of right’.106  These perspectives will be considered 
in more detail in due course.  To summarise, in seeking to understand the nature, 
causes and implications of post-war disputes the context in which they occurred is a 
necessary starting point.  It is vital to locate quayside conflict relative to the 
complex, sometimes contradictory, often highly contingent influences of history, 
culture and work processes outlined above which shaped the attitudes, experiences 
and expectations of the Liverpool dockers in the disputes documented below. 
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Chapter 4 
Liverpool’s Political, Economic and Social Development 
 
In order to properly examine the nature of rank-and-file attitudes and 
organisation at Liverpool docks, it is necessary to consider not simply pressures from 
within the industry but also the extent to which workers were immersed in a broader 
shared local identity and outlook.  An overview of the historical development of the 
city and local economy with particular focus on the post-war era is essential to 
highlight the origins of Liverpool’s complex social, political and industrial relations 
character.  The exceptionalism or otherwise of the post-war Liverpool experience 
will also be examined with reference to the growth of labour organisation and the 
city’s belated rise to political and industrial militancy.  The aim of such an approach 
is to consider other influences aside from the established occupational culture and 
workplace dynamic that may have impacted on Liverpool dockers’ consciousness, 
identity and solidarity.  Indeed, ‘a number of important social and economic changes 
cannot be investigated satisfactorily without analysing how these processes are 
embedded within different distinct localities.  This means, not merely that there are 
variations by localities in such processes, but that localities are themselves 
significant forms of social organisation which have been under-examined, or 
inappropriately examined, by the different social sciences’.1  Fundamentally, is there 
something peculiar about Liverpool’s historical development, which made its people 
more prone to industrial militancy in the post-war era, or is this experience common 
to other, similar, traditionally port-dominated economies? 
 
The early days – Liverpool’s rise to prominence 
Liverpool was founded in 1207 but it was not until much later, at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, that it began to flourish.  The construction of 
new dock facilities in 1715 was followed by the rapid expansion of the wet-dock 
system over the next century.2  The economic opportunities offered by the port’s 
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expansion were a predictable stimulus to immigration and the population of the town 
swelled accordingly.  From a population of around five or six thousand when the Old 
Dock opened in 1715, Liverpool had expanded to around 35,000 inhabitants by 1773 
and 54,000 by 1791.  Such seemingly rapid growth was dwarfed by the population 
explosion in the nineteenth century, as the town grew to 78,000 inhabitants in 1801 
and even further to 376,000 by 1851.3  Although much of this early increase was due 
to local migration from the surrounding north-west, the developing town also 
attracted a substantial Welsh community as well as a number of Scottish 
immigrants.4  Of course, the Irish later came to Liverpool en masse to escape the 
catastrophic failure of the potato crop.5  So, this mix of local and Celtic immigration 
along with a growing cosmopolitan seafaring element provided by the port, produced 
Liverpool’s original melting pot. 
Liverpool’s expansion was entirely dependent on its developing status as a 
port of international standing.6  The proliferation of nascent trans-Atlantic trading 
links was further accelerated by the advent of the slave trade, in which Liverpool 
played an essential part.7  Around a quarter of ships which set sail from the port in 
1800 were engaged in slave trading activities.8  Directly related to the ‘Triangular 
Trade’ was the importation of raw cotton through the port acting as an impetus to the 
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21-37; Hyde, F.E. Liverpool and the Mersey: An Economic History of a Port 1700-1970 (Newton 
Abbot: David & Charles 1971).   
3 Lawton, R. ‘From the Port of Liverpool to the conurbation of Merseyside’ in W.T.S. Gould & A.G. 
Hodgkiss (eds.) The Resources of Merseyside (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1982), p. 4. 
4 Hikins, H. ‘Origins of working-class politics: Liverpool 1756-1791’ in H. Hikins (ed.), Building the 
Union: Studies on the Growth of the Workers’ Movement, Merseyside 1756-1967 (Liverpool: 
Toulouse 1973). 
5 The Irish ‘Great Starvation’ began in 1845.  However, an Irish community was established in the 
town much earlier due to immigration in search of work and the close geographical proximity 
between Liverpool and Ireland.  
6 In 1709, Liverpool’s docks handled 14,600 tons of sea-borne cargo; by 1751 the figure stood at 
29,200 tons and by the turn of the century it had increased to 450,000 tons, a fifteen-fold increase in 
fifty years (Source: Marriner, S. The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside, London: 
Croom Helm 1982, p. 32).  
7 For more detail on the trans-Atlantic slave trade and Liverpool’s role therein see: Williams, G. 
History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque With an Account of the Liverpool Slave 
Trade, 1744-1812 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press 2004); Inikori, J.E. ‘Market structure 
and the profits of the British African trade in the late 18th century’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 
41, Issue 4, 1981, pp. 745-776; Anderson, B.L. & Richardson, D. ‘Market structure and profits of the 
British African trade in the late 18th century: a comment’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 43, Issue 
3, 1983, pp. 713-721; Hair, P.E.H. The Atlantic Slave Trade and Black Africa (London: Historical 
Association 1978).  
8 Murden, J. ‘Timeline: Liverpool 1699-2004’ in L. Grant, J. Murden, R. Meegan, P. Misselwitz, P. 
Keiller, A. Kidd, D. Haslam,  A. Brown, J. O’Connor, S. Cohen, R. Mellor, E. Ferrari, J. Roberts, A. 
Power, K. Mumford, C. Wong, M. Baker & N. Gallent, Shrinking Cities: Manchester/Liverpool 
(Working Papers – March 2004), p. 118 (pp. 118-129). 
56 
 
growth of nearby industrial centres, such as Manchester, which received the 
imported cotton to manufacture textiles for export and exchange for slaves, who 
were then traded in the Americas for commodities.  As Liverpool grew in size and 
transport links improved, so did local manufacturing towns.  Even after slaving was 
abolished in 1807, much to the chagrin of Liverpool’s elite, the international trade 
links forged by it continued to fuel the growth of the town and its hinterland through 
cotton and commodity trading, particularly sugar and tobacco.9  Banking, finance 
and insurance associated with the trade of the port also became central to the town’s 
economy in the post-slavery era.10 
A wealthy elite of merchants and ship owners sprang from the port’s 
extraordinary development.  In fact, by the close of the nineteenth century, only 
London could rival Liverpool for the number of resident millionaires in an English 
city.11  These ‘Liverpolitans’ became increasingly engaged with portraying the town 
as a leading world metropolis.12  It had already received favourable contemporary 
comparisons with cities of renowned international standing, while the dock system 
had even been acclaimed as a modern wonder of the world.13  Many of the early 
infrastructure and port improvements were local initiatives funded by the Town 
Corporation, which was made up of local merchants, ship owners and entrepreneurs.  
Belchem contends that there was a growing sense of parochial pride amongst the 
first and second-generation elite families who pioneered the idea of Liverpool as a 
‘world city’ identifying with commerce rather than manufacture, the international 
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rather than the provincial.14  After the municipal reforms of 1835 and the election of 
a Liberal Town Council, a more philanthropic attitude began to develop in the upper 
echelons of Liverpolitan society.  Alongside further expansion of the docks, a civic 
construction programme was undertaken providing architectural marvels such as St. 
George’s Hall, public museums and libraries.15 
Another aspect of this emerging liberal paternalist outlook highlighted the 
need to improve the plight of the labouring poor.  As already noted, the town 
witnessed a population explosion to accompany its exponential economic growth.  
The figure of 376,000 inhabitants in 1851 ballooned further to 704,000 by 1901.16  
Such significant immigration and population growth had an obvious impact on 
housing and sanitation.  Indeed, the opulent lives of the elite contrasted sharply with 
the reality of life for the majority.  As the middle-class and elite families retreated 
out of the centre and into the suburbs so immigrants continued to pour in, 
exacerbating the already overcrowded conditions in the inner city.  The problem was 
worsened by extensive Irish immigration prompted by the potato famine.  In inner-
city areas conditions were almost medieval.  Overcrowding, poor sanitation, disease 
and the poverty associated with casualism prompted the Town Council to take the 
unusual step of appointing a Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool.17 
As the nineteenth century progressed, Liverpool’s economy became 
increasingly port-dominated.  The modest eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
manufacturing base dwindled with the exception of the port-related processing 
industries, while skilled trades such as shipbuilding moved across the river to 
Birkenhead.18  Nearly all employment was associated with the port or the transport 
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and service industries it maintained.19  This inevitably resulted in an ever-increasing 
section of Liverpool’s burgeoning working-class being reliant on the vagaries of a 
port-orientated economy for employment with its casual, seasonal and demand-
driven nature.20  Add to these factors an endless surplus of unskilled manual labour 
and the repercussions for the majority are apparent - irregular engagement and 
extended periods of unemployment, underemployment and poverty, especially in the 
dockland areas.  The choice was simple, either chance getting work on the docks or 
become a seaman and work away from home.  For many generations of Liverpool 
working men this choice was universal, even in the immediate post-war era. 
Although life was difficult in working-class districts, a nascent sense of 
community began to emerge from the hardship.  However, because of Liverpool’s 
largely immigrant population these communities were split along ethnic, religious 
and occupational lines.21  Irish immigrants generally resided in the dockland areas 
and provided casual labour for the port although, as noted above, other nationalities 
came to be well represented in the city throughout the nineteenth century.22  Each 
ethnic group tended to live in their own areas of the inner city.23  Geographical 
separation meant local communities were close-knit and, in the case of Irish 
immigrants, this perpetuated religious schisms imported from the motherland. 
 Sectarianism thus became an integral feature of Liverpool’s political and social 
character during the nineteenth century and played a pivotal role in shaping the city’s 
modern culture and identity.  Although initially manifesting itself in the form of 
intra-community friction between Irish immigrants, sectarian identity and conflict 
were appropriated by the local establishment for political exploitation.24  
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Sectarianism gradually pervaded into other aspects of Liverpool life and religious 
allegiance became the divisive factor among the town’s working-class, especially 
from the 1830s onwards.25  Toryism became synonymous with Orangeism, although 
Liberalism was not necessarily associated with Irish Catholicism, as the Irish-
Catholic vote in the dockland ward went to the Irish Nationalist party.26  This is not, 
however, to contest that ethnicity was appropriated entirely as a political tool for the 
local establishment.  There were positive associational aspects to the parochial nature 
of culture in the city, reinforced by the geographical separation of immigrant 
communities.  Catholic and Protestant support networks were at the centre of the 
community, especially in dockland areas.27 
The synthesis of politics, religion and ethnicity only served to sharpen intra-
community tension and there was sporadic physical violence and rioting throughout 
the nineteenth century, particularly on significant days in the procession calendar 
such as St. Patrick’s Day and the Orange Lodge’s twelfth of July celebrations.28  
However, rather than sectarian tensions receding with the advent of labour 
organisation towards the end of the nineteenth century as was the case elsewhere in 
the country, religion and ethnicity became an even more divisive factor in working-
class Liverpool.  While class-based solidarity and identity had begun to take root in 
manufacturing towns such as Manchester after the stimuli of Chartism, Liverpool’s 
unique social and economic character perpetuated intra-class conflict along ethnic 
lines, spawning ‘more than one working-class’ in the city.29  The casual nature of 
employment in Liverpool’s port-orientated economy ‘created a vacuum of 
‘traditional’ labour organisations, and that vacuum was filled by sectarian 
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organisations which provided both the social services and emotionally satisfying 
solidarities found elsewhere in labour movements’.30  Even as late as 1909, 
Liverpool was experiencing serious sectarian violence, a cycle broken only in the 
post-war period.  After the chaos of the 1911 General Transport Strike, the local 
Tory establishment was forced to abandon sectarian rivalry as a political tool fearing 
any episodes of public disorder could take on a revolutionary tone.31  However, 
ethnic identity and communities were well-defined and remained active and intact 
until they were physically dismantled in the city’s post-war slum clearance schemes. 
Ethnicity permeated almost all aspects of working-class life in Liverpool and 
was a typically divisive issue in the pre-war employment market.  There were certain 
dockland occupations where religion could be the deciding factor in recruitment, 
such as the Protestant carters or the Catholic shipmen.32  Dockers in the North End 
docks were generally Irish Catholics, while those in the South End were generally 
Protestant, because these were the areas in which each community resided.33  Skill 
and religious sectionalism, when combined with the casual nature of the industry and 
the over-arching sectarian character of social and political life in the town, meant 
trade unionism and socialist ideals were slow to permeate the consciousness of 
Liverpool’s working-class.  The threat of blackleg labour from the town’s large 
surplus resulted in a protectionist and conservative attitude amongst those dockers 
and gangs who were employed semi-regularly within the casual system whether 
through merit, experience or religious allegiance.  Class struggle was not yet part of 
their identity or ‘commonsense’, to use Smith’s terminology.34  It was not until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century that working-class attitudes towards labour 
organisation started to change.  Skilled unionism, in the form of small and 
independent craft unions, was not new to Liverpool but it catered for only a tiny and 
privileged percentage of the working population.35  There were sporadic incidents of 
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labour unrest prior to 1889, though these were generally isolated and sectional.36  It 
was the advent of unskilled unionism, particularly at the docks, which implanted the 
concept of labour organisation into the fragmented working-class consciousness of 
Liverpool. 
 The battle for the ‘dockers’ tanner’ and subsequent strike wave heralded an 
embryonic mass labour movement in the city.  Although the 1889 dock strike was 
initiated in London, dockers at other ports quickly followed suit in demanding a 
wage increase from 5d to 6d an hour and reformation of the system of employment 
on the docks.37  The dockers were successful with their demands and although the 
influence of the newly-formed union waned shortly after, the concessions obtained 
demonstrated the power of mass unskilled unionism as a vehicle for some degree of 
social empowerment.38  Such was the impact of the 1889 dock strike, it even drew 
the attention of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels as a potential watershed in British 
working-class organisation.39  Indeed, precisely because of its port-based economy 
and the sheer number of working men employed on the docks, it could be argued that 
1889 belatedly kick-started the trade union movement in Liverpool. 
 The period 1909-1912 was a tumultuous time even in the context of 
Liverpool’s volatile social history.  A wave of sectarian violence in 1909 threatened 
to plunge the city into anarchy and prompted a police inquiry.40  This was followed 
in 1911 by a major general transport strike.  What began as a seamans’ and dockers’ 
strike over rates and union recognition in Liverpool in June/July 1911 gained 
widespread support amongst other port transport workers, such as railwaymen.41  
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The city was brought to a standstill for most of August as a general strike involving 
some 66,000 workers was successfully organised with assistance from Syndicalism’s 
national leader Tom Mann.42  The Town Council petitioned the Home Office for 
military intervention, although the drafting of troops and additional police from 
elsewhere in the country onto the streets of Liverpool merely inflamed the situation.  
Heavy-handed policing at a rally of around 80,000 people on St George’s Plateau on 
13 August caused city-wide rioting over several days.43  Indeed, the Government 
seemed to take the threat extremely seriously and it is often recalled that a battleship 
and a cruiser were despatched to the River Mersey in response to the unrest.   
 The strong support for Liverpool’s transport strike served as another indication 
that the concepts of trade unionism and class consciousness were beginning to 
belatedly permeate the consciousness of Liverpool’s hitherto divided working-class 
from the turn of the century.  Both Waller and Lane show that the strike contributed 
to a surge in union membership in the city.44  The idea that unionism and labourism 
had begun to take hold is further supported by the election of seven ‘Labour’ 
councillors in the 1911 municipal elections.45  Nevertheless, although the 1889 and 
1911 strikes seemed to awaken ideals of labour solidarity, such ideals still operated 
in the all-pervasive shadow of traditional social divisions until the post-war era.  
Politically, this was reflected in the fact that the city would not return a Labour 
council until 1955.46 
As the twentieth century developed, Liverpool was to face major new 
challenges.  Hyde’s oft-repeated assertion that the port’s fortunes were declining is 
illustrated by the fact that in 1914 it handled around a third of Britain’s imports and 
exports but by 1938 this figure stood at around a fifth.47  Nevertheless, in the early 
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twentieth century, Liverpool could still be considered a ‘world city’.48  Later, the 
gradual decline in trade at the port coincided with the faltering of British hegemony 
in international trade and capital.  The inter-war years were typically bleak for the 
whole of the world economy, yet Liverpool suffered more acutely than most places.  
Through the 1930s Liverpool’s unemployment persistently stood at over eighteen 
percent, nearly twice the national average.49  The lucrative cotton trade upon which 
the port’s prosperity was largely based began to decline in line with the contraction 
of the Lancashire textile industry, an early example of the shift in emphasis in British 
industry and trade from north to south and west to east.50  The dominance of the port 
transport industry in the local economy, which had for so long provided Liverpool’s 
wealth and stimulated its exponential growth, was to become its major vulnerability 
in post-war, and later post-industrial, Britain. 
 
The post-war period and the ‘boom’ years 
 The end of the Second World War brought a temporary fillip to the port and the 
city.  However, politicians and local policy makers were well aware of the structural 
weaknesses inherent in the local economy.  Even as early as 1936 the Liverpool 
Corporation Act was passed in Parliament, enabling the local authority to purchase 
land on the city’s outskirts for industrial development in an attempt to diversify the 
economy.51  Although this scheme was interrupted by the outbreak of war, the 
intention to undertake a radical remodelling of the city’s industrial and residential 
structure was reaffirmed in The Merseyside Plan 1944.52  Wartime rearmament had 
already begun to bring a manufacturing base to Liverpool’s periphery prior to 1944.  
Both Kirkby and Speke, hitherto rural areas on the fringes of Liverpool, witnessed 
the construction of huge factories providing aircraft components and ordnance for 
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the war effort.53  The cessation of hostilities in 1945 meant that the reorganisation of 
the city could begin.            
 The main principles of The Merseyside Plan were to develop a manufacturing 
base for the city, located away from the historic centre and to accompany the 
industrial reorganisation with a relocation of people to these new districts.  Poor 
quality housing and overcrowding had been a blight on the city’s traditional 
residential areas since the eighteenth century.  These areas, located predominantly 
alongside the docks, were badly run down and outdated.  The wartime blitz of the 
port had exacerbated existing problems, so in the spirit of ‘homes fit for heroes’ and 
the regional industrial reorganisation plan, an extensive construction and re-housing 
programme was undertaken.   This basically involved the wholesale dismantling of 
dockland communities, demolition of ‘slum’ housing and dispersal of inhabitants to 
new housing estates located close to the areas earmarked for new industries. 
 Obviously, such an ambitious reconstruction programme took time and money.  
It was not until the 1950s that the movement of people into the new housing estates 
commenced and major companies started to invest in the new industrial areas under 
the auspices of the ‘Merseyside Development Area’.  Large national and multi-
national companies were encouraged to set up shop in Liverpool through a series of 
incentives, including government grants and tax breaks.  The Kirkby industrial estate 
witnessed the arrival of some household manufacturing and processing names such 
as Birds Eye, Fisher Bendix, Kraft and Kodak.  Speke also benefitted from an influx 
of new companies including Dunlop and a host of chemical/medical firms.54  The 
new factories employed some 27,000 in these two areas alone and other smaller 
industrial/housing estates such as Aintree provided more jobs still.55  The early 
sixties brought car manufacture to the region and another wave of around 30,000 
jobs, although by then some of those companies which had arrived in the fifties had 
begun to close.56  Nevertheless, the diversification of Liverpool’s economy seemed 
moderately successful.  The port and related service and processing industries were 
declining but only gradually and so the city’s working-class enjoyed a temporary 
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spell of full employment in the late fifties and early sixties.  The old adage that ‘you 
could walk off one job on a Tuesday and into another on Wednesday’ was a reality.57 
 Amidst this radical restructuring of the city, the old attitudes and prejudices of 
the working-class began to change.  Whereas the traditional residential segregation 
of pre and inter-war Liverpool had perpetuated religious schisms, the dismantling of 
these communities seemed to reduce sectarian sentiment.  Often dockland residents 
were not re-housed together as whole communities and although this was a matter of 
some discomfiture amongst those who were relocated, for the first time working-
class families descended from different ethnicities and creeds were mixed together 
on the same street.58  Whether this was a deliberate act by town planners to integrate 
the previously divided communities is unlikely but over time it certainly had the 
effect of largely consigning sectarianism to a disturbing footnote in the history of the 
city. 
 Although some academics propose that post-war re-housing projects broke up 
existing communities and the solidarities that these sustained, resulting in new 
estates being occupied by a ‘population of strangers’ with an individualist outlook, in 
Liverpool this proved not to be the case.59  Where religious identity had once defined 
and divided Liverpool’s working-class, in the fifties and sixties this was gradually 
replaced by a belated assimilation of class-based workplace identity and solidarity, 
especially in the broader contemporary political climate.  Indeed, even in the pre-war 
era, Liverpool’s dockworkers had begun to organise effectively to fight for better 
pay and conditions.  The 1889 dock strike and the 1911 transport strike were the 
initial manifestations of this.  It is also interesting to note that the first registration 
scheme in the industry was introduced in Liverpool in 1912, to better regulate 
employment on the docks after pressure on employers from the quayside.  The 1945 
national strike wave on the docks forced the government to introduce the National 
Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS), which partially ‘decasualised’ the industry and 
improved pay and conditions for the majority.60  Similarly, seamen also have a rich 
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history in workplace solidarity which pre-dates the arrival of manufacturing to the 
city.61 
 So, traditions of solidarity and combativeness were already apparent on the 
docks and the ships in the pre and inter-war periods, despite the lack of a coherent 
class-based identity in Liverpool.  Lane contends that ‘the sheer magnitude of the 
numbers of people who were irregularly and casually employed, and their 
concentration in the densely populated waterfront, meant that it was they who came 
to be most prominent in the shaping of the city’s culture’.62  The dissemination of 
these workers to the periphery of the city with their ‘casual’ attitudes towards work 
and discipline in order to provide labour for new manufacturing concerns brought its 
own dimension to modern labour relations in the locality.  As previously noted, the 
casualism closely associated with the vagaries of a port-orientated economy was an 
obvious cause of poverty amongst the old dockland communities.  However, there 
were aspects of irregular employment that came to be regarded by dockworkers, all 
type of port transport workers and seamen, as privileges of their trade.  For example, 
the ability to pick and choose which days to work and which hours to keep or which 
ship to set sail on, especially in busy periods at the port, was in stark contrast to the 
experience of working men in industrial towns, whose lives were often dictated by 
work discipline and ‘factory time’. 
 Indeed, the traditions entrenched over many generations by forced familiarity 
with casualism contributed to the complex labour culture that earned the city’s 
workforce a reputation for militancy in the sixties and seventies.  The diversification 
of Liverpool’s economy from the late fifties brought factory discipline to an 
increasing number of ex-dockers, port transport workers and seamen hitherto 
unaccustomed to strictly regimented work processes and managerial control.  
Although these manufacturing companies often actively discriminated against 
employing ex-port workers and seamen specifically because of their burgeoning 
reputation for militancy, it was impossible due to the composition of the city’s 
previous occupational structure to exclude them from recruitment altogether.63  
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Indeed, almost the whole of Liverpool’s workforce had had some sort of association 
or employment history with the port.  These ex-dockers, port transport workers and 
seamen with experience of casual employment and workplace organisation brought 
such ideals to the shop floors of Merseyside’s new factories.  Just as industrial strife 
on the docks increased between 1947 and 1967, so the new industrial sector in the 
city experienced similar challenges.64 
Large national and multinational companies with branch plants in the city 
were increasingly susceptible to strong rank-and-file workplace organisation and this 
was especially prevalent in the car plants and, even prior to their arrival, at Dunlop.65  
Aside from experiencing difficulties with entrenched casual labour attitudes, near 
full employment in the fifties and early sixties added to the combative nature of 
Liverpool’s working population, giving it a self-confident and assertive edge.66  The 
city later became identified as ‘a hotbed of industrial unrest’ with a record of 
‘continued industrial strife’.67  Moreover, the growth and empowerment of the shop 
steward movement across the whole trade union spectrum brought a new dimension 
to contemporary industrial relations.  The sixties and seventies witnessed the 
democratisation of the unions and the rise of the ‘informal’ system of workplace 
bargaining and representation at the expense of the traditional ‘formal’ system, 
dominated by union officialdom.68  All these factors contributed to Liverpool’s 
growing reputation for industrial militancy. 
Another, less tangible factor also contributed to industrial attitudes amongst 
Liverpudlians in the sixties and seventies.  Although Liverpool’s status as a ‘world’ 
                                                                                                                                                      
would often ask whether the applicant had a mortgage, a car, any Higher Purchase agreements, how 
many children they had etc.  It was perceived that these seemingly innocuous questions were used to 
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various others).  
64 Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon Lord Devlin into certain matters 
concerning the Port Transport Industry, Cmnd 2734 (August 1965), p. 4.  
65 For a brief overview of rank-and-file organisation at Dunlop’s Speke factory in the late fifties and 
early sixties see Lane, Liverpool, pp. 122-124.  For a seminal account of early rank-and-file 
organisation at Ford’s Halewood plant in the sixties see Beynon, H. Working For Ford (Wakefield: 
E.P. Publishing 1973).    
66 The new manufacturing base in the city attracted a substantial number of women.  Women had 
previously been excluded from the trade union movement in the city because of the male-dominated 
nature of traditional occupations.  For an analysis of masculinities in the city in the post-war era see: 
Ayers, P. ‘Work, culture and gender: The making of masculinities in post-war Liverpool’, Labour 
History Review, Vol. 69, Issue 2, August 2004, pp. 153-167. 
67 The Times, 19 May 1975. 
68 See Chapter 2 for a theoretical analysis of shop stewards and industrial bargaining and conflict. 
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trading city was contracting with the fortunes of its port, its cultural status both 
nationally and globally was in the ascendancy.  The city’s contribution to modern 
British popular culture is well documented.  It is, of course, synonymous with The 
Beatles, rock n’ roll, the ‘swinging sixties’ and the hegemony of its football teams.  
As a result, the image of the Liverpudlian ‘scally’ as cocky and irreverent is eternally 
etched on public and media consciousness.  Indeed, such perceptions are not 
completely without justification or a degree of self-projection, yet the broad ‘scouse’ 
identity, which enjoyed celebrity and notoriety in equal measures in the post-war era, 
evolved under the influence of the development of the port in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.      
Liverpool’s port shaped the character and culture of the city in other ways.  
In addition to a substantial eclectic immigrant population, there was sizeable 
transient seafaring element contributing further to the cosmopolitan flavour of the 
city.  Moreover, world travel and international shipping exposed Liverpool’s seamen 
and dockers to the influence of other cultures, particularly with the advent of trans-
Atlantic passenger travel.  Indeed, the arrival of ‘Merseybeat’ in the sixties owed 
some gratitude to these ‘Cunard Yanks’, who introduced north American pop music, 
culture and dress to Liverpool long before its influence was felt throughout the rest 
of the country and the western world.69  When native seamen returned home they 
brought with them the commodities and experience of exotic lands as well as their 
end-of-voyage pay-offs, often to be spent over the course of a couple of nights as 
‘five minute millionaires’.70  Irregular work and wages contributed to a short-term, 
‘live-for-the-moment’ outlook amongst generations of Liverpool dockers and 
seamen.71  So, it is proposed that the city’s culture evolved differently from other 
major centres in Britain, further adding to this perception from without and within of 
Liverpool as a city of international, not provincial, character. 
                                                     
69 For more detail on Liverpool’s popular culture and music scene in the sixties see: Inglis, I. ‘The 
Beatles are coming! Conjecture and conviction in the myth of Kennedy, America and the Beatles’, 
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employment see: Connell, R.W. ‘Live fast and die young: The construction of masculinity among 
young working-class men on the margin of the labour market’, Journal of Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 2, 
August 1991, pp. 141-171.  
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 This plethora of influences – the growth of trade unionism, full employment, 
the rich cultural currency of the sixties, the casual attitudes towards employment 
derived from the city’s historical development – all combined to give its workforce a 
progressively combative edge.  The irreverent spirit of Liverpool in the sixties 
interacted with a work culture entrenched in casual traditions to foster an 
increasingly defiant attitude towards workplace relations and managerial discipline.  
Liverpool working men’s self-perception is clear: 
 
Liverpool men have always considered themselves as supermen.  They love 
being leaders whether its football, politics or trade union.  We’ve created so 
many good leaders in Liverpool, especially in the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union – Lennie McCluskey, Jack Jones, even (former Prime 
Minister) Harold Wilson.72 
 
The sixties were an exciting time for the working-class of Liverpool, the majority of 
which were finally lifted out of a history of poverty and casualism.  Lane argues that 
there was a sense of egalitarianism which had long existed in the minds of dockers 
and seamen, due to their occupational culture and experiences but now, mixed with 
the spirit of the sixties and relocated to manufacturing plants, this permeated the 
entire Liverpool consciousness.73  Nowhere was this more tangible than in the 
workplace – subordination and the paternalistic work relationships of previous 
generations had been swept away.  This is reflected in Merseyside’s record of 
industrial strife between 1968 and 1974 when the region had the highest incidence of 
days lost from work stoppages in the country, some two and a half times greater than 
the national average.74  Indeed, during this period, ‘the peculiar nature of the 
Merseyside local economy and its social and cultural influences did help produce a 
particularly distinctive form of collective trade union organisation and 
consciousness’.75 
 
                                                     
72 Author’s interview with F.L., January 2011. 
73 Lane, Liverpool, p. 125. 
74 Bean, R. & Stoney, P. ‘Strikes on Merseyside: A regional analysis’, Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 17, Issue 1, March 1986, p. 10 (pp. 9-23).  
75 Darlington, R. The Dynamics of Workplace Unionism: Shop Stewards’ Organisation in Three 
Merseyside Plants (London: Mansell 1994), p. 51. 
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Decline and defiance in the late seventies and eighties 
 The ‘boom’ years in Liverpool were relatively short-lived.  By the mid-
seventies the continued decline and contraction of the dock industry, for so many 
years the city’s lifeblood, was accompanied by a retrenchment of the manufacturing 
base.76  As previously detailed, the growth of the manufacturing sector in the fifties 
and sixties was pioneered by foreign multinational companies, with the assistance of 
generous government development grants.  When more austere times arrived for the 
world economy, these relatively new branch plants which had encountered strong 
workplace organisation and militancy were amongst the first to be considered for 
redundancies or closure.  Although manufacturing was in decline across the country, 
Liverpool suffered more than anywhere else.  Employment in the sector fell by over 
a half between 1971 and 1984, with somewhere in the region of 40,000 jobs cut from 
the local economy.77  The ‘new’ housing estates and communities on the periphery, 
for which manufacturing was the raison d’être, suffered enormously from the 
decline.  Both Kirkby and Speke saw a spate of redundancies and factory closures.  
In Speke, Dunlop and Triumph both closed entirely with the combined loss of seven 
thousand jobs.  Between 1980 and 1983, Ford also shed 1500 jobs through voluntary 
redundancy, with the threat of more to follow.  Kirkby lost around 13,000 jobs from 
manufacturing between 1971 and 1984.78  These losses were accompanied by the 
closure of other, more historic Liverpool firms such as Tate and Lyle’s and 
Meccano.  Such closures and redundancies were to have a profound effect on those 
areas and the city as a whole. 
 Meanwhile, the celebrity that had accompanied Liverpool’s status in the 
sixties quickly turned to a macabre fascination with its decline.79  The Toxteth riots 
during the summer of 1981 led some observers to superficially condemn Liverpool 
                                                     
76 The number of Registered Dock Workers (RDWs) employed at the Port of Liverpool fell from 
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as a failed city, despite several underlying factors for the disturbances.80  For 
example, the Merseyside Police were subsequently blamed for a culture of over-
zealous policing and racial discrimination.81  Of course, youth unemployment and 
disenfranchisement were also major contributory factors.  Such circumstances were 
not unique to Liverpool and other inner-city areas such as Brixton in London, 
Handsworth in Birmingham and Moss Side in Manchester also experienced serious 
civil unrest in 1981.  Nevertheless a combination of high unemployment, growing 
social problems and the city’s recently-acquired reputation for political and industrial 
militancy encouraged the contemporary Conservative political establishment to 
consider it a virtual write-off, apparently content to consign it to a state of ‘managed 
decline’.82 
 If the Conservative hierarchy already regarded the city and its inhabitants 
with a degree of suspicion and disdain after the events of 1981, the election of a left-
wing Trotskyist ‘Labour’ City Council in 1983 did nothing to assuage this 
perception.  The rise of the Militant Tendency faction in the District Labour Party 
reflected a broader rejection of the Government’s cuts-based monetarist experiment 
by the people of Liverpool and, indeed, elsewhere.83  The escalating decline of the 
city in terms of jobs, funding and population was greeted with defiance.84  If the 
sixties and seventies had witnessed the growth of workplace militancy and solidarity, 
its forced decline due to economic factors and anti-union legislation meant that 
political radicalism was belatedly in the ascendency in the city.  Indeed, ‘the 
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militants... faced with the limits of workplace militancy and community politics in 
the face of the global slump, turned to politics, the Labour Party and the Militant 
(Tendency)’.85 
The argument forwarded by Belchem that the Militant Tendency seized 
control of a ‘moribund’ and ramshackle local Labour party machine and propagated 
its ideology from there has been challenged by other historians who highlight the 
attractive and popularist aspects of the Militant manifesto and subsequent local 
election campaign.86  The idea that Militant was ‘swimming with the tide’ of 
contemporary local consciousness, coloured by the traditional egalitarian and 
democratic outlook of Liverpudlians that was intrinsically opposed to the 
Conservative government’s economic and social experiment, the decline of the city 
and the rise of unemployment, is a persuasive one.87  The local stand against central 
government policies gathered popular support and resulted in a landslide Labour 
Party victory in the 1983 local election, dominated by Militant councillors.  The 
campaign had been waged on the principles of job creation, house construction, rent 
reductions and a reversal of policy-making to the local level.88 
 However, the initial affinity between the people of Liverpool and the Militant 
Tendency was short-lived.  In 1985, a budget deficit crisis caused by government 
funding restraints and an arguably over-ambitious spending programme led to the 
council announcing that it would run out of money by September.  This resulted in 
the extraordinary step of issuing redundancy notices to all council employees.  The 
response was wholesale rebellion from local trade unions covering the plethora of 
council occupations and a souring of relations thereafter. 89  Derek Hatton, Deputy 
Leader of the Council, later admitted that this was a ploy in the game of 
brinkmanship unfolding between the Council and the Government and 
acknowledged that the move was a public relations disaster from which it never 
recovered.90  Accusations of corruption, cronyism and racism followed.91  All this 
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was combined with wholesale public animosity between the national Labour 
leadership and members of the ‘Labour’ City Council, cumulating in a number being 
expelled from the Party in October 1986.  By 1987, Militant had squandered the 
popular support which brought it to power in 1983 and the majority of its councillors 
had either been expelled from the Party or defeated at the local ballot box, largely 
ending its influence in local politics. 
 So, the convulsion of political militancy apparent in Liverpool in the mid-
eighties had its origins in a variety of different influences.  Firstly, and most 
obviously, austere times in the national and local economy, partly caused by a 
broader global recession and partly through governmental fiscal policies, lent 
themselves to political militancy.  Indeed, Liverpool was not the only city where the 
Militant Tendency gained a foothold in local politics.92  Secondly, the relatively 
belated experience of workplace organisation and militancy in the city fed into an 
equally belated growth of political radicalism, particularly in the context of the 
decline in trade union influence and membership at this time.  Quite simply, politics 
became the new medium for local working-class expression and resistance.  Thirdly, 
there was a growing siege mentality amongst Liverpudlians in the eighties that 
sprang from parochial pride and the decline of their once-great city, media portrayal 
of the place and its inhabitants, the Council’s stand-off with the Conservative 
government and a rejection of the principles of an unfettered laissez-faire economic 
policy.  All these factors combined to give Liverpool and Liverpudlians a reputation 
for militancy and radicalism in the modern national psyche. 
 In the case of Liverpool’s dockers, traditions of workplace and political 
militancy predate their dissemination into the wider populace of the city.  
Communist Party membership was a distinct feature of the dock industry as a 
whole.93  Casualism and underemployment had conversely fostered unofficial 
workplace solidarity even in the pre-war era.  The post-war period witnessed a series 
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of gains for dockers, not least the implementation of the National Dock Labour 
Scheme in 1947 and the Devlin reforms in 1967.  The introduction of an official 
shop steward system consolidated the unusual degree of workplace control and 
influence that dockers across the country had captured.  Nowhere was this more 
palpable than at the port of Liverpool.  Nevertheless, aside from the strong 
occupational identity and solidarity of the dockers it should be argued that they were 
simultaneously immersed in the zeitgeist of the city.  At the high point for Liverpool 
culture in the sixties this undoubtedly involved embracing the idea that they hailed 
from ‘one of the coolest cities on the planet’, that Liverpool men were ‘supermen’ 
and an egalitarian belief that everyone was equal regardless of wealth or class.94  All 
these factors contributed to dockers’ consciousness, their approach to labour 
relations and perception of managerial authority.  Even in less auspicious times for 
Liverpool, the defensive siege mentality of the city coincided with the contraction of 
the dock industry and terminal rundown of manning levels.  Again, during this 
period dockers’ consciousness could not help but be coloured by the rise of Militant 
and popular local political radicalism, the ideological stand-off with the 
Conservative government and the negative media perception of the city.  Indeed, 
occupational identity and work culture were extremely important in shaping attitudes 
towards labour relations at the port but as well as being dockers they were Liverpool 
dockers.  This certainly adds another dimension to consider when examining 
industrial relations at the port of Liverpool in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 5 
The Growth of the Shop Steward System at Liverpool Docks, 1967-1972 
 
Previous chapters of this thesis have highlighted long-term trends in work 
culture and organisation in the dock industry and the historical development of the 
city of Liverpool in order to provide the contextual basis for a chronological, primary 
research-driven examination of labour relations at the port of Liverpool 1967-1989.  
This section of the thesis considers the development of labour organisation and the 
dock shop steward system at the port from its inception as an unofficial body 
through to its official formalisation under the Devlin reforms in 1967 and subsequent 
rise to prominence and activism.  It documents the formation of the shop steward 
system before providing an account and analysis of significant disputes at the port 
thereafter, culminating in an assessment of the local and national perspectives of the 
1972 strike wave in the industry.  The aim of this section is to establish the dynamics 
of local organisation, in what could be described as an evolutionary phase in labour 
relations at the port in the context of the Devlin reforms watershed and subsequent 
decasualisation of the industry.  Indeed, the causes and outcomes of several of the 
disputes featured here have never been properly analysed and so it is contended that 
this study will help illuminate the dynamics of industrial relations at the port of 
Liverpool and contribute to the existing academic discourse regarding dockland 
industrial relations, local workplace relationships and the dock industry during this 
period.  Before the chronological analysis of events at Liverpool can commence, 
consideration needs to be given to the contemporary economic and industrial 
relations climate in which they occurred.         
 
The national economic, political and industrial bargaining context 
The end of full employment and relative stagnation of economic growth in 
Britain during the 1960s pushed the question of trade union influence and 
responsible industrial relations high up the political agenda.  As governments from 
both sides of the spectrum grappled with balancing the demands of free industrial 
bargaining with the health of the national economy, the political consensus was 
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increasingly turning towards industrial relations reform.1  Even during more 
prosperous times the Conservative Government had considered changes to the 
national system of industrial relations.  In 1958, a Conservative think-tank policy 
paper, entitled A Giant’s Strength, criticised the unions for wielding too much 
influence and proposed several reforms which resurfaced in later legislation.2  
However, at this juncture, there was no suggestion that legislative reform was 
imminent and the tradition of voluntarism remained omnipotent.  If anything, 
successive governments increasingly endeavoured to include trade unions in national 
economic planning.  Labour’s election to office in 1964 served to institutionalise this 
policy further.  Harold Wilson’s election campaign was based on the Party’s ability 
to re-invigorate and modernise the economy in partnership with the unions, a 
relationship formalised by the appointment of Frank Cousins (General Secretary of 
the Transport and General Workers’ Union) to the Cabinet as Minister of 
Technology.  The National Plan was conceived in 1965 which contained some 
references to a voluntary income policy but no legislative overtones.3  A Royal 
Commission, headed by Lord Donovan, was also established in 1965 to review the 
national system of industrial relations.4 
In the intervening period between the Donovan Commission being 
established and the final report being delivered, Britain’s economy had deteriorated 
further and the Labour Government became ever more concerned with the escalating 
incidence of unofficial industrial action across the major industries.5  This was 
largely attributed to growing influence of the ‘informal’ sphere of trade unionism.  
Having already introduced a voluntary incomes policy in co-operation with a 
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reluctant Trades Union Congress (TUC), the increasingly embattled Labour 
Government began to consider introducing legislation to better police industrial 
relations.6  The In Place of Strife White Paper, published in January 1969, sought to 
address the growing phenomenon of rank-and-file unofficial industrial action and the 
issue of union accountability.  The proposals, which included the establishment of an 
industrial relations court with the power to hand down legally binding judgements, 
‘cooling off’ periods, ballot provisions and union registration, was immediately 
unpopular with the trade union movement.7  Its legislative overtones were in contrast 
to the findings of the Donovan Commission which broadly found in favour of the 
perpetuation of voluntarism in industrial bargaining.8  This attempt to introduce 
legislation into industrial relations coupled with a mounting economic crisis proved 
to be the Labour Government’s downfall.  At the 1970 General Election, Edward 
Heath’s Conservatives were victorious. 
The Conservatives came into office having criticised the disproportionate 
influence of trade unions and the contemporary trend towards unofficial industrial 
action in their election manifesto and campaign.  While in opposition, the party 
leadership had formulated an approach to combat the perceived disruptive influence 
of rank-and-file action on the health of the national economy.  Initiatives proposed in 
various publications, such as Action Not Words (1966) and Fair Deal at Work 
(1969), advocated a legally-binding framework for industrial bargaining to ease 
inflation and stabilise the economy.9  The Industrial Relations Bill (1971) was the 
manifestation of this new legislative approach to British industrial relations.   
Immediately unpopular with the trade union movement, the Industrial 
Relations Bill was the first comprehensive attempt to impose legislation on the 
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hitherto voluntary tradition of industrial bargaining in Britain.10  It bore striking 
similarities to the previous Labour Government’s proposed programme of reform.  
The Bill introduced compulsory trade union registration, powers to force ballots, 
‘cooling-off’ periods and the establishment of the National Industrial Relations 
Court (NIRC) which was authorised to deliver legally-binding judgements and 
financial penalties, especially against those unions or individuals involved in ‘unfair 
industrial practices’.11  This last provision was clearly aimed at the growing 
proliferation of unofficial industrial action.  The Government unilaterally forced the 
Bill onto the statute book without meaningful consultation with the TUC, souring 
any possible reproach between the two institutions. 
By the time the Industrial Relations Act finally became law, the Heath 
administration had been already been rocked by several disputes in major industries.  
1970-71 saw the worst period of industrial unrest since the 1920s.  In addition to a 
series of smaller public sector disputes, the separate 1970 dock and electricity 
workers’ strikes twice forced the Government to declare an official State of 
Emergency.12  Matters went from bad to worse in January 1972 when the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM), following a ballot six months earlier, began strike 
action over pit closures, relative pay stagnation/fall due to the introduction of a 
national flat-rate wage and an overtime ban.13  The industry had not experienced a 
national official strike since the General Strike and several localised, unofficial 
instances of industrial action in 1969 and 1970 had equipped activists with new and 
highly-disruptive methods of picketing.  Secondary mass pickets and flying pickets 
were deployed to inhibit production/transportation at ancillary sites such as coke 
depots or power stations, in addition to collieries themselves.  The Government and 
the police were taken by surprise by the aggressive, pro-active tactics of the miners, 
aided by the support of transport unions in their refusal to cross NUM picket lines.14  
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The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1979).  
14 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 350. 
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The severity and scale of the miners’ action forced the Government into retreat, 
seeking negotiation.  The eventual pay settlement secured a 27% pay rise over 
sixteen months.15 
The consequences of the miners’ strike had a profound effect on the attitudes 
of organised labour, the Government and employers in the proceeding months.  
Firstly, the success of the miners’ innovative picketing techniques had equipped 
activists and militants with a new and effective disruptive tactic.  Moreover, the 
Government’s forced capitulation merely strengthened Heath’s resolve to fully 
utilise the impending industrial relations legislation to curb the influence of unions, 
although many employers were happy to maintain the existing status quo in 
industrial bargaining.16  Finally, the whole trade union movement appeared 
galvanised in opposition to the Conservatives’ approach to industrial relations in a 
manner not seen since the major nationwide industrial strife of some fifty years 
earlier. 
So, it looked as if organised labour and the Government were heading for a 
showdown in the contemporary political and legislative climate.  The miners’ strike 
had set the tone and context within which the battle would be fought.  The entire 
trade union movement was hostile to the implementation of the Industrial Relations 
Act and any major dispute in any sector of industry had the potential to become 
politicised by the intervention of the NIRC.  In the event, it was a convulsion of local 
industrial action by Liverpool’s dockers which was to be the first to test the resolve 
of the Act and its creators. 
 
 
Modernisation, Containerisation and Devlinism: Developments in the industry, 
1967-1972 
Prior to 1947 and the implementation of the National Dock Labour Scheme 
(NDLS), the dock industry had remained largely unregulated and casual employment 
was universal.  The traditional system was characterised by inconsistent earnings, 
underemployment, inequitable distribution of work and ultimately poverty and 
                                                     
15 Taylor ‘The Conservative party’, p. 160-161. 
16 Weekes et al, Industrial Relations and the Limits of the Law, pp. 42-45, 210-212. 
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hardship for the majority of dockers across the country.  Although the Scheme 
introduced registration and a degree of decasualisation and regulation to the industry, 
many of the traditional vagaries associated with the old system remained.17  As 
previously noted, the NDLS did little for industrial harmony as between 1947 and 
1955 the docks proved to be the most strike prone of the major industries.18 
The Devlin Committee was first set up in 1956 to examine the operation of 
the Scheme.19  It was re-commissioned in 1965 to investigate the root causes of the 
perpetual industrial strife, and hence poor productivity and efficiency, in such a vital 
national industry.  However, it was the imminent technological advances in cargo-
handling which forced the issue of employment and labour relations at the docks to 
the top of the political agenda.20  The global proliferation of mechanised cargo 
handling, particularly the advent of containerisation and roll-on/roll-off technology, 
implied a complete change in the character of dock-work.  Substantial investment 
was required from both the Government and employers to modernise the industry 
and keep it competitive in the world market.  However it was broadly accepted that 
the inherent industrial conflict, enhanced by the temporary and casual nature of 
employment on the docks, had to be remedied before any expensive modernisation 
programme could be attempted. 
Lord Devlin’s committee identified the limitations of partial decasualisation 
provided by the NDLS as the principal cause of industrial strife at the docks.  It 
argued that the benefits of the Scheme were being eclipsed by the temporary nature 
of engagement in the industry.  The Committee concluded that dockworkers 
struggled to form any ties or loyalties to a particular employer as continuous work 
with one company could not be guaranteed.   This encouraged a mutual lack of 
responsibility and hence casual attitudes towards work and management by 
respective parties.  Moreover, the perpetuation of the inhumane ‘call’ practice of 
‘turn’ (half-daily) recruitment also served to disenfranchise and polarise attitudes 
into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide, simultaneously fostering a strong sense of defensive 
                                                     
17 See Chapter 3 for an examination of the complexities of the historical employment system on the 
docks and the deficiencies of partial decasualisation introduced under the NDLS.   
18 Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon Lord Devlin into certain matters 
concerning the Port Transport Industry, Cmnd. 2734 (London: HMSO August 1965), p. 4. 
19 Report of a Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Operation of the Dock Workers (Regulation 
of Employment) Scheme 1947, Cmnd. 9813 (London: HMSO 1956).   
20 Wilson, D.F. Dockers: The Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana/Collins 1972), pp. 290-
291. 
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solidarity amongst workers.  The inequities of the piecework payment system were 
also considered by the Committee to be a contributory factor in poor labour relations 
and productivity.  The Report argued that these factors combined to shape attitudes 
that were visible in the prolific record of industrial strife on the docks.21 
The Final Report, published in 1965, predictably proposed complete 
decasualisation of the industry, with reforms to take place over two phases.  Phase 1 
(1967) introduced de facto decasualisation whereby the majority of dockers were 
assigned to an employer on a ‘permanent’ basis although provision was made for 
employers to loan/loan out men depending on company workload.  However, second 
and third tiers of dock-worker were created – supplementary workers without a 
permanent employer who were employed for a limited period with a single company 
(on a job-by-job basis) and ‘temporarily unattached’ workers (registered dockers 
without a permanent employer); both categories remained in the employment of the 
local dock labour board.22  Nevertheless, these measures appeared to dispense with 
the historic system of stand selection synonymous with casual employment, 
promising much-improved regularity of work, income and job security for the 
majority. 
The Devlin reforms were not solely about decasualisation of the industry, 
however.  Phase 2 (1970-1972) abolished the piecework system of payment and 
replaced it with a minimum weekly wage and tonnage flat rate coupled with locally-
negotiated productivity deals, to rationalise the industry in the context of 
modernisation/containerisation.  The Commission recommended that the number of 
registered employers in each port be dramatically reduced in order to deliver stable 
employers with a regular flow of work and with whom dockers could be 
permanently employed.  It was believed that the provision of standardised earnings, 
regular employment periods and the formalisation of working and manning practices 
would remove the inherent spectre of insecurity and casualism felt by dockworkers 
and hence foster a more progressive approach to industrial relations from all parties, 
                                                     
21 Devlin, Final Report, pp. 4-9. 
22 Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘Dockers, Devlin and industrial disputes’, Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 21, Issue 1, p. 28 (pp. 26-35). 
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with these improvements leading reciprocally to greater efficiency and 
productivity.23 
However, the measures did little to advance labour relations in the short-
term.  The introduction of Phase 1 immediately provoked strikes in Liverpool, 
London, Manchester and Hull.24  Although the proposed reforms undoubtedly 
offered dockworkers better pay and conditions, lessons remained unlearnt from the 
experiences of 1947.  There were several reasons why the Devlin reforms were 
resisted by some sections of the dock workforce.  Firstly, the standardisation of pay 
and employment did least for the interests of the aristocracy of the dock labour force, 
those ‘blue-eyed boys’ or specialists, who could pick and choose the most lucrative 
jobs thus immediately alienating an influential section of workers.25  Secondly, the 
introduction of more formalised systems of manning and time-management 
procedures imposed greater discipline on dockers.  As noted by Phillips and 
Whiteside, this conflicted with their traditional attachment to some of the more 
flexible aspects of casualism, especially amongst some of the older dockers.26  
Finally, the whole process was viewed with suspicion from the quayside – 
modernisation and containerisation were bringing rapid change to an industry in 
which working practices and employment relationships had remained relatively 
unchanged since the nineteenth century. 
Aside from the obvious teething difficulties associated with the overhaul of 
the system of employment in a major industry, retrospectively it is evident that 
Devlin’s reforms failed to address some key emerging issues.  The Committee’s 
main focus was on the revision of the casual system and so gave insufficient 
consideration to the potential problems that hasty modernisation/containerisation 
could inflict on workplace relations.  Directly attributable to the advent of unitisation 
was the growing trend of outsourcing of container-stripping duties, whereby cargo 
would pass through a port in a container and be loaded or unloaded (‘stuffed and 
stripped’) at depots outside the dockland area.  These inland depots were often not in 
the vicinity of the docks and hence were not governed by the Scheme.  In effect this 
                                                     
23 Turnbull & Sapsford, ‘Dockers’, p. 27-28. 
24 Wilson, Dockers, p. 187; Jones, Union Man, p. 185. 
25 Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, pp. 19-20. 
26 Phillips, G. & Whiteside, N. Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port Transport 
Industry 1880-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon 1985), p. 256; Author’s interview with M.C., January 2011. 
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meant that a growing amount of the dockers’ work was being done by road haulage 
companies at these groupage centres using cheaper labour.  This became a major 
source of antagonism for dockers and would prove a divisive issue for the industry in 
the early seventies, particularly in Liverpool.  Indeed, the outsourcing of container-
stripping provoked broader questions about the definition of dock-work as enshrined 
in the NDLS. 
In addition to concerns surrounding jurisdiction over ‘stuffing and stripping’ 
duties, there were a number of other factors which the 1967 reforms failed to foresee 
as potential flashpoints.  The construction of new privately-owned and financed ‘free 
ports’, which were exempt from the provisions of the NDLS, had been ongoing since 
the early 1960s and this trend was accelerating with the onset of mechanisation.  The 
cost of new-build container facilities was favourable when compared with the 
potential expense of renovation of facilities at existing ports.  Moreover, labour costs 
at non-Scheme ports were considerably lower because employers were neither liable 
for levy payments to the NDLB nor bound by the minimum pay and conditions 
enshrined in national and local agreements for Scheme ports, therefore providing 
them with a ‘hidden subsidy’ and a competitive advantage.27  A combination of these 
factors – new cargo-handling facilities, lower labour costs and changing trade 
patterns (increasing volume towards Europe and away from traditional export centres 
such as Commonwealth/trans-Atlantic countries), meant that shipping companies 
were directing more of their business towards non-Scheme ports.28  This was another 
major source of dissent for dockers nationwide, though especially in Hull where the 
Humber estuary witnessed the construction of several smaller free ports, in direct 
competition with the established Scheme port. 
 A final cause of conflict at the docks in the late sixties/early seventies was 
actually created by the Devlin Report itself.  The establishment of the Temporary 
Unattached Register (TUR) was only ever intended as a short-term measure for 
Registered Dock Workers (RDWs) without a ‘permanent’ employer for a specific 
engagement period.  However, numbers on the register increased significantly as 
                                                     
27 Statement by the TUC to the National Ports Council Enquiry into Non-Scheme Ports, 17 October 
1972 (Modern Records Centre, The University of Warwick). 
28 By 1970 11.6% by weight of the nation’s trade passed through non-Scheme ports (Source: Lindop, 
F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 1: Shop stewards and containerisation’, 
Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 5, Spring 1998, p. 49 [pp. 33-72]). 
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employers used the TUR as a reserve pool of labour, in opposition to its intended 
purpose.  By 1972 four percent of the total registered labour force was unattached 
and claiming fallback pay on the TUR.29  This was a particular problem at London 
docks where numbers on the temporary register were higher still, resulting in the 
TUR becoming the focus for both national and localised industrial strife.  Indeed, as 
Turnbull and Sapsford argue, the TUR affected ‘existing RDWs and illustrated to 
others the insecurity of their employment’.30 
 Certainly, there were a number of emerging issues in the industry which the 
Devlin Committee failed to identify or properly address although it could be argued 
that such matters were outside of its remit, an observation also made by Durcan et 
al.31  While in theory decasualisation dealt with the perennial challenges of 
underemployment and inconsistent earnings, these problems were superseded by the 
much graver spectre of unemployment in the longer term.32  Moreover, aside from 
the obvious effect of containerisation on manning levels, the deskilling and 
relocation of dock-work also posed a new threat to the very nature of the dockers’ 
occupational identity and culture.  The unloading of containers required no specialist 
handling skills in the traditional sense, hence the quasi-autonomous role of the 
‘gang’ in managing and organising work tasks and processes was removed.  Gang 
manning strengths were also under threat as the labour-intensive methods of break-
bulk handling were superseded by these technological advances.33  As Sapsford and 
Turnbull retrospectively calculated with their strike model, mechanisation was a 
fundamental threat to the dockers’ occupation and way of life and incrementally this 
was reflected in the nature and causes of industrial strife on the docks in the 
proceeding years, as dockers’ representation gradually came to recognise the impact 
of containerisation on employment opportunities in the industry.34  When all of the 
above factors were infused with a new system of local shop steward representation 
                                                     
29 Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, pp. 24-25. 
30 Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘Why did Devlin fail?  Casualism and conflict on the docks’, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 252 (pp. 237-257). 
31 Durcan, J. W., McCarthy, W. E. J. and Redman, G. P. Strikes in Post-War Britain (London: George 
Allen & Unwin 1983), p. 304. 
32 Indeed, the number of registered dockers employed in the industry fell from 51000 in 1967 to 
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Council Enquiry into Non-Scheme Ports, October 17th 1972). 
33 Deegan, F. There’s No Other Way (Liverpool: Toulouse 1980), p. 85. 
34 Sapsford, D. & Turnbull, P. ‘Dockers, Devlin and industrial disputes’, Industrial Relations Journal, 
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85 
 
and hence greater decentralisation of bargaining, as recommended by the Devlin 
committee and already being rolled out by the TGWU, it is clear in retrospect that 
there was potential for increasingly fractious labour relations in the industry.  
Liverpool in particular witnessed a sharp rise in strike incidence between 1967 and 
1970, becoming easily the most strike-prone port in the country.35 
 
Liverpool and modernisation 
The Devlin recommendations were generally welcomed by Liverpool’s port 
employers and the Employers’ Association of the Port of Liverpool (EAPL).  Local 
employers accepted the need to reform the system of employment in order to enable 
modernisation and the Association acknowledged that ‘the Inquiry was fair and 
thorough and had gone deep to the roots of the problems of the industry’.36  The 
EAPL even sought to voluntarily reduce the number of individual employers on the 
docks to comply with the Devlin Report.37  Its intentions were not solely selfless, 
however, as the Association was extremely interested in introducing container-
handling facilities to the port and in eliminating ‘category A restrictive practices’ as 
part of the modernisation programme.  Of particular concern was the pre-eminence 
of the ‘welt’ at the port and employers proposed to tackle ‘the failure of management 
which [it] represented’ by establishing ‘a code of practice for authorised breaks’ and 
‘a set of acceptable timekeeping rules’.38 
 Nevertheless, the employers’ perception of the Devlin Report was not shared 
by the dockers and their unofficial representatives.  Although an official shop 
steward system was due to be introduced to the dock industry as part of the reforms, 
Liverpool and other ports already had unofficial committees consisting of cross-
union shop-floor representation.39  The EAPL was shocked to learn that Liverpool’s 
                                                     
35 Liverpool’s ‘days lost per man annually’ rate (total man days lost per year, divided by number in 
workforce) was 2.4 times the national average 1967-1970 (Source: Mellish, M. The Docks After 
Devlin, London: Heinemann 1972, pp. 42-43, Table III & IV). 
36 EAPL meeting minutes, 8 March 1965 (Maritime Museum Archives, Albert Dock, Liverpool). 
37 EAPL meeting minutes, 10 August 1965.  The EAPL recognised that the number of employers at 
the port would need to be reduced to around twelve to comply with the Report and asked for 
voluntary withdrawals and mergers amongst its members.  Forty-three individual employers attended 
the meeting. 
38 EAPL meeting minutes, 10 August 1965.  For more details on and an explanation of the ‘welt’, see 
Chapter 3.  
39 The Liverpool Port Workers’ Committee was initially formed in the late 1940s (Source: Hikins, H. 
‘Liverpool dockers, 1967’ in H. Hikins (ed.) Building the Union: Studies on the Growth of the 
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unofficial Port Workers’ Committee had called for a port-wide strike to coincide 
with the implementation of Devlin Phase 1 on 18 September 1967.  Mr. Lindsay-
Alexander, Chairman of the EAPL, appealed to the dockers that ‘security, stability 
and dignity are there for you to grasp.  Grasp them and support your Union which 
has fought so hard for you’.40  Despite these sentiments being echoed by the 
leadership of the TGWU, the Government and the National Association of Port 
Employers (NAPE), ‘D-Day’ witnessed a rash of strikes across several of the major 
ports.41  However, while the Devlin Phase 1 strikes elsewhere petered out within a 
week, Liverpool’s continued unabated with the majority of its 12000-strong 
workforce out.42 
The principal source of dissent regarding the local decasualisation proposals 
hinged upon disparities in piecework and overtime rates between Liverpool and 
other ports, particularly London – average earnings were ten percent lower than the 
national average spread over a longer working week.43  Moreover, the manner in 
which the local agreement was imposed on the workforce, without any real 
consultation with shop-floor opinion, had alienated the majority of dockers.  Indeed, 
dissatisfaction with the TGWU was widespread amongst dockers in Liverpool at this 
time.  The National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers Union (NASDU) 
continued to wield influence on Merseyside and, as previously noted, a significant 
number of men were non-union, or ‘none-ers’, having left the TGWU in protest at its 
perceived unrepresentative and undemocratic nature.44 
                                                                                                                                                      
Workers’ Movement, 1756-1967, Liverpool: Toulouse 1973, p. 184; Author’s interview with J.D., 
December 2009; Jones, Union Man, p. 186). 
40 Liverpool Echo, 16 September 1967. 
41 ‘D-Day’ was a popular title amongst the Press for the beginning of the implementation of Devlin 
Phase 1, 18 September 1967.  Most of the major ports were on strike to coincide with the 
implementation of the reforms, with the exception of Southampton and Bristol while Hull returned to 
work after one day out.  Both the District Docks Secretary (Region 6, Liverpool) Lew Lloyd and 
Minister for Labour Ray Gunter were quoted in the Press promoting the benefits of the Devlin 
reforms (Source: Liverpool Echo, 16 September 1967).  
42 Parts of London docks remained out for longer over the ‘continuity’ issue, i.e. men handling 
loading and unloading on a specific ship should be allowed to work on the job until completion.  The 
figure of 12000 dockers employed at Liverpool’s port includes some 2000 on the Birkenhead side of 
the river (Source: Liverpool Echo, 16 September 1967 Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, p. 73; Wilson, 
Dockers, p. 186-188).   
43 Dock Labour Joint Committee, ‘Port of Liverpool – Principal provisions of agreements governing 
hours of work, rates of pay and conditions applicable to Registered Dock Workers’, September 1967 
(Modern Record Centre); Letter from Sir Jack Scamp to the Editor of the Institute of Personnel 
Management detailing the final pay deal at Liverpool, 15 December 1967 (Modern Records Centre). 
44 See Chapter 3 for a history on trade unionism on the docks and the dominance of the ‘White’ versus 
the growth of the ‘Blue’ in the post-war era. 
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There were other localised issues which contributed to anti-Devlin sentiment.  
In particular, secondary concerns relating to the arbitrary relocation of RDWs to new 
permanent employers, away from their traditional areas of work, caused considerable 
disquiet amongst the men: 
 
You were allocated to various employers and some people allocated to 
[particular] employers didn’t want to go… people had worked historically in 
one area for years.  In our area old stalwarts got shipped out who’d been there 
for thirty or forty years… so there was massive disruption.  It wasn’t done on 
a fair basis.45 
 
Although dockers had been approached by the local dock labour board regarding 
reallocation to particular employers, unofficial leaders encouraged men to refrain 
from stating a preference as this may be construed as a tacit acceptance of the 
reforms, meaning that some men were reallocated without their consent.46  So, it is 
clear that, aside from the principal issue of pay disparities between ports, there were 
also local nuances relating to custom and tradition at Liverpool which contributed to 
rank-and-file rejection of the decasualisation restructuring.  At a mass meeting of 
around 4000 dockers at the Pier Head on 19 September, the unofficial Port Workers 
Committee put forward a list of demands which included reassurances regarding 
redundancies, improvements in sick pay and pension contributions as well as pay 
increases across the board.47  The EAPL, and indeed the TGWU, were quite 
surprised and dismayed by the dockers’ resistance to reforms.  The Association 
refused to negotiate over any details until there was a full resumption of work.48  The 
TGWU also implored the dockers to accept the Devlin Agreement and return to 
work while local negotiations could begin over piecework rates.49  Despite the 
employers’ determination not to concede any ground under duress, the strike was 
                                                     
45 Author’s interview with J.D., December 2009. 
46 Ibid. 
47 EAPL meeting minutes, 19 September 1967. 
48 EAPL meeting minutes, 22 September 1967. 
49 Liverpool Echo, 18 September 1967. 
88 
 
estimated to be costing customers £100,000 per day as ninety-one ships lay idle in 
the Port.50 
However, with the strike only five days old, there was a growing divergence 
of opinion amongst dockers over how best to proceed.  Another mass meeting of 
4000 dockers on 23 September ended in a marginal vote against a return to work.  
This was despite some members of the unofficial committee urging the workforce to 
remain on strike.51  It was clear that a significant section of the men wished to heed 
the Union’s advice.  The EAPL seized on the apparently wavering resolve of the 
strikers by the Chairman releasing a statement which read: 
 
The confusion at this morning’s unofficial meeting is the best evidence that 
the dockworkers have been led up the garden path.  I am confident that most 
of them will now realise that they have been hoodwinked and will turn up for 
work on Monday.52 
 
On Monday 25 September there was a further fractious mass meeting at the 
Pier Head attended by 6000 dockers.  A return to work motion was defeated more 
comprehensively on this occasion but was accompanied by some acrimonious scenes 
as scuffles broke out amongst a section of the floor.53  The local newspaper reported 
that five men from the crowd bustled onto the speakers platform with noses and 
mouths bloodied, before one declared ‘they’re nothing but bullies.  We want to go 
back [to work] and this is what we get’.54  Despite the marginal vote the previous 
Friday this show of hands, attended by a greater proportion of the workforce, gave a 
clear majority to the strike mandate.  Opinions were still divided and the 
continuation of the strike hotly-disputed but there was no breaking ranks – if the 
majority was in favour then all stayed out, an example of the fierce tradition of 
workplace democracy apparent on Liverpool docks even before the introduction of 
an official shop steward system.  Moreover, the divergence in opinion illustrates the 
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in wages. 
51 Liverpool Echo, 23 September 1967. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Liverpool Echo, 25 September 1967. 
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complications encountered when attempting to categorise dockers as an 
‘homogeneous mass’.55 
As the strike deepened there were calls from the unofficial committee for the 
TGWU to make it official.56  Tim O’Leary (National Docks and Waterways 
Secretary) arrived on Merseyside to attempt to conciliate in the dispute, without 
much success.57  It took the intervention of Jack Jones (Assistant General Secretary 
of the TGWU) to make any headway.  Because of his background and the relative 
unpopularity in Liverpool of London-born O’ Leary, Jones was tasked with finding a 
solution to the strike at the port.58  As demonstrated above, the relationship between 
full-time dock officials and the unofficial committee was hostile, the employers 
refused to negotiate and so the local dispute was at a stalemate.  Jones apparently 
persuaded the Government and the TGWU hierarchy that an independent conciliator 
was the best means of securing a settlement.59  Jack Scamp was appointed to the post 
due to his broad-ranging experience as an arbiter in other areas of industry and his 
involvement in the Devlin Committee.  His Inquiry began in earnest on 16 October 
with the authority to ‘inquire into the locally determined aspects of the system of 
payments and earning opportunities of registered dock workers in the port of 
Liverpool (including Birkenhead) and to make recommendations’.60 
The Scamp Inquiry received evidence from all sides: employers, the TGWU 
and the unofficial committee.  However it was to glean no immediate agreement, as 
initially hoped.  Attitudes amongst the dockers had hardened by this stage and there 
was little indication that a settlement was imminent.  At a mass meeting on Friday 20 
October, the dockers voted to stay on strike until employers had dropped their pre-
condition that no negotiations could commence until the men had returned to work.61  
The mood of the men is clear from letters written to Scamp: 
 
 
                                                     
55 See Chapter 3 of this thesis for an overview of typical assumptions regarding dock-workers and 
their ideological and organisational tendencies. 
56 EAPL meeting minutes, 28 September 1967; Liverpool Echo, 28 September 1967.  
57 EAPL meeting minutes 3 October 1967; Liverpool Echo, 28 September 1967. 
58 James Larkin Jones was born and bred in Garston, Liverpool.  He was the son of a docker and had 
worked on the docks himself as a young man (Source – Jones, Union Man). 
59 Jones, Union Man, p. 186; Lindop, ‘The dockers, part 1’, p. 41. 
60 EAPL meeting minutes, 16 October 1967. 
61 Liverpool Echo, 20 October 1967. 
90 
 
Dear Sir, 
 
It has been recognised for many years by the Liverpool dockworkers that so 
far as pay was concerned they had become second class citizens in 
comparison with London and other ports.  Owing to a succession of 
inefficient and couldn’t care less trade union officials the present situation 
was bound to happen and the only surprise is that the dockers were able to 
contain themselves for so long.  The employers of Merseyside have pocketed 
untold millions of port workers’ pay during these years, and I would ask you 
to look upon this case in that light and not in the amount it is going to cost 
them now.  When they meet these claims they will still be paying far less 
than other ports.  The claims we have made from which you hear from our 
representatives are only the basis for a return to work, after that negotiations 
must continue to bring our piecework bonus earnings and differential 
payments to the level of London – nothing less will do…  Every port would 
then be indeed equal, with no poor relations (i.e. Liverpool at present)…  
basic wages [are] being negotiated on a national scale, while other forms of 
pay are not – it is bordering on the farcical and will always lead to 
inequalities and trouble. 
I am not a member of any political group and I am thirty-four years a docker 
in practically every department.  I am sure you will take notice in your 
wisdom, of the sincerity of this document, which voices the feeling of all 
Liverpool port workers.62 
 
 As the Liverpool dock strike dragged towards its sixth week, the Prime 
Minister was forced to intervene.  Harold Wilson arrived in Liverpool, cutting short 
a state trip to Mexico and summoned the various parties for a meeting at his room in 
the Adelphi Hotel.  Jack Jones, Bill Tonge (Chairman of NAPE) and a member of 
the unofficial strike committee arrived at the room at 4:45am where the Prime 
Minister stressed ‘the serious consequences of any failure to reach agreement... the 
country could not contemplate the idea of the Port remaining on strike for a further 
indefinite period’.63  Wilson’s intervention finally encouraged Liverpool’s employers 
to make a cash offer to end the strike.  This incorporated improvements to the fall-
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back guarantee, piecework rates and changes to the sick pay and pension schemes.64  
Although the offer was endorsed by Jones and the Union, Scamp and Wilson, 
Liverpool’s dockers voted to remain out.65  The employers’ offer only addressed 
some of the concerns of the dockers and the unofficial committee remained 
absolutely determined that all of its demands were met.  Principal amongst these 
remaining demands, aside from the piecework improvements, was a guarantee of no 
compulsory redundancies, a revision of the continuity rule for decasualisation and a 
£6 increase to sick pay rates.66  James Benbow, the Chairman of the unofficial Port 
Workers’ Committee, implored those gathered at the mass meeting on 25 October to 
vote against a return to work until their outstanding demands were met claiming ‘we 
have achieved at this stage 75 per cent of what we set out to achieve... we are on the 
verge of victory but only if we stand fast’.67 
 The breakthrough in the dispute finally came two days later.  The unofficial 
committee’s demands had been met by employers with the exception of a revision of 
piecework rates and incentives to attain parity with London.  It was agreed that this 
would be negotiated upon a return to work.68  At a mass meeting at the Pier Head on 
Friday 27 October attended by 6000 dockers, a return to work motion was 
successful.  However, there were still several hundred dissidents amongst the crowd 
who vocally challenged the platform when the proposal to return to work was made.  
There was considerable objection to the absence of a concrete piecework deal and 
the successful motion was subject to howls of derision from a small section of the 
men.69  Ultimately, the previously reticent EAPL, under considerable duress from the 
Government, Scamp, Jones and the economic strains of a six-week stoppage had 
conceded to the dockers’ demands.  The agreement was signed between Jack Jones 
(on behalf of the unofficial committee) and Lindsay-Alexander on 27 October; work 
resumed on the thirtieth.70     
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 Scamp’s report was also published on 30 October 1967, after agreement had 
been reached on a return to work.71  It supported the Liverpool dockworkers’ claim 
that they were the lowest earning in the industry and recommended that average 
earnings at the port should be increased through piecework and incentive 
improvements.72  Scamp went further by roundly condemning the effect the ‘welt’ 
had on ‘an efficient system of work’ and ‘proper pay conditions’ at the port.73  
However, he also acknowledged that the ‘welt’ was used by dockers as a means to 
improve earnings by creating additional overtime.  He therefore recommended that 
incentive bonuses be negotiated to help to improve productivity, eliminate restrictive 
practices and prepare the port for modernisation and mechanisation, though these 
discussions should be conducted through the newly-established Local Modernisation 
Committee (LMC).74  Indeed, the EAPL noted after the port got back to full working 
that ‘productivity... had fallen as a result of the disincentive effect of the settlement 
arrived at through Mr. Scamp’s conciliation.  Negotiations with the Union on the 
revision of the Port’s incentive payment system had now started’.75 
The settlement of the dispute was widely interpreted as a significant victory 
for Liverpool’s dockers.76  Moreover, the success of the unofficial action despite 
opposition from their own union, employers and the Government, gave the nascent 
local Shop Steward Committee considerable momentum and general support from 
the quayside: 
 
In 1967 when that shop steward movement came along… the men were 
100% behind [it]... the men themselves elected [the stewards] and over the 
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period of two years [two-year terms] the men could change their opinion… 
and so there was all sorts of factors which created a powerful movement.  A 
very powerful movement.77   
 
The traditionally fragmented nature of labour organisation at Liverpool 
docks, previously characterised by sectionalism, inter-union conflict, selective non-
unionisation and even sectarianism, was to undergo a significant transformation over 
the next few years.  Essential to the process of shop steward empowerment was the 
broader re-orientation of trade union policy on a national scale.  Jack Jones became 
permanent TGWU General Secretary in 1969 and was firmly committed to the 
democratisation of the union through the devolution of bargaining power to shop 
stewards, a policy which began under Frank Cousins.78  In Liverpool, Lew Lloyd 
had been appointed as TGWU District Docks Secretary in 1964, succeeding Jimmy 
O’Hare.  He was native to the city and the industry, having worked on the docks 
prior to becoming an officer.  He shared Jones’ outlook on democratisation, assisting 
in the transition towards an effective local shop steward system in the wake of 
Devlinism.79 
Shop steward elections in the industry were free and inclusive.  There was no 
restriction of choice to TGWU members and this had several ramifications.  Whereas 
the TGWU had traditionally banned Communist Party members from holding union 
positions and sought to marginalise the ‘Blue’ union wherever possible, stewards 
were elected by the workforce of each company in each dock area regardless of their 
union affiliation or political persuasion.80  Lindop argues that this led to the 
integration of militants into the official structure of representation on the docks, 
leading to worse rather than better industrial relations post-1967.81  When combined 
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with the spectre of rapid modernisation and concerns about the long-term future of 
the industry, this could help to explain a spike in strike action thereafter. 
Although shop steward elections were conducted in late 1967 at Liverpool, it 
took twelve months for the system to develop properly.  There were some initial 
organisational difficulties related to the geographical spread of different dock areas 
over approximately ten miles of waterfront and the representation of workers across 
the various port employers.  At the outset the shop steward system operated in an ad-
hoc area-by-area fashion, with no real synchronisation.  Eventually, late in 1968, a 
coherent system emerged with a central committee and regular port-wide shop 
steward meetings attended by as many as one hundred and twenty shop stewards.82  
Indeed, the Committee quickly became the ascendant force in bargaining and policy-
making at Liverpool docks, completely superseding the influence of union officials 
and ultimately dominating the TGWU Docks District Lay Committee.83  The newly-
formed official Port Shop Steward Committee comprised largely of the unofficial 
leaders of the decasualisation strike, subsequently elected as stewards.84 
 In recent years considerable research has been undertaken to establish how 
workplace organisation is cultivated and sustained.85  Kelly, Franzosi and others 
have attempted to advance theories of industrial action based on the process by 
which workers are bound into a collective actor.86  These theories of mobilisation 
emphasise the importance of workplace leadership, usually in the form of shop 
stewards, in framing issues and encouraging collective action where there is thought 
to be a grievance with the behaviour or policies of management.  However, labour 
organisation amongst RDWs at Liverpool differs distinctly from the experience of 
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workers in other industries, particularly factory workers, upon whom the majority of 
previous case studies are based.87 
 Whereas factory workers enjoyed contracts of employment and established 
working patterns, dockers were prone to acute underemployment and casualism prior 
to 1967.  The unofficial Port Workers’ Committee operated in extremely adversarial 
conditions prior to formalisation of an official shop steward system in the industry, 
yet it still managed to effectively mobilise opposition to the Devlin reforms, as well 
as in several other earlier disputes.  One possible explanation for this lies partially in 
the manner in which work was carried out on the docks.  Company foremen 
devolved responsibility for the execution of tasks to the ‘gang’, each with its own 
‘leader’ who organised and represented the other men.88  The arrangement of the 
industry, although rooted in the inequities of the casual system, therefore effectively 
established a surfeit of leaders, responsible for their gang and practised in 
negotiating with management over piecework rates, bonuses etc.  These leaders, 
experienced in ad hoc bargaining and formulating and conveying grievance, formed 
the backbone of the unofficial movement.  The historic intransigence of the TGWU 
officers towards dockers’ grievances merely strengthened their resolve to fight their 
own corner and contributed to the mobilisation of workers across different gangs, 
particularly those working on the same ship, or in the same area of the port.   
 So, whereas factory collectivism is thought to be fostered and maintained by 
a small and select group of activist and leader stewards it could be argued that, 
because of the influence of casualism and the peculiar structure and independence of 
work groups, there was a much larger pool of these figures available to frame issues 
and direct grievance on the docks.  This encouraged a strong and fiercely democratic 
unofficial movement to emerge at the port despite the obvious impact casualism had 
on effective organisation, the principles of which were transposed onto the official 
shop steward system post-1967 and helps to account for the dockers’ propensity for 
workplace activism and militancy.  Of course, these structural realities of the 
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industry were not restricted to Liverpool and the same can be said for other major 
ports in the country experiencing similar changes such as London.89  
  
The opening of Aintree Containerbase 
One of the first major challenges for the recently-established Port Shop 
Steward Committee was the imminent opening of Aintree Containerbase.  The 
Aintree base was a mere few miles from the Liverpool dock estate, one of several 
new container ‘stuffing and stripping’ depots constructed by the Containerbase 
Federation across the country.90  The company was undoubtedly on the leading edge 
of the container revolution and their purpose-built bases were amongst the first to be 
opened.  In 1968, the TGWU and the Federation held discussions over union 
representation at the depots.  It was decided by both parties that negotiations 
regarding recruitment should be conducted with the Road Transport Commercial 
(RTC) section of the TGWU and an agreement was signed in May 1968 to these 
ends.91  Container groupage work was disputed as it did not fall categorically under 
the jurisdiction of the NDLS and the definition of dock-work.  However, mindful of 
how the container-stripping depots would be perceived by the Docks section, 
provision was made in the agreement that ‘preference will be given to Registered 
Dock Workers’ when recruitment began but significantly that ‘consideration will 
also be given to other suitably qualified workers’.92 
The Liverpool Shop Steward Committee was extremely concerned that a 
container-stripping facility was being built close to the dock estate and that exclusive 
right to employment at the depot was not reserved for RDWs.93  Worse still was the 
perception that preference had been given to the RTC section of the Union ahead of 
their own, especially since container-handling was more synonymous with dock-
work.  Despite the Union moving to reassure dockers that preference would be given 
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to RDWs, the Committee announced that it intended to ban the handling of all 
containers through the port until agreement was reached over manning at Aintree.94  
After a three-hour meeting on 28 June 1969 between stewards, the District and 
National Docks Secretaries and the District Docks Committee, Lloyd was forced to 
announce that ‘the shop stewards refused to accept the District Committee decision 
and we couldn’t persuade them to change their minds’.95  The ‘blacking’ of all port-
wide container-handling was frostily-received by the EAPL, which claimed that the 
dispute was solely between the Containerbase Federation and the sections of the 
Union involved.96  It announced that ‘the Liverpool employers have every sympathy 
with the TGWU Docks section that these operations should be carried out by RDWs’ 
but also that ‘there is no dispute involving the port employers and no basis for any 
strike action or any general blacking of containers’.97  Furthermore, the Shop 
Steward Committee announced after the Saturday meeting with TGWU officials that 
the blacking action would be replaced by strike action from Tuesday 1 July 1969. 
For their part, the Containerbase Federation expressed unease at the prospect 
of guaranteeing all work for RDWs.  The company protested that ‘if dockworkers 
were given the work, they questioned whether the Road Transport Section would 
continue to deliver cargoes by lorry’.98  Moreover, Containerbase management felt 
that ‘if after spending millions of pounds [on the bases] dockers were introduced into 
them, all the bad practices would be taken with them and discipline would come 
under the NDLB... it was not just a local strike in Liverpool that was threatened but a 
national disaster’.99  This last assertion made it clear that, although the original 
agreement with the RTC section of the Union made provision for the employment of 
RDWs at Containerbase depots, the company wanted to keep dockworker 
recruitment to a minimum because of their reputation for militancy and the statutory 
protection they were afforded by the Scheme. 
So, in the absence of guarantees that all work at the Aintree depot would be 
the preserve of RDWs, the Shop Steward Committee brought the port to a standstill 
                                                     
94 EAPL meeting minutes, 1 July 1969. 
95 Liverpool Echo, 28 June 1969. 
96 ‘Blacking’, derived from the term ‘blacklegging’, was the name given by dockers to a ban on 
containers with a specific origin or container traffic generally.  
97 Liverpool Echo, 28 June 1969. 
98 EAPL meeting minutes, 1 July 1969. 
99 Ibid. 
98 
 
on 1 July.  Around 8000 dockers had stopped work by 1pm across every area of the 
port, with Birkenhead joining the action the following day.100  This was a vital show 
of strength for the Committee and it was not found wanting.  It placed the utmost 
importance on protecting the definition of dock-work against the encroachment of 
container-stripping depots outside the dock estate.  The reasoning amongst stewards 
was that ‘we knew that if they set it up in Aintree, they’d set it up elsewhere’.101  The 
wholehearted response to the strike from rank-and-file dockers indicates that the 
Shop Steward Committee had begun to operate effectively on a port-wide basis by 
1969 and enjoyed general support from the quayside. 
The effectiveness of the strike call led to a hasty intervention from the Union 
and once again Jack Jones was forced to mediate in a local dispute at the port.  He, 
Tim O’Leary, Ken Jackson (TGWU National Secretary, RTC Section) and Sir 
Andrew Crichton (Chairman of the Containerbase Federation) met at Transport 
House in London to discuss the developing situation.  Despite calls from Jones for 
the dockers to return to work while negotiations were conducted the men remained 
intransigent, voting at a mass meeting on 3 July to continue the strike.102  These were 
the same officials who endorsed the May 1968 manning agreement for 
Containerbase depots, but on this occasion the Union had been placed in a precarious 
position.  It was eager to avoid a high-profile fissure occurring between the two trade 
groups.  At the discussions, Jones argued that Containerbase should unilaterally tear 
up the previous agreement and state that all work at Aintree was dock-work and that 
the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MDHB) should operate as agents to provide 
RDWs for Containerbase.103  This was almost a complete volte face by the Union, 
which insisted on Containerbase dispensing with the agreement unilaterally so that 
the union hierarchy could not be accused of taking sides. 
Meanwhile at the local level, the Liverpool Shop Steward Committee was 
encouraged by the Union to meet members and shop stewards of the local district 
RTC section.  These rank-and-file meetings proved to be extremely fruitful.  While 
the Union hierarchy treaded softly to avoid inter-section conflict, a frank exchange 
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of views locally eventually led to a cordial understanding being reached between the 
Shop Steward Committee and the local RTC section: 
 
It was hard going at first... [but] in the end we developed a good relationship 
with the Road Transport section because they seen it was for their benefit as 
well.  The problem they were suffering was that there were a lot of non-union 
drivers.  So, down the docks, if anyone came in [driving a lorry] we could do 
a [union] card check… and if they never had a card, we could say we’re 
refusing to either load or discharge you…  That’s how the blacking list 
originally came out.104   
 
Co-operation and agreement was reached between the two trade groups regarding 
containerisation as a challenge for both industries that would be met with a united 
front.  A joint Docks-RTC liaison committee was established thereafter to deal with 
matters which concerned both parties.  The strike was called off on Friday 4 July 
after the meeting between Union officials and Containerbase management in London 
ended with an agreement that the twenty existing workers at Aintree would be given 
registered docker status and that all future recruits would come from the local 
register.105  The Containerbase Federation became licensed as a registered employer 
with the local Dock Labour Board.  Once elected, the shop stewards for Aintree 
would sit on the Port Shop Steward Committee.106  Containerbase had been forced to 
concede the dockers’ demands and found itself in exactly the position it feared – 
compelled to exclusively employ RDWs and bound by the restrictions of the 
Scheme. 
The Aintree dispute had a two-fold effect on local labour relations at the port: 
it further emboldened support from the quayside for the Shop Steward Committee 
and demonstrated its ability to pursue its policies without support from the TGWU, 
thus increasingly consigning the official machinery of the union to virtual 
redundancy in local negotiations and policy making.  The Union had undoubtedly 
been forced into an inauspicious u-turn by the voracious nature of the dockers’ 
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action, having authorised the Containerbase manning agreement only a year earlier.  
Furthermore, the Aintree dispute illustrated the difficulties shipping and cargo 
companies would face if actively seeking to circumvent the Scheme locally by 
outsourcing container-stripping duties.  A prominent member of the Committee 
emphasised the importance of the Aintree settlement, ‘I think once [employers] 
realised that they had to employ Registered Dock Workers to work [in container-
stripping depots] they were useless anyway’.107 
Indeed prior to Aintree, Liverpool’s port employers had already been 
approached by the Shop Steward Committee regarding container-stripping duties on 
the dock estate - ‘we had agreements in the early days with the dock company 
management when they suggested to us that they were going into containerisation… 
on a 100% understanding that all ancillary work would be ours’.108  If there was any 
lingering hope amongst employers inside and outside the port that they might use 
containerisation to dilute dockworkers’ statutory jurisdiction over cargo-handling, 
the Aintree dispute certainly extinguished it.  The ‘stuffing and stripping’ issue 
heralded a major point of future conflict in the industry both nationally and locally, a 
fact clearly not lost on the Liverpool Shop Steward Committee.  They had moved 
quickly to impose their interpretation of the Scheme onto this emerging threat to 
employment in the industry, namely that ‘anything within… a five mile radius [of 
the docks] was dock-work as far as we were concerned’.109  The consensus reached 
with the local Road Transport section meant that any disputes over the outsourcing 
of container-stripping duties would be met with a united front, a development which 
would prove important in the future.  By 1969 in Liverpool therefore, it appears that 
a strong, influential and well-organised Shop Steward Committee had come to the 
fore, pro-active in the defence of their local industry and prepared to defy employers, 
their union and the Government if necessary. 
 
The 1970 national dock strike 
Although bargaining in the dock industry was being rapidly decentralised to 
the local level, the TGWU was still responsible for negotiating the national basic 
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weekly time rate.110  Prior to the Devlin reforms the Union submitted an annual pay 
claim at the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry (NJC), a tradition 
which persisted in the medium term.111  Negotiations in 1968 and 1969 concluded 
with an increase in holiday entitlement, improved employer pension contribution and 
the weekly minimum guarantee being calculated on a daily basis.112  The TGWU, 
having failed to secure an increase in the weekly rate in previous years, lodged a 
claim for a substantial increase at the NJC in 1970.113  This was strongly resisted by 
NAPE because the ongoing local negotiations over the implementation of Devlin 
Phase Two would account for any increase in the time rate on a port-by-port basis.  
NAPE and the EAPL’s stance on the issue was clear: 
  
Since 85% of men [across the industry] were covered by talks currently 
proceeding on modernisation, employers were not prepared to increase the 
basic rate of £11.1.8 because of the consequential effect on piecework etc, 
which would set modernisation back for some years.114            
 
NAPE was mindful that any rise in the basic rate was customarily accompanied by 
improvements in piecework and overtime premiums.115  Pre-empting the Phase Two 
negotiations by agreeing a nationally-dictated time rate increase would likely 
escalate the cost of settling local modernisation negotiations.  In the face of a total 
rejection of the Union’s claim, a TGWU National Dock Delegates Conference 
endorsed a call for a strike and tended twenty-eight days strike notice which was to 
commence on 14 July 1970.116  However, despite the threat of a national strike 
NAPE was determined not to concede a national pay rise that would be closely 
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followed by a local rise.  A game of brinkmanship played out between the two right 
up until a couple of days before the strike was due to commence. 
Although the Government had initially expressed indifference to the dispute, 
as the deadline neared Robert Carr, Secretary of State for Employment, was forced 
to intervene by arranging tri-partite talks for 10 July.117  At these talks, Jones and 
O’Leary argued that the Union had attempted to negotiate a basic time rate increase 
in previous years and had been stonewalled by NAPE.  For the employers’ part, Bill 
Tonge (Chairman of NAPE) contended that the national basic time rate would soon 
become superfluous once local Phase Two deals had been agreed and that even if 
employers were to sanction such a rise it would only benefit those RDWs at small 
ports where modernisation talks were not applicable.118  Tonge did actually approach 
the NAPE Executive for authority to raise the basic rate from £11.1.8 to £13.1.8 if it 
would secure an agreement, but his request was refused.119  Employers were, 
however, willing to make concessions in other areas.  They suggested increasing the 
basic rate to £20 for those RDWs at smaller ports not covered by Phase Two 
negotiations.  A further £1 per week was offered on top of the weekly modernisation 
payment for all RDWs.  In addition they offered increases to fall-back pay, also to be 
applied to holiday pay.120  These last two provisions ensured that the proposed deal 
would offer an improvement on take-home pay for all RDWs without prejudicing 
local negotiations over Phase Two.121  Carr also promised to set up an inquiry into 
the basic rate discord.  On this basis, at the tri-partite discussions, the Union side 
agreed to seek deferment of the strike.122 
These last-ditch talks did not conclude until late on Monday 13 June.  With 
just hours remaining until Britain’s ports would grind to a standstill, Jones took to 
the television to appeal to dockers to postpone their strike action until a Dock 
Delegates Conference could reconvene on 15 June to debate the employers’ offer.123  
Nevertheless, Jones’ appeal was either too late or largely ignored.  At the port of 
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Liverpool, only approximately 1000 dockers out of 12,000 turned in for work and 
the port was brought to a halt.124  At a mass meeting at the Pier Head attended by 
3000, which was originally arranged as the first of a series of strike meetings, the 
dockers voted for an immediate return to work starting with the night shift that 
evening.  Jimmy Symes, Chairman of the Port Shop Steward Committee, told the 
gathered rank-and-file ‘we are as confused as you are’.  Lew Lloyd took to the 
platform to apologise for the perplexity, blaming the last-minute nature of the deal 
and Jones’ appeal, stating ‘we had no opportunity to get this across to you’.125 
The final hour agreement reached on 13 June seemed to avert the first official 
national dock strike since 1926.  However, when Jones addressed the recalled Dock 
Delegate Conference on 15 June to request that the strike mandate be deferred by 
four weeks while the employers’ offer was examined, the motion was marginally 
defeated.126  Instead, the original motion endorsing strike action ‘until the claim for a 
higher national basic rate is achieved’ was refloated and was successful.127  The 
national strike was back on and commenced the following day.  This development 
encouraged the Government to bring forward the Inquiry into the pay claim, which 
was to be headed by Lord Pearson.128  NAPE registered its disapproval of the strike 
by releasing a statement which read:  
 
The employers greatly regret that there should be a national dock strike in 
view of the offer already tabled.  Following the [Dock Delegates] conference 
Mr. Jones asked employers for talks on the claim for a higher national basic 
rate.  The employers are prepared to hold talks only in the event... that the 
strike is withdrawn.129     
 
However, Liverpool’s Port Shop Steward Committee seemed determined that strike 
action should be taken to secure the increase in basic rate.  The delegates from 
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Liverpool who attended the recalled conference voted overwhelmingly for the 
original strike mandate to be carried.130  The mood of the Committee is clear from a 
telegram sent to Jack Jones from the Treasurer, Frank Deegan: 
 
Merseyside dock stewards support the Docks’ Conference rejection of the 
employers’ disgusting offer.  We call on [TGWU] Executive Council support 
in our determined stand for a £20 basic wage, nothing less.  The employers 
are responsible for this fight – let’s give them one.  We call on the Executive 
Council to instruct dockers to prepare, if necessary, for [a] long struggle.131 
  
 
Lord Pearson commenced his inquiry with a fair degree of urgency on 21 
July as the Government declared a State of Emergency.132  The strike was proving 
solid and even TGWU members at non-Scheme ports such as Felixstowe had 
stopped work under instruction from the Union.133  Both employers and the Union 
had elected to wait until the Pearson recommendations were known before resuming 
talks.  It was in this context that a hurried Inquiry was conducted, lasting just one 
week.  The Report was published on 28 July and it found broadly in favour of the 
Union.  The claim for a £20 per week basic rate was not endorsed; instead take-home 
pay was increased by enhancing the overtime premium.  However, a £20 per week 
minimum fall-back guarantee broken down into a £4 per day was recommended, 
accompanied by a minimum £1 per week increase in modernisation payments.134  
The employers agreed to abide by Pearson’s recommendations, particularly since 
they had not been forced to concede the basic rate increase.135  Essentially, the strike 
had failed in achieving its stated aim although all RDWs saw improvements in their 
take-home pay.  At a Dock Delegates Conference on 29 July, a return to work 
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motion was successful by fifty-one votes to thirty-one.136  The fact that the basic rate 
had not specifically been adjusted was not lost on some activists, who voiced their 
disapproval as delegates left the conference at Transport House with shouts of 
‘you’ve sold us out’ and ‘we want Jack Jones’.137  Nevertheless, at a mass meeting 
on 31 July at Liverpool Stadium, local dockers accepted the deal and followed other 
ports back to work on 3 August. 
 The first national dock strike in forty-four years had been ended by yet 
another government-sponsored public inquiry.  However, the strike had been a rather 
strange and unconventional affair from the start.  Although the original action was 
pursued by the official leadership in furtherance of its national wage claim, its 
attempts to call off the strike at the final hour were defeated by a more militant 
section of the Dock Delegates Conference.  So why did the official leadership of 
Jones and O’Leary briefly lose control of events despite being the initial architects of 
the dispute?  Both Lindop and Wilson attribute the strike to a number of militant 
delegates from the two major ports who wished to broaden its remit to contest the 
impact of technology on job prospects in the industry.138  Indeed, the strike was 
strongly supported by delegates from the ports of London and Liverpool yet their 
constituencies had the least to gain from an increase in the basic time rate because 
earnings once Phase Two negotiations were completed would far outstrip this figure.  
One possible but unlikely egalitarian explanation for the dispute could be that 
dockers’ leaders from these ports wanted to ensure that those smaller ports not 
included in Phase Two negotiations also enjoyed a fair deal.139  Another possible 
interpretation, and one that this study offers, is that the rebel delegates intended to 
up-stage the leadership to illustrate where the power in the ports now lay, that is in 
the hands of local committees.  Certainly, as Wilson also contends, the hi-jacking of 
the return to work conference was a feat of opportunism by more militant members, 
although the Union leadership was able to quickly bring the dispute back under its 
influence through the intervention of the Government and the establishment of the 
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Pearson Inquiry.140  The intra-union power struggle interpretation seems to hold 
good since the recurring question of who held the influence in the Docks section of 
the TGWU manifests itself again later as the dockers came into conflict with the 
Industrial Relations Act. 
 
The implementation of Devlin Phase 2 at Liverpool 
 At most ports around the country, Devlin Phase Two was implemented in late 
1970.  Modernisation arrangements were negotiated at port-wide level through Local 
Modernisation Committees in order to tailor deals to the specific needs of each.  
However, for a number of reasons, Liverpool’s Phase Two negotiations did not 
begin until mid-1970 and were not concluded until over a year later.  Primarily, both 
employers and dockers were indifferent to further reforms.  The dockers were 
enjoying previously-unrivalled earning potential and conditions under the first stage 
of Devlin through improvements to local piecework deals.  For their part the 
employers were eager to ensure the continued smooth running of operations, 
especially as local industrial strife had been minimal since the 1970 national strike.  
Indeed the EAPL noted as late as May 1971 that ‘the labour force in Liverpool had 
hung back over Devlin II and perhaps some employers were not too unthankful after 
seeing the results of modernisation in some other ports... The Chairman said that 
most men were apparently quite content with the current working of the Port’.141 
 Furthermore, despite escalating labour surpluses at other major ports, 
Liverpool’s employers bucked the industry-wide trend by applying to the NDLB for 
additional recruitment to the local register.  The initial application for a significant 
influx of seven hundred and thirty-two new RDWs was made in February 1969, 
although the process was delayed well into 1971 because of shop stewards’ 
insistence that the Union nominate one hundred percent of the intake.142  Agreement 
between the Union and employers regarding future recruitment had been reached in 
July 1968 on a ratio of sixty/forty in favour of the Union.  Nevertheless, stewards 
reneged on the deal, making it clear that no recruitment would be considered unless 
nomination was wholly in their hands.  This stalemate had persisted for two years 
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with neither side willing to concede to the other’s demands.143  However, with the 
labour shortage at the port becoming more acute, the employers need for additional 
men forced them to re-open negotiations.  The serious situation of manning at the 
Port was debated, at length, by the EAPL: 
 
People were talking about the rundown of labour because of containerisation 
but the Port was turning away practically every day shipping lines which 
wanted to come to Liverpool.  This was because neither labour nor the 
required turnaround could be guaranteed...  If they failed to take up the 732 
men, even though they had to forego their principles to do so, the Port would 
become more difficult to keep afloat.144 
 
 
 Despite the debilitating effect the shortage was having on attracting new 
business to the port, some employers remained extremely hostile to the notion of 
allowing shop stewards to effectively hold them to ransom.  Foremost amongst their 
concerns was that conceding the issue ‘would be seen as caving in by employers’ 
and that ‘new entrants would identify shop stewards, rather than employers, as being 
in command’.145  Nevertheless, following a frank and heated exchange of views the 
Committee of the Association, by a narrow majority, agreed to one hundred percent 
nomination by the Union.146  The labour shortage at Liverpool, which was 
uncharacteristic of the industry as a whole, is another example of the disparities 
between major Scheme ports, thus emphasising the need for more focused local 
study of the type which this thesis provides. 
 Meanwhile, running almost parallel to the protracted recruitment dispute, 
tentative discussions were underway regarding the implementation of the Phase 
Two.  Initially, employers hoped to achieve an agreement on shift working, night and 
Sunday working and the abolition of overtime and piecework, to be replaced with an 
incentive-based bonus system.147  However, early reactions from the Union side of 
the LMC indicated that Sunday working was unacceptable and ‘while older men 
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might be more favourable disposed, the younger men did not like the loss of 
[piecework] and the restriction of earnings to £35 [per week]’.148  As negotiations 
progressed, consensus was almost reached regarding basic pay with the employers’ 
offer of £25 for a forty hour week.  The Union side of the LMC agreed to a two 
eight-hour shift working pattern but insisted the basic pay offer should be raised to 
£27 and that piecework should be retained.149  This was eventually agreed by 
employers.  The basic weekly wage would be supplemented by incentive-based and 
piecework bonuses which could considerably enhance earnings as well as weekly 
modernisation allowances.150  In the context of the unrest which accompanied the 
introduction of Devlin Phase One in 1967, the Phase Two negotiations had 
proceeded relatively quickly and quietly.  The Agreement was ratified at a mass 
meeting of RDWs on Saturday 21 August.151  However, because some small issues 
remained outstanding, its implementation was delayed until 2 October 1971.152   
The case of implementation of Devlin Phase Two at Liverpool illustrates the 
complex and inconsistent nature of the local industry.  Whereas other ports saw 
piecework scrapped as part of the Phase Two modernisation Liverpool, having only 
recently negotiated a satisfactory piecework system under Phase One, retained it.  
Indeed, Liverpool’s piecework rates were a significant contributory factor to the 
industrial strife which surrounded the implementation of Phase One.  Local 
Modernisation Committees were given considerable scope to negotiate their own 
Phase Two deals as necessary to boost productivity and such was Liverpool dockers’ 
affinity for the potential enhancement in earning opportunities which piecework 
offered, the employers dare not scrap it despite initially being in favour of doing so.  
Nevertheless, employers had gained some concessions by formalising hours of work 
into shift-patterns and attaining a degree of workforce flexibility.  Yet again, these 
negotiations demonstrate that local labour relations and work culture were inherently 
complex and underline the dangers of attempting to apply industry-wide assumptions 
or theoretical generalisations to an exceptionally nuanced situation.  As shall be 
revealed in due course, the formalisation of piecework rates at Liverpool at the 
dockers’ behest did little to suppress industrial strife at the port.  Both Wilson and 
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Mellish argue that, since London’s strike record improved notably after 
decasualisation whilst Liverpool’s worsened, the highly conditional nature of 
piecework can be regarded as significant in determining strike proneness.153  
However, this supposition has since been challenged by Turnbull and Sapsford, who 
contend that mechanisation and its consequences for manning levels and the 
definition of dock work, was the most significant impetus to industrial unrest post-
Devlin.154 
 
Conflict at Liverpool docks, 1972: The ‘blacking’ of haulage companies and the 
NIRC 
The story of the London dockworkers’ encounter with the Industrial 
Relations Act has been relatively well-researched and documented.155  Unofficial 
industrial action, organised by the local stewards’ committee, principally picketing 
Midland Cold Storage and Chobham Farm groupage depots, resulted in an 
extraordinary series of events in the summer of 1972 leading to the imprisonment of 
five dockers at Pentonville gaol under a warrant of contempt by the National 
Industrial Relations Court.  This crisis shook the whole country, leading almost 
inconceivably to a TUC call for a General Strike and forcing the Conservative 
Government into a significant retreat via a very visible political intervention into the 
institution of the judiciary.  However, while the most dramatic episode of this docks 
dispute occurred in London and has predictably attracted the most interest, the whole 
affair had its origins in the industrial action taken by Liverpool’s dockers earlier that 
year. 
The Liverpool dockers’ blacking campaign against haulage companies 
considered to be undertaking container ‘stuffing and stripping’ duties without 
registered labour was the first major challenge to the Industrial Relations Act and the 
NIRC, providing the catalyst for later events in London.  Liverpool’s role in this 
dispute is often under-played or omitted completely, in favour of a London-centric or 
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institutional approach.156  Moreover, running concurrently with the broader national 
furore were a series of local disputes relating to the opening of the brand-new 
container-handling facility at the Royal Seaforth Docks Complex.  The object of this 
section is to analyse more closely the actions and strategy of the Liverpool Port Shop 
Steward Committee in its campaign for jurisdiction over local container-stripping 
duties and the sequence of events this set into motion both locally and nationally. 
Labour relations in the dock industry became increasingly fractious in the 
early 1970s.  As previously noted, the implementation of Devlin Phase 2 was dogged 
by delays, 1970 had brought the first national dock strike since 1926, 
containerisation was in the ascendancy and related employer abuse of loopholes in 
the Scheme were escalating.  Add to these factors the growth of increasingly 
defensive and influential local shop steward committees, the formation of the 
unofficial National Port Shop Stewards Committee (NPSSC), fears about 
redundancy and the broader national industrial relations climate as previously 
detailed, and it appeared that all the ingredients for a potential flashpoint of militancy 
in the dock industry were present. 
The defence of manning levels and perpetuation of job opportunities in the 
face of containerisation were of paramount concern for local shop steward 
committees.  In London, the unchecked growth of the TUR and the outsourcing of 
container-stripping were the major sources of consternation.  Similarly, in Liverpool 
the issue proved to be jurisdiction over ‘stuffing and stripping’ duties.  A meeting of 
the NPSSC was arranged for December 1971 to debate the broader national strategy 
of job defence in the industry.  It agreed on a three-point policy: that all ‘stuffing and 
stripping’ of containers, regardless of the location, should be the preserve of 
registered dockworkers; that all unregistered ports should be brought into the 
Scheme; that the TUR should be abolished in every port.157  However, there were 
divisions amongst the delegates regarding how to proceed.  London proposed a 
national strike a few months later as more stevedoring companies pulled out of the 
port, leaving their workforces on the burgeoning local TUR.  This was resisted by 
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Liverpool, where the local steward committee was more interested in formulating a 
local campaign on the ‘stuffing and stripping’ issue, especially since the construction 
of the up-river Seaforth Container Terminal was continuing apace, due for unveiling 
in 1972.158 
Having witnessed the growth of local steward-led militancy at the port, the 
EAPL was enthused by the change of government in June 1970.  At the 
Association’s Annual General Meeting in May 1971, the Chairman celebrated the 
Conservative’s entry to office as heralding the death of the spectre of nationalisation 
of the dock industry.  Moreover, the employers’ optimism was further enhanced by 
the announcement of the introduction of the Industrial Relations Bill.  The Bill was 
seen as a means to control the influence of the local steward committee at the port 
and was ‘welcomed by the Association as legislation which was badly needed by the 
Port of Liverpool... and must inspire them all with hope for the future’.159  Such was 
the belief amongst employers at the port that the legislation would help to restore 
managerial prerogative, the Chairman of the Association encouraged its members to 
‘redouble their efforts to seek new business in the faith that fair industrial weather 
was ahead’.160 
However, the Association’s hope that improved industrial relations might 
result from the punitive aspects of the Industrial Relations Bill was found to be 
somewhat premature.  The legislation had caused considerable alarm at the official 
national level of the trade union movement but had little impact on the Liverpool 
stewards’ intention to pro-actively defend the local industry against the outsourcing 
of container-stripping duties.  Although assurances had been received from port 
employers and the Port Authority regarding container ancillary work, several 
independent haulage companies were undertaking ‘stuffing and stripping’ operations 
at their depots outside the dock estate.161  As previously detailed, the 1969 Aintree 
Containerbase dispute was significant because it was the first test of the local 
steward committee and was characterised by co-operation between the dock shop 
stewards and the local Road Transport Commercial section.  As a result, a joint 
docks-RTC liaison committee had been established and had operated locally 
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thereafter.  So, in the context of more and more haulage companies endeavouring to 
engage in their own container-stripping duties, the joint-liaison committee 
formulated a strategy to compel them to use RDW labour at their depots or transfer 
these operations inside the dock estate. 
In February 1972, the joint committee drafted an unofficial agreement to be 
signed by all haulage companies using Liverpool docks, specifically stating that all 
‘stuffing and stripping’ of containers would be carried out by either registered 
dockers or unionised workers on the same terms and conditions.162  The deadline to 
sign was set for Monday 20 March.  All haulage firms using the port were presented 
with the document upon arrival at the various dock gates.  Faced with the option of 
being turned away and blacked thereafter, most of them conceded to the demands 
and signed the agreement.  However, a select few were not so co-operative.  
Heaton’s of St. Helens refused to sign the document by the deadline and were the 
first to be blacked at the port - one of their trucks was immediately turned away at 
the gates of Gladstone dock on 20 March.163  Heaton’s management continued to 
refuse to concede to the dockers’ demands and instead reported the TGWU to the 
National Industrial Relations Court, applying for a temporary order to force dockers 
to load/discharge their vehicles.  The hearing took place on Wednesday 22 March, 
despite the non-attendance of the TGWU.164  The president of the NIRC, Sir John 
Donaldson, ordered that the TGWU ‘must stop [the] unfair industrial practice’ at 
Liverpool docks, issuing an interim order to cease the blacking of Heaton’s and 
inviting the Union to present its argument the following Monday when the court re-
convened.165 
Heaton’s willingness to immediately report the TGWU to the NIRC took the 
joint committee by surprise.166  However despite the court’s order, the blacking 
continued and was extended to other reticent companies.  In fact, before the NIRC 
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even had the chance to reconvene on Monday 27 March another haulage company, 
Bishop’s Wharf of Warrington, had applied to the court claiming they too had been 
denied entry at Liverpool docks for refusing to sign the joint committee’s 
agreement.167  The TGWU again boycotted the court on 27 March where another 
temporary order was issued, this time to desist in blacking activities against Bishop’s 
Wharf.  The Union was once more summoned to explain itself before the NIRC on 
Wednesday 29 March.  On this occasion, its non-attendance was viewed more dimly: 
the NIRC imposed a fine of £5000 on the TGWU for contempt of court, suspended 
for two weeks.168  It also threatened possible sequestration of the union’s assets if it 
continued its policy of boycott and non-recognition. 
The threat of sequestration shocked the TGWU into action.  Although the 
TUC boycott of the NIRC was still in effect, the judgement had placed the Union in 
a precarious position.  Jack Jones appealed to the Liverpool stewards to suspend their 
action while negotiations with the haulage companies could be conducted.  The 
attitude of the dockers is clear from Jones’ account: 
 
I myself was opposed to the blacking activities… I personally made appeals 
by telephone to shop stewards in Liverpool docks.  They listened to my 
views and in response told me that the docks were at boiling point; the work 
was moving away from dockland ‘like butter melting in the sun’.169  
   
 The £5000 fine for the Union brought no change in approach from the 
Liverpool dockers.  At a mass meeting called immediately after the judgement, they 
voted unanimously to continue the blacking action.170  In the meantime another 
haulage firm, Craddock’s of Wolverhampton, had been added to the blacking list at 
Liverpool docks for refusing to sign the joint committee’s agreement and had also 
applied to the NIRC for a temporary order.171  The dispute had reached an impasse 
and the case was due for resumption at the NIRC imminently.  The TGWU 
maintained its boycott of the court and the pressure was building towards a 
potentially divisive watershed in contemporary industrial relations.  This view is 
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reflected by comments made in the House of Commons by Walton (Liverpool) 
Labour M.P. Eric Heffer: 
 
Is it not clear that the operation of the Act must be becoming a great 
embarrassment to the Government, particularly in view of the situation 
developing in Liverpool where the dockers are carrying out what in their 
view is a traditional trade union activity?  Is it not advisable for the 
Government to advise employers not to rush into the use of this Act where 
the result can be large-scale industrial action which could have been avoided 
by normal industrial practice?  Do not the Government recognise that they 
have got themselves into a very dangerous and difficult situation?172 
 
 The pending NIRC judgements were nervously anticipated by several parties.  
The TGWU and TUC were persevering with their policy of non-attendance, though 
were privately expecting the worst.173  Even some sections of the Government 
watched on with unease at the potential chaos a harsh judgement could wreak, 
especially over such a comparatively minor and localised dispute.  A Government 
source expressed anxiety at the situation, commenting that ‘we were hoping the Act 
would stay in the background… now there will be dozens of nutty employers 
queuing up to have a go at their militant shop stewards’.174 
There was considerable pressure from all sides for the Liverpool Shop 
Steward Committee and Heaton’s to negotiate.  It appeared that neither the 
Government nor the TGWU wanted the comparatively minor dispute to escalate.  To 
these ends, the Department of Employment arranged for tri-partite negotiations 
between Heaton’s, the TGWU and a delegation of Liverpool stewards at Transport 
House Liverpool on 10 April 1972.175  However, on Sunday 9 April at a mass 
meeting of 5000 at Liverpool Stadium, the dockers voted overwhelmingly in favour 
of the continuation of the blacking strategy.176  The local committee therefore 
refused to attend, standing up the TGWU officials and Heaton’s management.  
Robert Heaton, joint Managing Director of Heaton’s Transport, is quoted as saying 
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that ‘we have bent over backwards to try and meet the dock shop stewards… but 
[none] turned up’.177  However, behind the scenes, the Liverpool stewards painted a 
wholly different picture of Heaton’s alleged willingness to negotiate.  Indeed, Jimmy 
Symes recollects a somewhat hostile previous meeting between Heaton’s 
management and the Committee regarding the unofficial ‘stuffing and stripping’ 
agreement: 
 
Bob Heaton [junior] had that pen in his hand… he was about to sign the 
agreement and for whatever reason… he said ‘I’ll just have to clear up one or 
two points and I will be back tomorrow’… When Heaton’s came back the 
next day [it] was a different group of people… it was his father then, it was 
old Bob Heaton… he said ‘who are you, a little Communist bastard like you, 
dictating to me and the Road Haulage Association and everyone else, over 
my dead body will we sign that form’.  We said ‘well, if it’s a fight to the 
finish then you’ll be dead before we are Bob’… and then we really started 
putting pressure on Heaton’s when they were coming down to the docks.  We 
set up blacking them and we then started getting writs all over the place and 
so forth… this is the game old Bob Heaton played and we suspected he had 
then become a front man for the Haulage Association…  He was prepared to 
make himself available at meetings, [but] I think that’s all it was.  It was a 
charade and he was really coming down in order to say to people ‘I’m doing 
my best’… [but] there was just no move [on Heaton’s behalf].  Now all we 
ever said to Bob Heaton was… we don’t want no arguments, we don’t want 
to fight you… we don’t want to put you out of business, in fact we want to 
get an agreement with you whereby your business will be protected.  Now the 
only way we can do that is by you signing the appropriate form, and we 
advised him that he was not setting a precedent [because] at that point in time 
we had just done a hundred genuine… well-established companies who had 
signed those forms.178 
 
The idea that Heaton’s was a front for a broader collusion between employers’ 
associations, and even the Government, was popular amongst shop stewards.179   
Certainly, the Road Haulage Association was in favour of the abolition of the NDLS 
and had lobbied members and the Government to these ends.180  The Confederation 
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of British Industry (CBI) also rallied against attempts by dockworkers to preserve all 
container work for themselves.181  Similarly, NAPE and the local dock employers’ 
associations harboured a traditional hostility to the statutory protection offered to 
dockers and its bearing on managerial prerogative.  The Heaton’s affair was 
undoubtedly a test-case not only in the climate of the Industrial Relations Act but 
also in the context of the evolving definition of dock-work and control of the 
increasingly lucrative ‘stuffing and stripping’ sub-industry created by the 
proliferation of containerisation.  Whether there was a concerted effort by those 
companies involved or their associations to challenge the dockworkers’ privileges 
via the Heaton’s case is uncertain, however at the very least it is clear that there were 
a number of parties with a vested interest in the outcome and its potential 
implications. 
 So, in the absence of any meaningful negotiations between Heaton’s and the 
joint Dock-RTC committee and the inability of the TGWU to dissuade stewards 
from their blacking action, the company re-applied to the NIRC complaining that its 
interim order was being ignored.  On 20 April the Court imposed another fine of 
£50,000 and threatened the union with sequestration of assets for repeated 
contempt.182  The date for payment of the fines was set at the 4th May.183  Members 
of the Liverpool Shop Steward Committee met union leaders at Transport House 
(Liverpool) the following day to discuss the response to the fines.184  The judgement 
had obviously caused alarm with all directly and indirectly involved.  A couple of 
days earlier, prior to the NIRC’s second judgement, Jack Jones had written to Vic 
Feather (General Secretary of the TUC) requesting advice on the boycott policy in 
relation to the original contempt fine.185  The 20 April ruling sent Feather ‘rushing’ 
over to Transport House (London) to urgently discuss the potential ramifications for 
the trade union movement.186  Jones feelings on the situation were clear: ‘the union 
was caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.  From the dockers there were 
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increasing calls for a national strike; on the other hand the threat of sequestration 
posed a challenge to the very existence of the TGWU’.187      
In response to the NIRC judgement, Jimmy Symes commented that he 
deplored the ‘vicious’ fine but significantly vowed that ‘at this stage [it] is not going 
to influence our decision [to continue blacking]’.188  At a hastily-arranged meeting of 
the TUC General Council, the official trade union movement considered its 
response.  While the TGWU wanted to maintain its policy of non-cooperation with 
the NIRC, the General Council appeared to be contemplating the lifting of the 
boycott.189  Eventually, the TUC advised the TGWU to pay the fines (with financial 
assistance from Congress) and then appeal against the judgement, though crucially 
this meant recognition of the Court.190  A motion by Jones to convene a Special 
Congress in order to co-ordinate a united strategy towards the Industrial Relations 
Act was also rejected when put to a vote.191 
With the threat of sequestration looming and the collapse of the TUC 
boycott, the TGWU finally sent legal counsel to the NIRC for the hearing on 3 May.  
Peter Pain Q.C., representing, asked for a review of the fines but his plea was 
rejected by the court.192  He argued that the Union had done all it could to dissuade 
the Liverpool shop stewards from their course and had considered withdrawing their 
credentials, but felt this would only exacerbate the situation further.193  The TGWU 
was forced to pay the fine but immediately took its case to the Court of Appeal; the 
hearing was set for the 13 June.194  Furthermore, although the Union had paid the 
fines, the NIRC’s order to desist in blacking Heaton’s was still being ignored by the 
Liverpool dockers.  On 12 May, after a further complaint from the company that the 
court order was not being heeded, the NIRC reconvened and threatened the TGWU 
with ‘unlimited sequestration’ if it did not discipline its members who were flouting 
the ruling.  It gave the union twenty-one days to co-operate.195 
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The manoeuvring in the institutional echelons still did not alter the Liverpool 
stewards’ blacking strategy, however.  Indeed, the blacking of Heaton’s and other 
haulage companies continued unabated at Liverpool docks right up to the deadline 
set by the NIRC for the TGWU to appear in court.  Their approach was increasingly 
drawing the dockers into conflict with the official machinery of the TGWU:196 
 
We couldn’t move [from our position]… we did have a confrontation, we did 
have visits from the [Union’s] legal people and we were told the hazards and 
dangers and we said ‘well, that’s unfortunate you know’.  I think if I had to 
spend one night in one of Her Majesty’s prisons, I probably wouldn’t be 
there the next morning.  But on that occasion [in relation to the Heaton’s 
case] it did look as if someone in Liverpool was likely to be the first taken [to 
prison]… we were prepared to do that and yes we were prepared to say to the 
union hierarchy ‘no sorry we’re not moving, this is one we can’t lose, this is 
one we’re not going to lose’… therefore at that point in time, yes, we were 
prepared to defy the national people of our union.197 
 
In fact whilst the original cases were being heard, the stewards had decided on 4 
May to extend the blacking to a further thirteen uncooperative firms.198  The 
Liverpool stewards’ committee was concerned with escalating the action further, not 
calling it off.   For its part the EAPL, which had previously remained indifferent to 
the action insisting the issue was between those companies involved and the 
stewards, was now reluctantly drawn into the dispute because ‘the extended blacking 
could cover 5% of lorry traffic [at the port]’.199  It initially elected to keep a watchful 
eye on the situation, however, acknowledging that any disciplinary intervention in 
the dispute could bring the whole port to a standstill.200 
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By late April, the blacking action instigated by the Liverpool stewards had 
spread to other major Scheme ports in the country.  Stewards at Hull and London 
began a blacking campaign of their own related to the ‘stuffing and stripping’ issue 
and both the Union and individual stewards were later called before the NIRC to 
explain their actions.201  As the TGWU argued its case at the NIRC on 3 May 
regarding the Heaton’s fine, the National Joint Council for the Port Transport 
Industry (NJC) met in London to discuss possible solutions to the container-blacking 
action.202  However, it struggled to make any meaningful progress and at a special 
conference in London the next day TGWU Dock Delegates voted in favour of a 
national strike, tending twenty-eight days notice.203  The Government was pushed 
into action with the official notification of a national dock strike.  The TGWU had 
followed the procedure enshrined in the Industrial Relations Act regarding proper 
notification of strike action, thus making the proposed strike within the law. 
On 17 May the Secretary of State for Employment, Maurice Macmillan, 
convened a meeting with employers to discuss the containerisation dispute, having 
met with Jack Jones the day before.  This meeting was attended by Bill Tonge 
(Chairman of NAPE), Sir Andrew Crichton (Chairman of Containerbase) and 
representatives from the Road Haulage Association and the Industry of Freight 
Forwarders.204  The employers expressed their stern opposition to any attempt to 
extend the Scheme to inland depots and non-Scheme ports – ‘any suggestion that 
some of their members would be required to use dock labour for stuffing and 
stripping was a non-starter; this was work which their members had been doing for 
many years’.205  The Department of Employment was mindful of the dockers’ 
perception of the ‘stuffing and stripping’ question, commenting that ‘this was of 
great emotional significance’ to the workforce.206  It appeared that the dispute was in 
deadlock with neither side willing to negotiate on the core issue. 
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The opening of Seaforth Container Terminal 
 While the blacking dispute continued at Liverpool and its consequences were 
being felt across the country in relation to the NIRC, another container-related issue 
threatened normal operations at the port.  Seaforth Container Terminal was due to 
open for business in May 1972.  This new container-handling facility took several 
years to build at enormous expense to the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company 
(MDHC), successive governments and private investors.207  The Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company, formerly the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MDHB), was 
the Port Authority and, prior to 1972, a fairly insignificant employer of RDW labour.  
However, its role within the port was to undergo drastic changes.  This was partially 
because, by the end of the 1960s, the MDHB was in dire financial trouble.  The 
Board was a public trust dating back to its creation under an Act of Parliament in 
1858 and as such was costing the Government and taxpayers a substantial amount in 
annual losses.  The new Conservative Government elected to sell the MDHB into 
private ownership in 1970 and it was listed on the London Stock Exchange.  As part 
of the deal which saw the company privatised the Government waived its debts, 
which were in excess of £100 million, in return for a twenty percent ‘golden share’ 
in the renamed and refinanced Mersey Docks and Harbour Company.208 
 Prior to the MDHB’s privatisation, the Government had begun to invest 
millions of pounds in modernising the port to prepare for containerisation and 
investment continued apace after privatisation.  This involved renovating existing 
facilities at the Gladstone and Hornby docks, but the majority of investment was 
ploughed into the construction of a series of brand new purpose-built docks, the 
Royal Seaforth Docks Complex.  Seaforth was perceived as the future for the port 
and consisted of four technologically-advanced docks, the largest for container-
handling and three others each geared towards specific commodities.209  Obviously, 
the opening of the first dedicated container terminal in the port of Liverpool was of 
prime concern to the local steward committee. 
Manning and conditions for the container terminal had been discussed at 
length by management and the Union well in advance of the proposed opening date.  
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Agreement had been reached on arrangements for those areas to which container 
traffic was to be introduced.  However, the implementation of Devlin Phase 2 at the 
port had altered piecework, bonus and incentive payments which meant the 
agreements in place for Gladstone, Hornby and Seaforth terminals had to be updated.  
The arrangements relating to these areas were altered in November 1971 after talks 
at the Local Modernisation Committee (LMC) between the EAPL and the Union.  
The new conditions were approved by the Union side of the negotiating committee 
in principal but significantly its representatives refused to sign the agreement despite 
considerable pressure from the employers to do so.210  
At a meeting of the Liverpool Shop Steward Executive Committee on 27 
April, also attended by Lew Lloyd, some stewards voiced serious reservations 
regarding the opening of the container terminal at Seaforth and its impact on 
manning levels across the whole of the port.211  It was thought that the 
technologically-advanced nature of the terminal meant that there would inevitably be 
a run-down of labour both there and eventually in other areas of the port as the trend 
towards container supremacy continued.  The Executive instructed Lloyd to 
approach port employers with a list of additional demands which would need to be 
added to the new agreement before it would be signed.  Principal amongst these were 
concrete guarantees that there would be no redundancies arising from the growth of 
container-handling at the port and that all containers handled at the port should be 
‘stuffed and stripped’ by RDWs.212 It was also proposed that the working week at the 
Terminal should be shortened to thirty-five hours per week as a means to utilise 
more labour, as well as insisting that a special basic wage, sick pay and holiday 
entitlement package should be negotiated to be applied to container-handling 
areas.213  The registration of all workers at the terminal had already been agreed in 
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November 1971 and the Committee expected that this assurance would also be 
upheld.214 
The EAPL was mortified that with just eleven days to go until the official 
opening of Seaforth its unveiling was threatened by these belated demands, 
especially since the terminal already had RDWs allocated to it as the MDHC 
conducted dry-run tests of the new facility a couple of weeks in advance of its 10 
May opening date.  These dockers had been working under the terms and conditions 
of the existing unsigned agreement, revised in November 1971.  The MDHC stated 
that since Hornby and Gladstone dock had been working normally under the 
November revised terms and work at the container terminal at Seaforth had also 
commenced under these conditions, the agreement was valid.215  RDWs had worked 
at the container terminal on Tuesday 2 and Wednesday 3 May but following 
ratification of the Executive’s claim by the rest of the Port Shop Steward Committee, 
their labour was withdrawn on the Thursday and Friday.216  At a mass meeting that 
Sunday of around 6000 dockers, a motion supporting the shop stewards’ claim was 
successful at a show of hands.217  This was followed by a successful motion not to 
provide labour for Seaforth until new negotiations with management on terms and 
conditions relating specifically to the terminal were undertaken.218 
Despite the EAPL maintaining that ‘there was a Seaforth agreement in 
existence and the fact that it was not signed did not affect its validity’, the reality was 
that they were in dubious waters.219  The Association privately admitted that ‘it was 
questionable whether they could get the blacking of Seaforth lifted without making 
some concessions’.220  However, after an emergency meeting of the LMC at 11am 
on 8 May, little progress was made.  Negotiators for the employers’ side reported 
that ‘the Union had been seeking guarantees on redundancy which obviously no 
employer could ever give’.221  In light of the limited progress made at the LMC 
meeting, the MDHC was forced to announce that the opening of Seaforth Container 
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Terminal had been postponed.222  George Brimyard, Managing Director of the 
MDHC, was insistent that the earlier agreement covered Seaforth and thus 
condemned the action as threatening the very future of the city’s port by delaying the 
terminal’s new customers:  
 
We have found that as a result of the trouble this week at Seaforth we are 
having diversions [of traffic to other ports].  There is no reason at all why any 
container cannot be taken by a number of other ports… At the moment, 
nobody is saying Liverpool is not going to do the job, but there is already the 
fear they may not and exporters are not prepared to risk it…  All that 
blacking does is to create adverse publicity for the Port of Liverpool, which 
must preserve its reputation for stability if its future security is not to be 
threatened… I think that the dockers, like the rest of us, are very conscious of 
the vital importance of Seaforth.223           
 
 Indeed Liverpool’s stewards knew only too well the vital importance of 
Seaforth.224  At further talks on 9 May, the Union side of the LMC was adamant pay 
and conditions were improved and that guarantees were required relating to 
redundancy and container-stuffing.225  As the Managing Director of the MDHC 
suggests in his comments to the local press, the company was extremely eager to 
ensure the smooth opening and operation of Seaforth without any further delays and 
were under considerable customer pressure to do so.  In this context, the company 
conceded to most of the dockers’ demands at the discussions on 9 May.  It was 
agreed that ‘a 35 hour week with consequential adjustments of basic rates’ would be 
introduced in the last quarter of 1972 to utilise more labour at the terminal and 
soothe dockers’ concerns about redundancies.226  However, guarantees that all 
containers passing through the terminal would be ‘stuffed and stripped’ by RDWs 
could not be given because the MDHC argued this was beyond the realms of 
practicality – it could not police the myriad of customers and shipping lines which 
provided containers to be loaded and discharged at the port.227  Nevertheless, the 
Union side of the LMC promised to return to the Shop Steward Committee and 
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recommend acceptance of the offer.   The deal was endorsed by the Committee on 10 
May and normal working at the terminal commenced the following day.228   
 The Seaforth settlement again illustrated the determination of Liverpool’s 
stewards to protect manning levels and job opportunities at the port in the face of 
containerisation.  As was the case with Aintree, the Shop Steward Committee moved 
to ensure that a strong precedent was set with employers in any sphere which would 
be affected by container-handling.  The final agreement for Seaforth kept manning 
levels artificially high through the introduction of a thirty-five hour week and the 
maintenance of existing break-bulk job quotas, as detailed here: 
 
In the early days on Seaforth we did great on the manning.  We more or less 
had the same manning on a container ship as we had on a general cargo ship.  
On the big gantry cranes [used to load/unload container ships] we had two 
drivers per shift on each crane and one driver relieving them.  There was 
three drivers per crane per shift, so for the four working cranes [operating at 
Seaforth when it initially opened]… there was twelve drivers employed.  On 
the old overhead cranes [used to handle break-bulk cargoes] we never had 
that so it was an improvement straightaway.  We kept the old holdsman 
levels as well even though there was no need for them.229 
 
So the MDHC and the EAPL were forced to concede most of the dockers’ demands 
over Seaforth.  A combination of solid support for the initiatives of the Shop Steward 
Executive Committee and the escalating cost of delays both in terms of the port’s 
reputation and lost revenue resulted in a satisfactory settlement for the dockers and 
their representatives.  The EAPL’s assertion in 1971 that ‘fair industrial weather was 
ahead’ because of the pending introduction of the Industrial Relations Act had 
proven considerably premature.  
 
The establishment of the A-J Committee and the deepening of the national 
crisis 
Although negotiations over Seaforth ended satisfactorily, the blacking action 
against haulage companies which refused to meet the dockers’ demands continued 
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unabated in other areas of the port.  The TGWU again appealed to the Committee to 
suspend its action pending the outcome of the Heaton’s case and the Court of Appeal 
judgement.  At a meeting at Transport House (Liverpool) on 24 May, attended by 
TGWU officials and one hundred Liverpool dock stewards, the union’s plea was 
rejected.  Lew Lloyd commented after that meeting that ‘the men said that while they 
were sympathetic to the Union’s point of view, the blacking would remain’.230  The 
Committee’s strategy continued to put it in conflict with the Union, employers and 
the State, making the imminent court judgements of vital significance. 
At the national institutional level the TGWU, the Government and employers 
were tasked with finding a solution to the current impasse before the deadline for the 
national strike.  At tri-partite negotiations between Jack Jones, Bill Tonge and 
Maurice Macmillan, Jones argued that the establishment of a joint special committee 
to investigate the dockers’ primary concerns might be the best way of securing a 
negotiated settlement.231  It was agreed that a committee should be made up of 
representatives of each of the major port authorities, TGWU Dock Delegates and 
two rank-and-file leaders.  The joint chairmen of the committee would be Jones and 
Lord Aldington, a former Conservative minister now Chair of the Port of London 
Authority.232  However, the prospective success of the new committee, dubbed the 
A-J or J-A Committee, was heavily dependent on the legal cases to be heard in the 
interim.  At a Dock Delegates Conference on 1 June, Jones proposed that the 
deadline for the official national strike should be extended by two weeks to allow the 
A-J Committee time to gather evidence and testimony from interested parties.233  
This motion was successful and the extension granted, although to the chagrin of 
more militant delegates.  Jimmy Symes summarised the mood amongst the more 
militant section by commenting, ‘I am not happy.  The meeting did not go our 
way’.234  Meanwhile, the evolving unofficial blacking action at London and Hull 
threatened the official effort to control the course of events. 
The Royal Docks dockers’ picketing of Chobham Farm haulage depot was in 
danger of becoming a flashpoint in the broader battle of trade unionism versus the 
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Industrial Relations Act.235  The details and chronology of this episode have been 
documented elsewhere and so do not require extensive re-iteration here, except for a 
couple of key developments.236  Principal amongst these developments was the clash 
between the TGWU Road Transport section and London’s Port Shop Steward 
Committee.  Whereas in Liverpool the local stewards’ committee and the transport 
section had a co-operative arrangement dating back to the Aintree Containerbase 
dispute and the establishment of a joint committee, London had no such collusion.  
Instead, the London dockers’ action in picketing several depots using non-registered 
labour increasingly brought them into conflict with the local Road Transport section, 
whose members were performing container-stripping duties there.  After the failure 
of mediation attempts by TGWU officers, the Chobham Farm stewards (not the 
company) applied to the NIRC to prohibit the Royal Dock stewards from blacking 
the depot.  The application named individual dock shop stewards and the London 
Shop Steward Committee, not the TGWU or the NASDU.237  This meant that 
Donaldson’s order on 12 June was against the individuals involved, compelling them 
to attend court to explain themselves. 
 The crisis worsened with the Court of Appeal judgement.  The NIRC had 
previously ruled that the TGWU was liable for the actions of its members despite 
protestations to the contrary by the union’s legal representation and so refused to 
review the £55000 in fines levied for breaking the court’s orders under a charge of 
contempt.  Consequently the Union had paid the fine and then petitioned the Court of 
Appeal where the hearing was set for 13 June.  Lord Denning (Master of the Rolls), 
heading a three-man panel of appeal judges, acknowledged and sympathised with the 
dockers’ diminishing employment opportunities in the context of containerisation 
but pointedly restricted the remit of the court to the legal ramifications of unofficial 
blacking of haulage companies in Liverpool and Hull:238 
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According to the law as I believe it to be, a union, registered or unregistered, 
is not responsible for the actions of its shop stewards when they call for 
industrial action, if in doing so those shop stewards are acting outside the 
scope of their authority.  On the evidence in this case I hold that the shop 
stewards at Liverpool and Hull were acting on behalf of their own work 
groups and not on behalf of the union.  They were acting outside the scope of 
their authority from the union.  They are undoubtedly liable themselves but 
the union is not.239        
 
The court ruled that the Union was not liable for the actions of its stewards 
and so set aside the fines imposed by the NIRC.  However, the judgement paved the 
way for the imprisonment of individuals involved in ‘unfair industrial practice’ if in 
contempt of a court order.  Indeed, Denning also commented that ‘ever since the 
blacking policy has been in effect, those engaged have been guilty of an unfair 
industrial practice against the three companies’.240  The judgement was widely 
regarded as explosive.241  On the one hand, the Industrial Relations Act and the 
NIRC (and by extension the Government) had been undermined by the ruling; on the 
other, there was the prospect of large-scale industrial rebellion if any trade unionist 
was committed to gaol for undertaking industrial action.  The haulage companies 
being blacked at Liverpool were as stunned by the judgement as the trade unions.  
Heaton’s challenged the ruling by appealing its case to the House of Lords because it 
believed that the gaoling of individual stewards would do little to help its 
predicament.242 
To compound matters further, another TGWU Docks Delegate Conference 
had been convened to discuss a further postponement of the proposed official 
national strike until the A-J Committee had had the opportunity to make an interim 
report, a motion which was carried by 49 votes to 32 on 14 June.243  Around 30,000 
dockers, roughly three-quarters of the national workforce, were already out on an 
unofficial one-day strike organised by the NPSSC to coincide with the Conference in 
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protest against the proposal to delay the official strike deadline again.244  At 
Liverpool the whole of the 8000-strong workforce were out.245  The conference at 
Transport House (London) was being picketed by the NPSSC with the intention of 
pressurising delegates not to concede a further postponement of the strike.246  News 
of the successful motion caused angry scenes outside the meeting, also prompting 
some protestors to storm Transport House, and was greeted by cries of ‘scabs!’ and 
‘you have sold us out!’247 
A further unofficial one-day strike was organised by the NPSSC for Friday 
16 June in response to the NIRC’s order against three London stewards involved in 
the picketing of Chobham Farm.  Because the Court of Appeal judgement effectively 
made individuals liable, there was a possibility that the three could be imprisoned for 
contempt if they failed to appear before the NIRC.248  As a result, approximately 
35,000 dockers were on strike on Friday.249  In the event, despite refusing to attend 
the NIRC to explain themselves and a warrant being issued for their arrests, the three 
stewards were spared gaol by some creative legal conjuring.250  The failure to 
execute the NIRC’s imprisonment order was viewed as a victory for the dockers and 
so Liverpool and the other ports voted to return to work on Monday 19 June.251  
Nevertheless, the issue had only been temporarily circumvented as the blacking 
action continued at Liverpool, London and Hull leaving open the possibility that the 
NIRC could issue another arrest warrant against stewards involved in the action.  By 
this stage, the dock industry in Britain was in chaos, convulsed by a series of 
unofficial one-day strikes, the threat of imprisonment for stewards and the possibility 
of an official national strike in due course. 
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The Smith-Coggins dispute 
While the national crisis developed in the summer of 1972, the port of 
Liverpool experienced several localised disputes which further contributed to the 
disruption of port operations.  As already detailed, a strike broke out over manning 
and conditions associated with the opening of Seaforth Container Terminal in May.  
When considered in the context of the ongoing blacking of rogue haulage firms, the 
action at Seaforth demonstrated that the Liverpool stewards were prepared to 
broaden their strategy of defending manning levels and job opportunities to any area 
they perceived to be affected by the trend towards containerisation of cargo-
handling.  Just two months after the blacking of Seaforth ended with a satisfactory 
settlement for Liverpool’s dockers another strike arose, partly because of a minor 
dispute relating to cargo discharging manning quotas and partly because major 
changes were taking place locally associated with the opening of Seaforth, the 
closure of older docks and facilities and the allocation of labour. 
As construction neared completion on Seaforth, manning quotas and 
arrangements came under discussion.  The major stevedoring companies, which had 
historically provided dock labour for the loading/discharging of cargo at the various 
docks of the port, approached the MDHC to discuss their role in manning the 
complex.  Major employers of labour such as A.E. Smith-Coggins and Port of 
Liverpool Stevedoring amongst others, had always assumed that their services would 
be required to provide labour for the various Seaforth berths.  However the MDHC 
and its shareholders, having invested millions in the complex’s construction had 
already decided that it would bring stevedoring operations and manning in-house so 
as to minimise overheads and maximise profitability.252  This decision took the other 
major employers at the port by complete surprise and they began to realise the 
implications for the viability of their operations at the port.  Containers were clearly 
the future for the industry and the port and so the prospect of being frozen out of 
Seaforth was too much to accept.  Smith-Coggins, Port of Liverpool Stevedoring and 
Ocean Port Services began to seriously consider their future.  It was announced that 
formal discussions were taking place regarding the merger of the three companies 
with the MDHC.253  Predictably, the proposed merger raised questions about 
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redundancies.  In fact, as a result, two-hundred and seventeen clerical staff were 
issued redundancy notices.254  Although all RDWs received assurances that they 
would all be reallocated to the MDHC, the possible disappearance of two stalwart 
employers from the port made dockers and their representatives extremely 
nervous.255 
Amidst this uncertainty, a minor manning dispute escalated into a port-wide 
stoppage.  Again it was linked to the tumultuous changes taking place at the port.  
Aside from the opening of Seaforth, by mid-1972 the various docks in the south end 
of Liverpool were being prepared for closure.256  All port operations were to be 
consolidated at the north end of the dock estate and the final date for closure was set 
for 1 September 1972.  The reasons for the closure of the south end were simple.  
Firstly, the decision was taken in 1970 when the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
was in serious financial trouble and so the closures were part of a cost rationalisation 
programme.257  Secondly, in the future the majority of shipping would call at the 
north end docks because facilities were newer and the three container-handling 
facilities were located there.258  Finally there were several issues relating to the 
physical geography of the River Mersey that had an impact on the decision.  For 
example, considerable routine maintenance work was required to keep the south 
docks de-silted, which was less of a problem further up the river.  Also, the tide was 
particularly extreme in the south end of the river which meant that shipping arrivals 
and departures were more prone to disruption, again this was less of a problem in the 
north end. 
Dockers’ representation acquiesced to the closure of the south end docks on 
condition that all RDWs employed there would be reallocated to the north end.  
Larger port employers operated at docks throughout the estate and so it was agreed 
that RDWs would be redeployed for the same companies on their north end 
operations.  All the relevant arrangements, including transfer of the workforce, took 
place well in advance of the proposed closure date and the integration process had 
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proceeded without major disruption.  However, trouble was to flare regarding 
custom and practice peculiar to the south end docks.  Wharfage clerical work, that is 
quayside tallying and administrative duties, were generally carried out by clerical 
staff in the south docks because ‘RDWs in the South End did not consider 
themselves competent to undertake [this work]’.259  This was a grey area in manning 
quotas because, although wharfage administrative work essentially fell under clerical 
categorisation, in the north end docks ‘90% of this type of clerical work was carried 
out by RDWs’.260  This is an illustration of how manning arrangements could vary 
wildly from area to area or company to company and were often tacit and unofficial 
in nature, dictated by historic custom and practice. 
  A.E. Smith-Coggins had recently moved its south end business to the north 
end of the port and used the RDWs from its southern operations to work on all the 
usual ships and cargoes which had been diverted permanently to the north.  
However, this caused some teething problems relating to contrasting manning 
arrangements in different areas of the port.  When a ship called the Cavtat arrived at 
the port on Wednesday 12 July, Smith-Coggins deployed their standard south end 
manning quota to discharge the vessel.  They used one staff wharfinger, one staff 
wharfinger’s clerk and a RDW to carry out the quayside clerical work.  Dock 
stewards from Smith-Coggins’ north end operations objected to this manning 
arrangement, claiming that the RDW concerned was forced to perform two duties, 
that of tonnage clerk and window clerk.261  Smith-Coggins management refused to 
add another RDW to the wharfage manning quota stating that ‘according to the 
Definition of Dock Work it was clear that this type of work could be carried out by 
either staff or RDWs.  There was, therefore, no breach of any existing agreement’.262  
Nevertheless, all RDWs on the ship withdrew their labour in protest.  This action 
quickly escalated into a company-wide dispute and all 1590 men employed by 
Smith-Coggins went on unofficial strike.263 
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In the talks between the Union and the company which followed, Smith-
Coggins maintained that ‘the Definition of Dock Work gave priority to staff 
employees in respect of the type of work in dispute’ and that ‘RDWs were engaged 
for these jobs as convenient’.264  In the absence of any flexibility on the company’s 
behalf, a mass meeting at the Pier Head on 18 July voted for a port-wide strike in 
support of the Smith-Coggins claim; the action would begin on Friday 21 July.265  
The EAPL was aghast that a comparatively minor issue could cause a port-wide 
stoppage but believed that a vital principle was at stake.  They considered that ‘the 
[dock] stewards were attempting to engineer a position whereby priority would be 
given to registered dock workers over clerical staff in the manning of office jobs’ 
and that ‘if the principle... was conceded the repercussions on the Port’s competitive 
position would be far reaching and existing flexibility would be lost’.266  Similarly, 
in the context of the significant uncertainty surrounding the port, Liverpool’s dock 
stewards felt that if precedent was not set over this matter it could, in the future, 
leave them open to further manning reductions by stealth.267  One of the major issues 
at stake here was the principle of ‘one man, one job’, which was tightly guarded by 
the Shop Steward Committee and the Union as a means to ensure proper utilisation 
of the workforce.268  The deployment of one RDW to carry out two duties had 
contravened this principle.  It appeared that neither side were likely to compromise 
their position. 
The EAPL moved swiftly to establish a tri-partite standing sub-committee, 
consisting of RDW, clerical staff and employer representation to discuss the dispute.  
However, in the event, this local manning dispute was superseded by events in 
London and the arrest of the ‘Pentonville Five’.  The committal of the five dockers 
provoked an unofficial national strike and the EAPL observed that ‘the urgency for a 
decision on any concession in the local dispute had now been removed by national 
developments’.269  Nevertheless, further issues relating to Smith-Coggins, the 
allocation of labour at Seaforth and compulsory redundancies were to resurface in 
the near future, causing yet more local industrial turbulence. 
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The first manifestation of the Smith-Coggins dispute reflected the extreme 
uncertainty surrounding the local industry at this time.  The challenges posed by 
containerisation and rationalisation all came to a head in the summer of 1972 and 
each individual concern combined to leave dockers at the port feeling extremely 
apprehensive about the future.  This is displayed in their increasingly militant and 
defensive approach to any threat to manning levels at the port, regardless of how 
minor it might seem.  For stewards to successfully provoke a port-wide stoppage 
over what effectively amounted to jurisdiction over four jobs demonstrates that by 
this stage the mood amongst rank-and-file dockers was anxious, hostile and 
combative.270  The proposed changes to the structure of port employers aggravated 
the situation and, when combined with the transformation of the industry, the EAPL 
observed that ‘there was a fear of redundancy in the Port... and the prospect of 
mergers reinforced this fear’.271  The ever-escalating incidence of industrial action at 
the port was symptomatic of this fear.  As previously noted, the insecurity felt by 
dockers during this period of rapid and tumultuous modernisation and mechanisation 
is highlighted as a major factor behind industrial militancy in Sapsford and 
Turnbull’s study and their findings are supported by the nature of both the Seaforth 
and Smith-Coggins disputes at Liverpool.272  
 
The imprisonment of the ‘Pentonville Five’ and the interim report of the A-J 
Committee          
In London, blacking of and picketing at Dagenham Cold Storage and 
Midland Cold Storage continued as agreed at port-wide and National Port Shop 
Steward Committee (NPSSC) level.273  Although these premises and the companies 
using them had been blacked since May, Midland management applied to the NIRC 
on 4 July for an order instructing the London Shop Steward Committee, not the 
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TGWU, to desist in its unfair industrial practice.274  The Court named seven 
individuals in the order, issued on Friday 7 July which compelled them to cease their 
action forthwith.  Nevertheless, the blacking continued.  After the previous victory at 
the Court of Appeal, the NIRC’s order was perceived as largely impotent, especially 
in relation to the possibility of imprisonment.275  However, whereas the June crisis 
had been averted at the last minute due to the Denning’s intervention this had upset 
some in the Government, not least Edward Heath who thought the Court of Appeal 
had overstepped its remit and authority.276  Moreover, a call from dock employers to 
declare a State of Emergency over the paralysis of London docks could have 
convinced the Government to come down hard on the perpetrators of the blacking.  
Consequently, on this occasion, when the NIRC issued warrants for the arrest of five 
dockers on Friday 21 July, they were quickly executed.  Three of the five (Cornelius 
Clancy, Tony Merrick and Derek Watkins) were arrested picketing outside Midland 
Cold Storage depot in Hackney, East London.277  Bernie Steer was arrested at his 
home that evening, while Vic Turner was arrested the following day, picketing 
Pentonville gaol.278 
 The imprisonment of the ‘Pentonville Five’, as they were later dubbed, 
provoked wide-scale rebellion.  By Saturday morning several of the major ports had 
stopped work and by Monday all the country’s 42000 dockers were out on strike.279  
Mass pickets had assembled outside Pentonville gaol and Midland’s Hackney depot 
while the London Shop Steward Committee despatched delegates and flying pickets 
to lobby other sectors of industry.280  Liverpool’s Shop Steward Committee met 
immediately upon news of the London stewards’ committal and organised a coach 
convoy to travel to London in order to man picket lines and show solidarity.281  A 
mass meeting at the Pier Head on 25 July voted to remain on indefinite strike until 
they were released.282  On Wednesday 26 July, the day the men were released, a 
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major unofficial strike was underway with around 250,000 workers across various 
industries out in solidarity.283  Even the usually passive TUC threatened an official 
general strike, although its hand was undoubtedly forced by the spontaneity of the 
unofficial action. 
 The wholesale revolt of the trade union movement against the imprisonment 
of the five dockers was a politically-charged and emotive affair but their release did 
not resolve the underlying causes behind the committal.  Blacking action was still 
being pursued by stewards’ committees at Liverpool, London and Hull, while the A-
J Committee attempted to gather evidence and deliver a report which it hoped would 
bring to a close a summer of extreme turmoil in the industry.  On 25 July, the day 
before the men were released from gaol, the A-J Committee released its interim 
report.  The main recommendations of the report stipulated that the TUR should be 
eliminated in every port and that all dockers should be permanently allocated to an 
individual employer irrespective of whether he was surplus to requirements; that 
negotiations should take place between port employers, the Union and other 
employers regarding the preservation of container groupage work for RDWs; that 
improved voluntary severance terms, footed by the Government, should be made 
available to dockers to reduce the manpower surplus in the industry.284 
The Report was frostily-received by some employers but was accepted at the 
national level by NAPE as a means to end the intermittent industrial strife of the 
previous months.285  Indeed, some members of the EAPL were ‘appalled with the 
terms of the Report’ and registered their official disapproval with the national 
association.286  Despite reluctant acceptance by employers through necessity, it was 
rejected by a Dock Delegates Conference on 27 July.287  This, of course, meant that 
the twice-postponed national strike was now back on and scheduled to start the 
following day.  Clearly, the tumultuous events of the previous few days had 
reinforced a mood of militancy amongst dockers and their representatives, as it 
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appeared that the Report went some way to addressing major concerns about the 
TUR and redundancy in the industry.  The strike went ahead, commencing on 28 
July and received strong support from the major ports.  In Liverpool fifty-one ships 
were stranded and the EAPL reported that the entirety of the 8000-strong workforce 
on the Liverpool side of the river was on strike.288 
 The A-J Committee continued to work towards a formula to end the dispute 
in a series of meetings from 31 July.289  However, progress was slow and on 3 
August the Government was forced to declare a State of Emergency because of 
critically low levels of animal foodstuffs.290  Meanwhile, the NPSSC and local 
steward committees were escalating their disruptive action.  Some non-Scheme and 
British Rail ports were continuing to work throughout the official strike.291  Stewards 
believed that these ports were undermining the effectiveness of the strike and so a 
programme of direct action was formulated to disrupt operations there.  Huge 
delegations of flying pickets were organised from London and sent to various ports 
and container bases across the country.  A small non-Scheme port at Keadby in 
Lincolnshire had been working normally throughout the strike and was consequently 
picketed by the NPSSC.  Emotions ran high and clashes occurred between pickets 
and the police.292  This scenario was repeated in Scunthorpe where police officers 
were hospitalised and pickets arrested.293  In Liverpool, stewards appealed to British 
Rail ports in the locality to stop work and support the strike.  When their plea was 
ignored these ports also became subject to widespread picketing and further clashes 
with the police occurred.294  If anything it appeared that attitudes were hardening 
amongst dockers and the action was escalating. 
 In the face of a worsening situation, the A-J Committee redoubled its efforts 
to come up with a peace formula.  On 14 August Jones called for a Dock Delegates 
Conference to take place in two days time.295  At the recalled conference on 16 
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August the Committee submitted its revised report for consideration.  The Report 
retained all its original provisions and also made some additional assurances.  
Principal amongst these was the promise of an inquiry into non-Scheme ports, a 
proposal to levy extra handling charges on containers that had not been ‘stuffed and 
stripped’ by RDWs, an undertaking by Lord Aldington as Chairman of the Port of 
London Authority that all container-stripping work at the port would in future, 
wherever practical, be carried out by RDWs and a reiteration of the pledge that no 
compulsory redundancies would arise from modernisation in the industry.296  When 
a motion to accept the augmented interim report and return to work was put to the 
vote at the delegates conference it was successful by fifty-three votes to thirty.297 
The NPSSC had organised a rally outside Transport House to coincide with 
the Dock Delegates Conference and more than a hundred dockers gathered to await 
its outcome.  The announcement that the strike had been called off was met with 
angry scenes.  A group of protestors stormed the building and burst into the 
conference room.  Objects, including a large free-standing metal ashtray, were 
thrown at the platform narrowly missing Jones and O’Leary, while another officer 
was punched.  A barrage of verbal abuse followed before the men involved ordered 
all journalists out of the room under intimidation and the threat of violence.  After 
the Press had left, order was restored somewhat and Jones and O’Leary fielded 
questions and accusations from the protestors.  The two Secretaries were allowed to 
leave after over an hour and a half of questioning.298  Outside the meeting departing 
delegates were jostled and mounted police were forced to intervene as scuffles broke 
out.299 
The furious reaction to the decision to return to work illustrates just how 
strongly many activists and stewards felt about the challenges facing the industry 
from containerisation, the outsourcing of container-stripping duties and the threat of 
redundancy.  Jones’ description of an encounter with a shop steward after the 
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conference is oft-repeated but demonstrates exactly how seriously dockers regarded 
the tumultuous changes that were taking place in the industry: 
 
As I left Transport House that day one of the shop stewards from the London 
docks came up to me.  He was holding his little son by the hand.  ‘What 
about my future?’ he asked.  ‘You’ve got a permanent job as a result of this 
agreement’, I replied.  ‘Ah’, he said, ‘but what about the boy?’300  
 
The comments of this shop steward demonstrate how employment in the industry 
was perceived from the inside.  Many dockers considered their job to be their 
birthright, often passed down from the generation before and in due course, to be 
passed on to their children.  Containerisation and the rationalisation of the workforce 
were not just a threat to dockers’ jobs but to their son’s jobs and indeed their way of 
life.301  It is unsurprising therefore that emotions surrounding the dispute and 
modernisation more generally were so acute. 
Just hours after the Dock Delegates Conference, the NPSSC held a meeting 
which rejected the return to work vote.  It vowed to continue the strike unofficially 
and put forward a four-point list of demands to be satisfied before action would 
cease.302  However, despite some stirring rhetoric at the NPSSC meeting, Tilbury, 
Southampton and Felixstowe all voted to return to work the following day at local 
mass meetings.303  The rest of London docks and Hull quickly followed suit on 18 
August, leaving just Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow out on unofficial strike.  At 
a mass meeting at the Pier Head on 17 August, Liverpool’s dockers voted 
overwhelmingly to support the NPSSC’s demands and remain out.304  However, 
once Manchester and Glasgow voted to return to work on 19 August, Liverpool was 
isolated and pursuing a strike that could not be won.305  At a mass meeting on 
Sunday 20 August, Liverpool’s dockers reluctantly voted to return to work.306  The 
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national dock strike was over.  However, industrial strife at the port of Liverpool 
continued.307 
 On the surface, the A-J agreement apparently represented a peace deal for the 
industry which addressed all of the major concerns of RDWs.  The proposed 
abolition of the TUR and permanent employment with a single employer meant that 
dockers now enjoyed unrivalled job security – or ‘jobs for life’ as it has since been 
termed.308  Its rejection by the stewards’ movement must be regarded in relation to 
concerns surrounding the future of the industry and in the context of the militant 
mood established because of the summer of unrest.  Although the NPSSC rejected 
the Dock Delegates Conference’s decision to return to work, its list of demands was 
practically identical to those already proposed by the A-J Committee.  The difference 
was simple: the NPSSC wanted these changes introduced before dockers returned to 
work so that they could not be diluted or compromised later, especially since the 
agreement was purely advisory in its capacity and would not become integrated into 
the existing statutory provisions of the Scheme.  This effectively meant that it was a 
voluntary, non-legally binding agreement between employers and the Union and as 
such could conceivably be unilaterally derecognised by management at a later 
juncture.309  It could also be argued that more militant stewards across the country 
resented and rejected the official attempt to call off a summer of unofficial-led 
action. 
Another major area of contention related to the primacy of voluntary 
severance in the A-J agreement.  There was considerable discomfort amongst 
stewards about the nature of the voluntary severance scheme because of its 
implications for manning levels.  Clearly, the campaign of disruption throughout the 
summer had been aimed at safeguarding jobs and manning levels in the industry, yet 
one of the A-J agreement’s defining principles was a reduction of the workforce.  As 
highlighted in Turnbull and Sapsford’s study, voluntary severance and the incessant 
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whittling down of the register proved to be a source of great insecurity for dockers 
and a major impetus behind future industrial unrest, particularly during the eighties 
as will be explored later.310  A leading Liverpool steward recalls the local 
committee’s attitude towards the voluntary severance scheme:  
 
We’d encourage lads not to take the cash because we could see the jobs 
disappearing and not being replaced... [but] lads had never seen that sort of 
money.  It was like becoming millionaires overnight.  It’s alright you telling 
them not to take it but you don’t know what responsibilities they’ve got.  I’m 
sure the employers and the Government realised that when they threw the 
carrot out there.311 
 
The fact that the voluntary severance sum would be paid entirely by the Government 
in the first instance meant that employers encouraged as many men as possible to 
take the money.  It also gave the impression that employers and the Government 
were on the same side in running down employment levels in the industry.  Several 
accounts from stewards at Liverpool state that, such was the instant uptake for 
redundancy money, the port actually suffered from a labour shortage for some time 
thereafter, especially of key specialist grades.312 
  The effect of the delegates’ decision to accept the A-J agreement at the 
conference on 16 August, the lure of the severance money for a section of the 
national workforce and a summer of extreme turmoil with considerable financial cost 
to the individual combined to divide the ports and bring an end to the national dock 
strike.  There was also a fundamental divergence in opinion between stewards within 
the same port and between different ports.  More militant stewards wanted to stay 
out on strike until all the NPSSC’s demands were implemented and rejected the A-J 
agreement in its entirety, while others thought it was the best that could be achieved 
in the circumstances.  Jimmy Symes, Chairman of the Liverpool Port Shop Steward 
Committee, later expressed a somewhat moderate view: 
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We didn’t get everything we thought we should have on the J-A agreement, 
but I can say this – in all my years on the docks, I have never got back off a 
dispute or strike [where] I felt we’ve got what we could have got... Jack 
Jones and his Aldington Committee did a good job... but we were let down in 
fact by politicians of our own party [Labour].  People can turn around and 
say they should have immediately [recommended] nationalisation, which is 
what I want in the industry anyway, but they dealt with it in the right way - 
first of all let’s take into the orbit of the Scheme the unregistered ports, let’s 
establish those areas outside of the dock which are doing groupage work as 
dock-work... and [then] we was in the position where the industry could have 
transitionally moved over to nationalisation, unfortunately that didn’t happen 
but I’m not a critic of Jones-Aldington.313 
 
Other stewards on Liverpool’s committee shared the view that the A-J agreement 
made the best of a difficult situation, ‘I wouldn’t bear no grudges with [Jack Jones] 
over [the A-J report] because the pressure on him must have been enormous’.314  
However, some were less charitable about the Agreement arguing that ‘it upset us... 
the actions of Jones.  We never accepted [the A-J agreement] but in the end we had 
to recognise it because we could see the way the industry was going in respect of a 
rundown of labour’.315  
 Despite the rancour surrounding the A-J agreement and its indifferent 
reception by dockers, it had made some progress in documenting and addressing the 
major challenges for the industry.  On the one hand, it abolished the much-maligned 
TUR, guaranteed no compulsory redundancies and perpetuated the unrivalled degree 
of workplace control enjoyed by dockers.  The Agreement also set up an inquiry into 
the role of non-Scheme ports and raised the possibility of nationalisation of the 
industry.  Although voluntary severance provisions led to a significant exodus from 
the industry, there was no way that British ports could have remained competitive 
without shedding a proportion of their workforces to allow for the cold reality of 
containerisation.316  Maintenance of pre-container break-bulk manpower was simply 
                                                     
313 Lindop’s interview with Jimmy Symes and Lew Lloyd. 
314 Author’s interview with L.D., December 2009. 
315 Author’s interview with J.D., December 2009. 
316 In 1972 there were 41200 RDWs working at Scheme ports.  By 1975 the number had fallen to 
32000 and by 1980 only 23000 RDWs remained in the industry.  See Chapter 7 for more detail and 
analysis regarding the reduction of the register at Liverpool and nationally (Source: British Ports 
Association, ‘Report on manpower in the UK ports industry, 1987’, 1988; Statement by the TUC to 
the National Ports Council Enquiry into Non-Scheme Ports, 17 October 1972; Turnbull et al, Dock 
Strike, p. 47). 
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unsustainable, although dockers’ representation endeavoured to keep manning levels 
as high as possible.  This is indeed what they continued to do at the port of Liverpool 
and elsewhere throughout the seventies and eighties by a combination of negotiation 
and strike action.  In fact, the A-J agreement later proved a useful shield for dockers 
as it consistently scuppered employer attempts to wrest workplace control and 
prerogative from their hands.  Certainly, the port employers always resented the 
enhanced employment protection and bargaining position it provided.317  In similar 
fashion to the Devlin reforms of five years earlier, over time the Agreement made 
the transition from resisted and reluctantly-accepted by dockers to wholeheartedly-
embraced and jealously-guarded, as shall be demonstrated in due course. 
 The events of 1972 were obviously tumultuous and brought major changes to 
the dock industry.  Indisputably, the protection now afforded registered dock 
workers at Scheme ports was unparalleled and the balance of power heavily skewed 
away from management and towards the quayside.  However, although RDWs 
currently enjoyed unrivalled job protection, serious challenges remained for future 
employment prospects in the industry in the context of the proliferation of 
containerisation at the expense of traditional, labour-intensive break-bulk cargoes 
and the introduction of a relatively lucrative voluntary severance scheme.  The 
TGWU and local port-wide labour organisation were by now acutely aware of the 
impact containerisation was likely to have on the industry and prepared themselves 
for a rearguard defensive action against job cuts, using the Scheme and the A-J 
agreement as a barrier against wholesale changes in working practices and the run-
down of manning levels.  As highlighted by Turnbull and Sapsford, the 
consolidation of the NPSSC between 1970 and 1972 also strengthened dockworker 
solidarity across the industry and raised the prospect of further ‘multi-port’ industrial 
action in defence of the industry, the manner of which had been witnessed in the 
summer of 1972.318  Undoubtedly, Aldington-Jones was a double-edged sword 
which heralded a significant watershed in the industry.319
                                                     
317 EAPL meeting minutes, 26 July 1972; EAPL meeting minutes, 11 August 1980; Finney, ‘Repeal 
of the National Dock Labour Scheme’; Davis, ‘Clear the Decks’. 
318 Turnbull & Sapsford, ‘Why did Devlin fail?, p. 253. 
319 Further evaluation of the impact of the A-J agreement is undertaken in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter 6 
‘What about us?’ The evolution of clerical militancy at the port of Liverpool 
 
 This thesis has already alluded to several potential weaknesses in the current 
historiography of labour relations in the British dock industry.  Wide-ranging 
research and publication has been undertaken in the area but it has tended to focus on 
national trends and flashpoints or institutional accounts of the provision and 
operation of statutory employment protection afforded to Britain’s Registered Dock 
Workers (RDWs) in the form of the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS).  As 
previously argued, more attention needs to be given to the development of labour 
relations, local work culture and grassroots activism in specific ports in order to 
better understand the factors that influenced militancy and solidarity amongst 
dockworkers.  However, there is another section of the workforce which remains 
largely neglected in academic surveys of dockland industrial relations, yet which 
played a progressively influential and disruptive role in the seventies and eighties, 
particularly at the port of Liverpool. 
 The Association of Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Staff (ACTSS) was 
the clerical section of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU).  At the 
port of Liverpool, several different grades of port worker fell under the auspices of 
this section – storekeepers, timekeepers, ship’s planners, wharfingers, ‘counter-offs’, 
quay foremen and ship’s foremen.  Most grades of worker were support staff for 
RDWs, either concerned with providing services directly associated with the 
administration of dock-work and dockworkers or with the provision of ancillary 
services for customers such as cargo inventory, port logistics etc.1  This eclectic mix 
of occupations which fell under the heading of ‘staff’ accounted for a significant 
section of the total workforce at the port in the late sixties and early seventies.2  The 
6/567 Branch catered purely for those clerical workers employed within the dock 
estate, usually attached to the offices of the various shipping/stevedoring 
companies.3 
                                                     
1 For clarification of those grades whose duties are not self-explanatory, see Appendix III.  
2 There were over 1000 staff workers at the port during this period (Source: Author’s interview with 
E.R., July 2011). 
3 Most shipping companies had an office within the dock estate and one in the city centre.  Those 
clerical workers employed in the town offices had their own branch within ACTSS and are excluded 
from this study. 
144 
 
 Prior to 1969, unionism amongst clerical staff at the port was severely 
restricted.  Staff workers had no shop steward representation, no recognised 
negotiation body and limited official union recognition or representation across the 
bulk of the employers at the port.4  The Association of Scientific, Technical and 
Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) was recognised amongst a minority of employers but 
membership was poor as it did not cover most grades of clerical worker.5  The Port 
of Liverpool Staff Association (POLSA) also had minor representational powers for 
its membership, although similarly this was mainly made up of middle management 
from the town offices of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MDHB).6  There 
was no machinery for clerical staff to enter into negotiations with employers over 
any matter and wages and conditions varied wildly from employee to employee and 
company to company, due to ‘completely individualised contracts of employment’.7  
This had been the status quo at the port for staff for many years.  Even in the post-
Devlin era when dockers began to achieve some progress in pay, conditions and 
representation, staff workers were subject to the perpetuation of this traditional 
paternalistic workplace relationship: 
 
Wages were determined by personal negotiation, the working week included 
Saturday morning and for the majority of workers overtime was unpaid... 
wage increases, if payable, came from the Head of the Department who 
would call you aside and inform you that management had agreed to pay an 
extra ten shillings; he would then tell another employee that they could only 
afford a five shillings rise and tell another he was getting nothing... We 
finally managed to persuade about 80% of the wharfage department to 
disclose their wages... and we found twenty-seven different rates for seventy-
five employees.8 
 
This scenario made effective workplace organisation extremely difficult.  However, 
amidst the broader trend of trade union growth and influence in the late sixties and 
                                                     
4 ACTSS was already recognised by two of the larger companies prior to 1970 (MDHB and Smith-
Coggins) but there was no company/port-wide agreements relating to pay and conditions and 
membership levels were low. 
5 EAPL meeting minutes, 10 July 1970. 
6 Author’s interview with T.N., March 2011; Author’s interview with T.T., Jan 2011. 
7 Author’s interview with E.R., July 2011. 
8 Former ACTSS Branch Secretary Eric Ankers recalls the arbitrary nature of staff pay and conditions 
prior to the formation and consolidation of the Branch in Carden, M. ‘Staff  trade unionism and 
industrial decline: the ACTSS 6/567 Branch and the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company’, 
Unpublished MA thesis, University of Warwick, September 1983, pp. 13-14.  Carden was himself a 
clerical worker and shop steward at the Port and later Chairman of the MDHC stewards between 1983 
and 1988.     
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the explosion of militancy at the docks, staff workers gradually began to assert their 
right to workplace representation and bargaining.   
Predictably, this was a hard-fought and drawn out process.  It was in fact a 
small cadre of ex-RDWs from A.E. Smith Coggins, a major employer at the port, 
who provided the impetus to form the local ACTSS branch.  Before a RDW could 
accept a staff job they were required to give up their ‘books’ (i.e. registration as a 
dockworker with the National Dock Labour Board) which would most frequently but 
not exclusively, occur when a RDW was offered a foreman’s post in a particular 
company.  Although ex-dockers who had joined the clerical grades often retained 
their membership of the local TGWU Docks Branch, it was not recognised by 
employers for their staff workers.  Ex-RDW staff men were essentially in limbo as 
far as workplace representation was concerned, as not only would employers refuse 
recognise the Docks section of the TGWU in the office but the Docks section also, 
paradoxically, proved somewhat ambivalent towards members who were perceived 
to have switched allegiances.  These workers, experienced in trade unionism and 
workplace militancy, found the status quo described above unacceptable and in 1964 
established the 12/67 Branch of the National Association of Clerical, Technical and 
Supervisory Staff, a trade group within the TGWU.9  They attempted to persuade 
their colleagues at Smith-Coggins and other companies to join and a full-time 
officer, Mr. J.D. Charters, was appointed to the branch by the Union.  However, 
some employers were initially strongly opposed to general staff unionism and 
actively sought to discriminate against, and even dismiss, workers attempting to 
unionise.10  
Initial progress for the Branch was painfully slow.  Between 1964 and 1969 it 
struggled to broaden its membership beyond a couple of hundred workers out of a 
staff workforce of well over one thousand.11  A large section of the staff was 
completely unfamiliar and uncomfortable with trade unionism.  They were often 
older, more ‘starchy types’ with archetypal ‘white-collar’ ideals and aspirations who 
identified more closely with managerial prerogative and individualism than 
                                                     
9 The 12/67 Branch would later become the 6/567 Branch after the TGWU overhauled its regional 
structure.  The early history of the Branch is based on author’s interviews with A.D., May 2011; T.T., 
January 2011; E.R., July 2011 and Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, pp. 12-15.  
10 Author’s interview with T.T., January 2011.  Liverpool Maritime Terminals and T&J Harrisons 
were particularly noted for their anti-union attitude. 
11 Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, p. 15. 
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workplace collectivism.12  Moreover, the Branch was faced with a fragmented 
potential membership split geographically up and down the length of the port, across 
various companies and along occupational grades.  Nevertheless, in the context of 
the wholesale changes being wrought on the industry by the onset of containerisation 
and the growing influence of trade unionism in Britain more broadly, the clerical 
movement at the port began to gain some momentum.  In 1969 the first shop 
stewards were elected on a grade-by-grade basis - each occupation, for example the 
‘counter-offs’ or store men, were represented by a steward in each area of the port.    
In July 1970, J.D. Charters resigned as Branch Officer to take up another 
post.  His replacement, Eddie Roberts, was a newly-recruited TGWU officer who 
had cut his teeth first as an activist at Dunlop’s, then as a shop steward in Ford’s 
Halewood (Liverpool) Plant before being elected as Convenor there.  His first 
appointment was as officer for ACTSS and saw a change of direction for a branch 
previously beset by ‘relative conservatism’, low membership and non-recognition 
amongst a number of employers.13  This new approach began with a pro-active 
recruitment drive and fresh shop steward elections, attempting to broaden 
membership across the multitude of companies at the port by minimising the hitherto 
majority of the ‘none-ers’ amongst clerical staff.14  One account of how ACTSS shop 
stewards began to aggressively assert the branch’s new recruitment policy is 
instructive: 
 
The day they come they come to [T&J] Harrisons was the day they joined the 
union, we never let anyone past.  If anyone tried to avoid joining we made 
sure they’d be blackballed.  We’d ostracise them, nobody would talk to them 
and within weeks they’d be back asking to join.  And so our numbers were 
shooting up and we’d well passed the amount of none-ers.15 
 
Moreover, the Branch began to lobby the Employers’ Association of the Port of 
Liverpool (EAPL) for ‘rights of consultation and negotiation in respect of clerical 
and supervisory staffs... [for] grades not covered by the existing machinery of the 
                                                     
12 Author’s interview with E.R., July 2011. 
13 Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, p. 44. 
14 ‘None-ers’ was local dockside/union slang for those workers with no union affiliation or 
membership.   
15 Author’s interview with T.T., March 2011. 
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Dock Labour Joint Committee’.16  The Association acknowledged that ‘the stage had 
been reached where staff unionism had to be recognised’ but significantly also 
accepted ‘that certain companies were opposed to the Association carrying out 
negotiations with staff grades and an attempt would be made to provide for their 
exclusion [from negotiations]’.17  So, while in principle the EAPL conceded that 
provision would have to be made for joint negotiation on port-wide pay and 
conditions, similar to that established with the dockers, it also significantly 
recognised the right of individual companies to abstain from its agreements. 
The strengthening of the clerical workers’ branch, whilst predictably opposed 
by some employers, was not necessarily welcomed by all sections of the RDW 
workforce either.  There existed a peculiar and complex relationship between RDWs 
and clerical workers at the port.  Those clerical workers whose duties were carried 
out on the quayside were often regarded with hostility, especially by older dockers 
who viewed all quayside jobs as the preserve of registered men: 
 
We started to form the Union and it was hard at first… We had to deal with 
the dockers’ old prejudices – because you’re not registered, you shouldn’t be 
on the quayside, a stupid attitude.  I was in a good position though because 
I’d say ‘there’s twenty-five of my family on the docks [as RDWs], you go 
and tell them that’.18 
 
Furthermore, amongst a certain section of RDWs, clerical workers were treated with 
a degree of contempt and suspicion.  The fact that ACTSS 6/567 branch included the 
supervisory grades, ship and quay foremen, amongst their membership did not help 
the situation.  Even amongst the younger, more moderate dockers who generally 
supported the awakening of clerical activism there was an acute sense of ‘us’ and 
‘them’.  Some viewed clerical workers as having relatively safe, easy jobs ‘sitting on 
radiators’ and, whilst dockers undertook ‘the hard work’, staff were gaining 
concessions from employers ‘on their coat-tails’.19  Indeed, ‘there was always a 
division between staff and dockers and that’s not just at Liverpool docks.  There’s 
always a divide between the office and the shop floor in any industry in the world – 
                                                     
16 EAPL meeting minutes, 10 July 1970. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Author’s interview with T.N., March 2011. 
19 Author’s interview with M.C., January 2011. 
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if you’re not digging a hole, you’re not working’.20  For the new generation of 
clerical workers who were beginning to organise relatively quickly and effectively, 
this sort of attitude was considered unhelpful.  One ACTSS shop steward retorted 
that ‘there was a common misconception about clerical workers in that somehow 
they had no link with dock-work.  Most of the clerical workers you would find that 
their father’s were dockworkers and that getting a job in the office instead of on the 
quay might be seen as moving up a bit’.21  Indeed, prior to the implementation of the 
Devlin reforms and total decasualisation of the industry, a job in the office was often 
perceived as a step up the occupational ladder on the docks, despite the frosty 
relationship between the two trade groups: 
 
Some senior dockers saw it as a betterment to bring their sons to the 
quayside, not as scruffy-arsed dockers who were casual workers but as staff 
men who were going on a salary and so they were quite elite by comparison.  
It was only with the advent of Devlin that dockers began to wield some 
power and considerably enhanced their earning opportunities.22 
 
By the late sixties the demographic of staff workers had begun to change and 
with it attitudes towards unionism and activism.  As the older ‘starchy’ types retired 
from the industry they were usually replaced either by ex-RDWs or young recruits 
straight out of school, often with relatives already working on the docks.  With 
recruitment to the register (as a Registered Dock Worker) becoming increasingly 
restricted due to the proliferation of containerisation and its related reduction in 
manpower requirements, employment in the ‘office’ became the new route for 
nepotism on the docks.  This was a major contributory factor in the evolution of 
industrial attitudes and the progress of the Branch as young staff workers from 
working-class backgrounds came into contact with seasoned trade unionists, recently 
transferred from the Docks section.  
So having gained recognition from the EAPL, received assurances regarding 
port-wide bargaining and gradually improved membership levels, ACTSS 6/567 
branch had begun to establish itself at the port in the early seventies.  The first port 
wide agreement on terms and conditions was eventually signed on 23 November 
                                                     
20 Author’s interview with T.N., March 2011. 
21 Author’s interview with M.C., January 2011. 
22 Author’s interview with E.R., May 2011. 
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1971, nicknamed the ‘grey book’ by workers.  A Joint Negotiating Committee (JNC) 
was also established between the employers’ association and the Branch similar to 
that which existed for dockers.  The Branch followed up its success by issuing a list 
of six points that it wished to negotiate with management including, most notably, a 
‘no recruitment without consultation policy’ and a campaign to obtain registration 
for all staff workers under the NDLS.23  This ambitious shopping list seemed to 
indicate a new-found assertive edge for the Branch under the leadership of Roberts 
and the recently-elected Shop Steward Committees.  The campaign for registration, 
while audacious was not without precedent because at the Port of London all clerical 
workers were registered and afforded the same rights and protection as RDWs.24  
However, the initiative met with a mixed reaction from the Docks section, which had 
long campaigned for all workers employed on the docks to come from the register, 
but had reservations about all existing staff workers being issued with books: 
 
The dockers jealously protected their books and they weren’t particularly 
keen on the notion of extending that protection to these people who they 
viewed with the utmost suspicion and absolute distaste in many regards... 
they viewed them with utmost suspicion because some [of the membership of 
ACTSS] were management grades and there was history there.25 
    
 Aside from making progress at the workplace, the Branch also began to 
broaden its influence within the Union by gradually increasing its representation on 
regional, national and trade group committees.  Moreover, it successfully lobbied for 
a ‘no compulsory redundancies’ Branch policy, mirroring statutory protection 
afforded RDWs, which was ratified at the National Executive Committee level of the 
TGWU.26  This was to prove an important statement of intent for future disputes and 
illustrates the growing confidence of the workforce, the stewards and the Branch. 
The organisational structure of the Branch, established after shop steward 
elections lent itself to enfranchisement of its membership and, as a result, an increase 
in numbers, participation and activism.  Each occupation, for example the ship’s 
                                                     
23 Carden, ‘Staff unionism’ pp. 17-18.  The only major employer of five to abstain from the first port-
wide agreement was T&J Harrisons, although a smaller employer, Liverpool Maritime Terminals, 
also refused to implement it.  The major employers who signed up to the agreement were the MDHC, 
Ocean Port Services, Port of Liverpool Stevedoring, A.E. Smith Coggins and West Coast 
Stevedoring. 
24 Author’s interview with T.T., March 2011. 
25 Author’s interview with E.R., May 2011. 
26 Ibid. 
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foremen or wharfingers, would vote for shop stewards in their area of the port on a 
biennial basis.27  An area shop steward committee would then be formed from the 
elected stewards of the various grades.  The area committees were semi-autonomous 
in their nature but also reported to a port-wide clerical stewards committee.  This 
structure was similar to that which existed in the Docks section at the port.28  
However, whereas by 1972 most dock stewards were full-time and did not carry out 
dock-work duties, all ACTSS stewards were ‘working’ stewards.  This ensured 
constant contact with the membership and direct involvement in day-to-day 
workplace matters.29  Moreover, area lay committees were established which further 
enabled accountability and participation, fostering the growth of ‘shop floor trade 
unionism’ amongst the clerical staff.30 
 
 
The Smith-Coggins dispute 
Despite the progress made by the Branch, major challenges lay ahead.  In 
June 1972, with all employers in the industry attempting to rationalise their RDW 
and non-registered workforces in the context of the reduced manpower requirements 
of the container-era, A.E. Smith-Coggins and Ocean Port Services issued 
redundancy notices to two hundred and seventeen non-registered employees at the 
port.31  The decision was the first clear challenge to ACTSS’ no compulsory 
redundancy policy as a total of fifty of their members were under threat.32  
Moreover, the redundancy notices were shortly followed by an announcement that 
merger talks were taking place between the MDHC and Smith-Coggins, Ocean Port 
Services and Port of Liverpool Stevedoring Services, raising the possibility of 
further job losses on the clerical side.33  In fact, the EAPL acknowledged that ‘there 
was a fear of redundancy in the Port’ due to the prospect of company mergers and 
                                                     
27 Prior to 1972 when the South End docks closed and Seaforth opened there were five main 
geographical areas of the port of Liverpool.  These were the North Area, the South Area, the Middle 
Area, the Coast Area and Birkenhead. 
28 Authors interview with J.D., December 2009; Author’s interview with L.D., December 2009. 
29 Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, p. 48. 
30 Ibid, p. 21. 
31 EAPL meeting minutes, 18 July 1972.  The category of ‘non-registered’ employees basically 
encompassed all workers at the port who were not RDWs.  This broad terminology covered all 
ancillary workers such as clerical staff, shoregang, shipwrights, tugboat men, gigboat men etc. 
32 Twenty ACTSS members at Smith-Coggins and a further thirty at Ocean Port Services were 
threatened with redundancy. 
33 See Chapter 5 for an overview of the reasons behind the merger. 
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‘the figure of 950 [non-registered] redundancies had been floated’.34  The insecurity 
felt by clerical workers was exacerbated still by an unrelated manning dispute 
between Smith-Coggins and its dockers, taking place at the same time. 
The Docks Shop Steward Committee was threatening to undertake port-wide 
strike action in furtherance of its claim that certain types of quayside clerical work 
should be carried out by RDWs.  As previously noted, clerical workers who worked 
on quayside operations were often resented by some dockers who wanted all such 
jobs preserved for registered men.  In this case, the manning arrangements for the 
unloading of a ship had employed only one RDW on quayside administrative work 
where the Docks section argued that at least one more should have been used.35  
Dock stewards had already been pressing employers for guarantees that ‘priority 
would be given over clerical staff in the manning of office jobs’ and that ‘when a 
staff member died, retired or resigned he would be replaced by a registered dock 
worker’.36  For their part ACTSS stewards were growing increasingly concerned 
about RDWs being employed in roles which were traditionally clerical and in the 
wake of the latest manning dispute asked for a statement from the EAPL ‘concerning 
their position vis-a-vis registered dock workers in view of their encroachment on 
staff jobs’.37 
This combination of pressures on clerical jobs led to increasing calls for 
strike action. In this context, a mass meeting was convened on Saturday 15 July 
attended by three hundred ACTSS clerical workers.  After an in-depth discussion 
regarding the future of clerical employment at the port, a motion to give one week’s 
notice of strike action from Monday was overwhelmingly approved, targeted 
particularly at the redundancy notices issued to ACTSS members.38  The dockers 
also voted at a separate mass meeting on 18 July to begin strike action from 21 July 
over the Smith-Coggins manning dispute.39  The EAPL, faced with a double threat of 
strike action, established a tri-partite standing sub-committee consisting of RDW, 
clerical and employer representation to discuss manning arrangements at the port.  
                                                     
34 EAPL meeting minutes, 18 July 1972.  The 950 redundancy figure covered all non-registered jobs 
at the port, a significant proportion of which would fall in the clerical category. 
35 For more detail on the July manning dispute at Smith-Coggins see Chapter 5. 
36 EAPL meeting minutes, 18 July 1972. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Liverpool Echo, 17 July 1972. 
39 EAPL meeting minutes, 20 July 1972; Liverpool Echo 18 July 1972. 
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At the first tri-partite committee meeting, dock stewards argued that ‘work presently 
carried out by staff clerks should be done by RDWs’.40  In response, clerical 
stewards took the opportunity to further their case for all dock estate clerical workers 
to become registered.41  They argued that this would alleviate fears amongst their 
membership regarding redundancy and satisfy RDW claims that all quayside 
workers should be registered.  However, although employers recognised that ‘if the 
staff were to become registered and the registered dock workers were to support 
them, then the present problem would possibly be solved’, they were predictably 
reluctant to see another section of the port workforce afforded the blanket protection 
of the Scheme.42  Indeed, ‘it [was] unlikely that there was any general support for 
such a measure either amongst employers or the Government because of the wider 
implications of such a move’.43  Nevertheless, the EAPL feared that the prospective 
strike action might only be solved by some movement on this point.  It 
acknowledged privately that ‘the demand might arise for the registration of all dock 
jobs’.44 
In the event, the jailing of the Pentonville Five superseded the proposed local 
strike action and hence the EAPL observed that ‘the urgency for a decision on any 
concession in the local dispute had now been removed by national developments’.45  
As previously detailed, the spontaneous reaction to the imprisonment of the five 
London dockers brought the country to a standstill.  However, the release of the 
dockers did not witness a return to work at the port of Liverpool because rejection of 
the Aldington-Jones report by a Dock Delegates Conference on 27 July resulted in a 
reaffirmation of the official national dock strike mandate.46  Similarly, although 
ACTSS’ strike action over the proposed Smith-Coggins and Ocean Port Services job 
losses had also been eclipsed by widespread industrial action relating to the 
committals at Pentonville, clerical workers had already gone out on strike as agreed 
and refused to return to work afterwards.  At a mass meeting on 28 July, clerical staff 
                                                     
40 Dock Labour Joint Committee – Standing Sub-Committee meeting minutes, 19 July 1972 
(Liverpool Maritime Museum).  Staff clerks were those clerical workers which carried out quayside 
clerical duties. 
41 Ibid; EAPL meeting minutes, 18 July 1972. 
42 EAPL meeting minutes, 18 July 1972. 
43 Ibid. 
44 EAPL meeting minutes, 20 July 1972. 
45 EAPL meeting minutes, 21 July 1972. 
46 For more detail on the RDW dispute and the A-J report see Chapter 5. 
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voted to remain on strike until the redundancy notices served on their membership 
were reversed.  As a result, around eight hundred were out on indefinite strike.47 
While the clerical workers and RDWs remained on strike over their 
respective grievances, worse news was to follow.  On 7 August, Smith-Coggins 
announced to the EAPL that it ‘would not renew its stevedoring license when it fell 
due on 18 September’.48  The company’s decision to withdraw from the port entirely 
rather than merge with the MDHC meant that many more than the original fifty 
ACTSS jobs were now under threat.  The withdrawal announcement was not, 
however, completely unexpected.  Smith-Coggins’ management was extremely 
displeased about the manner in which they had been excluded from Seaforth.49  
When added to the economic impact of a summer of severe industrial strife and a 
decline in trade, the company had apparently decided to cut its losses.  The MDHC 
signalled its intention to take on the business and customers of Smith-Coggins at the 
port, subject to Government approval.50  However, it also made it clear that ‘the 
question of redundancy in the clerical section would now cover a much wider field.  
No assurances could be given other than to registered dock workers’.51 
The MDHC was adamant that there would be extensive redundancy amongst 
clerical workers at Smith-Coggins because they simply did not require ‘duplication’ 
of existing jobs.52  No other port employer registered an interest in recruiting 
additional clerical labour and without the Scheme for protection the majority of 
Smith-Coggins’ five hundred staff were facing redundancy.53  Despite the Docks 
section resuming work on 21 August in the wake of the conclusion of the official 
national strike, on 23 August ACTSS voted to stay out in the absence of any 
reassurances regarding their members.54  This in turn meant that although the port 
reopened, operations were severely limited without some grades of clerical worker 
                                                     
47 The Liverpool Echo, 28 July 1972 reported that 850 clerical staff were on strike which constituted 
the vast majority of the workforce.  However, Carden states that the total membership of ACTSS 
numbered only 300 at this time.  It would appear that, although not members of the ACTSS branch, 
the rest of the workforce had also gone on strike in protest against the proposed redundancies 
(Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, p. 73). 
48 EAPL meeting minutes, 8 August 1972. 
49 See Chapter 5 for an account of manning arrangements for the new Royal Seaforth Docks complex.  
50 EAPL meeting minutes, 8 August 1972.  As noted in Chapter 5, the Government held a 20% 
‘golden share’ in the MDHC. 
51 Ibid. 
52 EAPL meeting minutes, 11 August 1972. 
53 Liverpool Echo, 19 August 1972. 
54 Liverpool Echo, 23 August 1972. 
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such as timekeepers, ships’ foremen etc.  By 24 August, the clerical staff had been 
on sustained strike for a total of thirty days.  Although dockers were working forty-
three vessels at the port, sixteen were lying idle and a further fourteen were stranded 
at the Mersey Bar awaiting berth space.55  The EAPL warned of ‘serious quayside 
congestion’ as a result.56  Furthermore, none of the ships being worked by dockers 
could leave the port without certain grades of clerical worker being present to 
administer the relevant paperwork. 
  Having apparently brought to an end months of local intermittent industrial 
strife with the dockers’ settlement, the news that the clerical workers were to remain 
on strike was greeted with anger by employers.57  The dockers were also keen to get 
the port back to full working again after a significant spell out and the related 
personal financial cost.  Over the next few days ‘all the focus was on a group of 
clerical workers who’d never been in the spotlight before’ and immense pressure was 
put on ACTSS to return to work and enable the full re-opening of the port.58  
Similarly, the remaining port employers were under considerable duress to find a 
settlement and so negotiations began out of necessity.  However, the Branch was 
sticking to its ‘no compulsory redundancy’ policy, insisting that ‘anyone who wants 
to take the money [enhanced voluntary severance], we’ll talk money but anyone who 
wants a job must be... reallocated to another employer’.59 
Most companies still insisted that it was impossible to absorb so many staff 
jobs into existing workforces and so the burden was left to the MDHC, as the new 
major employer in the port, to make an offer to re-employ a significant portion of 
those made redundant.  However, the initial offer was laden with conditions.  The 
MDHC proposed that it would employ around seventy-five percent of the surplus 
staff, ‘but there was certain elements they didn’t want and that was some of the 
activists’.60  The negotiating party for the union side rejected any form of selective 
recruitment, especially on the grounds of activism.61  Nevertheless, such was the 
pressure from within the Union hierarchy and elsewhere that when the MDHC 
                                                     
55 Liverpool Echo, 24 August 1972. 
56 Ibid. 
57 EAPL meeting minutes, 22 August 1972.  
58 Author’s interview with T.T., January 2011. 
59 Author’s interview with E.R., May 2011. 
60 Author’s interview with T.T., January 2011. 
61 Author’s interview with E.R., May 2011. 
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returned with a final offer in which they agreed to employ all clerical workers except 
those over sixty years old, it was put to the vote at a fractious mass meeting at the 
Pier Head baggage halls on Friday 25 August.  Under the terms of this new offer 
only twelve over-sixty ACTSS members would be affected.62  Several shop stewards 
and activists objected strongly to the over-sixties being sacrificed as part of the 
settlement but amidst the accusations and the unusual suppression of questions from 
the floor, a show of hands returned a two-to-one majority in favour of the offer.63 
Eventually, the pressure mounting from all sides to end the dispute told as 
‘panic started setting in’ amongst striking clerical workers.64  The majority of them 
were totally inexperienced in high-pressure industrial battles and the vote for a return 
to work illustrated that there was limited appetite for a potentially drawn-out 
conflict, particularly having already been out on strike for over a month.  The 
negotiating committee for the union side reluctantly admitted that ‘to prolong the 
strike could prove severely damaging to the future job security of our members’, 
despite some stewards and members believing the MDHC would eventually concede 
reallocation of the entire workforce.65  Similarly the Branch Official, Eddie Roberts, 
reflected upon the return to work vote by commenting that ‘I bitterly regret the 
situation that… the over sixties are facing.  In any battle there are casualties and in 
any battle we even face the possibility of defeat.  Yes, we have got casualties but we 
are not defeated’.66  Nevertheless, the manner in which the motion was hurried 
through the meeting without the usual due process left a sour aftertaste for some 
activists, with one shop steward describing the affair with retrospect as ‘a stain on 
our Branch’.67  Another steward recalled that ‘the stewards had the right to vote for it 
or not.  I chose not to… but it was pushed through under enormous pressure’.68 
Despite the failure of ACTSS to maintain its recently-ratified branch policy 
of no compulsory redundancies, the campaign for reallocation could be considered a 
relative success.  Notwithstanding massive pressure from the Government, port 
                                                     
62 Liverpool Echo, 23 August 1972.  Although scores of clerical staff over the age of sixty were to be 
made compulsorily redundant, only twelve of these were actually ACTSS members. 
63 Liverpool Echo, 25 August 1972; Author’s interview with A.D., May 2011; Author’s interview 
with M.C., January 2011; Author’s interview with T.T. January 2011. 
64 Author’s interview with T.T., January 2011. 
65 Liverpool Echo, 25 August 1972; Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, pp. 74-75. 
66 Liverpool Echo, 25 August 1972. 
67 Author’s interview with T.T., January 2011. 
68 Author’s interview with A.D., May 2011. 
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employers, the dockers, and indeed the bureaucracy of their own union, little short of 
five hundred jobs had been saved.  It is also important to note that only a small 
fraction of the workforce was discriminated against solely on the grounds of age and 
forcibly made redundant and that their severance sum was enhanced considerably 
beyond the statutory requirement to £4800 as part of the final settlement.69  
Furthermore, the episode had signified that ACTSS was now a player in industrial 
relations at the port and, more importantly, illustrated that it had a de facto veto on 
port operations.  If they went out on strike, the port ground to a virtual standstill: 
 
The clerical workers realised that they were key men and that they could halt 
the port.  It was the realisation that, for the first time... dockers were back at 
work but the port couldn’t function properly because the staff were on 
strike...  The 1972 dispute was pivotal for the branch.  It brought to the fore 
the younger element.  Their eyes lit up when they saw what could be 
achieved.70 
 
The growth in membership and recognition, coupled with a new official and 
the election of an emerging wave of young, idealistic and pro-active shop stewards 
had transformed ACTSS 6/567 branch from a non-entity into a ‘fighting force’ on 
the docks within just a few short years.71  The relative success of the campaign for 
reallocation had several repercussions.  The dispute had brought forward the younger 
generation of activists and shop stewards, some the sons of dockers and 
indoctrinated with more traditional combative ‘blue-collar’ values and attitudes, 
changing the character of staff unionism at the port considerably.  It also encouraged 
ACTSS stewards to become more progressive in their efforts to improve pay and 
conditions for the membership.  Out of the new stance adopted came a renewed 
campaign for all clerical workers to become registered which persisted on and off for 
the remainder of the decade.  The EAPL was to note much later that ‘the staff could 
be even more militant in their actions than the RDWs’.72  The solidarity displayed in 
the Smith-Coggins dispute was to become more rule than exception thereafter and 
industrial relations at the port had been altered irrevocably, although this only 
                                                     
69 Liverpool Echo, 23 August 1972; Liverpool Echo, 25 August 1972; EAPL meeting minutes, 25 
August 1972. 
70 Author’s interview with E.R., May 2011. 
71 Author’s interview with T.T., January 2011. 
72 EAPL meeting minutes, 11 August 1980. 
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became apparent with the passage of time.  The progress made by the new breed of 
clerical union activist is well-illustrated here: 
 
The lads became very self-sufficient after the 1972 dispute.  Whereas there 
was a great reliance on me as full-time officer in the first couple of years, 
once flush with success they found their feet.  They took [union] education 
classes and there were some articulate lads amongst them.  From then on they 
didn’t need me there every five minutes – they were quite capable of getting 
on and doing the business themselves and began fashioning their relationship 
with employers and the dock shop stewards in a much more meaningful 
way.73 
 
 Nevertheless, despite the moral victory for the Union over reallocation for the 
majority of its Smith-Coggins members to the MDHC, staff workers at Ocean Port 
Services were still threatened with redundancy.74  On 7 October an ACTSS 6/567 
branch meeting passed a resolution which read ‘guarantees of employment should be 
given for members threatened with redundancy in Ocean Port Services... otherwise 
all ACTSS members in the Port would withdraw their labour from Monday 30th 
October’.75  After three weeks of negotiation at the JNC and only four days before 
the strike was due to commence it was agreed that the redundancy notices would be 
withdrawn and those under threat would be reallocated to the MDHC.76  
Doubtlessly, clerical unionism was here to stay and employers now took ACTSS 
seriously.  A final measure of how pivotal the Smith-Coggins dispute had been in the 
direction of the Branch is illustrated by the upsurge in membership thereafter.  From 
around three hundred members before the dispute, numbers jumped to eight hundred 
and thirty by late 1973 and one hundred percent membership of over one thousand 
staff workers was reached just one year later.77  For employers, now faced with two 
well-organised trade groups at the port, bruising battles were in prospect as the need 
for rationalisation and reorganisation of the industry accelerated.
                                                     
73 Author’s interview with E.R., May 2011. 
74 As previously noted, thirty ACTSS members at Ocean Port Services were threatened with 
redundancy in the initial wave of notices served in June. 
75 Minutes of 6/567 ACTSS Branch, 7 October 1972, reproduced in Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, p. 76.  
76 EAPL meeting minutes, 27 October 1972. 
77 Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, p. 77. 
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Chapter 7 
The Changing Dynamics of Labour Relations at the Port of Liverpool, 1973-
1989 
 
The role played by Britain’s dockworkers in the events of the summer of 
1972 has been well-documented in the preceding chapters.  However, while the 
seminal national rebellion against the Industrial Relations Act was widely interpreted 
as an example of the strength of labour organisation on the docks generally, the 
challenges which precipitated it persisted.  Containerisation continued to cast a long 
shadow over manning levels and employment prospects in the industry and authority 
over ‘stuffing and stripping’ duties outside of the dock estate was still hotly-
contested.  The Aldington-Jones agreement, while on the one hand guaranteeing 
permanent employment for Registered Dock Workers (RDWs) with an individual 
employer by rendering the Temporary Unattached Register (TUR) obsolete, was also 
conversely concerned with shedding a significant number of the national registered 
workforce through voluntary severance.  Similarly, modernisation of the industry 
carried a significant threat to ancillary workers such as clerical staff, whose future 
was inextricably linked to that of the dockers.  So, despite the upheaval created in the 
summer of 1972 and the subsequent departure of the Conservatives from government 
in 1974, significant challenges were still apparent for all workers remaining in the 
industry. 
For the port employers, their ability to properly restructure and rationalise the 
industry to accommodate the proliferation of containerisation remained inhibited by 
the continuing existence of the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) and the 
protection afforded RDWs by the Devlin reforms and A-J agreement.  The A-J 
agreement was certainly resented by employers.1  It was largely conceded as a means 
to end the persistent industrial strife of 1972 and, unlike the Devlin reforms and the 
Scheme, it never became statutory.  Employers always took exception to the ‘job for 
life’ provision and sought to discard the Agreement and even the Scheme when the 
time was right, with the initial intention that it be supplanted by a voluntary 
                                                     
1 Employers Association of the Port of Liverpool (EAPL) meeting minutes, 26 July 1972 (National 
Maritime Museum, Albert Dock, Liverpool); Finney, N. ‘Repeal of the National Dock Labour 
Scheme: Britain’s ports in an era of industrial relations change’, Employee Relations, Vol. 12, No. 4, 
1990, pp. 10-16.  Finney became Director of the National Association of Port Employers (NAPE) in 
1980. 
159 
 
arrangement with the Union.2  It appeared that the opportunity to do so would 
present itself following the Conservative victory at the 1979 General Election, 
encouraging the National Association of Port Employers (NAPE) and the various 
local employers’ associations to begin to lobby for the Scheme’s replacement and to 
attempt to re-assert managerial prerogative.  However, where the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union (TGWU) had previously been accused of complacency and 
inaction by its Dock section membership, the eighties saw a hardening of its stance 
particularly in relation to the defence of the NDLS and A-J agreement.3 
In the national sphere, the defeat of the Heath government at the 1974 
General Elections and the subsequent unveiling of the victorious Labour Party’s 
much-heralded Social Contract with the Trade Union Congress (TUC) seemed to 
indicate a re-invigoration of the relationship between organised labour and its natural 
political ally.4  However, after an initially positive start, economic realities forced the 
Government to first negotiate and later impose wage restraint policy on the trade 
union movement.5  By the winter of 1978, amidst widespread industrial unrest, 
another attempt at corporatism and socialist economic planning lay in tatters, 
destroyed by a faltering economy, oppressive inflation and disastrous pay round 
increases.6  With retrospect, the resultant Conservative victory in the 1979 election is 
                                                     
2 Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. & Kelly, J. Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in Britain’s Ports 
(Aldershot: Avebury 1992), p. 84. 
3 This lean to the left could at least in part be attributed to the increasing dominance of regional and 
national trade group committees by local dock shop stewards and the members of the National Port 
Shop Stewards’ Committee throughout the seventies (Source: Author’s interview with F.L., January 
2011; Author’s interview with M.C., January 2011; Lindop, F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial 
Relations Act, part 1: Shop stewards and containerisation’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 5, Spring 1998, p. 49 [pp. 33-72]; See also Chapter 5 of this thesis). 
4 It is worth noting that the February 1974 General Election returned a hung parliament and Labour 
assumed power without a majority.  The October election returned a slender majority of three for 
Labour.  For more detail on the Social Contract see: Taylor, R. The TUC: From the General Strike to 
New Unionism (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2000); Wilkinson, F. & Tarling, R. ‘The Social Contract: Post-
war incomes policies and their inflationary impact’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 1, 1977, 
pp. 395-414; Undy, R. ‘The TUC: From the General Strike to New Unionism’, Employee Relations, 
2001, Vol. 23/ 3, pp. 290-302; McIlroy, J. & Campbell, A. ‘The high tide of trade unionism: mapping 
industrial politics 1964-79’ in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman & A. Campbell (eds.), British Trade Unions 
and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 
93-132. 
5 For more detail on the introduction of incomes policies by Labour see: Taylor, R. ‘The trade union 
‘problem’ in the Age of Consensus 1960-1979’ in B. Pimlott & C. Cook Trade Unions in British 
Politics (London: Longman 1991), pp. 175-199; Wilkinson & Tarling, ‘The Social Contract’; Boston, 
J. ‘The theories and practice of voluntary incomes policies with particular reference to the British 
Labour government’s Social Contract 1974-1979’, PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 1983. 
6 For more detail on the events of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ see: Hay, C. ‘Narrating crisis: The 
discursive construction of the ‘Winter of Discontent’’, Sociology, Vol. 30/2, May 1996, pp. 253-277; 
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widely regarded as a watershed in British political, economic and industrial relations 
history.  Over the course of the next decade, through a combination of monetarist 
laissez-faire fiscal policies, piecemeal industrial relations legislation, high 
unemployment, economic recession and an apparent electoral mandate in favour of 
reform, Thatcher’s government succeeded in irrecoverably changing the nature and 
influence of trade unionism in British political and industrial culture. 
The Thatcherism paradigm has been well-scrutinised and thoroughly 
documented by the various branches of historical enquiry and other disciplines.  It is 
not the intention of this study to recount in detail the general context of 1979-1989 or 
the unrelated policies of the Conservative government, as these have already been 
comprehensively researched elsewhere.7  Of course, it is difficult to properly analyse 
the challenges facing the Liverpool registered dock/clerical workers and their 
representatives without some reference to the major pieces of legislation that 
considerably restricted the scope and effectiveness of industrial action for all 
description of labour organisation.  It is therefore a secondary objective of this 
chapter to evaluate if and the extent to which the changing landscape of voluntary 
bargaining impacted upon the dock and clerical workers’ industrial attitudes and 
ability to mobilise effectively throughout the eighties at the port of Liverpool, 
cumulating in an examination of the campaign against the abolition of the NDLS in 
1989. 
It is in these dual contexts - the changing nature/modernisation of the dock 
industry and the impact of political policy on union organisation post-1979 - that this 
chapter considers labour relations at the port of Liverpool between 1973 and 1989.  
The chapter comprises a chronological assessment of significant disputes at the port 
during this period, some involving the Docks section, some involving the 
Association of Clerical Technical and Supervisory Staff (ACTSS) and others 
involving both trade groups.  It aims to not only shed light on the local relationships 
between port workers and management but also on the sometimes tempestuous 
                                                                                                                                                      
Thomas, J. ‘‘Bound in by history’: The Winter of Discontent in British politics, 1979-2004’, Media, 
Culture & Society, Vol. 29/2, March 2007, pp. 263-283. 
7 For more detail on the evolution of the Conservative government’s policies see, for example: 
McIlroy, J. The Permanent Revolution: Conservative Law and the Trade Unions (Nottingham: 
Spokesman for the Society of Industrial Tutors 1991); Taylor, A. ‘The Conservative party and the 
trade unions’ in McIlroy et al, British Trade Unions, pp. 151-186; Freeman, R. & Pelletier, J. ‘The 
impact of industrial relations legislation on British union density’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 28, No. 2, July 1990, pp. 141-164. 
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relationship between dockers and clerical workers themselves.  The causes and 
outcomes of many of the disputes featured have never been properly examined.  
Thus it is therefore contended that this study will help illuminate the true picture of 
industrial relations at the port of Liverpool and contribute to the existing academic 
discourse regarding dockland industrial relations, local workplace relationships and 
the impact of Thatcherism on labour organisation. 
 
Developments in labour relations at Liverpool 1973-1979 
By 1973, the Docks section was well-established at the port and had enjoyed 
several successes in confronting management and haulage companies over proposed 
changes to working practices and the outsourcing of container-stripping duties.  To 
further exacerbate the local employers’ predicament, the Smith-Coggins dispute also 
signified the consolidation of clerical unionism and as ACTSS 6/567 Branch 
continued to establish itself and strengthen its membership, it became increasingly 
apparent that management would be forced to deal with two active and well-
organised trade groups at the port.  When these local factors are added to the broader 
industry-wide challenges, it would appear that the prospect of any real measure of 
industrial harmony remained as remote as ever. 
Indeed, although the events of the summer of 1972 had proven to be a 
politically-charged affair, the subsequent A-J agreement did not address the major 
concerns of Liverpool’s RDWs namely the definition and scope of dock work, the 
contraction of manning levels and the growth of non-Scheme ports, all of which had 
triggered the broader national furore over the blacking issue. The Dock Shop 
Steward Committee remained pro-active in their defence of manning levels, 
especially following the introduction of the industry’s National Voluntary Severance 
Scheme (NVSS) and its implications for the potential shrinking of the local register.8  
After the Smith-Coggins settlement, both the dock and clerical stewards were 
encouraged to press employers for further concessions regarding manning.  The next 
                                                     
8 The NVSS was introduced as part of the A-J agreement amidst employer demands to rationalise the 
workforce in the face of containerisation.  The initial amount available to RDWs was £4000.  
Although there had been a severance scheme in operation under the Devlin reforms, the relatively 
small severance sum of £1500 attracted only modest interest. 
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opportunity to act progressively on this issue came with negotiations over the 
opening of Seaforth Grain Terminal. 
As previously noted, the opening of the Seaforth Container Terminal was 
delayed by the Union side of the Local Modernisation Committee (LMC) seeking 
guarantees regarding redundancies and sole jurisdiction over container-stripping 
duties.9  Agreement was eventually reached in 1972 regarding the allocation of 
RDWs to the terminal, although negotiations had been ongoing since 1970.  
However, the opening and operation of Seaforth Grain Terminal, located on the same 
site as the container terminal, was delayed well into 1974 because of a protracted 
dispute regarding manning, terms and conditions.10  Seaforth Grain Terminal had 
been purpose-built to handle the largest of bulk grain carriers, featuring modern 
equipment and a 100,000 tonne silo, and so massively improved the port’s 
capacity.11 
An employer-union liaison committee, the Grain Committee, had initially 
been established in 1972 as a vehicle to negotiate pay and conditions.  From the start 
of discussions, shop stewards on the union side insisted on registration of all workers 
at the terminal, including clerical staff, as a precondition for any other negotiations.12  
However, the registration of clerical workers was rejected out-of-hand by the 
Employers’ Association of the Port of Liverpool (EAPL), representing the interests 
of those companies concerned.13  Employers were compelled to use RDWs for 
quayside work at the terminal but unsurprisingly ‘were not prepared to extend 
registration to any other class of worker on the docks’.14  Aside from the short-term 
financial inconvenience the registration of staff workers at the Grain Terminal might 
cause, the long-term consequences of such a deal could have left port employers 
open to a deluge of similar claims for registration by other sections of the non-
                                                     
9 See Chapter 5 for more detail on the construction and opening of the Seaforth Container Terminal 
and the establishment of Local Modernisation Committees in every Scheme port in Britain as part of 
the 1967 Devlin reforms. 
10 The Royal Seaforth Docks Complex contained a number of different terminals - meat, timber, grain 
and container terminals.  The Grain Terminal was the last on the site to open. 
11 House of Commons debate, 25 July 1974 (Hansard, Vol. 877, cc. 1978-88). 
12 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 5 Nov 1973.  This was not without precedent because the 
manning agreement for Seaforth Container Terminal stipulated that all employees there would be 
registered. 
13 The MDHC was the major employer at the Grain Terminal, and indeed in the port as a whole, 
having absorbed the workforces of Smith-Coggins, Port of Liverpool Stevedoring and Ocean Port 
Services in late 1972 – see Chapter 5 for more detail. 
14 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 12 Nov 1973. 
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registered dock workforce or in other areas of the port.  At a meeting of the Grain 
Committee on 8 November 1973, representatives of the EAPL/Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company (MDHC) informed the union side that the registration of staff 
workers at the terminal was a non-starter.  In response, the shop stewards once again 
made it clear that no negotiations could proceed on any other issue relating to the 
terminal until they were guaranteed that all workers would be registered, ‘at that 
point the lay members of the union side walked out of the meeting’.15  This stalemate 
persisted for several months.16 
As in the case of Seaforth Container Terminal the MDHC, as both Port 
Authority and majority employer, came under substantial pressure from customers 
intending to use the facilities at the Grain Terminal.  Shipping interests and grain 
processors, some of whom had invested in new mills adjacent to the terminal, were 
pushing for an agreement and threatened the permanent transfer of their operations to 
rival ports.17  Eventually, despite serious misgivings on the employers’ side, a 
settlement was reached through the machinery of the National Joint Council for the 
Port Transport Industry (NJC) whereby ‘it was agreed that in this case and this case 
alone - not setting any precedents for any other part of the port, or any other port - 
the clerical workers on the computer side of the Grain Terminal should be registered 
dockworkers’.18  On the surface this agreement appeared to represent a victory for 
both ACTSS and the Docks section – for the staff it provided a precedent regarding 
registration, something which was already being actively pursued by the branch; for 
the dockers, it maintained their policy of extending the register and sphere of 
influence wherever possible. 
However, agreement over registration of all workers at the Grain Terminal 
was only the first hurdle in negotiations.  When discussions began over manning 
levels and pay and conditions, the MDHC was subject to an unpleasant shock.  The 
company assessed that the operation of the terminal required two seven-hour shifts 
                                                     
15 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 12 Nov 1973. 
16 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 12 Nov 1973 – 1 March 1974. 
17 House of Commons debate, 25 July 1974.  Kelloggs and Allied Mills both opened new premises 
next to the terminal. 
18 Ibid.  The National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry consisted of an equal number of 
employer/union members.  It was founded in 1920 as part of the Shaw Inquiry recommendations (an 
early Government inquiry into the casual system of employment on the docks) and dealt with 
establishing and administering the port industry’s national minimum wage, overtime rates and holiday 
pay. 
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of between thirty-two and thirty-seven men per shift to achieve maximum 
profitability (total sixty-four to seventy-four), ‘it believed that was the correct figure 
in the interests of the port if it was to push up throughput and bring additional benefit 
to the Merseyside docks’.19  Clearly, because of the sophisticated nature of the new 
grain handling facility, the figure proposed by the company fell well short of the 
conventional numbers required for the handling of grain at other berths in the port.  
The Dock Shop Steward Committee, upholding its central policy of maintaining 
manning levels, saw this as reduction of the workforce by proxy.20  The Union’s 
counter-proposal stipulated that one hundred and twenty-three workers were required 
per shift on a three-shift rota.21  Yet again, the Grain Committee fell into stalemate 
and the issue was referred to the NJC.22 
On this occasion, the NJC also became deadlocked and internal assessors 
were appointed to advise.  Their findings set the manning levels at fifty-eight 
workers to cover two seven-hour shifts per day, with additional men on duty for 
cleaning and store keeping, a total of one hundred and sixteen men.23  Management 
accepted the recommendation, but again the union side argued that such a figure 
would equate to a relative loss of jobs on previous grain handling levels.24  Instead 
the Union proposed that the two sides met half-way on their initial manning 
estimates, equating to eighty men to cover two shifts per day, a total of one hundred 
and sixty.25  There was also further disagreement over shift lengths and weekly pay 
guarantees. 
Eventually, the Grain Committee agreed on £67 for a thirty-five hour week 
but it took several more weeks of negotiations before a mutually suitable 
arrangement was agreed regarding manning levels.  At a meeting of the Grain 
Committee on Friday 13 September, the Union side finally agreed to a total of one 
hundred and thirty two men split across an early and late shift, each working a thirty-
five hour week.26  The final manning settlement represented almost double the initial 
                                                     
19 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 1 March 1974. 
20 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 1 March 1974. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Such was the growing rancour surrounding the affair, it featured in a House of Commons debate.  
See House of Commons debate, 25 July 1974. 
23 EAPL – TGWU Seaforth Grain Committee meeting minutes, 5 June 1974. 
24 House of Commons debate, 25 July 1974. 
25 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 1 March 1974. 
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estimate by employers and an increase of sixteen on assessment provided by the 
NJC.  The terminal eventually opened on 28 October 1974, some two years after 
negotiations regarding manning and conditions had commenced.  As in previous 
negotiations over the container terminal, the union side had played a waiting game in 
refusing to allocate labour and hence allowed financial and customer pressure to 
mount on the MDHC, which ultimately resulted in an enhanced and satisfactory 
settlement.  The MDHC, shorn of the usual powers of coercion available in a 
standard employment relationship, were stymied by the tactics utilised by the Union 
side of the negotiating committee.27  These tactics were rooted in an intimate 
knowledge of the statutory protection afforded them and the time-hungry nature of 
the shipping and dock industries, not entirely dissimilar to the tailored ‘factory class 
consciousness’ cultivated by stewards in Beynon’s study of Ford workers, who 
‘knew what their bit of the world was about’.28  It is evident that early battle lines 
were being drawn here in the broader contest of modernisation/containerisation 
versus the local industry and the maintenance of those all-important manning levels. 
Meanwhile in the national sphere, several new initiatives for the dock 
industry were unfolding.  In the wake of the 1972 national dock strike, the A-J 
Committee had recommended an overhaul of the Dock Labour Scheme to better deal 
with the litany of challenges posed by modernisation.  The recently-elected Labour 
government, led by Harold Wilson with Michael Foot as Secretary of State for 
Employment, was considering implementing either an extension of the NDLS or 
nationalisation of the port industry.29  On 15 July 1974, Foot announced a proposal 
in a House of Commons statement to significantly extend the Scheme.  The details of 
the proposal did little to raise morale at the National Association of Port Employers 
(NAPE) and the EAPL.  Aside from stating that the NDLS should be extended ‘to all 
significant cargo-handling activities at ports and wharves which have not been 
covered up to now’, the plan made provision for the implementation of the ‘five-
mile’ rule, a redefining and strengthening of the definition of dock-work and a 
perpetuation of the industry joint control arrangements through the National Dock 
                                                     
27 The Union side of the negotiating committee consisted of stewards appointed by the Dock Shop 
Steward Committee plus the District Docks Secretary, Lew Lloyd. 
28 Beynon, H. Working For Ford (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1973), pp. 80-81. 
29 EAPL meeting minutes, 27 August 1974. 
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Labour Board (NDLB), local boards and the machinery of the NJC.30  The 
reaffirmation and augmentation of the Scheme was the worst possible scenario for 
employers.  At Liverpool, the EAPL even considered nationalisation as the lesser of 
two evils, an indication of exactly how strongly the employers felt about any 
extension of the Scheme’s powers.31  Indeed, it was suggested at a Policy Committee 
meeting that ‘one of the conditions of nationalisation should be the complete 
abolition of the Dock Worker’s Scheme and that dockworkers should take their place 
in the industrial field under exactly the same conditions as other workers in other 
industries, this is fundamental’.32  Similarly, NAPE asked the Department of 
Employment ‘why extend the Dock Labour Scheme when it was not necessary 
anyhow?’33 
The Government published its final document on dock-work on 21 March 
1975.  However, the consultative process did little to alter the initial provisions of 
the Bill, which retained all of the major points announced in the original notification 
of extension of the Scheme and received its second reading in the House of 
Commons in February 1976.  The ‘five-mile’ rule was a central issue of contention, 
especially amongst freight and road haulage companies.  The events which 
transpired in the summer of 1972 were largely a consequence of haulage companies 
refusing to recognise ‘stuffing and stripping’ as dock-work and therefore any 
legislation which preserved all container groupage work within a five-mile radius of 
Scheme ports for RDWs was bound to be hotly-disputed.  So, not only was the Bill 
strongly resisted by port authorities and employers, it was also challenged by major 
haulage companies who vociferously made their feelings known to the 
                                                     
30 Department for Employment Press Release, ‘Proposal to extend the Dock Labour Scheme 
announced today’, 15 July 1974 (The University of Warwick, Modern Records Centre).  Although 
Scheme port employers had previously lobbied for the extension of the NDLS to non-Scheme ports 
on the grounds of unfair commercial advantage, the other provisions contained in the proposal 
strengthened dockworkers’ employment rights further.  The ‘five-mile’ rule basically stipulated that 
all container groupage work (‘stuffing and stripping’) which took place within five miles of any 
Scheme port gates was deemed dock-work and hence had to be carried out by RDWs. 
31 In fact, the MDHC was already part-owned by the government.  The badly debt-laden MDHB was 
sold to the private sector in 1970 with the government assuming 20% of the company as 
compensation for writing off public debts of around £100m (see Chapter 5 for more detail).  Indeed, 
the Royal Seaforth Docks complex was mostly financed by Government loans and grants (Source: 
House of Commons debate, 25 July 1974). 
32 EAPL meeting minutes, 27 August 1974. 
33 EAPL meeting minutes, ‘Re: Consultative Document ‘Dock Work’, 1 July 1975.  
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Government.34  It was in this context that the Bill marginally passed its second 
reading in the House of Commons.  However, it was savaged in the House of Lords 
and was returned to the Commons with a series of amendments proposed, most 
notably that a public inquiry should be held before it was passed into law.35  In 
response, the Government tabled a motion disagreeing to the public inquiry 
amendment recommended by the House of Lords.  This was carried by an ultra-
slender 310 votes to 309, requiring the Speaker of the House’s vote to break the 
deadlock.36  Nevertheless, two similar motions opposing the Lords’ amendments, 
relating to replacing the ‘five-mile’ rule with a scaled-down half mile boundary, 
were defeated.37 
The final outcome of the exhaustive debate and voting at the Commons was 
that a considerably diluted Act received Royal Assent on 22 November 1976.38  The 
‘five-mile’ rule, which was a central tenet of the unofficial National Port Shop 
Steward Committee’s (NPSSC) demands over the previous few years, had been 
voted down in the Commons with a significantly more modest half-mile boundary 
being founded in its place.39  No new Scheme was established immediately, instead 
the Act gave an undertaking that the Secretary of State for Employment would 
‘prepare in draft... a new Dock Labour Scheme to replace the 1967 Scheme’ after 
consultation with all sides of the industry.40  The only real immediate change was a 
re-shuffle and enlargement of the NDLB with four new members appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Employment.41  Indeed, the final Act was considered 
somewhat of a ‘dud’ by dockers.42  The Bill had started with lofty ambitions but 
failed to implement either of its proposed major reforms partly because of the 
Government’s wafer-thin majority and partly because of strong opposition from 
                                                     
34 See various correspondence to the Department for Employment regarding the consultative stage of 
the Dock Work Bill from concerned parties - The Institute of Freight Forwarders, 20 Jan 1976; 
Christian Salvesen (Cold Storage) Ltd, 9 Jan 1976 etc. (Modern Records Centre). 
35 House of Commons debate, 10 November 1976 (Hansard, Vol. 919, cc.487-602).  The 1946 Dock 
Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, which founded the original NDLS, contained reference to 
the need for a public inquiry if the Act were to be revised considerably or replaced. 
36 Ibid. 
37 House of Commons debate, 10 November 1976. 
38 Dock Work Regulation Act 1976 (London: HMSO November 1976). 
39 Although vague provision was made for the Secretary of State for Employment to extend this half-
mile boundary ‘if it appears to him necessary in the light of local circumstances affecting any 
particular definable dock area’, Department for Employment, ‘The Dock Work Regulation Act 1976’ 
(Retrieved 19 August 2011 - http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/ 79/contents/enacted). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Author’s interview with F.L., January 2011. 
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employers within the dock and road haulage industries.  This was effectively the last 
battle in the campaign to preserve container-stripping rights for RDWs.  The 
inability of the Government to force through the reforms represented a significant 
defeat for the dockers’ movement and an acceleration of the trend towards the 
outsourcing of container-stripping.  
Meanwhile, at the port of Liverpool, where dockers and staff had wrung a 
series of concessions from employers, especially in relation to the Seaforth 
terminals, a period of relative industrial peace ensued.  Nevertheless ACTSS, having 
gained recognition from the majority of employers and the EAPL in 1970/71, was 
still involved in a struggle for recognition from other employers at the port.43  Two 
companies steadfastly resisted despite concessions from every other employer; these 
were Liverpool Maritime Terminals and T&J Harrisons.  T&J Harrisons in particular 
was described by ACTSS stewards as ‘fiercely anti-union’, initially threatening any 
staff employee who joined the union with dismissal.44  By 1976, these two 
employers were reluctantly brought to the negotiation table amidst union efforts to 
ramp up the pressure through the threat of industrial action.  ACTSS stewards 
demanded that they recognise the union and implement the Port Agreement on terms 
and conditions for their workforce.45  Despite pressure from the Union and the 
EAPL, Harrisons remained indifferent.  Eventually they were forced to recognise the 
Union and accept the port-wide pay agreement after ACTSS took the company to the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) in early 1977.46 
This enforced recognition was a reflection of the growing strength and 
influence of ACTSS.  As previously noted, not all RDWs welcomed the awakening 
of clerical militancy, especially when their actions encroached on the dockers’ 
sphere of influence or authority.  The Smith-Coggins affair had been a case in point.  
There was further rancour connected to a proposed week-long boycott of South 
                                                     
43 See Chapter 6 of this thesis for an account of the implementation of the port-wide agreement for 
clerical workers. 
44 Author’s interview with T.T., March 2011. 
45 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 12 January 1976.  The Port Agreement on pay and conditions for 
staff mirrored the RDWs negotiation structure – the EAPL and the Union negotiated terms on an 
annual basis which applied to every company and clerical worker throughout the port. 
46 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 17 January 1977. 
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African goods in January 1977.47  An EAPL meeting reported that ‘it appeared that 
the week boycott of South African goods supported by the TUC should pass without 
difficulty as far as RDWs were concerned.  However, the Association had been 
approached by ACTSS which asked for a stop work meeting to discuss the call for a 
boycott with their membership’.48  On this occasion the ACTSS meeting voted 
against boycotting South African cargoes or ships in solidarity, although sympathetic 
political action was increasingly on the agenda for ACTSS stewards.  The mere fact 
that clerical workers were considering an independent stoppage over a political 
matter was greeted with anger by dockers’ leaders, who had already voted against 
taking action because it had not been officially adopted as policy by the TGWU.49  
Furthermore, the ACTSS stewards were reminded from within the Union that 
‘you’re only the junior partners in the port and you can never do anything in 
isolation from the dockers – you’ve got to keep them on board’.50  An official joint-
liaison committee had been established between the dockers and clerical workers in 
August 1973 but the meetings were infrequent and sometimes fractious with little 
being resolved – ‘half the time you’d go to these liaison meetings and they’d just end 
up as fisticuffs’.51 
Despite the initially strained and somewhat hostile relationship, the dock and 
ACTSS stewards gradually began to work together over certain matters.  The 
proposed closure of Dunlop’s tyre factory in Speke (Liverpool) brought a united 
response of solidarity from both parties.52  This was part of a broader trend towards 
secondary sympathetic action by shop stewards at the port.  Indeed the EAPL noted 
that ‘there had recently been several examples of dock workers responding to 
approaches from workers in other industries to have goods or services of their 
                                                     
47 Some trade unions in Britain encouraged their members to boycott handling or transporting South 
African goods throughout the seventies and eighties because of the Apartheid government in that 
country. 
48 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 17 January 1977. 
49 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 17 January 1977. 
50 Author’s interview with T.T., November 2010. 
51 Ibid; Carden, M. ‘Staff  trade unionism and industrial decline: the ACTSS 6/567 Branch and the 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Company’, Unpublished MA thesis, University of Warwick, September 
1983, p. 79. 
52 For more detail about the closure of Dunlop’s, see for example: McGovern, T. ‘Why do successful 
companies fail? A case study of the decline of Dunlop’, Business History, Vol. 49, Issue 6, 2007, pp. 
886-907; Willman, P. ‘Leadership and trade union principles: some problems of management 
sponsorship and independence’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 4, November 1980, pp. 
39-49. 
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employers blacked in the Port’.53  The ‘blacking’ of Dunlop’s products had been 
sanctioned indirectly at the national level of the TGWU.54  The Union had 
encouraged its membership to co-operate with the Dunlop Action Committee, set up 
by the company’s employees and union representatives in the wake of the closure 
announcement.  The Dunlop Action Committee ‘had asked that Dunlop products be 
blacked on Liverpool docks and RDWs and ACTSS had agreed to act on this 
request’.55 
The slightly more co-ordinated approach between RDWs and staff could at 
least be partially attributed to a change of personnel in the branch hierarchy.  Eddie 
Roberts, the officer accredited with reviving the fortunes of the 6/567 ACTSS branch 
by making it more inclusive, representational and pro-active left his post in 1977 to 
take up another appointment within the Union.  The man who replaced him as 
official responsible for the clerical staff at the port was none other than Jimmy 
Symes, someone who was a household name amongst dockers and across the 
dockland community as a whole.  Symes was an ex-RDW who had been ‘poached’ 
by the TGWU to become an official and whose pedigree on the docks was 
considerable.  He was Chairman of the Dock Shop Stewards Committee from its 
inception in 1967 until 1977, playing an influential part in the series of disputes 
referred to in the last chapter and the broader evolution of labour relations at the port 
following the implementation of the shop steward system in the wake of Devlin 
Phase 1.56  While Roberts was respected on the docks for his ability as a negotiator 
and organiser, especially from within his own ranks, Symes was a son of the industry 
and was held in very high regard by most RDWs.  This made for an interesting 
appointment and, in theory, the possibility of a thawing in relations between the two 
trade groups at the port. 
However, Symes’ tenure at ACTSS was short-lived because in February 
1979 he became TGWU District Docks and Waterways Secretary, returning to the 
section where he originally forged his reputation.  His successor as ACTSS 6/567 
                                                     
53 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 12 April 1979.   
54 Liverpool Echo, 6 April 1979. 
55 EAPL Policy Committee minutes, 10 April 1979.  Ultimately, the campaign to save the factory fails 
with the loss of over 2500 jobs (Source: Meegan, R. ‘Paradise postponed: the growth and decline of 
Merseyside’s outer estates’ in P. Cooke (ed.) Localities: The Changing Face of Urban Britain, 
London: Unwin Hyman 1989, p. 208). 
56 Symes was replaced by Dennis Kelly as Chairman of the Dock Shop Steward Committee. 
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Branch Official was Lennie McCluskey, a man who enjoyed fervent and widespread 
support from within his own branch.57  He was an extremely popular choice because 
he had graduated through the port clerical shop steward system, had spent all his 
working life on the clerical staff at the port and understood the complexities of the 
challenges facing the Branch.58  In the long term McCluskey’s appointment did 
nothing to help the relationship between dockers and clerical staff as he and his 
branch shop stewards increasingly sought to pursue improvements and safeguard 
members’ jobs regardless of how their actions were perceived by the Dock section or 
the TGWU bureaucracy. 
The Thatcher years at the port of Liverpool, 1979-1989 
The defeat of Callaghan’s Labour administration in the 1979 General 
Election brought an extra dimension, beyond the obvious, to labour relations at the 
port of Liverpool.  As previously noted, from 1975 to 1979 the Labour government 
operated an incomes policy, initially with the consent of the unions and later without, 
which restricted annual wage round increases despite the impact of rapidly escalating 
inflation on the cost of living.59  The pay freeze policy had expired during the last 
months of Labour’s administration and was immediately dismissed and discarded as 
a mechanism for inflation control by the new Conservative government, which 
considered such measures an affront to free market economics.  This, of course, 
signified a return to free collective bargaining for the first time in five years.  
Unions, having witnessed their members’ standard of living and take home pay 
decline in real terms over that period, were eager to secure annual pay deals which 
exceeded the rate of inflation.60 
At Liverpool, port-wide pay negotiations for RDWs took place through the 
vehicle of the Local Modernisation Committee (LMC), established as part of the 
Devlin reforms, which consisted of an equal number of employer and union 
representatives.  Clerical staff had their own pay negotiation committee, the Joint 
                                                     
57 EAPL – ACTSS Joint Negotiating Committee meeting minutes, 23 February 1979.  Lennie 
McCluskey is, of course, the current General Secretary of UNITE (which includes the merged 
TGWU). 
58 Author’s interview with T.N., March 2011; Author’s interview with T.T., November 2010. 
59 Thorpe, ‘The Labour Party and the trade unions’ in McIlroy et al, British Trade Unions, p. 143.  In 
1975 inflation stood at a crippling 26.9% and although the rate fell thereafter it remained over 15% 
until 1978. 
60 Inflation jumped from 13.4% in 1979 to 18% in 1980 (Source: http://safalra.com/other/historical-
uk-inflation-price-conversion; http://www.whatsthecost.com/historic.cpi.aspx). 
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Negotiating Committee (JNC) which met other EAPL representatives.  As the major 
player at the port, the Docks section was always first to negotiate with port 
management in the annual pay round followed by clerical workers and other 
ancillary staff.  For example, if the LMC agreed on a ten percent annual wage rise, 
ACTSS and other ancillary workers would usually expect their pay deal to be 
roughly comparable.  This arrangement was formalised in a grade parity agreement 
with employers in 1974.61  So, the status quo at the port was that the RDW pay deal 
set the bar for other sections of port employee.  However, as ACTSS became more 
independent and pro-active in its pursuit of members’ interests, it increasingly 
disregarded the status quo and began to negotiate aggressively for its own individual 
claim.  This approach was perceived in some quarters as challenging the established 
hierarchy at the port: 
 
The dockers would say ‘hang on, we’ve just done our deal – you can’t get 
more than us’.  But why not?  We were a separate branch [of the Union] with 
separate negotiating bodies... we met one set of employers’ representatives, 
the dockers met a different set and we had our own committees.  Because we 
got a few successes in getting better deals, the dockers would have a right go 
at us.  In the end, they went back to the employers and said ‘although we’re 
the first in in any negotiations... if you make a higher settlement with any 
other section in this port, we’ll be coming back to you because we expect at 
least the same as them’.62 
 
Again, this instance of the clerical workers acting independently of dockers was 
frostily-received.  The idea that the ‘junior partners’ in the port could trump the 
dockers in pay negotiations was interpreted as encroachment on their sphere of 
influence by some elements in the RDW camp.  Sectionalism was undoubtedly alive 
                                                     
61 The growing number of RDWs employed in clerical roles was due to the local ACTSS branch 
ratifying a ‘no new recruitment’ policy in the wake of the 1972 Smith-Coggins dispute.  It was 
conceived with the intention of protecting existing jobs and furthering the campaign for registration.  
However, a by-product of the policy meant that when a vacancy appeared in the clerical ranks due to 
natural wastage it was filled by a RDW.  As a result ACTSS lobbied employers to introduce a parity 
agreement to ensure that those higher clerical grades who worked side-by-side with RDWs 
commanded similar salaries to their counterparts.  Interestingly, whereas prior to 1972 any RDW who 
went to work in the office was forced to give up his ‘book’ (i.e. registration under the Scheme as a 
dockworker), this was no longer the case and those RDWs ‘on loan’ to the clerical side retained their 
registration with the local dock labour board and membership of the Docks section of the Union 
(Source: Carden, ‘Staff unionism’, pp. 79-81; Author’s interview with T.T., March 2011).  
62 Author’s interview with T.T., March 2011. 
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and well in the local industry, a phenomenon which has previously been highlighted 
by Hyman as a potential by-product of strong, local shop steward organisation.63 
Pay negotiations in 1979, spurred on by the return to free collective 
bargaining, reaped an inflation-equalling 13.35% rise for RDWs.64  However, at a 
time of increased financial pressure for employers, the rise was reluctantly absorbed.  
The union side of the LMC had also demanded an increase in fall-back pay and a 
shortening of the working week to thirty-five hours in all areas of the port.65  This 
was rejected by the EAPL as ‘unrealistic’ and it pointed to the perilous state of port 
finances as evidence that the pay rise was the maximum affordable.  In the case of 
ACTSS and the 1979 pay round negotiations, its delegates had insisted on the 
formalisation of a parity formula into the agreement which related the staff grades’ 
rates of pay to an RDW checker employed on office work.66  In other words, all 
ACTSS grades of pay were at the very least to be linked to the pay of RDWs 
involved in ‘checking-off’ duties.67  This guaranteed de facto Scheme-dictated pay 
for the clerical staff who, despite not being afforded the protection of statute, were 
gradually mirroring some of the benefits derived from it through their own 
negotiations with management.  Furthermore, by linking the salaries of dock workers 
and clerical staff pay and conditions now became an area of joint interest, and 
potentially of co-operation. 
Collaboration between the two trade groups on other matters did indeed 
appear to be on the rise, perhaps illustrated by a co-ordinated port-wide stoppage in 
sympathy with steelworkers in March 1980.  As in the case of Dunlop’s, the action 
was triggered by a TGWU ruling requiring its membership to support steelworkers 
in their national dispute.  On 20 March, gangs working a Russian cargo ship refused 
to load manufactured steel for export, resulting in around one hundred men being put 
                                                     
63 Hyman, R. ‘The politics of workplace trade unionism: Recent tendencies and some problems for 
theory’, Capital & Class, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1979, p. 55 (pp. 54-67). 
64 EAPL meeting minutes, 30 April 1979.  The pay rise was made up of an £8 per week increase on 
the basic rate and an increase in holiday pay of £24.57. 
65 A thirty-five hour week was already in operation at Seaforth’s Container and Grain Terminals. 
66 The 1979 parity agreement was an augmentation of the 1974 agreement as it guaranteed all clerical 
grades’ pay would be linked to RDWs on ‘checking off’ duties. 
67 EAPL meeting minutes, 30 April 1979.  In some areas of the port ‘checking-off’ duties were carried 
out by RDWs not clerical staff.  This was dependent on agreements already in place relating to 
manning allocation in individual areas of the port. 
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‘off-pay’, one of the few disciplinary weapons available to management.68  The 
following day, flash mass meetings at the dock gates provoked a complete walk-out 
of the five thousand-strong RDW workforce.69  ACTSS quickly followed suit after 
their own mass meeting on 21 March and the port was brought to a complete 
standstill.70  Dennis Kelly, Chairman of the Dock Shop Steward Committee 
following Symes’ departure, outlined the details of the current impasse: 
 
We explained to the lads that the instruction to load the steel was contrary to 
a directive from the TGWU Executive... It is entirely up to the employers 
whether we return to work.  We will work every other cargo but the steel and 
that means we’re willing to do 99 per cent of the work on the docks.  We 
think they [the employers] are under pressure from the Government...71 
  
The inference that the MDHC and other employers were being lent upon by 
the Government as part of a broader campaign against the twelve week-old 
steelworkers strike seemed to be given credence by the port employers’ apparent 
unwillingness to negotiate over a return to work on all other cargo.72  Furthermore, 
the action initiated in Liverpool spread to other Scheme ports where steel products 
and materials were also being boycotted.  There was even talk of a national dock 
strike.73  Yet again, pressure from port users came to bear as the MDHC struggled to 
justify their decision not to re-deploy dockers on all cargoes except steel in order to 
circumvent the TGWU ban.  Indeed, one Managing Director of a Liverpool-based 
shipping agent described the MDHC’s handling of the dispute as ‘disgusting’.74  The 
return to work eventually took place on 2 April after a complete volte face by 
management whereby guarantees were given that dockers would not be expected to 
                                                     
68 As previously noted, nearly all disciplinary matters had to be referred to the local Dock Labour 
Board and NDLB for consideration, removing managerial disciplinary prerogative. 
69 Liverpool Echo, 21 March 1980. 
70 EAPL meeting minutes, 24 March 1980. 
71 Liverpool Echo, 21 March 1980. 
72 For more detail on the 1980 steelworkers strike see, for example: Blyton, P. ‘Steel: A classic case 
of industrial relations change in Britain’, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 5, September 
1992, pp. 635-650; Bacon, N., Blyton, P. & Morris, J. ‘Among the ashes: Trade union strategies in the 
UK and German steel industries’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 34, Issue 1, March 
1996, pp. 25-50; Sadler, D. ‘Works closure at British Steel and the nature of the State’, Political 
Geography Quarterly, Vol. 3, Issue 4, October 1984, pp. 297-311.  
73 Liverpool Echo, 27 March 1980. 
74 Ibid. 
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work any steel cargoes whatsoever.75  Industrial peace at the port was, however, 
relatively short-lived. 
 
The T&J Harrisons dispute 
The next major dispute to take place at the port sprang from a challenge to 
the vigorously and vociferously-defended manning levels.  This took the form of the 
announcement of the closure of T&J Harrisons’ stevedoring operations in June 1980, 
followed shortly by notification of withdrawal from the port by Bulk Cargo 
Handling Services.76  The withdrawal of Harrisons could at least in part be 
considered in the context of its failed attempt to remain outside of the port-wide staff 
pay agreement, due to the ACAS ruling in 1977.  Such was the company’s inferior 
wage structure, the conciliation service’s enforced ruling meant that some staff 
workers at Harrisons enjoyed a one hundred percent pay rise to bring them in line 
with the rest of the port.77  It is clear that ACTSS stewards considered this hard-
fought victory to have a bearing on the company’s decision to cease operations at 
Liverpool.  The ACAS ruling ‘had an impact on the decision [to leave the port]... 
they [Harrisons management] just couldn’t handle it, the staff being in the union’.78  
In addition to possibly considering the ruling an affront to its managerial prerogative, 
Harrisons must have also struggled to come to terms with the economic burden of 
subscribing to the port-wide agreement, all contributing to the decision to withdraw 
from cargo-handling. 
The Harrisons’ announcement left other employers at the port in an 
uncomfortable position.  It was a significant employer of labour with one hundred 
and seventy-eight RDWs and one hundred and forty-two non-registered workers on 
its books and the onus fell on those remaining to absorb the surplus dockers under 
the terms of the A-J agreement.79  Bulk Cargo Handling had also notified the 
Association of their intention to cease operations within the next calendar month, 
                                                     
75 Liverpool Echo, 2 April 1980. 
76 The announcement of Harrisons withdrawal was made on 20 June, the date was set for 30 
September (Liverpool Echo, 9 August 1980).  
77 As an example, the weekly wage for one timekeeper jumped from £44 per week to £92 per week in 
the wake of ACAS’ ruling (Author’s interview with T.N., May 2011). 
78 Author’s interview with T.N., May 2011. 
79 Liverpool Echo, 10 August 1980. 
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shedding thirty-one jobs in total.80  However rather than seeking to enhance their 
workforces, the employers stated the ‘need to reduce the register in Liverpool by 
something in the order of 800-900 men’.81  Indeed, the closure of Harrisons and Bulk 
Cargo left the register surplus at Liverpool at an eye-watering eighteen percent.82  
Moreover some smaller employers stressed that ‘if they were forced to take labour 
they would no longer be viable entities and could find themselves in the position of 
T&J Harrisons’.83  This has been described elsewhere as the ‘domino effect’ of the 
A-J agreement, whereby the mandatory reallocation of RDWs from one failing port 
employer causes another to become unsustainable, and so on.84  Times were proving 
increasingly desperate for port employers as a combination of declining trade, 
surplus labour costs and associated voluntary redundancy payments took their toll. 
In the initial discussions following the notification of withdrawal, port 
employers suggested that the men affected should be transferred to the Temporary 
Unattached Register (TUR) which since 1972 had been rendered virtually obsolete 
by the A-J Agreement, aside from use in exceptional circumstances, such as 
disciplinary or unexpected bankruptcy-related reallocation cases.85  Predictably this 
suggestion was rejected out-of-hand by the Dock Shop Steward Committee, with 
Dennis Kelly commenting that ‘if any attempt is made by the port employers to 
break the Aldington-Jones agreement we will ask the National Docks and 
Waterways Committee to call an all-out strike of dockers in the Scheme ports’.86  
This threat was echoed by TGWU officialdom, which stated that any attempt to 
revive the TUR in Liverpool would doubtlessly provoke a national strike call.87  To 
further exacerbate the possible economic burden facing individual employers if they 
were forced to absorb the surplus, the EAPL acknowledged that ‘there were other 
groups of people in Harrisons – ACTSS, shoregang, shipwrights – who had trade 
union organisation behind them and were equally adamant about their rights.  These 
                                                     
80 Ten RDWs and twenty-one staff were to be made redundant by the closure of Bulk Cargo 
Handling. 
81 EAPL meeting minutes, 11 August 1980. 
82 The Department for Employment, ‘Employment in the ports: The Dock Labour Scheme’, Cmnd. 
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83 EAPL meeting minutes, 11 August 1980. 
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other groups presented the same problem, though on a smaller scale, as the RDWs 
did and the same time scale applied.  None of these people could be offered 
employment by other companies’.88  Clearly, the context and dynamics of the 
situation had the potential to develop into a major port-wide, and indeed nationwide, 
dispute. 
In response to the wholesale rejection of any suggestion that the TUR might 
be utilised, the EAPL instead proposed that compulsory redundancies might instead 
be required.89  Again, this was flatly rejected by the Dock Shop Steward Committee 
and the TGWU.  In the absence of any progress between the Union, the EAPL and 
the local Dock Labour Board, the case was referred to the NDLB for consideration at 
its September meeting.  Meanwhile, the Department for Employment (DfE) 
encouraged employers and the Union to shed as many jobs as possible through 
voluntary means, although the EAPL argued that the severance sum was far too low 
to attract a substantial number of applicants.90  There was stalemate and attitudes on 
both sides were hardening.  Liverpool’s port employers saw this dispute as an 
opportunity to take a stand against binding statutory regulation of the industry and 
hoped that the new Conservative Government might be sympathetic to their cause.  
Indeed, the Financial Times ran an article with the headline ‘A Crucial Time for 
Overmanned Ports’ and the EAPL anticipated that the repeal of the NDLS might 
finally be elevated to the political agenda.91  It stated that the employers it 
represented ‘hoped the Government would not intervene and that the industry was 
allowed to bring this problem [compulsory reallocation of RDWs] out into the 
open... it was not solely a Liverpool issue, it was a national issue’.92 
 After much deliberation at a series of meetings week commencing Monday 8 
September, the NDLB proposed that the port’s remaining employers concede 
reallocation of the surplus RDWs, which the EAPL described as ‘not acceptable’ and 
‘urged the Board to think again’.93  Such was the gulf between the parties that the 
NDLB failed to secure an agreement and the matter was referred to the DfE to 
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consider.  After a meeting between NAPE and the DfE, it was agreed that the 
Government would loan additional funds to the National Voluntary Severance 
Scheme to enhance lump sum settlements from £8500 to £10000 per man, 
exclusively for Harrisons and Bulk Cargo Handling’s RDWs at the port of 
Liverpool.94  However, the modest increase in redundancy pay failed to attract much 
interest.  The offer was later extended to every company at the port in an attempt to 
create room for the one hundred and seventy-eight men soon to be left without an 
employer.95  Problems continued to mount for the EAPL as calls for an indefinite 
national strike were formalised at a TGWU Shop Steward Delegate Conference in 
London on 15 September, with the strike due to commence one week later if no 
agreement had been reached regarding reallocation by this date.96  The impact of 
affirmation of the national strike call was accentuated by news that the EAPL had 
been roundly condemned at a meeting of NAPE: 
 
Mr Fitzpatrick [Chairman of the EAPL] said it had been made clear to him 
during national discussions... that no other port would support Liverpool in 
its stand against reallocation.  The view had been expressed that over a period 
of years other ports had accepted reallocation of labour and as a result were 
carrying a surplus greater than Liverpool and that right was on the men’s 
[RDWs] side.  He had been told that Liverpool [Employers’ Association] had 
no right to take them to the brink of a national dock strike and that they 
would be disowned totally and completely.97 
        
So, in the conspicuous absence of moral or material support from the 
Government or NAPE, the EAPL’s stand against reallocation seemed doomed to 
failure.  With time running out on the national strike commencement deadline and 
the closure of Harrisons and Bulk Cargo Handling imminent, the EAPL was 
compelled to accept the reallocation of one hundred and sixty-nine RDWs amongst 
its members.98  As had been the case with Smith-Coggins the MDHC, as the 
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majority employer and port authority, was forced to absorb the majority of the 
surplus.  To add further injury, the dockers also sought a written guarantee from the 
employers that RDWs would only be transferred to the TUR in disciplinary cases as 
a pre-condition for withdrawal of the strike notice.  A recommitment by employers 
to the provisions of the A-J agreement was absolutely necessary in the eyes of the 
dockers and the stewards’ committee.  This demand was bitterly swallowed by the 
EAPL and on Sunday 21 September the national strike was called off at a second 
shop stewards’ conference.99 
Despite the settlement of the RDW side of the dispute, employers at the port 
were still confronted with the significant problem of Harrisons and Bulk Cargo 
Handling’s non-registered employees.100  The EAPL recognised that ‘time was 
running out’ in relation to finding a solution before the two companies ceased 
trading and that ‘employers did not want to be in a position of having found a 
solution to RDW problem, albeit not the one they would have sought, then be faced 
with a port problem which nobody wished to know about’.101  For its part, ACTSS 
made it absolutely clear to employers at meetings of the JNC that their ‘no 
compulsory severance policy was sacrosanct and would be defended to the best of 
their means’.102  Harrisons had been slow to define exactly what severance terms 
were available to its clerical staff and ACTSS negotiators complained that they were 
unable ‘to estimate how many of their members wished to volunteer for severance 
and how large a problem they were left with’ in relation to reallocation of those 
remaining.103  Harrisons’ management responded by making an offer of enhanced 
redundancy equivalent to that for RDWs.  However, this amount was only available 
until the company withdrew from the port on 30 September; thereafter it would 
revert back to the statutory sum as dictated by the Redundancy Payments Act.104  
This at least enabled both parties to take stock of exactly how many clerical workers 
required reallocation, although the EAPL maintained that just because ‘the Branch 
was determined to hold a certain policy [no compulsory redundancies], it did not 
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mean that the employers had to accept or implement that policy’.105 As in previous 
reallocation episodes, surplus clerical workers were regarded as personae non gratae 
and the EAPL stressed that it was not its responsibility to make provision for 
reallocation of non-registered workers, rather that it was up to individual employers 
to decide on manpower requirements.  Predictably, ‘all had indicated that they had 
no requirement to recruit labour’.106 
So, with the closure of Harrisons imminent it appeared that the two sides 
were at an impasse.  ACTSS had made it clear that it would not hesitate to call an 
indefinite strike of all its members at the port if an agreement was not reached to 
redeploy Harrisons’ clerical workers with other employers.107  For their part, the 
EAPL and individual employers pointed to the already-pernicious state of the port’s 
finances as evidence that, on this occasion, reallocation could not be permitted.  In 
order to avert what would likely be a damaging strike for the port’s prospects as well 
as for relations between the Branch and RDWs and the Branch and port employers, 
ACTSS proposed a compromise.  It proposed that the voluntary redundancy terms 
offered to Harrisons’ clerical staff be expanded to include those at the MDHC and 
other smaller employers.108  By doing so it was hoped that additional applicants for 
severance would be achieved and that these jobs could be filled by those clerical 
staff from Harrisons who wished to remain in the industry.  Initially, after 
consultation with its members, the EAPL rejected the compromise on the grounds 
that clerical workers were skilled and experienced in operations and procedures 
which were peculiar to each individual company and ‘did not wish to swap labour 
around’.109  Nevertheless with the closure of Harrisons just days away and possible 
strike-related financial disaster looming the MDHC, yet again the body at the port 
which stood to lose the most, offered voluntary redundancy to a section of its clerical 
staff.110  Having received thirty applications, the company agreed to take on the 
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twenty-nine Harrisons’ ACTSS members left without an employer and who did not 
wish to accept redundancy.111 
The conclusion to the Harrisons affair once again plainly illustrated where 
the power lay in the port of Liverpool.  Despite a determined consensus to resist 
RDW reallocation, the remaining ten port employers had been forced into a hasty 
retreat in the face of fierce opposition from the Dock Shop Steward Committee and 
the National Docks section of the TGWU.112  Doubtlessly, the EAPL and its 
members had seriously overestimated the level of support their ‘stand’ against 
reallocation would receive from NAPE and the Government.  The MDHC failed 
even to make a principled stand against absorbing Harrisons’ clerical staff, despite 
being overtly hostile to the idea.  Although the NDLS went against every ideological 
principle of the new Conservative Government, it appeared that it had absolutely no 
intention of taking on the dockers locally or nationally at such an embryonic stage in 
its political/economic experiment.113  As Turnbull contends, the apparent insulation 
dockers enjoyed from the blossoming state-driven programme of deregulation and 
privitisation of industry owed substantial gratitude to their strong employment 
protection, enshrined in statute.114 
This was the first major port-wide dispute at Liverpool since 1972, yet it 
quickly became clear that the Liverpool dockers and clerical staff had lost none of 
their appetite or capability to defend manning levels at the port and easily out-muscle 
management, regardless of how determined the EAPL was in resisting reallocation.  
Nevertheless, the employers’ stand was illustrative of shifting attitudes amongst 
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management and a growing willingness to challenge the Union’s stranglehold at the 
port in the context of the changing political and economic environment of the time. 
 Harrisons’ decision to pull out of the port was symptomatic of increasingly 
austere times in the dock industry and especially at Liverpool.  The omnipotence of 
containerisation and its associated Scheme and surplus-related costs, coupled with a 
general decline in trade at the port caused by the shift from north to south and west 
to east in trading patterns, meant that most companies at the port were struggling to 
survive.  MDHC Chief Executive James Fitzpatrick illustrated the extent of 
contracting trade at the port by commenting that ‘before containerisation Liverpool 
handled four times more Far East trade than any other port... Now, we handle 
none’.115  The financial pressure the port was under in 1980 is plainly illustrated by 
the fact that the Government was forced to inject £14 million in loans in the first six 
months of 1981 to prop up the MDHC, yet it still recorded trading losses of £2.5 
million over the same period.116 
At the beginning of May 1981, Huskisson Transit Company announced its 
intention to withdraw from the port of Liverpool at the close of the month.  It cited 
‘the cessation of the importation of Commonwealth sugar and the consequent closure 
of the Tate & Lyle refinery [in Liverpool]’ as the principle factor behind its 
decision.117  On this occasion, the announcement of the proposed withdrawal 
resulted in a large proportion of its workforce applying for enhanced voluntary 
severance.  Huskisson’s ‘register of RDWs had already been reduced by severance to 
36 and they had 15 [other] outstanding applicants’.118  The EAPL did not challenge 
the reallocation of such a small number of RDWs, but were quietly encouraged by 
the percentage of the workforce who had immediately applied for severance.119  
With the chastening Harrisons’ ordeal still fresh in the mind of port employers, the 
EAPL acquiesced that ‘in accordance with... the ruling of the previous year, the 
RDWs who remained at the end of May would be returned to the local Dock Labour 
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Board for reallocation within the Port’.120  It would appear that, in the short term at 
least, the EAPL and its members had lost their appetite for challenging the Scheme 
or the local register surplus. 
 
The 1981 pay negotiations and related dispute 
 Following hot on the heels of the Huskisson closure came the 1981 pay round 
negotiations and further trouble for employers.  The EAPL was determined to make 
any pay rise conditional on dockers accepting changes in work practices in order to 
improve flexibility in the labour force and reduce operating losses.121  This was 
resisted by the Docks section which insisted that any pay offer should be 
unconditional.  In the absence of any willingness to negotiate from the employers’ 
side, since April the dockers had undertaken three one-day port-wide stoppages in 
protest.122  They vowed to continue and possibly escalate the programme of 
disruption if employers did not drop the conditions from the pay offer.  Similarly, 
ACTSS promised to give full support to the dockers by joining them in any future 
protest stoppages and furthermore gave an undertaking that clerical workers would 
boycott weekend work with effect from 20 June, badly inhibiting operations at 
Seaforth Container Terminal.123  Once again, the EAPL ‘had stressed the serious 
financial position of the Port generally’ and were determined not to concede on the 
need for changes to working practices.124 
This stalemate persisted for several months and as a result, the port was 
subject to several more instances of one-day disruption.  The EAPL attempted to 
force the issue by making an enhanced ‘final’ offer which was rejected at a mass 
meeting at Liverpool Stadium on 3 September on the grounds that ‘the issue was not 
money, it was the terms and conditions upon which the pay increase was based, 
particularly on changes to gang manning strengths’.125  However, amidst rumblings 
                                                     
120 EAPL meeting minutes, 5 May 1981. 
121 EAPL meeting minutes, 12 June 1981.  The principal change in work practices insisted upon by 
employers was that labour could be deployed in any area of the port as management saw fit.  This was 
resisted because it meant that gangs could be split up and dockers made to work away from their 
traditional areas of employment.  Employers also wanted a reduction in standard gang manning 
numbers, which was similarly strongly resisted by the rank-and-file. 
122 EAPL meeting minutes, 12 June 1981. 
123 Ibid. 
124 EAPL meeting minutes, 19 June 1981. 
125 EAPL meeting minutes, 4 September 1981. 
184 
 
of an escalation of industrial action in pursuit of their pay claim, agreement was 
eventually reached.  Employers dropped one of the conditions attached to the deal 
and the new offer was put to another mass meeting on 16 September, where it 
received a close majority in a show of hands.126  Despite marginal approval of the 
deal, many dockers remained resentful of the gang manning reductions which 
employers had managed to force through.  Following the meeting, Dennis Kelly 
summed up the atmosphere amongst RDWs by commenting that ‘there has been a lot 
of heart searching but the way shipping is leaving the port, we will try and make it 
work’.127 
Expecting to be successful in its efforts to attach conditions to the RDW pay 
award, the EAPL pressed other sections of port employee to fall in line.  In 
preliminary negotiations with ACTSS at the JNC in May 1981, the Union side was 
informed of the changes which the Dock section was being asked to accept and 
insisted that the clerical staff would be expected to do likewise as part of any pay 
rise.128  As previously noted, the ACTSS membership had already voted to ban 
overtime in co-ordinated action with the Docks section as protest against employer 
demands.  Clerical workers had also followed dockers out on strike in a series of 
lightening one-day stoppages. 
Despite dockers voting to accept the pay deal in September, ACTSS’ 
negotiations dragged on into November.  This was because of a dispute over back 
pay and disquiet amongst members at Seaforth Container Terminal who argued that 
the majority of manning reductions and flexibility arrangements were targeted 
specifically at them.129  When a ‘final offer’ was tabled by employers on 30 
November 1981 that proposed a compromise on back pay, it was put to a vote at a 
mass meeting.  Although stewards recommended that the offer be rejected on the 
grounds that it was particularly onerous for those one hundred members employed at 
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the container terminal, it was successful at a show of hands.130  However, the clerical 
staff and stewards at the terminal rejected the decision.  They refused to implement 
the changes in manning and flexibility and were put ‘off-pay’ by the MDHC.  This 
disciplinary action provoked a walk-out of all clerical workers there.  The Seaforth 
stewards involved offered their resignations to the Union in response to the manner 
in which they were being forced to undertake changes in working practices.131  In the 
absence of support from the rest of the Branch, the sectional strike was short-lived 
lasting only two days.  Although ACTSS stewards from other areas of the port 
sympathised with their counterparts at Seaforth Container Terminal, illustrated by 
their failed recommendation that the pay deal be rejected, they were bound by the 
democratic decision taken at the mass meeting.  The clerical workforce at the 
terminal returned to work and was forced to implement the changes in manning 
arrangements. 
The employers were in quite buoyant mood having, for the first time, 
managed to attach significant conditions to a pay deal.  Furthermore, the EAPL also 
celebrated its achievement in breaking ‘new ground in negotiating the Port 
Industry’s first two year pay agreement.  Similar pay agreements were negotiated 
with ACTSS and other ancillary workers’.132  In addition to implementing a biennial 
pay review structure, the negotiations with ACTSS had also precipitated a degree of 
in-house conflict which would have doubtless been welcomed behind closed doors.   
The discord apparent amongst ACTSS members regarding these pay 
negotiations illustrates the difficulties apparent in the application of general theories 
of organisation to the realities of real-time negotiations.  This study has documented 
the growth of clerical worker unionism at the port and emphasised its increasingly 
pro-active and combative nature through united action in several major disputes.  To 
use the terminology of Kelly’s theory of mobilisation, there can be little doubt that 
since the early seventies stewards of the branch had established the strong leadership 
necessary to ‘imbue workers with a sense of grievance, create a sense of social 
identity, urge collective action and legitimate such action in the face of hostile 
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criticism’, yet in this dispute they were unable to influence the membership to resist 
management changes to working practices.133 
Even in the context of the well-developed and coherent collective identity 
displayed by clerical workers at the port, it is evident that a degree of sectionalism 
can still flourish.  The staff workers at the container terminal were the aristocracy of 
the clerical workforce – they were registered under the Scheme and enjoyed higher 
average earnings than workers elsewhere in the port.134  The advantages enjoyed by 
container terminal staff could be perceived as contributing to the uncharacteristic 
indifference of their colleagues and emphasises how the nuances of a particular 
workplace can create caveats and affect broader theoretical notions of mobilisation, 
collective identity and militancy, also demonstrating the sometimes uneven nature of 
the exercising of collective action.135  Furthermore, it highlights problems in 
attempting to categorise rank-and-file membership as passive and homogeneous, 
subject to influence and manipulation by stewards with a greater grasp of ‘factory 
class consciousness’ and the balance of power in the workplace.136  As Darlington 
notes, the relationship between stewards and the rank-and-file is a two-way 
interaction and it is necessary to consider not only stewards’ attempts to influence 
the membership, but also members’ expectations and their attempts to influence the 
stewards, which in turn is often directly affected by managerial behaviour.  Indeed, 
whilst ‘the subjective element in industrial relations is inextricably linked to the role 
of leadership, this should not be taken to imply it is simply reducible to it’.137  
A mere three weeks after the contentious pay deal was agreed, conflict 
erupted over the new gang manning levels forced through by employers.  On 7 
October, the Keta Lagoon entered Huskisson Dock at the port of Liverpool complex.  
During the voyage its cargo of cocoa butter had slipped and stowage had collapsed.  
RDW gangs employed by Liverpool Maritime Terminals (LMT) were due to 
discharge the cargo but once the damage was inspected a claim was submitted to 
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management to double the gang manpower below deck, to ensure safe working.138  
The gang insisted that, due to exceptional circumstances, the number working in the 
hold should be increased from four to eight.  Management refused, instead allowing 
for only two additional dockers to work below to discharge the cargo.  This was 
deemed unacceptable by the gang which claimed that the recently-ratified changes in 
working practices allowed provision for the additional manpower in such 
circumstances.  By the close of the day, LMT’s entire four hundred-strong RDW 
workforce had gone on unofficial strike over the matter.139 
The unofficial stoppage persisted for four days, with management adamant 
that it would not permit eight men to work below deck on the cargo.  LMT’s RDWs 
were equally resolute that work would not recommence on the cargo until 
management yielded to their demand.  It appeared that this relatively small issue was 
regarded by both sides as a precedent for how the new working conditions, created 
as part of the recent pay settlement, were to be interpreted and implemented.  On 11 
October, the Dock Shop Steward Committee organised a mass meeting at which a 
port-wide stoppage was discussed.140  The following day, the whole RDW workforce 
was out on strike and the port had been brought to a standstill.  The EAPL 
condemned the action as ‘totally unjustified’ and said that the strike ‘could mean the 
difference between survival and disaster’.141  Dockers’ leaders were steadfast in their 
resolve, claiming that ‘we have honoured the agreement on cutting gangs and we 
will stay out until the employer starts talking sensibly... the new arrangements 
accepted by the men took full account of any exceptional circumstances such as 
this’.142  Yet still the dispute dragged on.  The deadlock caused consternation 
amongst port users especially since the September pay deal had apparently ended 
five months of intermittent disruption.  The Chairman of the Liverpool Steam Ship 
Owners’ Association commented that ‘the present strike, following the recent 
jointly-approved pay and manning deal, must cause all port users to consider the 
long-term future of the Port and to seek alternative arrangements for their vessels 
and cargoes’.143  By 12 October twelve ships lay idle in the port and again it 
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appeared that customer pressure was beginning to mount on port management and 
LMT because, at a Local Modernisation Committee meeting scheduled for that 
afternoon, the EAPL began to seek compromise over interpretation of the new 
working conditions and stated that ‘in circumstances where shop stewards believed 
additional men were required, a case could be made to local management and that 
each job would be judged on its merits...’144 
Still this did not placate the Union side of the LMC because the final decision 
on any given case remained in the hands of the employers.  The strike dragged on 
and continued to cause damage to the port’s trade and reputation.  It was not until 19 
October that the dockers voted to return to work.  Interestingly, this was in the 
absence of any concrete agreement regarding interpretation of the new working 
practices.  It was the damage which was clearly being inflicted on the port’s future 
prospects which encouraged the men to return.145  Instead, Dennis Kelly told of an 
interim arrangement whereby ‘if we can’t come to an agreement now on the 
interpretation of the rulebook, we have agreed take it to the National Joint Council 
[for the Port Transport Industry] for their ruling’.146  As part of the return to work 
terms, talks were to continue at the LMC on implementing the changes agreed in 
principle in the pay negotiations in September.  The dispute had ended out of 
necessity rather than compromise with a heavy financial cost to the port and to 
individual dockers themselves through loss of earnings.  An MDHC spokesman 
summed up the mood of both sides by saying ‘the strike was damaging... the only 
victory at the end of the day is for common sense in that we are back to work – 
nobody else wins’.147  Indeed, 16,950 man days were lost as a result of the 
stoppage.148 
 It is noteworthy that this twelve-day long dispute was ended by dockers 
without management capitulating to their demands.  Clearly, the damage that was 
being done to the port’s future prospects encouraged dockers’ representatives to 
recommend a return to work in the absence of a concrete agreement.  This is another 
example of the nuances of a particular situation at a particular time in a particular 
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workplace.  The strength of dockers’ organisation and their previous record for direct 
action would seem to indicate that this dispute would be pursued until a satisfactory 
agreement was reached, especially since the issue involved controversial changes to 
working practices – ‘a dispute of right’.149  However, because of the changing nature 
of the dock industry more broadly and the difficulties faced by the port locally, on 
this occasion a degree of pragmatism appears to have been exercised by the dockers 
and their representatives.  The future viability of the port in an increasingly austere 
context illustrates the conflicting issues which can bind workers to their employers, 
despite the level of workplace organisation or activism.150  They had a vested interest 
in the survival of the port and this stifled their previous inclination towards victory at 
all costs, wholly apparent when the port’s viability was not in doubt and the industry 
was not suffering from escalating rationalisation and increased competition at home 
and abroad.  The actions and outcomes of this dispute were dependent on the 
peculiarities of the local industry in that particular context and time, emphasising the 
highly contingent, uneven and unpredictable character of collective action and 
demonstrating the problems faced when attempting to apply broad theoretical 
approaches to practical situations, especially in the case of such a complex and 
historic industry. 
 
Voluntary severance and the contraction of manning levels at the port 
Despite the rancour surrounding the Keta Lagoon incident, from an industrial 
relations perspective the beginning of the eighties appeared to be rather productive 
for the dockers and clerical workers of the port of Liverpool.  They had challenged 
and defeated the employers over reallocation and pay and conditions and seemed as 
willing and able as ever to cause major disruption in the defence of their (local) 
industry if necessary.  The balance of power at the port was indisputable, albeit in 
the context of an increasingly resolute and combative approach on behalf of 
management.  However, despite the best efforts of the Dock Shop Steward 
Committee and ACTSS and their emphasis on maintaining manning levels, the port 
of Liverpool was haemorrhaging jobs as quickly as money.  For example, the 
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register in Liverpool had contracted by more than half from 10449 RDWs in 1970, to 
4614 in 1980 and the decade thus far had seen several high-profile closures of long-
established stevedoring firms.151  Worse still, by the end of 1981 the EAPL claimed 
that only 2352 remained on the register in Liverpool.152   Nearly all of these jobs 
had been lost to voluntary redundancy under the National Voluntary Severance 
Scheme, although at huge cost to port employers and successive governments.153  
Clearly, the severance scheme was concerned with minimising the large RDW 
surplus at Britain’s ports (which ran at all-time highs in 1980 and 1981) and meant 
that these jobs were lost to the industry forever.154  Similarly, Liverpool’s employers 
were equally eager to shed their surplus clerical staff.  The MDHC, which carried a 
significant surplus of clerical workers, had already offered severance terms akin to 
those afforded RDWs under the Scheme.155  Employers could also take heart from 
the decline in man days lost due to industrial action at the port – 46645 in 1980, 
falling to 36935 in 1981 and 21771 in 1982.156  Nevertheless, the insecurity which 
voluntary severance and falling manning levels engendered was a major cause of 
industrial unrest throughout the eighties.  Turnbull and Sapsford’s statistical model 
clearly shows a correlation between the surplus labour rate, voluntary redundancy 
levels and strike action during this period as a by-product of the effect of 
modernisation and mechanisation.157 
 Still the cut was not deep enough and there remained a considerable labour 
surplus, particularly in Liverpool and London.  It was in this context that employers 
at these two ports made an offer at the National Joint Council for the Port Transport 
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Industry (NJC) to enhance redundancy payments for a limited period under the 
auspices of the Special National Severance Scheme.  This was, of course, partially 
funded by the Government and offered a maximum of £22500 to RDWs under sixty-
three years old with fifteen years or more service on Liverpool and London docks 
only.158  The offer was scheduled to run for a six-week period from 19 April to 28 
May 1982.  The EAPL hoped to shed a minimum of 715 men from the register.159  
But the MDHC sought to go further, by offering similar redundancy terms to all non-
RDW employees, ‘out of a total staff of 5000, the MDHC were looking for a 
reduction of 1500, roughly divided between RDWs and non-RDWs... [although] a 
large proportion of non-RDWs would come from the Engineering department’.160  
This non-registered severance campaign received one hundred and ninety-seven 
applications from ACTSS members at the MDHC.  However, the uptake took the 
company a little by surprise as it only wanted to shed one hundred and thirty-seven 
clerical posts, resulting in some applications being refused.161 
The problem for the Docks section and ACTSS was how to stem the exodus 
from the port.  After all, every individual was free to ‘take the money’ if they chose 
to do so and there was no way of legislating against that.  Some shop stewards in 
both the Dock Shop Steward Committee and ACTSS took a dim view of their 
colleagues accepting redundancy.  A leading dock steward reflected in retrospect that 
‘they were selling their job and it wasn’t their right to sell that job – it had been 
passed down from their Dad, and even Granddad...  it was their birth right’.162  
Similarly, one prominent ACTSS steward commented that the uptake in severance 
could be attributed to ‘greed’, ‘...people took the bag of money.  That was the choice 
they made – to sell their job’.163  Others were more philosophical – ‘I haven’t got 
anything against the lads who took the money, but I think it badly weakened the 
stewards’ movement’.164  So, despite Liverpool’s RDWs and clerical workers 
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winning the major battles at the port regarding pay, reallocation etc. it appears that 
they were losing the war in the broader context of manning levels through a 
combination of forces - namely contraction of labour requirements in the dock 
industry and the national severance programme - that were ostensibly beyond their 
control.  A similar picture was also unfolding at other major Scheme ports across the 
country.  
In the national context, the Docks and Waterways Committee of the TGWU 
increasingly regarded an extension of the Scheme to all non-Scheme ports as the 
only way to safeguard their members’ jobs.  To these ends, pressure was exerted on 
the Government to draft a new Scheme, long-overdue under provision made in the 
1976 Act.165  On behalf of the Union, the trade group committee had approached the 
Government several times since it gained power to urge it to fulfil its commitment to 
the 1976 Act.166  On each occasion, the Department for Employment was less than 
enthusiastic.  By early 1982 the Union was considering undertaking national 
industrial action to force it to think again.  A National Docks Delegate Conference 
took place on 21 April at which it was proposed that ‘a total withdrawal of dock 
labour takes place in all ports, Scheme and non-Scheme... from 10 May 1982 in 
support of the extension of the present 1967 Dock Labour Scheme to all non-
registered ports and wharves’.167  This resolution received almost unanimous support 
and hence the Government was given notice of pending national strike action.168  In 
response the Government, clearly eager to avoid a national stoppage, expressed a 
willingness to consult with the Union over the extension of the Scheme and indicated 
that they would be happy to consider the case of each non-Scheme port on its 
individual merits, as and when presented by the Union.169  This drew the sting out of 
the national strike call and encouraged the Union to compile a list of likely 
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candidates for entry into the Scheme; the strike was suspended at a subsequently 
recalled Docks Delegate Conference on 8 May.170 
 Although the national labour surplus had fallen to its lowest since 1977, port 
employers continued to forge ahead with the most effective weapon available in their 
limited armoury.171  In September 1983 the Special National Severance Scheme was 
re-opened, offering enhanced payments of £22500 to Liverpool and London dockers 
under the same terms and conditions as the April 1982 scheme, except on this 
occasion its availability was limited to a four-week window.172  At the same meeting 
of the NJC, NAPE also made a proposal to repeal the NDLS and enter into a joint 
voluntary agreement with the TGWU, ‘to change the functions of the NJC so that it 
can effectively supersede the NDLB and to introduce by negotiation a new national 
framework agreement’.173  The proposal was discussed at both the official and 
unofficial level by the Docks and Waterways National Committee and the NPSSC, 
although it was rejected in its entirety.174 
1983 was actually the most strike free year in the industry since the early 
1950s, while the labour surplus stood at its lowest rate for six years.175  Nevertheless, 
it was clear that reform of the NDLS was on the employers’ agenda, whether to be 
replaced by a voluntary agreement with the Union or dissolved altogether.  At the 
local level, the EAPL was also enjoying a period of relative industrial peace with 
man days lost having continued to fall year-on-year since the beginning of the 
decade.176  This encouraged a more pro-active mood and approach from employers 
in planning for the upcoming 1984 pay negotiations, where they were determined to 
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perpetuate the biennial format as well as insist that any increase in wages should be 
accompanied by improvements in workforce flexibility.177  In March, the TGWU 
submitted its local pay claim which required an increase of £10 per week on the 
basic rate.178  This figure was calculated with the two-yearly structure firmly in 
mind.  The EAPL responded to the claim by presenting a paper to the union side of 
the negotiating committee detailing changes in flexibility and manning arrangements 
which would be attached as conditions of any pay rise.179  The Union later informed 
the Association that, having discussed the conditions with their members, they were 
increasing their pay claim to an £18 per week increase in basic rate, if the suggested 
changes were to be implemented.180  On 27 April, the employers made a counter-
offer of a £6.50 per week increase with conditions still attached.  The Union 
responded by stating that ‘this would not be sufficient even if [the offer] was 
unconditional’.181  It was clear that the two sides were a significant margin apart in 
their estimations.  At a mass meeting on 24 June 1984, a motion was adopted which 
permitted the use of industrial disruption if compromise was not reached 
imminently.  The Chairman of the EAPL reported at the next Association meeting 
that ‘it was obvious that the temperature was rising’.182  The dockers’ attitude is 
illustrated here: 
 
There was a good deal of resentment building because RDWs felt that they 
had been badly treated during the [previous] two-year pay deal...  They had 
made sacrifices, given the employers the changes they desired [in gang 
manning strengths and flexibility]... but employers had failed to recognise 
their efforts.  Looking at the national position it was an understatement to say 
that RDWs at Liverpool were at the bottom of the earnings league.183 
 
However, although industrial action over the local biennial pay negotiations looked 
increasingly likely it proved to be superseded by the eruption of a national strike, 
ignited by the actions of the British Steel Corporation (BSC). 
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The dockers’ entanglement with the Miners’ strike, 1984 
The miners’ strike had been ongoing since March in response to a 
Government-proposed programme of pit closures and although the TGWU and other 
major unions had not struck in solidarity, there had been some instances of 
sympathetic action such as railwaymen refusing to transport imported coal.184  
Liverpool’s RDWs, and those at other ports, had refused to handle coal imports from 
the beginning of the miners’ dispute.185  Furthermore, the National Union of Miners 
(NUM), in co-operation with the TGWU Docks section, had set quotas for foreign 
coal importation through British ports.186  These quotas had been agreed between the 
TGWU, the NUM and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) and were 
used by the miners as a means to prevent their campaign being undermined by an 
increase in coal imports for industry.  Although quotas had initially been respected 
by the BSC, by May it seemed increasingly inclined to circumvent the agreement.  It 
was accused of unloading imported coal at Hunterston by ‘free-grabbing’, clearly in 
contravention of both the NDLS and the established coal quotas.187  In response, the 
Union threatened a stoppage of all work at Hunterston with the possibility of 
escalation into a national dispute.188  On this occasion, the BSC beat a hasty retreat at 
a meeting with the TGWU on 16 May and gave an undertaking not to repeat its 
actions.189  The proposed industrial action, scheduled for 21 May, was subsequently 
called off. 
 Nevertheless, as the miners’ strike deepened its bite on British industry, BSC 
again tried its hand.  On 3 July members of the National Union of Railwaymen 
(NUR) and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) 
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refused to deliver iron ore from Immingham because miners had established a picket 
line outside the port.190  The BSC in turn advised the TGWU that they intended to 
change their normal rail delivery to road delivery operations, which in normal 
circumstances was not unusual if there was rail disruption.  However on 5 July, in 
the context of the miners’ strike, the TGWU ordered dockers at the port not to load 
any iron ore for road transportation.191  On 6 July, BSC completely disregarded the 
Union’s ruling and went ahead with loading its lorries, making a delivery by road to 
its Scunthorpe works.192  Contractors’ equipment and men were used to load the ore, 
although this was a previously-established arrangement at the port under Clause 10 
of the Scheme which meant that RDWs were on pay as ‘ghosts’ for contractors.193  
Despite this ‘ghosting’ agreement the BSC had flouted the Union’s ruling by stealth 
and, at a mass meeting on 9 July, RDWs at Immingham decided to withdraw their 
labour.194  At 2pm the same day BSC loaded more lorries destined for Scunthorpe 
except on this occasion, because all RDWs were already on strike at the port, there 
were no dockers on pay for ‘ghosting’ contractors and the Scheme had clearly been 
breached by the use of non-registered labour.195 
 The breach of the Scheme was seized upon by the Docks section of the 
TGWU which immediately called an indefinite national strike amongst all members 
at Scheme and non-Scheme ports.  The strike lasted two weeks and the whole 
unionised dock labour force of approximately 25000 dockers came out in support, 
only 13400 of whom were RDWs.196  The Dock Shop Steward Committee declared a 
port-wide stoppage from 10 July and all other ancillary workers at the port of 
Liverpool followed suit.197  The rapidity with which the strike spread and the depth 
of support it received surpassed employer and government expectations and 
illustrated the appetite of dockers and their union to defend the Scheme as the last 
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bastion of protection for jobs in the industry.  For their part BSC, having grossly 
miscalculated the response its actions would provoke, quickly moved to make 
amends by training RDW drivers to use specialist loading equipment so that non-
registered labour was no longer required for ore handling at Immingham.198  
However, the strike dragged on for a further week because of wrangling between 
NAPE and the TGWU regarding proper procedure for the use of non-registered 
labour on specialised operations at non-Scheme ports.199  Agreement was reached at 
the NJC on 20 July and endorsed by a recalled Docks Delegates Conference the 
same day – the return to work commenced from midnight on Saturday 21 July.200  
 So, the two-week July strike highlighted the commitment of the TGWU and 
rank-and-file dockers to vehemently defend the Scheme.  Nevertheless, more 
industrial strife was on the horizon just a few weeks later, again associated with the 
on-going miners’ strike.  On this occasion BSC attempted to exceed the quotas 
established between the NUM, the TGWU and the ISTC for coal importation 
through Hunterston, in a similar situation to that which occurred in May.  After the 
TGWU refused to co-operate in the berthing and unloading of the Ostia, BSC took 
the decision to use non-registered labour to berth the ship before ‘free-grabbing’ the 
coal.201  Since all TGWU members were advised not to assist, BSC used contractors 
to replace boatmen in order to moor the vessel.  This was interpreted by the Union as 
BSC using ‘scab’ labour in order to circumvent a trade dispute and so another 
national dock strike was called.202 
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 Liverpool RDWs withdrew their labour indefinitely on 26 August 1984, 
despite having only just reached agreement on the biennial pay deal.203  However, 
the picture in the rest of the country was far less emphatic than had previously been 
the case, prompting the EAPL to observe that ‘total support had not been given to 
the call for action and over 50% of the ports were still working’.204  On this occasion 
most non-Scheme ports elected to continue working and even at some Scheme ports 
support for the strike was erratic.  NAPE and local employers’ associations were 
quietly encouraged by the lack of cohesion from the start of the strike and took 
matters into their own hands as the dispute dragged on.  For example ‘in some ports, 
notably London, the employers had taken a public stance of encouraging 
dockworkers to defy the Union’s national strike call’.205  This was surprisingly 
successful, with a section of RDWs at Tilbury container base voting for a resumption 
of work and a significant number of Bristol RDWs ignoring the initial strike call 
altogether.206  In the case of Liverpool, the EAPL observed that, despite the MDHC 
and Liverpool Maritime Terminals writing directly to their workforces outlining the 
consequences of continuing the dispute at the port, ‘there was little prospect of 
persuading Liverpool dockworkers to return to work in defiance of the Union... there 
was a tradition of solidarity and one could not hold out any hope that there would be 
a break in the strike’.207  In fact, pickets from Liverpool travelled to other ports in the 
country to provide assistance where support for the strike was dwindling or a return 
to work had begun.208  Nevertheless, the Association also noted that ‘local union 
representatives were very unhappy – they were observing a national strike call and 
could see the Port’s trade and their members’ jobs drifting away to East Coast 
ports’.209 
Although the strike did not peter out, lasting over three weeks before an 
agreement was reached with BSC regarding coal quotas and the re-instatement of 
TGWU boatmen dismissed during the dispute, it was hardly the ringing endorsement 
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of solidarity which had resonated throughout the July strike.210  There were a number 
of possible reasons for the lukewarm reception the second national strike call 
received.  Most obviously, the proximity of the first strike to the second, and the 
associated financial cost to the individual, might have diminished support.211  More 
importantly, the fact that the dispute was ignited by one minor secondary employer 
in the dock industry, specifically concerned with moving specialist resources through 
a select few ports in the country, lent itself to the perception that this was not an 
attack on the Scheme or the industry per se.  Indeed, the EAPL was informed that 
‘the Union had no argument with employers or anyone else in the Port of 
Liverpool... and, as soon as agreement was reached with BSC, there would be a 
return to work’.212  Additionally, ‘the consensus view was that port authorities were 
an entirely innocent party and that the issue was between the TGWU and the 
BSC’.213 
Employers encouraged the perception that the second strike had more to do 
with the mines and less to do with the docks, illustrated by the BSC undertaking ‘a 
national publicity campaign... condemning the strike as a political exercise in support 
of the NUM’, an accusation first made by the Government during the July strike.214  
Nevertheless, the erratic support for the strike surely gave some future 
encouragement to NAPE and local employers’ associations, supporting the notion 
that if the issue at stake was unclear or muddied, support for national action initiated 
by the TGWU would not be automatic at every Scheme port and certainly not at non-
Scheme ports.215 
 
The Isle of Man Steam Packet dispute, 1985 
After the upheaval of the summer of 1984, the remainder of that year and 
beginning of the next passed without a major dispute at the port.  However, trouble 
flared again in early 1985 over the withdrawal of the Isle of Man Steam Packet 
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Company from the port.  Isle of Man Steam Packet and its stevedoring company, 
Ireman Stevedoring Services, provided freight, vehicle and passenger transportation 
services between Liverpool and Douglas.  Its decision to withdraw from Liverpool 
and relocate to Heysham was due to a pending change of ownership and its dire 
financial position.216  In February, redundancy notices were served on forty-four 
RDWs and sixteen clerical staff, twelve of whom were ACTSS members.  The 
MDHC, fearing it would again be forced to absorb the bulk of reallocated labour, 
made a joint approach to the company with the TGWU.  They offered to trim its 
RDW workforce from forty-four to twenty-one in order to keep the company viable, 
with the surplus labour being reallocated to the MDHC.217  Despite the innovative 
and novel nature of the plan, the company refused and the Isle of Man Steam 
Packet/Ireman Stevedoring Services confirmed its intention to leave the port.218  The 
forty-four RDWs facing redundancy were reallocated to other port employers as per 
the A-J agreement.  However, a familiar scenario emerged for the clerical staff left 
without an employer.  The MDHC refused to absorb them into their workforce, 
informing the EAPL that they ‘already had a surplus of clerical and supervisory 
staff... and were unable to provide jobs’.219 
Obviously, the clerical workers and their representatives had foreseen their 
predicament because of the past experiences of colleagues at other firms.  On 28 
February, the twelve ACTSS members threatened with redundancy physically 
occupied the Isle of Man freight vessel the Peveril, which was moored at Hornby 
dock in the port of Liverpool complex.220  ACTSS announced that ‘as far as [these] 
men were concerned... the Union would pursue a policy of ‘no compulsory 
redundancies’ and would insist that its twelve members are offered jobs by the 
MDHC’.221  The unusual step of staging a sit-in on one of Isle of Man Steam 
Packet’s freight ships certainly brought the campaign for reallocation some publicity 
and doubtlessly applied some pressure on the company and the EAPL to find an 
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agreement.222  Nevertheless, both the MDHC and the Association were steadfast in 
their resolve.  The EAPL’s Executive Secretary highlighted the strength of the 
opposition to reallocation amongst employers by observing that ‘if these twelve men 
achieve their purpose of being taken on by another port employer, all other non-
registered groups in the port would expect no less than a job for life’.223  Instead, 
under duress, the Isle of Man Steam Packet made an offer of enhanced redundancy 
to its clerical staff: £1000 per year for up to twenty years service, equating to an 
average payment of £18000 per man compared with an initial offer of £8000.224 
In the context of a hardening of the employers’ stance regarding reallocation, 
ACTSS organised a walk-out and indefinite strike of all its three hundred and fifty 
members at the port from 1 April.225  Furthermore, the Branch threatened to picket 
the dock gates in support of the sit-in, something which had not happened at 
Liverpool since the 1955 ‘Blue’ Union (NASDU) versus ‘White’ Union (TGWU) 
strikes.226  Despite eight of the twelve clerical workers indicating that they were 
prepared to accept the enhanced redundancy terms, on 3 April ACTSS stewards 
assembled their picket lines.227  The clerical stewards’ committee was convinced 
that, if they conceded even one compulsory redundancy, it would be the beginning of 
the end for the Branch – they could be ‘wiped out overnight’.228  The MDHC was 
carrying a significant surplus of clerical workers and it was feared that the company 
would quickly use any compulsory settlement as precedent to begin mass 
redundancies.229  ACTSS’ actions brought a hostile reception from employers and 
dockers alike.  Aside from breaking the dockers’ tradition of never picketing the 
dock gates, the fact that so few staff workers were involved meant the issue was 
regarded as too insignificant to warrant stopping the whole port.  Dennis Kelly, 
Chairman of the Dock Shop Steward Committee, outlined their opposition to the 
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clerical workers’ action and recommended that dockers cross picket lines in order to 
report for work: 
 
The recommendation has been made to save the port from disaster.  If we 
were to go on strike in support of the clerks, within three weeks the MDHC 
would be out of business and there would be no jobs for anyone.  We have 
been advised by the Union that the pickets on the dock gates were not official 
and had the dockers refused to cross lines, the Dock Company would have 
started immediate lay-offs.230    
 
 Indeed, neither the strike nor the picket line was legally official because no 
ballot had been organised.231  So, on the advice of the Union and the Dock Shop 
Steward Committee some dockers returned to work, crossing picket lines.  Others, 
whether the issue was regarded as spurious or not by their stewards, were unwilling 
to cross picket lines under any circumstances.232  Of course, the decision by the 
Committee to advise the dockers to return to work was met with outrage by the 
clerical staff.  There were angry and unsavoury scenes at the gates as some dockers 
chose to cross lines and return to work.  One of the ships to be worked by the 
dockers that had returned was the Peveril.  Although it was still being occupied by 
the twelve clerical workers, it was due to be loaded with freight and released with 
immediate effect.  The consensus amongst clerical stewards was that ‘if the dockers 
work this ship we’re finished’.233  This was regarded as a defining moment in the 
survival of the Branch and desperate times made for desperate measures: 
 
We agreed that we had to do something to prevent the Peveril being worked.  
[One of the ACTSS stewards] went and got a JCB from another part of the 
dock, drove it across and parked it at the back of the ship.  He took the keys 
out and disabled it...  It was a roll-on/roll-off freighter and this stopped 
anyone loading it.234 
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This action brought a visit and reprimand from the port police but illustrates the 
lengths to which ACTSS stewards were willing to go to defend their branch policy 
of ‘no compulsory redundancies’.  For their part, the MDHC was seriously 
considering legal action to force an end to the strike, citing recent legislation which 
forbade secondary and unballoted action.235  In the event, such was the pressure from 
port employers, dockers and the Union that the four clerical workers who had 
previously rejected the enhanced redundancy offer decided to accept the terms on 5 
April.236  They were never instructed by their own branch to accept redundancy 
however, as stewards and their official remained committed to securing reallocation 
for the men – ‘it is not for us to accept or reject severance terms... it is up to the 
individuals themselves’.237 
The Isle of Man Steam Packet episode caused a fair degree of bitterness 
between the two major trade groups at the port and within the Union hierarchy.  The 
fall-out from the dispute is described here: 
 
There was a big internal dispute within the Union itself - it went all the way 
to the Executive Council.  When we did put picket lines on the dock gates a 
lot of dockers walked past us, a lot of dockers didn’t, but it caused so much 
friction that our relationship was never the same again.238 
 
Aside from causing a new rift and air of mistrust between dockers and clerical staff, 
the dispute highlighted the determination of ACTSS 6/567 Branch to safeguard its 
members’ jobs.  Its leadership was willing to risk an illegal strike, direct action to 
cause disruption of port operations and divisive confrontation with the Union, 
employers and dockers in order to maintain its policy of ‘no compulsory 
redundancies’ in an extremely unfavourable context.  The whole affair was a 
demonstration of exactly how far the Branch had developed and how militant it was 
prepared to be, bucking the national trend for trade union influence and power 
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which, it is generally acknowledged, was deteriorating considerably around this 
time.239  An ACTSS steward summarises their attitude towards the Docks section at 
this juncture: 
 
In my opinion 6/567 became more progressive than the dockers on a national 
and port-wide basis.  If someone was going to lose their job, we went into 
dispute... simple as that.  We didn’t ask the dockers ‘can we go into dispute?’  
If the dockers didn’t like it, they didn’t like it.  We were looking after our 
own just as they looked after theirs.  I had a lot of good friends amongst 
dockers and their stewards but at times things could get a bit hairy.240 
 
Indeed, although Carden contends that ‘much of the argument between both sections 
takes place within the confines of liaison meetings and is never allowed to take place 
in front of the employer or the membership’, his account is restricted to events pre-
1984.241  By 1985, however, it appeared that the two trade groups’ relationship was 
deteriorating amidst desperate times for the port and the industry as a whole. 
 The Isle of Man Steam Packet dispute raises some interesting questions 
relating to the source of ACTSS’ leverage at the port.  Foremost of these is if RDWs 
were ‘insulated’ from the effects of Thatcherism by their statutory employment 
protection, as argued earlier in this chapter and elsewhere, why and how did clerical 
workers manage to mimic their colleagues without the backing of the Scheme?242  
One likely answer lies in the concept of ‘environmental’ or structural influences, 
raised by Martin in his study of the disposition of bargaining power in the 
workplace.243  As already established, because of the nature of the dock industry, 
with its emphasis on quick turnaround of ships and potentially perishable cargoes, 
labour stoppages were extremely expensive and particularly distressing for 
customers at both ends of the chain, applying pressure on dock employers to come to 
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expedient solutions to disputes.  Moreover, as had become apparent during the 
Smith-Coggins dispute, certain grades of clerical staff were integral to the 
functioning of the port, effectively ‘skilled’ workers who could not be easily 
replaced nor their duties circumvented.  In this respect, by rigorously pursuing a non-
negotiable redundancies policy with the full backing of its membership, the Branch 
had created de facto employment protection.  Despite the fact that there was a 
considerable surplus of clerical workers at the port, employers (particularly the 
majority employer, the MDHC) were fearful that an outright confrontation, even in 
the contemporary political and legislative context, would cause significant economic 
damage to the port’s future prospects.  All these influences were structural, that is 
peculiar to the employment situation at the port and in some aspects in the dock 
industry more broadly and provided clerical workers with an imposing power 
resource which also insulated them from rationalisation and re-assertion of 
managerial prerogative, as witnessed in other industries.  
 
1986: The introduction of the National Employers’ Release Arrangement, the 
closure of Aintree Containerbase and the A1 Feeds dispute 
In the national context, the growing clamour from employers for the Scheme 
to be superseded led the Government to propose a compromise regarding voluntary 
severance.  As previously noted, the severance scheme was costing employers 
millions of pounds in contributions under the fifty-fifty deal, whereby they and the 
Government split the cost equally.  However, with the Government reluctant to 
address employer demands for abolition of the Scheme until after the next General 
Election it bought off NAPE’s protestations by proposing a new severance scheme in 
October 1985, under which the Government would pay one hundred percent of 
redundancy costs until 31 March 1986.244  This of course encouraged employers to 
seek to shed as many jobs as possible under the first stage of the arrangement and led 
to accusations of ‘moral blackmail’ by the TGWU over the manner in which some 
dockers, particularly older men, were being put forward for redundancy.245  The 
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Docks and Waterways Committee called on all local modernisation committees and 
dock labour boards to ‘examine in detail all demands by employers for reductions in 
the register... and ensure that any name put forward by employers is one that has 
come forward purely voluntarily and not because of pressure by the employer 
concerned’.246  Another contentious aspect to the new severance scheme was that the 
Government committed to pay one hundred percent of costs for registered employers 
who ceased trading at any Scheme port until March 1988.247  This obviously 
encouraged smaller port employers to cease operations without having to face the 
prospect of paying a considerable amount to release its RDW employees and so 
further increased the burden on medium and large employers by lumbering them 
with reallocated men who refused to take redundancy, the so-called ‘domino effect’ 
as described earlier.248 
 A familiar pattern of decline was by now emerging at the port of Liverpool in 
the mid to late eighties, characterised by a spate of company closures and 
withdrawals and accelerated by the new severance scheme.  January 1986 brought 
notification of the closure of Aintree Containerbase.  As shown in Chapter Five, its 
opening in 1969 had been the scene of a significant dispute involving the newly-
established Dock Shop Steward Committee, the Road Transport section of the 
TGWU and Containerbase Federation management relating to container-stripping 
and the use of unregistered labour.  The container base was one of the first dedicated 
container-handling facilities in the country to be built outside a dock estate, 
employing fifty-one RDWs in 1986 and more at its height.249  Its demise was due to 
the increasing trend of transhipment through European ports, the primacy of Seaforth 
in local container handling and the general contraction of trade at Liverpool.  The 
company notified the EAPL of its intention to cease trading completely on 7 
February 1986.250   
Since the port was still carrying a labour surplus of around ten percent, 
employers were again predictably reluctant to accept reallocation of Containerbase’s 
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workforce amongst them.251  Several companies such as Liverpool Grain Storage 
threatened to cease stevedoring operations altogether if they were forced to absorb 
any of the surplus.252  The stage seemed set for another showdown as ‘the Chairman 
summed up the feelings of the registered employers, saying that the consensus was 
to resist reallocation. He agreed that NAPE must be advised of the decision’.253  
Although the EAPL had been defeated before in high-profile reallocation cases, 
clearly it felt the climate had changed and that its campaign might on this occasion 
draw some sympathy from NAPE and indeed the government.  As usual, the Dock 
Shop Steward Committee was adamant that employers adhered to their 
responsibilities under the A-J agreement.  With neither side willing to concede 
ground in the dispute, the case was referred to the local Dock Labour Board in the 
first instance and when agreement could not be reached it was referred to the NDLB 
for deliberation at its March meeting.254  There, an unusual settlement was negotiated 
between NAPE, the EAPL, the Government and the TGWU.255 
A minor employer at the port, UML Bromborough, had ceased to trade in 
November 1985 and their small RDW workforce had been reallocated amongst other 
employers.256  The company’s stevedoring licence with the local Dock Labour Board 
was still valid and it was proposed that it be transferred to the EAPL with the 
intention of the Association employing the thirty-six ex-Containerbase RDWs 
directly.257  This of course meant that the EAPL had essentially become a port 
employer of last resort.  The Association was to be referred to as a ‘shell’ employer 
and its thirty-six dockers were to be divided and transferred between other port 
employers as required.  In such an event, the company temporarily employing the 
dockers would be liable for their wages.  Where no work was available, the men 
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would be paid fall-back pay as dictated by local agreements, which would be 
covered by a levy on all employers at the port.258  The technicalities of the settlement 
ensured that companies were not compelled to accept reallocation of the dockers 
permanently, instead using them as and when required and that costs would be 
spread more evenly and gradually.  Its ad hoc nature again demonstrated the still 
impregnable position of the NDLS and the A-J agreement for employers and the 
‘insulation’ of dockers from the programme of restructuring of industrial relations 
being undertaken by the Conservative government.259  Moreover, the outcome also 
indicated that despite a radical decline in manning levels and therefore membership, 
the influence of the Docks section at the port was as weighty as ever. 
The first few months of 1986 witnessed considerable activity at the port.  
Running almost parallel to the Containerbase standoff, a dispute had developed at 
the Grain Terminal.  Dockers there had refused to load lorries destined for A1 Feeds, 
an animal feedstuffs processor whose plant was located close to Gladstone dock.  It 
transpired that A1 Feeds management and the local TGWU were locked in a battle 
over union recognition for its workforce.  Its workforce was on strike and picketing 
access to the plant but the company had resisted pressure to concede recognition and 
was engaged in ‘anti-union’ strikebreaking activities.260  The workers had appealed 
to the Dock Shop Steward Committee directly for assistance.  In the context of the 
Union’s dispute with the company and the plea to the dock stewards, Jimmy Symes 
had instructed the dockers responsible to refuse to service delivery for A1 Feeds.  Its 
cargo was waiting on the quayside but the Union feared that ‘the company would 
seek to break the picket line with lorries loaded at S2 [the Grain Terminal]’.261  The 
EAPL was dragged reluctantly into the dispute because it claimed that the MDHC 
could be facing legal action from A1 Feeds over ‘its failure to supply the customer 
with his own goods’.262  It informed the Union side at the LMC that it would be 
forced to put those dockers who refuse to load A1 Feeds’ cargo ‘off-pay’.  
Furthermore, the Association deplored the action as ‘bad for the prosperity of the 
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port’, arguing that ‘the press would inevitably have a field day expounding on the 
problems which beset Liverpool’.263    
The sympathetic and secondary nature of the action meant that it was indeed 
prone to legal challenges in the contemporary legislative climate, as the EAPL had 
feared.  The Chairman of the Association informed the Union side at the meeting of 
the LMC on 4 February that A1 Feeds ‘had now taken out an injunction to prevent 
the TGWU from impeding their normal activities in secondary industrial action 
which lay outside legal immunities for trade unions’.264  The MDHC was in an 
extremely uncomfortable situation.  It now had to be seen to make efforts to 
discipline the dockers involved and attempt to deliver the cargo to A1 Feeds.  If not, 
A1 Feeds might pursue legal action against them.  However, if it did seek to move 
the cargo without the agreement of the Union it recognised that this might provoke a 
port-wide stoppage, ‘either way the MDHC stood to lose a great deal of money’.265  
To the relief of management at the MDHC, it was clear that the TGWU was already 
amply aware of the injunction that had been issued against it.  At the same meeting, 
Jimmy Symes advised the employer’s side of the LMC that ‘the Union had revised 
its stance as a result of the Court Order and the stewards had already advised the 
RDWs at the Grain Terminal to work normally’.266  Although dockers’ employment 
protection had kept the realities of Thatcherism at bay, the exercising of sympathetic 
or political industrial action was now dependent on the appetite of companies from 
outside the industry to utilise recent changes to employment legislation. 
Further to the two disputes, March 1986 brought the beginning of the 
biennial pay round negotiations.  As usual the two sides were some distance apart in 
their estimation of a satisfactory award.  At the LMC, the Docks section put forward 
its pay claim – a twelve and a half percent increase in basic pay, holiday pay and 
bonuses.  The EAPL again stressed the need for changes in manning levels and 
workforce flexibility and the importance of making any pay rise self-funding.267  
Dennis Kelly outlined the reasons why the Docks section should be afforded a ‘no 
strings’ pay award, ‘RDWs wages have fallen behind those paid to ACTSS and the 
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national industry average... savings from the substantial severances achieved by 
employers [under the new release arrangement] should enable companies to pay their 
dockworkers a reasonable wage’.268  The employers’ counter-offer comprised a four 
percent increase that year followed by a further four percent in 1987 with manning 
reductions in certain areas, particularly the Seaforth Container Terminal.269  This was 
rejected at a shop steward meeting on 5 May and, in the absence of an improved 
offer, plans were made for industrial action to increase pressure on the employers.  
At a Docks section shop stewards’ Executive Committee meeting at Transport 
House, a motion to seek a membership vote on an immediate indefinite port-wide 
stoppage was narrowly defeated.270  Instead, at a later mass meeting at Liverpool 
Stadium, a vote for an overtime ban returned an overwhelmingly positive result.271  
This was not immediately implemented, however, as talks with the EAPL continued. 
The EAPL reacted to the notice of an overtime ban by threatening the closure 
of the loss-making timber terminal at Seaforth, potentially affecting one hundred 
RDW and twenty clerical jobs.272  This was dismissed by the Union as brinkmanship 
but employers were adamant that closure could be imminent.  In fact, the 
Association took the extraordinary step of offering the timber terminal to the Union 
to run in return for ‘a nominal rent... since the Union considered the Terminal a 
going concern.  The Union could employ the men, organise their wages etc.  Any 
profits which were made, they could keep’.273  The MDHC maintained that this was 
a serious and formal offer and required a formal response.  The Union side replied 
that the offer would be considered in due course but pointedly remarked that it had 
absolutely no bearing on the pay negotiations.274 
Debate and negotiation at the LMC continued but was growing increasingly 
acrimonious.  The EAPL persistently argued that it could not possibly afford a 
twelve and a half percent across the board increase unless it was accompanied by 
manning reductions or changes in work practices.275  Despite these familiar employer 
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protestations, Jimmy Symes recalled that ‘just recently the MDHC had released their 
figures for last year and had made a profit of £1.9million... as far as the Union was 
concerned, this clearly indicated that the Port was able to stand an unconditional pay 
increase’.276  In response, the MDHC argued that the profit made for that financial 
year had already been re-invested into new equipment and facilities at the port.277  
The war of words escalated as Symes accused employers of ‘not recognising the 
achievements and sacrifices of RDWs in the last four years’.278  All this sabre-
rattling came to a head at a meeting of the LMC on 8 July where, in the absence of 
meaningful progress, both parties withdrew from negotiations. 
The LMC remained on extended hiatus for four weeks.  During this time, 
attitudes hardened further.  When the Committee finally reconvened on 5 August, the 
Union side opened by warning that ‘if no progress was made in the next few days, 
the Union would be forced to take action’.279  To these ends, the overtime ban was 
finally implemented on 28 August, accompanied by the threat of escalation.280  The 
EAPL responded by withdrawing from all talks until the ban was removed.  
However, a mere week later, employers returned to the table and asked the Union 
side to lift the ban so that a serious discussion could take place to finally bring an 
end to the marathon wage negotiations.281  Nevertheless, the two sides were still 
some distance apart.  The Union side remained absolutely determined to secure an 
unconditional deal, while employers argued that the port simply could not afford it. 
A breakthrough did not arrive until November.  Eventually a formula was 
agreed upon whereby voluntary redundancy would be offered to a small section of 
the RDW workforce to facilitate funding for an unconditional twelve and a half 
percent rise across the board.282  After further disagreement regarding the terms and 
scope of the voluntary redundancy scheme, a shop stewards’ meeting voted on 17 
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December to accept the deal.283  The agreement brought to an end nine months of 
difficult and sustained intercession.284  However, this was only the first hurdle in the 
annual pay round.  ACTSS had basically shelved their pay negotiations until the 
outcome of the RDW deal was known.  This meant that employers then faced 
another round of tortuous negotiations with other groups at the port, all equally 
determined to secure an unconditional deal.  
It is in this context that ACTSS began its talks with employers in January.  
The EAPL’s opening offer was similar to that which satisfactorily concluded RDW 
negotiations, perhaps indicating that employers were eager to avoid another 
protracted debate.  Employers offered an £8 per week increase on basic pay but 
sought clerical manning reductions at the container and timber terminals.285  The 
Union side agreed in principle on the pay rise but predictably refused to accept any 
manning reductions.  It also asked for written assurances regarding compulsory 
redundancies.286  In response the EAPL stated that ‘they believed that a large gulf in 
negotiations had been created’ because of ACTSS’ ‘refusal to consider manning 
reductions... and until that position had changed the employers would not be 
prepared to make concessions’.287  Negotiations over the next two months were slow 
and, as a result, the JNC was broken down into two sub-committees to discuss 
manning changes at the two terminals in question.288  Still there was no movement 
from either side, leading Lennie McCluskey to comment that ‘negotiations were now 
further from agreement than before’.289 
By May, negotiators on the Union side were growing increasingly restless 
and an overtime ban was proposed and ratified.290  The overtime ban spurred the 
EAPL into action as it began to affect operations at Seaforth.  The Association 
proposed that manning flexibility be implemented in place of manning reductions 
and as a result it appeared that an agreement was near.291  However, differences 
remained over the retrospective payment of increases back to March when 
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negotiations began.  The overtime ban continued while the details of the settlement 
were hammered out in full.292  Finally it was agreed that half the outstanding monies 
would be paid as a lump sum while the other half would be donated to a charity of 
the union’s choice.  The offer was put to a mass meeting of the membership on 3 
June where it was accepted.293   
The prolonged and tightly-contested nature of the 1986/87 pay negotiations 
indicated that both employers and workers were closing ranks.  Employers were 
concerned with continually minimising the register surplus at the port while 
simultaneously attempting to renegotiate manning agreements in the face of 
declining traffic and tonnage.  For their part, port workers were alarmed by the 
increasing erosion of manning levels in every area and the ongoing exodus from the 
industry via the plethora of voluntary severance schemes.  The battle to protect jobs 
was confronted with the battle to cut costs and neither side believed they could 
afford to concede ground.  Once again, both clerical workers and RDWs had brought 
pressure through industrial action and it was only once both trade groups 
implemented an overtime ban that employers began to negotiate seriously over the 
major stumbling block of manning reductions.  Despite its best efforts, the EAPL 
failed to attach manning reduction conditions to the final agreement indicating that 
the impetus still largely lay with the shop floor even though manpower, and thus 
membership, was declining sharply.     
 Another Special Severance Release Arrangement was opened at the port of 
Liverpool in January 1987.  Despite the first phase of the National Employers’ 
Release Arrangement having expired in March 1986, whereby the Government 
would be liable for one hundred percent of severance costs, the second phase still 
guaranteed state-funding for seventy-five percent of RDW voluntary redundancy 
sums until March 1987.  It was in this context that a new severance sum of £35000 
was offered to RDWs at the port, mirroring an offer made at the port of London the 
previous year.  However, the only employers who declared surpluses were the 
MDHC and EAPL and even they indicated that applications would not be accepted 
from those with key or skill shortage specialisms.294  In fact consideration for 
redundancy was extremely selective and mainly restricted to older dockers.  Under 
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the two-week Scheme, which commenced on 12 January 1987, two-hundred and 
fifty-five RDWs left the port.295  This was a significant blow to already-dwindling 
ranks: by 1988 only approximately 1,400 remained on the register at Liverpool.296 
  
The withdrawal of Liverpool Maritime Terminals, 1988 
Further damage appeared to be inflicted on Liverpool’s prospects in early 
1988 as Liverpool Maritime Terminals (LMT), a company with a considerable 
history at the port, announced its decision to withdraw from stevedoring operations.  
It was no coincidence that the decision to withdraw coincided with the pending 
cessation of the National Employers’ Release Arrangement.297  LMT was a 
significant employer of RDW labour, employing two hundred and forty-two 
dockers.298  The prospect of absorbing such a high surplus of labour into existing 
workforces was daunting for those employers remaining, particularly the MDHC 
which had just recently managed to shed a similar number from its books through 
the Special Severance Release Arrangement.  Fortunately, bucking the trend at 
Liverpool and elsewhere in the industry, the EAPL had received applications for 
stevedoring licenses and local board registration from two new companies.  Merlin 
Stevedores Limited and Liverpool Stevedoring Limited had applied to begin trading 
at the port specifically with the intention of undertaking LMT’s work once the 
company had withdrawn and so it was proposed that they be allocated those surplus 
RDWs who did not wish to take severance.  In the meantime, the closure of LMT 
was postponed until 21 February to allow provision for severance applications and 
the orderly transfer of labour.299 
Despite the RDW reallocation on this occasion being settled without the 
threat of industrial action, Jimmy Symes, the District Docks Section Secretary, 
stressed that ‘if a full solution was to be achieved, the employers would have to give 
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consideration to any ACTSS members who did not wish to accept severance’.300  By 
1988, LMT did not employ many clerical staff and the majority of those it did 
employ were happy to take an enhanced severance package linked to each 
individual’s period of service.  After several meetings of the Joint Negotiating 
Committee it became apparent that only five ACTSS members employed by LMT 
wished to remain in the industry.301  One of the five clerical staff involved recalls the 
situation: 
 
In 1988 LMT went to the wall.  I’d been there since I was fifteen years old.  I 
was entitled to redundancy... I had £18,500 built up.  But there were five of 
us out of maybe thirty-two/thirty-three staff at that time who said ‘no, I don’t 
want to go’, which threw up problems because there was nowhere for us to 
go, no jobs for us... We had a [joint-liaison] meeting with the dock stewards 
at which we made it clear that we wanted to be transferred to another 
company.302 
 
Inevitably, ACTSS once again made it absolutely clear to employers that 
these men must be reallocated within the port.  Equally unsurprising was the 
response from port employers that they did not require any additional clerical labour.  
The stage seemed set for a re-run of the somewhat acrimonious Isle of Man Steam 
Packet dispute.  In order to avoid a repeat of that scenario ACTSS and the Docks 
section proposed that a solution be tailored similar to that which had achieved a 
satisfactory settlement for reallocation of Aintree Containerbase’s RDWs, when it 
had ceased trading in 1986.303  It appeared that, on this occasion, the employers were 
as eager as ACTSS to avoid a potentially damaging dispute and so it was agreed that 
the five men would be employed by the EAPL, again in a ‘shell’ capacity. 
On this occasion however, the settlement contained an even more interesting 
twist.  Whereas the RDWs employed by the EAPL were transferred between port 
employers on an ‘as required’ basis, there were no conceivable circumstances 
whereby clerical workers would be needed by other companies.  The EAPL would 
therefore be encumbered with five men for whom it had no work but still had to pay.  
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At the next meeting of the JNC, the Chairman of the Clerical Port Shop Steward 
Committee requested the details of the terms and conditions applicable to the five 
ACTSS members currently being employed by the EAPL.  The Chairman of the 
EAPL replied ‘that the five men were undertaking a training programme and were to 
be listed... for registered dock-work through the inter-employment transfer 
system’.304  This in effect meant that the five clerical workers were to be retrained to 
become registered dockers under the Scheme.  Clearly, this was a most unusual 
occurrence since the register had been closed at Liverpool for over fifteen years.  
The solution was entirely unique.  Once again, the make-shift and unparalleled 
nature of the settlement indicated that management remained acutely aware of the 
strength, determination and disruptive power of ACTSS even as late as 1988 and 
dared not impose compulsory redundancy, on as few as five non-registered workers, 
for fear of the reprisals this would provoke.  As previously noted, the organisation of 
the port and structural factors inherent in the dock industry meant that clerical 
workers, through solidarity in several watershed disputes and an acute 
comprehension of their position in the operation of the port, had developed their own 
de facto employment protection which also insulated them from the deregulation and 
restructuring witnessed by other sectors of industry.  The reallocation of the five 
surplus LMT clerical staff and extraordinary retraining as RDWs is testament to this. 
Further evidence of the exceptional position and influence of Liverpool’s 
RDWs and clerical staff, even this deep into the Thatcher era, is provided by the ban 
on the handling of Namibian Uranium Hexafluoride at the port.  The initiative, 
pioneered by ACTSS stewards, sought to boycott the movement of the commodity 
through the port because of ongoing military action in Namibia.305  Initially, dock 
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stewards were indifferent to a potential boycott as it was perceived that such overtly 
political action could damage already-dwindling trade at the port.306  Nevertheless, 
having been approached by the Namibian Support Committee, ACTSS stewards 
were determined not to handle a cargo which was being extracted and shipped in 
ethically questionable circumstances and used their port veto to effectively ‘black’ 
any containers or ships carrying Uranium Hexafluoride from Namibia.  An ACTSS 
steward outlined the process by which clerical workers could passively prevent the 
movement of a particular cargo within the port: 
    
We had the power, because we did the paperwork, to refuse a container or 
ship to be loaded.  Whereas the RDWs needed [the support of] forty, fifty, 
sixty men to stop a ship, ours was more of an individual thing.  For example, 
if I was a customs clerk and I wanted to stop a South African container going 
on a ship, all I had to do was refuse to sign it off and that’s exactly what we 
used to do – refuse to sign the C88 Release Forms.307 
 
After several discussions about the policy at joint-liaison meetings, the Docks 
section gradually warmed to the boycott.308  However, because Namibian ‘Hex’ had 
already been processed with batches from elsewhere before reaching the port it took 
significant research before its presence could be identified.309  Eventually, on 22 
February 1988, Liverpool’s dockers and clerical staff identified and stopped a 
consignment of containers from being loaded at the port.  They contained Uranium 
Hexafluoride from British Nuclear Fuel’s (BNFL) Springfield plant where it had 
been partially enriched and was destined for further enrichment in the United 
States.310  The dockers and clerical staff requested documentation to prove that some 
of the mixed ‘Hex’ had not originated from Namibia.  When BNFL could not 
provide proof, the cargo was ‘blacked’ and the company was informed that these 
shipments would no longer be handled at Liverpool docks.  As the dockers had 
initially feared, BNFL’s response was to divert operations permanently to 
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Felixstowe, a non-Scheme port.311  The provenance of Namibian Uranium 
Hexafluoride and its ethical implications had already been raised by ACTSS and the 
District Docks section at the local and national level of the Union.  This led to a 
motion from the National Docks and Waterways Committee calling on the General 
Executive Committee of the TGWU to ‘implement a ban called by the UN... [and 
ensure] that there is a complete handling ban on Namibian minerals in all ports of the 
UK’.312 
The boycott was not the first of its kind at the port of Liverpool – Chilean 
and South African cargoes of various description had previously been ‘blacked’ at 
the behest of ACTSS and dock stewards because of the political situation in those 
countries.313  This brand of political sympathy action was practically unparalleled in 
other industries and again illustrates the influence enjoyed by the two major trade 
groups at the port right up until the abolition of the Scheme in April 1989, despite a 
seemingly unfavourable environment for labour activism elsewhere. 
 
The national context – The road to the repeal of the National Dock Labour 
Scheme 
 The Scheme came under mounting duress in the final years of the eighties.  
In May 1986, NAPE commissioned a report into the probability of success an 
abolition campaign might have.  Its findings, in March 1987, were positive and 
encouraged NAPE to commence a full-scale repeal drive.314  At the local level, this 
emboldened some employers who initiated attempts to circumvent the Scheme.  
Both 1987 and 1988 witnessed national strike calls from the TGWU over breaches at 
different ports.  In January 1987, Hapag-Lloyd withdrew from the port of Greenock 
and transferred operations to Liverpool.315  Its dockers were left without an employer 
and, in the absence of willing recipient companies, it was proposed that the men be 
placed on the Temporary Unattached Register.  The suggestion that the men would 
not be reallocated was greeted with the threat of industrial action from the TGWU.  
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However, the employers at the port were immovable in their stance and so the Union 
balloted members for a national dock strike.316  The result was positive and a 
national strike was narrowly averted by a last-minute climb-down by employers that 
saw some of the twenty-four RDWs reallocated amongst existing companies at the 
port and the remainder employed by a newly-registered company, Strathclyde 
Stevedoring Services. 
In November 1987 NAPE’s repeal campaign began to pay dividends as 
Jacques Arnold, Conservative MP for Gravesham, tabled Early Day Motion Number 
275 calling on the Government to repeal the Dock Labour Scheme and labelling it 
‘an anachronism which both endangers the viability of jobs in Scheme areas and acts 
as a deterrent to job creation by new ventures’.317  On the first day, sixty-nine MPs 
signed the motion with two hundred and twenty-eight Conservative MPs pledging 
support by the end of the parliamentary session.318  This initiative was opposed by 
elements within the Labour party and Early Day Motion Number 332, tabled in 
December, called for the Scheme to be retained.319  To the growing frustration of 
port employers and some Conservative MPs, the Government still resisted 
committing itself to repealing the Scheme.320  The Government’s persisting 
reticence, even as late as May 1988, was illustrated by the defeat of a Ten Minute 
Rule Bill introduced by David Davis MP imploring abolition.321  Although Labour 
MPs voted overwhelmingly against the Bill, it required the assistance from some 
within the Government to successfully vote it down.322  Nevertheless, it was clear 
that the campaign for abolition was gathering momentum as right-wing think tanks 
and academics published a series of papers roundly condemning the Scheme.323  
Having marginally avoided a national dock strike in early 1987, it appeared 
                                                     
316 Press statement by John Connolly (National Docks and Waterways Secretary) ‘Re: Ballot for 
national strike over TUR use’, 24 July 1987 (Modern Records Centre). 
317 House of Commons debate, 10 March 1988 (Hansard, Vol. 129, cc. 521-33). 
318 NAPE, ‘The History of the Dock Labour Scheme’. 
319 Ibid.  However, the motion only received the support of 76 MPs. 
320 House of Commons debate, 10 March 1988.  Patrick Nicholls, Under-Secretary of State for 
Employment, insisted during the debate that ‘there are no present plans to abolish or amend the 
Scheme’. 
321 NAPE, ‘The History of the Dock Labour Scheme’. 
322 Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, p. 96. 
323 See, for example: Hanson, C. ‘Time to end the National Dock Labour Scheme’, Economic Affairs, 
June/July 1988, pp. 34-36; Davis, D. ‘Clear the Decks: Abolish the National Dock Labour Scheme’, 
Centre For Policy Studies, Policy Study Number 101, November 1988; Rosewell, R. ‘Locked in a 
time warp – Must we keep Britain’s docks as an industrial museum?’, Aims of Industry, September 
1988. 
220 
 
increasingly likely that the next dispute in the industry could provoke all-out war 
between the Union and employers over the future of the Scheme.  Opportunity for 
confrontation quickly arrived with the annual review of the National Docks 
Agreement in late 1987 and a dispute relating to the use of unregistered labour at the 
port of Glasgow in 1988.   
The Annual Review took place under the auspices of the NJC and over recent 
years NAPE had been reluctant to discuss anything beyond peripheral matters such 
as sick rate pay.  Indeed, the majority of important negotiations regarding pay, 
overtime rate etc. were by now devolved to the local level, as was the case at 
Liverpool.  At the review in November 1987, the Union pushed for a commitment to 
a reduction to the working week from thirty-nine to thirty-five hours, an increase in 
holiday entitlement from twenty-two to thirty days per annum and an increase in the 
sick pay rate.324   However, the employers remained adamant that any claims raised 
by the Union should be the subject of local negotiations to enable them to be linked 
to productivity/flexibility deals at individual port level.325  In response, whereas in 
previous years the Union had not maintained pressure on employers to come to a 
national agreement regarding improved terms and conditions for RDWs, on this 
occasion, possibly in the context of NAPE’s escalating abolition campaign and 
hostile posture, the Union stated that ‘if an improved, acceptable offer, is not made 
on those items made in our claim for a review of the National Dock Agreement 
1987... a recommendation for industrial action will be made to the docks 
membership’.326 Following meetings of the NJC that took place throughout 1988, the 
employers eventually made an offer to increase sick pay by 4.4% and to enhance the 
holiday entitlement by one day to twenty-three days per annum.  However, the offer 
was made with one significant condition attached: the implementation of a cashless 
pay system for holiday pay in any port where it was required by the employer.  Both 
elements of the offer were rejected by the workers’ side of the NJC, along with a 
wholesale rejection of the cashless payment proposal.327  The scene therefore seemed 
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set for a showdown over the annual review.  On reflection, it can be argued that the 
dispute represented a battle of wills between the TGWU and NAPE.  
 On 1 September 1988, the TGWU began a ballot of its dock membership for 
industrial action.  All eyes were on the outcome and its implications for the industry 
and the NDLS.328  The proposed strike action was to take the form of one twenty-
four hour stoppage per week until a satisfactory offer was made by employers.  
However, when the result was released on 7 October, it made disastrous reading for 
the Union.  In a turnout of 6895 RDWs out of a possible 9430 across the country, the 
‘no’s’ had it by 3777 votes to 3118.329  John Connolly, TGWU National Docks and 
Waterways Secretary, in a masterful display of understatement, remarked that the 
outcome was ‘disappointing’.330  Nicolas Finney, Director of NAPE, was far less 
restrained in his assessment commenting that ‘the dockers’ decision indicates that 
the days of automatic support for any national call for strike action in the docks are 
over’.331  The Union had virtually staked its reputation on the ballot and was found 
wanting.  Despite arguing that the result had little relevance to the dockers’ and 
Union’s determination to defend the Scheme, it was nothing short of a public 
relations calamity and encouraged those who supported abolition to believe that the 
time was right.  In an interesting aside, the result of Liverpool’s ballot bucked the 
national trend.  Of 1390 RDWs, 490 voted yes and 363 no with 532 ballots unused 
and five unreturned.332  However, even in the case of Liverpool, the sizeable chunk 
of men who did not vote, and those who voted against, seemed to indicate a distinct 
lack of enthusiasm for the issue at stake.  Overall, the call for industrial action at that 
point and in respect of this issue appeared to be a gross miscalculation by the Union. 
 Running almost parallel to the national annual review dispute was another 
localised dispute which threatened to escalate into a national strike call.  In May 
1988 Sheppard (Group) Limited set up a scrap metal export operation in the port of 
Glasgow.333  Despite initially reassuring the Union that it would employ RDWs, 
upon commencing work it refused to do so.  The local Dock Labour Board made it 
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clear that the work the company was undertaking was dock-work yet it continued to 
refuse to employ RDWs.  The issue was referred by the local board to the NDLB 
where, in the absence of co-operation from Sheppard, legal proceedings were issued 
to prevent the company from continuing in breach of the Scheme.  However, its 
attempt to gain an injunction failed and the NDLB subsequently appealed the court’s 
decision.  The Board also applied to an Industrial Tribunal to rule on the Sheppard 
dock-work issue. 
All the while Sheppard continued its operations in the port using non-
registered labour.  This encouraged another two scrap metal exporters working out of 
the port, J.R. Adams & Sons and Arnott Young, to follow suit and they signalled 
their intention to cease employing registered men after 1 December 1988.  On 2 and 
7 December, ships were discharged by these two companies without utilising RDW 
labour.  On the second occasion, all RDWs at the port withdrew their labour 
indefinitely in protest at such a blatant breach of the Scheme.  Before the official 
movement could devise a response to the evolving situation, the port authority 
applied to an Edinburgh court seeking an injunction against the Union as a 
consequence of the RDWs withdrawing their labour without following proper strike 
notification procedure.  The injunction was granted on 10 December, although 
successfully challenged by the Union on 13 December, albeit on the proviso that no 
further industrial action would be taken until a ballot of the members involved had 
been carried out and that forty-eight hours notice of the ballot be provided to Clyde 
Port Authority.  The RDWs returned to work while the Union prepared a ballot of its 
port membership.  In the interim, the Dock Labour Board was successful in securing 
an injunction against the two companies involved for using non-registered labour on 
its operations.334 
The upshot of the whole affair was that, although the local ballot received a 
positive result and was followed by a successful motion to ballot for a national 
stoppage at a subsequent National Docks Delegate Conference, the strike was 
postponed until the Industrial Tribunal ruled on the original Sheppard case.335  This 
dragged on into the following year and as a consequence was superseded by the 
announcement of the abolition of the Scheme.  The legal wrangling surrounding the 
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case was an appetizer for the restrictions which would handicap the TGWU’s 
attempts to call a national stoppage over the abolition announcement and seemed to 
illustrate that by the end of 1988 some employers were beginning to flout the 
Scheme in anticipation of its demise. 
 
The abolition of the NDLS 
On Thursday 6 April 1989 Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for 
Employment, announced to the House of Commons the Government’s intention to 
abolish the National Dock Labour Scheme on 16 July.  The Dock Work Bill was 
accompanied by a White Paper detailing the reasons behind the Government’s 
decision.336  It was largely based on previous research undertaken on behalf of 
NAPE and regurgitated many of the statistics and facts already in the public 
domain.337  In short the Government cited the costs of Scheme-related surplus labour 
and severance, the inefficient practices which its protection encouraged, joint 
industry control and its impact on managerial prerogative and discipline, the 
commercial disadvantages compared with non-Scheme ports, the statutory monopoly 
over dock-work by registered dockers and how a combination of all these factors 
acted as a disincentive to investment and development of the industry.338  The White 
Paper also referenced the case of the forced reallocation of T&J Harrisons’ RDW 
workforce at Liverpool in 1980 as an example of all that was wrong with the 
Scheme. 
 Not surprisingly, the announcement was warmly-received by major dock 
employers and centre-right commentators.  The Times summarised the mood by 
leading with an article entitled ‘Free Ports At Last’.339   Keith Stuart, Chairman of 
Associated British Ports (ABP) which owned and ran several British ports including 
Southampton, Hull and Cardiff, could hardly disguise his satisfaction commenting 
that: 
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ABP has strongly supported the campaign for the abolition of the Dock 
Labour Scheme and we are very pleased that the Government has announced 
its intention to bring the Scheme to an end... The abolition of the monopoly 
right of RDWs to handle cargo will enable new working arrangements to be 
negotiated to the benefits of the ports, our customers and our employees.340 
 
The MDHC gave a more measured response but was nevertheless enthused by the 
announcement of abolition.  Trevor Furlong, Chief Executive of the company, 
highlighted the positive implications for the competitiveness of the port: 
 
The proposed legislation gives Liverpool the chance to compete more 
aggressively against other ports in both the UK and Europe.  We have been 
successful within the Scheme.  We are confident that Liverpool will be able 
to enhance its position still further without the Scheme.341    
 
The repeal of the Scheme had long been feared by RDWs across the country, yet the 
timing came as somewhat a surprise in the context of the Government’s frequent 
statements to the contrary.342  It is possible that the Government’s hand was forced 
by the threat of a national strike over the Sheppard dispute and a general escalation 
of hostilities between the TGWU and NAPE.  Nevertheless, the dockers response 
was almost instantaneous.  At Liverpool, the RDW and clerical workforce walked 
out soon after the news broke.343  Indeed, ACTSS ‘pledged to give our full support to 
the Docks section in any action they chose to take’ in response to the abolition 
announcement.344  The unofficial stoppage was short-lived, however, as the Union 
implored all dockers to continue working until provision was made for official action 
which was within the law.  A TGWU spokesman was categorical in stating that ‘as 
far as unofficial action is concerned, our view from here is that there shouldn’t be 
any’.345  Liverpool’s dockers returned to work on Monday 10 April, having been 
convinced by the District Docks Secretary Jimmy Symes that unofficial wildcat 
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action simply could not be sustained in the current legislative context.  He 
commented, ‘the men are very angry about this.  They didn’t want to return to work 
this morning but we urged them to go back’.346 
The Liverpool Dock Shop Stewards Committee and dockers nationwide were 
assured that the Union was organising to mobilise an official and legal campaign 
against abolition and to these ends a meeting of the National Docks Committee was 
convened for 10 April, followed by a recall of the General Executive Committee of 
the Union on 14 April and a meeting of the workers’ side of the NJC on 15 April.347  
At these meetings it became apparent that all involved were acutely aware of the 
legal restrictions within which any campaign would have to be conducted.  There 
was also an acknowledgement that the Docks section had to avoid ‘a split between 
the Trade Group and the rest of the Union’.348 The final outcome of these discussions 
was that, despite the fact that ‘a number of the [National Docks] Committee had 
been mandated [for a national strike ballot] and... will have to justify the change in 
their position when they go back to their ports’, negotiations with NAPE would be 
exhausted before a ballot of the membership would take place.349 Although at its 
meeting on 14 April the National Docks Committee heavily favoured an immediate 
ballot, Turnbull contends that it was essentially overruled by Ron Todd (General 
Secretary) and the General Executive Council of the TGWU and persuaded to 
reluctantly consent to the leadership’s strategy at another meeting the following 
day.350  The summit with NAPE was scheduled for 18 April. 
At that meeting on 18 April the Union maintained that national negotiations 
should take place to establish ‘conditions of employment no less favourable than at 
present’.351  However, the negotiating party for NAPE made it absolutely clear that 
its members had no intention of reaching any agreement at the national level and that 
all future negotiations regarding terms and conditions should be conducted on a local 
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port-wide basis.352  NAPE accused the TGWU of manoeuvring towards a ‘political 
campaign’ against employers by insisting on national negotiations.353  The only 
undertaking given by employers at the meeting was that there would be ‘no return to 
casual employment systems after the repeal of the Scheme’.354  So, the faint hope 
retained by the TGWU leadership that employers might be willing to negotiate on a 
national voluntary arrangement with the Union was quickly expunged.  Whether Ron 
Todd and John Connolly honestly thought that employers would consider a quasi-
Scheme replacement for the NDLS or whether this was merely an exercise in 
demonstrating that the Union had exhausted all avenues before balloting for strike 
action, is another matter.  Having gained precious little ground at the meeting with 
NAPE on 18 April, the Union decided to write to each individual port employer 
directly seeking assurances regarding the maintenance of terms and conditions for 
RDWs and their endorsement of the perpetuation of national and joint bargaining 
machinery.355  The TGWU also wrote to all registered dock workers apprising them 
of the current situation and advising them that, in the absence of a satisfactory 
response from port employers or NAPE, preparations were being made for a ballot of 
the trade group membership to undertake industry-wide strike action.356 
The response of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company to the Union’s 
correspondence was predictable.  It merely repeated NAPE’s assertion that ‘no 
national machinery is necessary’.357  The company went further by writing directly 
to Jimmy Symes stating that ‘there will be no adoption... of any casual system of 
employment’ and that ‘our cargo-handling activities require a skilled, permanent 
workforce and this is what we fully intend to maintain’.358  The letter also 
emphasised the company’s belief that the future of the port could be put at risk by 
‘threatened industrial action on a parliamentary matter which is entirely outside the 
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MDHC’s control’.359  This was clearly a statement of intent by the MDHC, indirectly 
asserting that any industrial dispute could be considered as secondary action under 
the provisions of the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts and echoing NAPE’s 
declaration that any national action would be considered political. 
In the absence of any meaningful co-operation from employers at any level 
and in the context of the Bill to abolish the Scheme receiving a second reading in the 
Commons, the Union finally decided to begin preparations for a strike ballot on 27 
April.360  The actual ballot of members was to take place 10-17 May with the 
national count from 19 May and the result to be announced thereafter.361  However, 
before the Union could even issue ballot papers the employers went on the offensive.  
On 8 May, ABP and the Port of London Authority (PLA) applied to the High Court 
for an injunction restraining the Union from inducing its members to breach their 
contracts by engaging in political action where no primary trade dispute was 
apparent.  The MDHC followed suit on 11 May.362  At the initial hearing the Union 
gave assurances that it would not call for strike action, regardless of the result of the 
ballot, until the court had chance to consider the applications by the employers 
concerned.363  The cases were due to be heard in full on 18 May. 
While the legal jostling began, the ballot results were counted.  On 19 May, 
the TGWU announced that, of approximately 9300 RDWs, 6333 voted in favour of 
national strike action and 2191 against, with a turnout of 90.8%.364  By now, shop 
stewards at some of the more militant ports were itching to begin action.  The 
unofficial National Port Shop Stewards Committee met on 20 May to discuss the 
present situation and devise future strategy.  After considerable debate and a clear 
divergence of opinion between representatives from the various Scheme ports, it was 
agreed that strike action must wait until for the outcome of the court case.365  On 27 
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May, the High Court delivered its verdict which found in favour of the Union.  
However, the employers involved immediately announced that they would appeal 
against the decision at the Court of Appeal and the TGWU again gave an 
undertaking to the court not to proceed with strike action until the application had 
been heard.366  In the interim, the Dock Work Bill had received its third reading in 
the Commons.367  It was becoming increasingly apparent that time was not on the 
dockers’ side.  The protracted legal wrangling meant that the pressure was on in 
relation to the expiry of the strike ballot mandate and the abolition of the Scheme.368 
The Court of Appeal convened on 1 June to consider the employers’ 
application. On 7 June it delivered its judgement which found in favour of ABP, the 
PLA and the MDHC.  It reversed the High Court decision and granted an injunction 
against the TGWU preventing the Union from implementing its ballot and 
expediting the strike mandate.369  The creative nature of the judgement left the 
Union, the dockers and some political commentators astounded.370  The Guardian 
editorial described the decision, in the light of the TGWU’s efforts to remain within 
the law, as ‘the humiliation of responsible trade unionism’.371  Eddie Loydon, MP 
for Garston (Liverpool) remarked that ‘this shows it is virtually impossible for a 
trade union to take industrial action’.372  After the verdict, the rank-and-file activists 
could no longer be controlled.  There were spontaneous walk-outs at several ports.373  
On 8 June at Liverpool, about seven hundred RDWs on the morning shift withdrew 
their labour, with the final five hundred expected to join the action in the afternoon.  
By the following day the whole of Liverpool’s RDW workforce was on strike and 
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2800 were out across the country.374  The Union urged restraint, having immediately 
appealed the Court of Appeal decision to the House of Lords.  A TGWU spokesman 
stated, ‘we know the men are frustrated but we want them to stay calm and let us do 
this through the proper channels’.375  However, by this juncture, the legal process 
was regarded by dockers at Liverpool as a sham.376  Speaking in the wake of the 
announcement of the verdict, Jimmy Nolan (Chairman of the Liverpool Dock Shop 
Steward Committee and the NPSSC) stated that ‘the High Court’s decision is a 
disgrace and it is one that Liverpool dockers will not tolerate.  We will break the law 
if we have to’.377 
The unofficial action was declared ‘ill-judged’ and ‘suicidal’ by NAPE, with 
Nicolas Finney commenting that ‘the shop stewards are living in dreamland if they 
think that unofficial action will alter either the Government’s or employers’ 
decision’.378  Nevertheless, such was the furious reaction to the Court of Appeal 
verdict that Liverpool’s dockers could not be talked down.  Ron Todd argued that the 
unofficial strikers should tow the Union line but also pointedly acknowledged that 
‘you can’t instruct people to go back to work, you can only urge them’.379  At a mass 
meeting on Sunday 11 June at the Philharmonic Hall, Liverpool’s RDWs voted 
overwhelmingly to continue the unofficial stoppage amidst some tub-thumping 
rhetoric.380  The local meeting had been preceded by a fractious summit of the 
NPSSC on Saturday 10 June at which London and Liverpool, the two ports where 
the action was having the most success, implored other reticent ports to join the 
unofficial strike.  Both Hull and Southampton had held votes over whether to take 
action but in both cases the result was negative.381  Liverpool’s stewards were 
growing increasingly frustrated with the duality of their counterparts at Southampton 
in particular.  There was a sense amongst some Liverpool stewards that ‘although the 
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stewards at Southampton were talking tough at the NPSSC, they were already 
talking to management behind the scenes’.382 
  Even if support for the strike across the country was patchy, at Liverpool it 
was undoubtedly wholehearted.  There were reports that employers might begin to 
seek injunctions against individual unofficial leaders if the action persisted.383  On 13 
June, although the strike at Liverpool was in its fifth day and showed little sign of 
abating, the rest of the country witnessed a slow drift back to work.  By the weekend 
of the sixteenth, only Liverpool, Garston and a section of Tilbury remained out.384  
The unofficial action was finally called off on Monday 19 June.385  Its erratic and 
incomplete nature illustrated that not even the traditionally representational and 
combative NPSSC could rely on cross-port solidarity, highlighting the divisions 
within the rank-and-file movement and the challenges facing the TGWU if it ever 
managed to free itself from the legal fetters inflicted upon the official campaign for 
strike action. 
 Nevertheless, amidst the growing gloom for the dockers was a chink of light.  
On 21 June the House of Lords upheld the TGWU’s appeal, overturning the Court of 
Appeal judgement.  Indeed, the Law Lords expressed considerable disbelief that 
Clause 8 of the Scheme could ever have been interpreted as a statutory requirement 
for dockers to be available for work at all times, thus removing the right to strike.386  
The Union was finally able to make arrangements for industrial action.  However, 
conveniently for employers and the Government, the initial twenty-eight day strike 
mandate had recently expired and the Union was forced to organise another ballot of 
its members in the Docks section.  Meanwhile, the Government announced that the 
date for Royal Assent of the Dock Work Bill had been moved forward from 16 July 
to 3 July.387  Clearly this was an attempt to ensure that any official strike could not 
begin prior to the Scheme being abolished, thus removing some of the legal 
protection from strikers and enhancing the employers’ hand.  It appeared that the 
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chances of a national dock strike being successful in achieving its goals were 
receding.388 
 Ballot papers were issued to RDWs on 22 June.  The result would not be 
counted for at least a further two weeks and in the interim employers did their utmost 
to encourage as many dockers as possible to apply for the lucrative £35000 
severance package which would soon be on offer.  In some ports, employers also 
intensified their campaign to commence local negotiations with shop stewards in 
order to divide the potential official national strike action.389  On 7 July, four days 
after the Dock Work Bill had received Royal Assent, the ballot results were made 
public.  The result mirrored that from the initial ballot: a 90.3% turnout returned 
6067 in favour of strike action and 2111 against.390  It was a welcome fillip for both 
the dockers and the TGWU.  The strike was scheduled to begin at midnight on 
Monday 10 July. 
 The abolition of the Scheme before strike action could begin was a huge 
blow to the prospects of the dockers.  There was more than a hint of inter-
institutional collusion between the Government and judiciary as a series of legal 
obstacles and the speeding up of the legislative process combined to ensure RDWs 
would go on strike without the protection of the Scheme.  In Liverpool, worst fears 
were confirmed within hours of the Dock Work Bill receiving Royal Assent.  Sixty-
nine dockers had been put on the Temporary Unattached Register at the end of May 
when Liverpool Grain Storage Company went into voluntary liquidation.391  The fact 
that the TUR had been used in Liverpool for the first time since the interim A-J 
agreement had been introduced in 1972 was an indication of the treatment dockers 
would be facing at the hands of buoyant and re-invigorated management.  The very 
same day that the Scheme was finally abolished these sixty-nine RDWs were 
immediately notified that they were being made redundant.  They were given four 
weeks’ notice and although they were entitled to the redundancy payments of 
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£35000, only twenty out of the sixty-nine wished to leave the industry.392  Clearly 
port employers, even the relatively more moderate MDHC, were revelling in the re-
affirmation of managerial prerogative and could hardly wait to mete out some 
sobering treatment to ex-RDWs. 
    The official national strike began at midnight on Monday 10 July and all 
the major Scheme ports came out in support.  In an act of impeccable timing NAPE 
announced prior to the commencement of the strike that it was to disband and that no 
equivalent structure would be taking its place.393  A TGWU spokesman described 
this move as a ‘gimmick... it’s not going to alter our determination to get a national 
agreement’.394  Nevertheless, this was part of the employers’ broader strategy of 
ensuring that local deals would replace the national framework, regardless of the 
outcome of the strike action.  Another indication of the new cold reality of the 
industry occurred at Garston, where all fifty-eight registered dockers employed there 
immediately took the severance money, effectively leaving the dock without a 
workforce.395  Further grim news followed as port employers estimated that by 
Tuesday 11 July 1400 out of the 9000-strong national RDW workforce had already 
took the money.396  Reports of ruthless managerial action across several Scheme 
ports in which dockers were summarily dismissed added to the gloom and 
uncertainty felt by those who wished to remain in the industry.397   
 The problems confronting the strike were further exacerbated by the inability 
of the TGWU to instruct non-Scheme ports to stop working due to legal restraints on 
secondary action.  These restraints also applied to any unofficial action being taken, 
such as physically picketing the gates of non-Scheme ports.  The NPSSC expressed 
an interest in mounting pickets at non-Scheme ports but the Union’s reluctance to 
provide strike funds for transportation meant that a substantial amount of cargo was 
still getting in and out of the country, effectively undermining the impact of the 
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strike.398  So, even by the end of the first week prospects for the strike were not 
promising.  Some smaller ports had returned to work and the number of dockers 
taking the redundancy money was rising by the day. 
The employers’ attack on solidarity continued.  Daily updates by NAPE 
detailed the numbers of dockers who had already taken redundancy and those who 
had resumed normal working at some ports.  By the end of the second week, it was 
estimated that 2000 dockers had returned to work and that thirty-two out of the sixty 
Scheme ports were now working normally.399  At Tilbury, management took the 
initiative by notifying sixteen leading shop stewards that they were being made 
compulsorily redundant.400  This scenario was not repeated at Liverpool, however, 
where the MDHC was more discreet in its approach.  It insisted that local talks 
should take place but stopped short of issuing redundancy notices to any of its ex-
RDW employees.401  However, as the strike persisted into a second week the MDHC 
wrote directly to each of their 1000 employees, warning them that they were in 
breach of contract and that jobs could be at stake.402  In another blow to morale at 
Liverpool, it emerged that twelve of the fifty-eight dockers who had taken 
redundancy from Garston docks were planning to form their own stevedoring 
company to tender for work there under casual conditions.403   The Dock Shop 
Steward Committee immediately issued a warning to these rebel dockers that they 
would face picketing if attempting to work while the strike was still in progress.404  
Jimmy Symes’ somewhat diplomatic statement emphasised that ‘we would expect 
them not to be involved in any activities at Garston until the strike is satisfactorily 
concluded’, although privately both the Union and the stewards’ committee were 
absolutely livid.405 
Nevertheless, despite these setbacks stewards at Liverpool stepped up their 
programme of disruption.  It is important to note that the clerical stewards were fully 
included in strategic planning.  They were invited to all meetings of the Dock Shop 
                                                     
398 Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, p. 146. 
399 Liverpool Echo, 25 July 1989. 
400 Liverpool Echo, 25 July 1989; McIlroy, The Permanent Revolution, p. 179. 
401 Letter from Trevor Furlong (Managing Director and Chief Executive of the MDHC) to Ron Todd, 
26 July 1989 (Modern Records Centre); Liverpool Echo, 25 July 1989. 
402 Liverpool Echo, 25 July 1989. 
403 Liverpool Echo, 19 July 1989; Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, p. 141. 
404 Liverpool Echo, 19 July 1989. 
405 Ibid; Author’s interview with L.D., December 2009. 
234 
 
Steward Committee as both sets of stewards recognised that the abolition of the 
Scheme had changed everything.406  No longer would there be divisions and 
sectionalism between the two trade groups as the reality was that all skill, job and 
grade distinctions were being swept away and that everybody employed in the 
industry would now likely be categorised as ‘port workers’.  Locally, the stewards’ 
committee attempted to build support for the dockers’ struggle by canvassing 
workers of nearby port-orientated industries.  The intention was to disrupt any 
operations which were still generating revenue for the MDHC.  Flying pickets were 
also assembled to prevent work at Garston and the Freightliner depot in Speke.407  
Moreover, the stewards signalled their intention to take their fight abroad and to seek 
solidarity from foreign dockers as part of a NPSSC initiative.408  A demonstration of 
the new atmosphere of unity between stewards from the dock and clerical trade 
groups is signified by the leading role played by a clerical steward in co-ordinating 
and planning the international strategy.  Indeed, this senior clerical steward set about 
producing leaflets in four different languages to make their colleagues in other 
countries aware of the struggle taking place on Britain’s docks.409  Liverpool’s 
dockers and the more militant section of the NPSSC were still determined to broaden 
their stand, even if support elsewhere was beginning to waiver. 
 As the third week of the strike began, employers stepped up their ‘divide and 
rule’ campaign.  At Tilbury, one hundred and forty dockers had been added to the 
sixteen shop stewards made compulsorily redundant.410  Most of this number were 
activists or stewards.  Clearly the management had declared all-out war on trade 
unionism at the port.  Indeed, such hard-line tactics sent shockwaves through those 
who had not been dismissed but were still on strike.  On 25 July, those who 
remained were issued with new employment contracts and an ultimatum – sign them 
or go.411  This ruthless move had the desired effect from the employers’ point of 
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view as the strike at Tilbury began to crack.  The ultimatum encouraged a drift back 
to work and an acceleration of those accepting the redundancy money. 
For their part, Liverpool’s dockers were horrified to learn of the situation at 
Tilbury.  The London dockers had always displayed strong determination and 
solidarity and were regarded by Liverpool’s stewards as their closest allies.412  The 
news that a drift back to work was occurring prompted the Liverpool stewards to 
organise a flying picket to the gates of Tilbury docks.  One hundred and thirty 
Liverpool dockers formed a picket line accompanied by some of the Tilbury 
stewards who had been summarily dismissed but, amidst some emotional scenes, 
they were unable to prevent their counterparts from returning to work.413  A 
Liverpool steward bluntly summarised the challenges facing the strike in the face of 
the merciless employer strategy developing at some ports, particularly Tilbury: 
 
A letter in the post containing their P45 and a cheque for £35000.  The sack 
is a great leveller.  People start panicking, thinking about themselves and 
their families, which is only natural of course...414 
    
Worse news was to follow.  Over the weekend of the 28/29 July, having also been 
issued a Tilbury-style ultimatum, both Hull and Southampton had voted to return to 
work.415  Once again Liverpool’s stewards dispatched a flying picket to both ports 
but to no avail.416  The national strike was floundering badly and looked set to 
collapse.  Indeed, at a meeting of the TGWU General Executive Council (GEC) on 
Tuesday 2 August, worst fears were realised and the official strike was called off.417 
 At Liverpool, in the wake of the collapse of the official strike, the MDHC 
began to ratchet up the pressure on the striking dockers.  Trevor Furlong, the 
company Managing Director and Chief Executive, had already written to Ron Todd 
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on several occasions imploring him to encourage Liverpool’s shop stewards to begin 
local negotiations.  The company also intensified its campaign in the local press in 
the context of the drift back to work elsewhere, warning that ‘if a prolonged strike 
leads to the loss of major customers, it must affect manpower needs’.418  Once news 
of the TGWU GEC’s decision was released, the MDHC wasted no time in issuing its 
remaining employees with a new, non-negotiable contract of employment.419  The 
contract was practically identical to that which existed prior to abolition of the 
Scheme, except with a few significant changes.  It offered ‘the same pay, the same 
hours and the same holiday and sickness pay’ but crucially removed all reference to 
joint-negotiating machinery, ended workforce rotation, moved the disciplinary 
process wholly into the hands of management and was deliberately vague on the role 
of the Union and shop stewards.420  In an act of extreme symbolism, the contract 
dissolved all skill and grade distinctions, including those between clerical staff and 
ex-RDWs and categorised all labour at the port under the title ‘Port Operative 
Worker’ with a ‘deliberately chosen’ acronym of ‘P.O.W.’421 
In the context of these new contracts, by 3 August nearly a quarter of the 
MDHC’s 1000-strong workforce had applied for redundancy.422  A mass meeting 
was organised for Friday 4 August to decide where to go next.  It was suggested in 
the local press that the new contracts offered by the MDHC would be discussed and 
that the Liverpool dockers could follow other major ports and vote to return to work 
immediately.423  However, such predictions proved to be wildly inaccurate.  At the 
mass meeting on Friday at the Philharmonic Hall, attended by the entire 1200 dock 
workforce, an overwhelming majority voted to reject the new contracts and remain 
out on strike.  In fact, at a show of hands, just five of all those gathered voted for a 
return to work.424  Jimmy Nolan outlined the reasons behind their determination to 
fight on - ‘the men have made it very clear that we cannot accept these contracts... It 
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is not a question of being isolated.  We have fought very hard over the years to 
achieve our agreements and we will not see them disappear’.425 
Nevertheless, behind the comprehensive mandate for continuation of the 
strike, it appeared the resolve of many dockers was fading.  It was obvious that the 
cessation of the official strike left Liverpool completely isolated.  In the charged 
climate of the mass meeting, few dared show weakness but in reality a steady flow of 
men began to sign the non-negotiable contracts tabled by the MDHC.  By 5 August, 
the company claimed that four hundred had already agreed to the new terms and 
conditions and had signed the contract.426  Smelling blood and an expedient end to 
the local dispute, the MDHC imposed an extended deadline for the contract offer to 
be accepted.  Those who did not sign by 5pm on Monday 7 August and return to 
work the following day would be deemed to have dismissed themselves and would 
not be entitled to severance payments.427  All attention turned to an official TGWU 
mass meeting at the Philharmonic Hall arranged for Monday which was to be 
addressed by Ron Todd and John Connolly. 
 At said meeting the atmosphere was particularly tense.  The previous meeting 
on 4 August had been conducted in an unofficial and extremely combative tone, so 
much so that even Jimmy Symes as representative of the official movement refused 
to speak up and tow the union line by recommending a return to work.  However, 
this meeting had been called by the TGWU and would be strictly controlled by the 
General Secretary, the National Docks and Waterways Secretary and local officials.  
The course of events is vividly described here: 
 
The first meeting we called ourselves... [but] within two days the Union had 
called their own meeting where no shop stewards would be allowed onto the 
platform, only officers.  Invites to all dockers were sent by special delivery 
direct from the Union... When we got there, we found officers who’d been 
great mates for years acting as bouncers to make sure that the meeting was 
properly policed... It was made absolutely clear that there would be a number 
of speakers, there’d be a statement and then there’d be no debate from the 
floor.  Well, it was a very hostile meeting, a terrible meeting.  The people 
                                                     
425 Liverpool Echo, 4 August 1989. 
426 Liverpool Echo, 5 August 1989. 
427 Ibid.  The MDHC had already set a deadline for 5pm on Friday 4 August but in the context of the 
overwhelming majority at that day’s mass meeting and the scheduling of an official TGWU mass 
meeting for the following Monday, the company decided to extend it to Monday. 
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who we wanted to speak on our behalf, our leaders, were stymied.  We tried 
to hold a meeting outside, in the car park [of the Philharmonic Hall]... but by 
that time the game was up.  There were such divisions and people were 
worrying about their own futures.428           
  
Amidst the acrimony and accusations, a return to work motion was successful by a 
majority of three-to-one.429  Todd had spelt out the hopeless position of the dockers 
and, in the absence of effective argument and rebuttal from local stewards, had 
managed to convince the majority that the fight was over. 
 On Tuesday 8 August at 7:30am, Liverpool’s POWs met at Canada Dock and 
began to march down the Dock Road carrying banners aloft, following a lone 
piper.430  Liverpool Registered Dock Workers’ last convulsion of militancy had kept 
the port out on strike for a week beyond the cessation of the official strike and other 
major ports returning to work.  The bitterness at their forced capitulation was 
palpable and recriminations towards the Union continued.  Jimmy Nolan claimed 
that the return to work vote was misleading because ‘most men did not vote’ and that 
the motion was carried on a ‘limited’ show of hands.431  For some stewards the 
whole affair had been too much to take: 
 
When we came back in August, we had five senior stewards leave [take 
voluntary redundancy] on the first day back... They marched in behind the 
banner and went straight upstairs [to the employers’ office] and were told that 
they could go immediately.  The rest of the lads were very down 
heartened.432    
 
Amongst the stewards who immediately took redundancy were the Secretary and the 
Treasurer of the now-defunct Liverpool Dock Shop Steward Committee.  Despite 
belated attempts by the stewards remaining to enter into negotiations with 
management over terms and conditions of the new contracts, employers made it clear 
                                                     
428 Author’s interview with T.T., November 2010. 
429 Liverpool Echo, 7 August 1989.  Turnbull et al, Dock Strike (p. 173) claims that the vote was 
closer and returned a two-to-one majority in favour of a return to work. 
430 Liverpool Echo, 8 August 1989.  The main banner read ‘Merseyside Dock Labourers Shop 
Stewards Committee – Unity is Strength’. 
431 Liverpool Echo, 8 August 1989. 
432 Author’s interview with F.L., January 2011. 
239 
 
that ‘the men were given the chance to negotiate locally last April.  They refused.  
Now it is too late – the contracts are not negotiable’.433  It was common knowledge 
amongst stewards that post-Scheme managerial strategy and employment contracts 
had been painstakingly developed on behalf of the MDHC by a team of expensive, 
high-flying employment law experts.434  On the surface, the new contracts of 
employment were ostensibly similar to those which preceded the abolition of the 
Scheme.  Rates of pay remained unaltered, including holiday and sickness pay.  The 
MDHC was also at pains to stress that there would be no return to casual working or 
conditions.435 
Nevertheless, behind the sound-bites there were several important changes.  
Foremost amongst these was the inevitable revision of disciplinary procedures 
whereby all joint worker-management arbitration was removed.436  Crucially, this 
now returned managerial prerogative to the employer.  Furthermore, a questionnaire 
circulated during the strike asked workers to stipulate the area in which they would 
prefer to work.437  Each terminal at the port was separated into an individual concern, 
complete with its own workforce, management and subsidiary company.438  The 
employment law specialists recruited by the MDHC were concerned with making the 
port strike-proof and by breaking operations down into specialised and 
individualised subsidiary companies throughout each area of the port they sought to 
inhibit future port-wide solidarity by rendering it illegal under secondary action 
legislation.   
Also, the questionnaire had a further effect of discriminating against activists 
by stealth.  Around one hundred and fifty men, most of whom were stewards refused 
to state which terminal they wished to work at.439  The MDHC then used this to its 
advantage by assigning these men en masse to the general cargo terminal, thus 
isolating the rank-and-file leadership from its membership.440  This was 
accompanied by de-recognition of port-wide bargaining machinery and the Dock 
                                                     
433 Liverpool Echo, 8 August 1989. 
434 Author’s interview with T.T., October 2010; Author’s interview with F.L., January 2011. 
435 Liverpool Echo, 2 August 1989. 
436 Liverpool Echo, 8 August 1989. 
437 Liverpool Echo, 2 August 1989; Liverpool Echo, 3 August 1989. 
438 The Mersey Docks and Harbour Company, Port of Liverpool Handbook and Directory, 1991-1992 
(Liverpool: Mediafine 1992), p. 8. 
439 Liverpool Echo, 3 August 1989. 
440 Turnbull et al, Dock Strike, p. 173; Liverpool Echo, 3 August 1989. 
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Shop Steward Committee.  Although shop steward representation was permitted, it 
would be recognised solely on an area-by-area basis.441  In an interesting aside, the 
ACTSS 6/567 Branch disbanded and merged its membership with the Docks 
section.442  This represented a widespread recognition that the new blanket 
categorisation as POWs made previous job distinctions obsolete.  
 So, in the wake of the collapse of the national strike port employers across 
the country had set about enthusiastically restoring the managerial prerogative and 
drastically restructuring their businesses and workforce.  By comparison with some 
other ex-Scheme ports around the country, Liverpool had had it relatively easy.443  
There had been no compulsory redundancies arising from the restructuring of the 
MDHC and there was still a degree of worker representation.444  Nevertheless, after 
decades of disenfranchisement the company had gone to extreme lengths to use the 
opportunity to finally tip the balance of power at the port in their favour.   
 However, despite the best efforts of management to minimise solidarity 
henceforth, many of the stalwarts of the dock remained and the spirit of 
combativeness and irreverence persisted amongst the men to a degree.  In fact, only 
months after the return to work a dispute broke out relating to the disciplining of two 
workers.  It appeared that these men were certain to be sacked and resulted in the 
whole port workforce threatening a walk-out over perceived mistreatment.  This 
forced management to think again and ultimately to fully re-instate the men.445  
Further gains were made by Liverpool’s port workers in the twelve months 
following abolition of the Scheme.  Whereas the MDHC were initially adamant that 
the new contracts of employment were non-negotiable, several concessions were 
wrung from management in the interim including ‘an acceptance of no compulsory 
redundancies, no casual labour and the maintenance or improvement in rates of 
pay’.446  Several other subsequent minor disputes were broadened to include the 
                                                     
441 Liverpool Echo, 7 August 1989. 
442 Author’s interview with T.T., October 2011. 
443 Tilbury had seen a purge of activists and stewards as well as a formal de-recognition of the shop 
steward committees and the TGWU itself.  Other ports such as Cardiff also witnessed selective, 
compulsory redundancies.  At several smaller ports, the entire RDW workforce had been dismissed as 
soon as the Dock-Work Bill received Royal Assent (Source: TGWU National Committee minutes, 19 
April 1990, Modern Records Centre; Turnbull et al, Dock Strike).  
444 The only compulsory redundancies at the port of Liverpool occurred on 4 July when the sixty-nine 
dockers who were on the TUR received compulsory severance. 
445 Author’s interview with T.N., November 2010; Author’s interview with T.T., October 2011. 
446 TGWU National Committee minutes, 19 April 1990. 
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whole workforce, despite the MDHC’s best efforts towards divide and rule.447  
Indeed, this eventually cumulated in a bitter and prolonged twenty-eight month battle 
which began in 1995, after over five hundred dockers were summarily dismissed for 
refusing to cross a picket line.448  The Liverpool dockers’ unrivalled employment 
protection and workplace influence may have suffered badly as a result of the 
abolition of the Scheme in June 1989 but the attitudes and organisational skills these 
fostered over decades of shared work experience, activism and solidarity lived on.
                                                     
447 In July 1992, the MDHC attempted to transfer the contracts of employment of a handful of its 
employees to Pandoro (better known as P&O).  Those workers involved resisted and a five day port-
wide strike ensued (Source: Towers, B. Waterfront Blues: The Rise and Fall of Liverpool’s Dockland, 
Lancaster: Carnegie 2011, p. 292). 
448 The 1995-1998 lock-out at Liverpool docks has received limited academic attention.  The only 
extensive account of the dispute is provided by Lavalette & Kennedy although it is less than rigorous 
as it was published in 1996, before the dispute had even concluded.  Brian Towers’ new book, 
Waterfront Blues, provides the best concise overview of the strike (pp. 290-297), despite some minor 
errors relating to the employment history of some of the protagonists, while the introduction to 
Saundry and Turnbull’s 1996 article gives an accurate overview of the causes of the strike.  There are 
a couple of other short journal articles dedicated to aspects of the strike but a full, analytical account 
is unfortunately lacking.  This represents a glaring gap in the historiography of the local and national 
industry.  Nevertheless, for more detail on the 1995 strike at the port of Liverpool see: Davies, S. 
‘History in the making: The Liverpool docks dispute, 1995-96’, North West Labour History Journal, 
Vol. 21, 1996/7, pp. 67-72; Lavalette, M. & Kennedy, J. Solidarity on the Waterfront: The Liverpool 
Lock-Out of 1995/96 (Birkenhead: Liver Press 1996); Saundry, R. & Turnbull, P. ‘Melee on the 
Mersey: Contracts, competition and labour relations on the docks’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 
27, Issue 4, December 1996, pp. 275-288; Towers, Waterfront Blues; Carter, C. Clegg, S. Hogan, J. & 
Kornberger, M. ‘The polyphonic spree: The case of the Liverpool dockers’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol. 34, Issue 4, October 2003, pp. 290-304; Castree, N. ‘Geographic scale and grass roots 
internationalism: The Liverpool dock dispute 1995-1998’, Economic Geography, Vol. 76, Issue 3, 
July 2000, pp. 272-292. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, significant advances in working 
conditions and labour organisation were achieved by dock workers who had 
historically comprised one of the most exploited, least powerful sectors of the British 
working-class.  The importance of the dock industry to the recovery and growth of 
the post-war national economy ensured that dockers emerged as key beneficiaries of 
government legislation which regulated pay, conditions and the labour market.  
State-sponsored regulatory intervention represented a complete change in the 
dynamics of workplace bargaining and irrevocably altered the relationship between 
port workers and their employers.  This revolutionary shift in the balance of power 
on the docks did not go unnoticed.  Contemporary social scientists, journalists and, 
subsequently, historians and academics across a range of disciplines have devoted 
considerable attention to the changing nature of labour relations in the dock industry 
during this period, establishing a body of research that was an invaluable and 
inevitable starting point for this study.  Engagement with this secondary literature, 
the re-visitation of evidence drawn on in earlier studies and research undertaken on 
previously unexplored sources, all interpreted within a framework that emphasised 
the importance of an historical approach, has shaped the methodology of the research 
for this work. 
This thesis concludes that labour relations on the Liverpool waterfront in the 
years between 1967 and 1989 were considerably more complex than previous studies 
have suggested.  The findings summarised below cumulatively support this 
conclusion.  Primarily, it is argued that, while there are certain factors and pressures 
which are inherent in the nature of the dock industry, there is considerable variation 
in the organisational character and experiences of dock workers in different ports.  
Liverpool developed its own brand of labour relations based on historic custom and 
practice, local culture and identity and workplace relationships that were peculiar to 
the local industry.  These local idiosyncrasies are central to a proper evaluation of 
labour relations and workplace relationships at the port, particularly regarding 
union/rank-and-file and employer/worker relations.  Furthermore, the dynamics of 
labour relations at the port were affected by the growth of clerical organisation post-
1972.  This phenomenon further complicated already-nuanced workplace 
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relationships by introducing another participant to industrial bargaining at the port, 
complete with its own outlook on labour relations and its own membership to 
represent.  The atypical case of ‘white-collar’ organisation and the historically-
anchored dynamics of workplace relationships at the port are fundamental to 
understanding the intricate and composite nature of port-wide industrial relations at 
Liverpool in the seventies and eighties.  Several studies, such as Jackson, Turnbull et 
al and Phillips, provide useful overviews of labour relations in the dock industry but, 
as is the nature of such surveys, they fail to identify the nuances which distinguish 
individual ports.1   Above all else, the research for this thesis has emphasised the 
importance of a detailed examination and analysis of workplace relationships to 
better understand the various processes and influences at work in shaping 
dock/clerical workers’ industrial attitudes at the local level. 
What is offered throughout the thesis contributes to existing knowledge in a 
variety of ways.  At its most fundamental, it examines the growth and development 
of rank-and-file steward-led organisation at the port of Liverpool between 1967 
and1989, something which has attracted only limited attention within the existing 
historiography.  While Liverpool has been the focus of a small number of other 
projects, these often provide only a short overview of labour relations or concentrate 
on one aspect of employment at the docks in isolation from other historic or 
contemporary influences and none consider the relationship between Registered 
Dock Workers and their clerical colleagues.  There have been several MA theses that 
focus on labour relations at the port of Liverpool in the post-Devlin era but these are 
limited by their brevity and the related narrowness of consulted sources.2  Moreover, 
because these studies were undertaken prior to the abolition of the NDLS in 1989, 
they do not have the benefit of placing the experiences of port workers in their 
historical context.  Other surveys such as Hikins’ focus solely on the Liverpool 
dockers’ opposition to the introduction of the Devlin reforms in 1967, while Carden 
and Critchley’s doctoral theses concentrate on specific aspects of labour relations 
                                                     
1 Jackson, M.P. Labour Relations on the Docks (Farnborough: Lexington 1973); Turnbull, P. 
Woolfson, C. & Kelly, J. Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in Britain’s Ports (Aldershot: 
Avebury 1992); Phillips, J. ‘Decasualization and disruption: Industrial relations on the docks 1945-
1979’, in C.J. Wrigley (ed.), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 (Cheltenham: Elgar 
1996), pp. 165-185. 
2 See, for example: Wells, C. ‘The industrial relations of the port of Liverpool since 1967’, 
Unpublished MA thesis, The University of Warwick, 1986; Chapman, P.W. ‘Industrial relations in 
the port of Liverpool: A study of the major developments affecting relations between employers and 
registered dock workers since 1970’, Unpublished MA thesis, The University of Warwick, 1981. 
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such as working practices and malpractices in the case of the latter and the 
relationship between dock stewards and the centralised machinery of the TGWU in 
the former.3 
In the case of this study, the use of port employers’ minutes allied to oral 
evidence made it possible to establish the chronology and meaning of events at 
Liverpool from the perspective of both the employers and workers.  By providing a 
narrative and analytical account of the development of the dock shop steward system 
post-1967 and the rise of clerical activism from 1972 through to the abolition of the 
NDLS in 1989, the thesis has uncovered or highlighted several overarching historical 
factors and contemporary influences which shaped and characterised labour relations 
at the port of Liverpool during this period; something which has previously been 
absent from related contributions to historiography.  These factors and influences 
have prompted a wider reflection on established theoretical assumptions relating to 
‘shop stewardism’, ‘white-collar’ ideology and organisation and state intervention in 
industrial relations.  This final chapter provides an opportunity to summarise key 
findings and re-emphasise the perspectives that have been important throughout but 
which have sometimes featured only sporadically and tacitly.  This will be 
accompanied by an assessment of where these perspectives and arguments challenge 
or concur with interpretations and conclusions offered elsewhere in studies relating 
to both the dock industry itself and British trade unionism more broadly. 
Historically, the irregular nature of the British dock industry coupled with the 
system of employment made progressive labour relations difficult.  This study and 
others have demonstrated that the historic development of the dock industry more 
                                                     
3 Hikins, H. ‘Liverpool dockers, 1967’ in H. Hikins (ed.) Building the Union: Studies on the Growth 
of the Workers’ Movement, 1756-1967 (Liverpool: Toulouse 1973); Carden, M.J. ‘Union democracy 
and incorporation: A case study of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, Merseyside Division, 
with particular reference to the dock industry’, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Liverpool, 
1993; Critchley, D. ‘Working practices and malpractices in the ports of Liverpool, London and New 
York, with special reference to the period 1945 to 1972’, Unpublished PhD thesis, Liverpool John 
Moores’ University, 2003.  Carden’s thesis is primarily concerned with testing theories of 
incorporation (i.e. documenting the position of the shop steward within union organisation) and 
dedicates the majority of its focus to these ends.  Although the dock shop steward system provides the 
case study portion of the thesis, there is only limited attention paid to the causes of disputes at the port 
such as the perpetuation of attitudes engendered by the casual system, the campaign for a piecework 
pay system and the reasons behind it and the attitudes and tactics of dockers and their representatives 
in light of developments in the local and national industries.  Critchley’s thesis is more concerned 
with a criminological approach to work practices in those respective ports rather than any detailed 
examination of the nature of labour relations and restricts the majority of its focus to the pre-
containerisation era.     
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broadly, and the work culture which it engendered, impacted immeasurably upon the 
attitudes of workers and management alike.  In particular those studies by Phillips 
and Whiteside, Turnbull, Wilson and Simey have contributed immeasurably to our 
understanding of work culture and custom and practice and its influence on labour 
relations in the dock industry.4  Similarly, there is a substantial strand within the  
historiography relating to the entirely unique employment situation that arose from 
state intervention in the industry.  Surveys by Mellish, Dempster and Sapsford and 
Turnbull all direct attention to the ways in which major instances of state regulation 
affected labour relations and workplace attitudes.5  It is precisely because 
dockworkers enjoyed unrivalled workplace control and protection post-1967 that the 
industry was like no other in Britain.  These are factors which characterised the 
British dock industry as a whole and were not peculiar to Liverpool.  Nevertheless, 
this thesis has shown that these historic, industry-inherent pressures had a major 
impact on how Liverpool dockers and port clerical workers conceptualised their 
workplace relationships and how their representatives approached labour relations.  
The studies detailed above are an invaluable starting point for understanding these 
pressures and their impact on labour relations.  However, generic industry-inherent 
factors only tell part of the story when attempting to comprehend Liverpool dockers’ 
burgeoning reputation for militancy in the sixties and seventies.  This thesis reaches 
beyond such explanations with a focused and detailed study that emphasises the 
locally-inspired factors which lent themselves to strong labour organisation and the 
increasingly confrontational stance adopted by Liverpool’s port workers and their 
representatives. 
For example, in addition to the evolution of the local industry and the 
distinctive brand of workplace relations it produced, the inimitable development of 
the city of Liverpool also influenced industrial attitudes.  The history of the port and 
the city are irreversibly intertwined and logically had a reciprocal influence on each 
                                                     
4 Phillips, G. & Whiteside, N. Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port Transport 
Industry 1880-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon 1985); Turnbull, P. ‘Dock strikes and the demise of the 
dockers’ occupational culture’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 40, Issue 2, May 1992, pp. 294-318; 
Wilson, D.F. Dockers: The Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana/Collins 1972); Simey, T.S. 
The Dock Worker: An Analysis of Conditions of Employment in the Port of Manchester (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press 1956). 
5 Mellish, M. The Docks After Devlin (London: Heinemann 1972); Dempster, J. The Rise and Fall of 
the Dock Labour Scheme (London: Biteback 2010); Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘Why did Devlin 
fail? Casualism and conflict on the docks’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 
June 1991, pp. 237-257. 
246 
 
other that cannot be ignored.  Chapter Four of this thesis charts the growth of the 
port and the evolution of Liverpool’s social and cultural character and outlines how 
this impacted on Liverpool dockers’ attitudes towards workplace relations and 
industrial solidarity.  It concludes that Liverpool’s dockers were immersed in a 
broader parochial identity which partly expressed itself through labour, and later 
political militancy, in the seventies and eighties.  As well as being dockers, they 
were Liverpool dockers.  By combining an analysis of local culture and identity with 
the occupational culture of the dockers, this study has contended that industrial 
consciousness and activism can be influenced by specific factors outside the 
workplace without resorting to outmoded ‘occupational community’ or ‘port-
orientated economy’ concepts, such as those forwarded by Kerr and Siegel and 
Lockwood.6 
There have been several recent studies that have sought to untangle the 
myriad factors which lent themselves to the relatively belated development of labour 
and political militancy in the city of Liverpool.  Foremost of these is Brian Towers’ 
book which provides a comprehensive and admirable attempt to link the historic 
development of the city and the port with the attitudes and outlook of its inhabitants, 
an approach partially shared by this thesis.7  It is mainly concerned with the social 
and cultural development of life in the dockland districts where, prior to the slum 
clearances and relocations of the post-war era, the majority of Liverpool’s working-
class resided.  There is some attention paid to major developments at the port, 
particularly the two penultimate chapters which consider the rise and fall of the 
NDLS and the impact of the Devlin reforms.  However, while these constitute 
perfectly acceptable overviews of the watersheds in the industry, the book fails to 
provide a detailed account and explanation of why and how Liverpool’s port workers 
continued to resist its restructuring; an absence this thesis addresses through a 
focused chronological approach.  Other studies such as Waller, Ayers, Lane and 
Hyde all contribute to the contextual knowledge of the development of Liverpool 
and how this impacted on the attitude of its inhabitants towards workplace 
                                                     
6 Kerr, C. & Siegel, A. ‘The inter-industry propensity to strike – an international comparison’, in A. 
Kornhauser, R. Dubin & A.M. Ross (eds), Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill 1954),  pp. 
189-212; Lockwood, D. ‘Sources of variation in working-class images of society’, The Sociological 
Review, Vol. 14, 1966, pp. 249-267. 
7 Towers, B. Waterfront Blues: The Rise and Fall of Liverpool’s Dockland (Lancaster: Carnegie 
2011). 
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relationships, managerial authority and the local social and cultural currency of the 
twentieth century.8  Again, these contributions are a valuable resource for 
establishing the general context upon which this thesis is founded, the defining 
difference being that what is offered here attempts to link the broad influences 
highlighted by these authors specifically to the attitudes displayed by Liverpool’s 
port workers and how these impacted upon labour relations at the port. 
By extension, these issues raise the question of whether the experience and 
organisation of Liverpool’s dockers/clerical workers was unique and peculiar to the 
locality or whether theirs was similar to that of port workers elsewhere.  This study 
did not seek to categorically prove that there was an exceptionalism to workers and 
labour relations at the port of Liverpool because without undertaking similar studies 
in other localities, this is impossible to discern.  It has, however, emphasised the 
crucial need for this type of detailed analysis to be applied to other ports to properly 
explore the nuances of local organisation.  There are several studies which focus 
specifically on local developments in the dock industry and others which deploy a 
comparative approach to assess similarities in the experiences of dockers in different 
ports.  For example, Lindop’s rigorously-researched review of the London dockers’ 
entanglement with the Industrial Relations Act is a prime demonstration of how 
detailed local analysis, albeit limited to a relatively short time period, can contribute 
enormously to contemporary and historical understanding.9  Similarly, Hill’s book 
provides a thorough exploration of the work culture and local custom and practice of 
London’s dockers in its historical context.  Hill’s approach is undoubtedly one that is 
shared by this thesis, placing the local development of the industry and labour 
organisation as paramount in dictating the form and course of workplace 
relationships and relations at the port.10  Although Liverpool and London are the 
ports which have attracted most academic attention by virtue of their size, 
importance to the national economy and propensity for militancy, there are other 
                                                     
8 Waller, P.J. Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool 1868-1939 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1981); Ayers, P. The Liverpool Docklands – Life and Work in 
Athol Street (Liverpool: Docklands History Project 1987); Lane, T. Liverpool: City of the Sea 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1997); Hyde, F.E. Liverpool and the Mersey: An Economic 
History of a Port 1700-1970 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles 1971). 
9 Lindop, F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 1: Shop stewards and 
containerisation’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 5, Spring 1998, pp. 33-72; Lindop, F. 
‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 2: the arrest and release of the Pentonville 
Five’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 6, 1998, pp. 65-100. 
10 Hill, S. The Dockers – Class and Tradition in London (London: Heinemann, 1976). 
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studies of individual ports in Britain, such as Turner’s account of labour relations at 
the port of Hull during the tumultuous period of 1972 to 1973, Davies’ survey of the 
history of the Hull dockers, 1870-1960 and Bassett and Richardson’s articles on the 
effect of deregulation on the port of Bristol.11 
International comparative studies of various ports seek to provide a point of 
reference for an assessment of how dock industries operate across the world, the 
common challenges and pressures faced by dock workers and how labour relations in 
individual ports differ from one another.  Jensen’s exploration of hiring practices in 
the ports of New York, Rotterdam, London, Liverpool and Marseilles was one of the 
earliest attempts to compare the employment experiences of dockers in an 
international perspective.  This has since been expanded upon by Davies et al., 
Turnbull and Sapsford and Davis among others.12  Although these comparative 
studies often seek to explore similarities in the experiences of dockworkers, they 
simultaneously highlight the local nuances present at individual ports and so reveal 
the value of focused port-wide studies to better explain and understand exactly why 
and how industrial relations, the labour process and work culture can vary from place 
to place. 
So, what exactly were the nuances which developed at Liverpool and how 
did these differentiate the experiences and expectations of its dockers from others in 
Britain?  As previously noted in Chapter Five, the Devlin reforms in 1967 were a 
watershed for the entire industry and seemed to imply a new dawn in employment 
security and pay and conditions for Britain’s dockers.  However, the reforms, when 
combined with the rapid modernisation and rationalisation of the industry, had the 
opposite of their intended effect at Liverpool.  The Devlin Report’s raison d’être was 
                                                     
11 Turner, T. Diary of the Docks Dispute 1972-1973 (Hull: The University of Hull Industrial Studies 
Unit, 1980); Davies, S. ‘The history of the Hull dockers, c.1870-1960’ in S. Davies, C.J. Davis, D. De 
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12 Davies et al, Dockworkers; Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘Hitting the bricks: An international 
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to improve labour relations in the industry to prepare it for modernisation, yet 
Liverpool experienced an increasing strike rate and became easily the most strike-
prone port in the country thereafter.  There are several interrelated explanations for 
this phenomenon, some rooted in structural factors and others related to 
contemporary developments. 
The 1967/70 two-phase decasualisation reforms sought to dispense with 
piecework payment systems, as these were highlighted by Devlin and his committee 
as a major cause of restrictive practices and industrial unrest in the industry.  It was 
thought that by formalising pay and conditions and permanently assigning dockers to 
a single employer, the spectre of casualism, and the industrial strife it helped to 
sustain, would peter out.  However, Liverpool was an unusual exception to the rule.  
The port had operated on a time rate basis for many years prior to Devlin and 
Liverpool’s dockers perceived themselves as poor relations compared with their 
counterparts at piecework rate ports.  This is clear from the evidence received by the 
Scamp Inquiry, as detailed in Chapter Five.  Since Phase Two modernisation 
agreements were largely devolved to the local level, Liverpool’s dockers were 
adamant that recently-introduced piecework and bonus rates for which they had 
campaigned for many years, should remain.  Therefore, when the rest of the industry 
moved to time rate in 1970, Liverpool witnessed a reversal, retaining a system of 
payment with a piecework element. 
The formalisation of piecework rates at Liverpool at the dockers’ behest did 
little to suppress industrial strife at the port.  Piecework agreements necessitate a 
degree of impromptu bargaining which can encourage short-term stoppages and 
disputes, adding to Liverpool’s strike record.  Indeed, the role of pay systems in 
creating or moderating industrial strife on the docks has already been identified by 
several authors.  Both Wilson and Mellish argue that, since London’s strike rate 
improved notably after decasualisation whilst Liverpool’s worsened, the highly 
conditional nature of piecework can be regarded as significant in determining strike 
proneness.13  However, this supposition has since been challenged by Turnbull and 
Sapsford, who contend that mechanisation and its consequences for manning levels 
and the definition of dock work, was the most significant impetus to industrial unrest 
                                                     
13 Wilson, Dockers, pp. 295-296; Mellish, The Docks After Devlin, pp. 134-135. 
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post-Devlin.14  Certainly, the outsourcing of container handling in the early seventies 
was a cause of much consternation for the Liverpool dockers and several key 
disputes directly resulted from challenges to the definition of dock-work.  The 
container revolution was the driver of mechanisation and the constant threat to 
manning levels that it represented was undoubtedly at the root of Liverpool’s 
volatility post-1967.  However, the same circumstances existed for dockers at other 
ports across the country so Liverpool’s increased strike proneness cannot be blamed 
on mechanisation alone.  Similarly, the extreme, progressive reduction of 
employment levels in the industry, fuelled by the increasingly lucrative terms of 
voluntary severance, added to insecurity not just in Liverpool but also elsewhere. 
In the case of Liverpool, the particularly rapid decline of the local industry 
was the cause of significant uncertainty amongst the workforce.  The port was 
confronted with a reorientation of trade patterns away from the traditional centres of 
Liverpool trade, such as North America and the Commonwealth, and towards 
Europe and the southern ports, in tandem with the broader rationalisation that was 
taking place across the industry.  Dockers’ fears were exacerbated further by the 
Liverpool employers’ frequent bulletins regarding the parlous state of the port’s 
finances.  At every possible juncture, particularly in pay negotiations as documented 
in Chapter Seven, the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC) and 
Employers’ Association of the Port of Liverpool (EAPL) used the port’s contracting 
trade as a bargaining tool.  However, while this provided employers with a 
defensible short-term excuse to limit pay rises and renegotiate existing agreements, it 
also had the effect of creating a sense of overwhelming uncertainty and insecurity for 
workers. 
Similarly, the Harrisons dispute can be regarded as a tangible example of 
growing insecurity amongst the workforce which doubtlessly contributed to 
Liverpool’s strike record.  The concerted effort by the MDHC and EAPL to resist 
reallocation confirmed the suspicion that the Aldington-Jones agreement was 
dispensable in the eyes of employers.  Insecurity contributed to a siege mentality 
amongst RDWs and clerical workers and encouraged militancy as a form of defence.  
Often, as in the case of negotiations over manning at the Grain Terminal and the 
withdrawal of Harrisons, dockers and their representatives made a stand over what 
                                                     
14 Turnbull & Sapsford, ‘Why did Devlin fail?’, p. 252. 
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they regarded a matter of principle in the context of the escalating decline of the 
local industry.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the Keta Lagoon dispute, where the 
dockers returned to work without a resolution, and their indifferent response to 
ACTSS’ plight during the Isle of Man Steam Packet withdrawal, that the employers’ 
message regarding the precarious position of the port’s fortunes was making an 
impact on the dockers’ approach to labour relations. 
So, it was likely a combination of local factors – the consistent forecasts of 
doom by employers, the existence of a piecework element to the pay agreement, the 
reorientation of British trading patterns, the influence of the Harrisons dispute on 
dockworker perceptions – which in turn interacted with those industry-wide 
structural pressures identified by Turnbull and Sapsford’s statistical model, such as 
mechanisation and the terminal run-down of manning levels via voluntary severance, 
to instigate and maintain Liverpool’s increased strike rate.15  Indeed, as Turnbull and 
Sapsford contend, while ‘industry-level variables may predispose dockworkers to 
strike, they represent insufficient data to explain the actual pattern of industrial 
conflict on the waterfront’.16  Event-driven local nuances are the missing connection 
that can establish and distinguish the militancy of dockers at particular ports. 
Having identified the influences which differentiated the experiences of 
Liverpool’s dockers from those elsewhere and contributed to the port’s escalating 
strike record, attention will now turn to how workplace organisation was cultivated 
and sustained on the docks.17  In recent years, considerable research has been 
undertaken to create a theoretical foundation to help explain the structures which 
facilitate strong workplace organisation.   Kelly, Franzosi and others have attempted 
to advance general theories of industrial action based on the process by which 
workers are bound into a collective actor.18  These theories of mobilisation 
emphasise the importance of workplace leadership, usually in the form of shop 
stewards, in framing issues and encouraging collective action where there is thought 
to be a grievance with the behaviour or policies of management.  However, labour 
                                                     
15 Turnbull & Sapsford, ‘Why did Devlin fail?’, pp. 248-251. 
16 Turnbull & Sapsford, ‘Hitting the bricks’, p. 234. 
17 For an overview of the present state of the historiographical debate, see Chapter 2.  
18 Kelly, J. Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves (London: 
Routledge 1998); Franzosi, R. The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Post War Italy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); Tilly, C. From Mobilisation to Revolution (New 
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organisation amongst RDWs at Liverpool, and the dock industry more broadly, 
differed distinctly from the experience of workers in other industries, particularly 
factory workers, upon whom the majority of previous case studies are based.19 
The Devlin reforms revolutionarised labour organisation and representation 
in the industry.  Previously, workplace relations were characterised by unofficial 
organisation, ad hoc bargaining and stoppages and by dissatisfaction with the 
inaction of union officialdom.  Whereas factory workers usually enjoyed contracts of 
employment and established working patterns, dockers were prone to acute 
underemployment and casualism prior to 1967.  The unofficial Port Workers’ 
Committee at Liverpool operated in extremely adversarial conditions prior to 
formalisation of an official shop steward system in the industry, yet it still managed 
to effectively mobilise opposition to the Devlin reforms and several other earlier 
disputes, as detailed in Chapter Five.  After 1967, one of the fundamental differences 
between the dock industry and others was that it was now subject to statutory 
regulation and, as a result, joint union-employer control at both the local and national 
level.  This meant that many aspects of workplace bargaining which would normally 
have been outside the remit of worker representation such as manning, recruitment 
and discipline were subject to influence from shop steward committees under the 
auspices of the local Dock Labour Board and local modernisation committees.  
Furthermore, when combined with the unusual degree of control dockers enjoyed 
over the labour process because of the industry’s historical development and the 
work culture and custom and practice it engendered, it is evident that major 
dissimilarities emerge between the role and influence of dock shop stewards and 
those in other sectors. 
Aside from the protection and influence that statutory regulation provided 
dock stewards, the manner in which work was carried out on the docks prior to 
complete decasualisation was undoubtedly a contributory factor to strong workplace 
organisation and leadership.  Company foremen devolved responsibility for the 
execution of tasks to the ‘gang’, each with its own leader who organised and 
                                                     
19 See, for example: Batstone, E., Boraston, I. and Frenkel, S. Shop Stewards in Action: The 
Organisation of Workplace Conflict and Accommodation (Oxford: Blackwell 1977); Lane, T. & 
Roberts, K. Strike At Pilkingtons (London: Fontana 1971); Beynon, H. Working For Ford 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin 1973); Darlington, R. The Dynamics of Workplace Organisation: Shop 
Stewards’ Organisation in Three Merseyside Plants (London: Mansell 1994). 
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represented the other men.20  The arrangement of the industry, although rooted in the 
inequities of the casual system, therefore effectively established a surfeit of leaders, 
responsible for their gang and practised in negotiating with management over 
piecework rates, bonuses etc.  These leaders, experienced in ad hoc bargaining and 
formulating and conveying grievance, formed the backbone of the unofficial 
movement.  The historic intransigence of Transport and General Workers Union 
(TGWU) officers towards dockers’ grievances merely strengthened their resolve to 
fight their own corner and contributed to the mobilisation of workers across different 
gangs, particularly those working on the same ship, or in the same area of the port. 
So, whereas Batstone et al, Kelly and Beynon, among others, contend that 
factory collectivism is fostered and maintained by a small and select group of activist 
and leader stewards it could be argued that, because of the influence of casualism 
and the peculiar structure and independence of work groups, there was a much larger 
pool of these figures available to frame issues and direct grievance on the docks.  
This encouraged a strong and fiercely democratic unofficial movement to emerge at 
the port despite the obvious impact casualism had on effective organisation, the 
principles of which were transposed onto the official shop steward system post-1967.  
These historic, industry-specific influences help to account for the dockers’ 
propensity for workplace activism and militancy.  When combined with the fillip 
that the introduction of the shop steward system and the protection of statute 
provided, it is clear that the form and nature of workplace leadership and 
organisation on the docks was significantly different from that in other sectors.  Of 
course, these structural realities of the industry were not restricted to Liverpool and 
the same can be said for other major ports in the country experiencing similar 
changes, such as London.  Nevertheless, by providing an insight into the actions and 
strategies of the Liverpool Dock Shop Steward Committee, this study has added to 
existing knowledge by emphasising the various forms shop steward organisation can 
take depending on workplace circumstances and demonstrated that those theoretical 
assumptions relating to factory workers and their representatives cannot be readily 
applied to dock workers and the dock industry. 
Directly related to these industry-specific dynamics of ‘shop stewardism’ is 
the nature of intra-union tension and conflict on the docks.  The period 1967-1972 
                                                     
20 For more detail on the pre-1967 system of employment and various disputes, see Chapter 3. 
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was characterised by a significant but underlying power struggle, which coloured 
labour relations across the whole industry, including Liverpool.  It can largely be 
conceptualised as a rank-and-file rebellion against TGWU officialdom amidst the 
transformation of labour representation in the industry.  As detailed in Chapter 
Three, historically the relationship between rank-and-file dockers and the dominant 
union in the industry was extremely fraught.  The undemocratic nature of worker 
representation on the docks lent itself to selective non-unionism, unofficial militancy 
and the rise of the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers Union (NASDU) 
as an alternative to the oligarchic structure of the TGWU.21  The Devlin Reforms 
finally democratised labour representation on the docks and once local shop steward 
committees had established themselves they sought to challenge the Union over 
many centralised initiatives and policies, especially those concerning rationalisation 
of the industry.  In both 1970 and 1972 the TGWU was upstaged by local activists, 
intent on expressing their concerns and impressing their influence on the changing 
nature of the industry.  Similarly, even prior to the implementation of the shop 
steward system, the Devlin Reforms met with considerable resistance from unofficial 
organisation, despite official TGWU endorsement of the proposals. 
The struggle for influence over bargaining and policy-making was at its most 
acute in the early seventies and, allied to the tumultuous technological changes in 
cargo-handling methods, contributed to the sustained industrial strife visible over 
this period.  However, as the decade wore on, internal conflict and tension within the 
Docks section began to recede.  Once shop steward committees became firmly 
established as the dominant force in the industry, their influence began to trickle into 
the machinery of the TGWU.  Over time, more and more stewards were elected onto 
the District and National Lay Committees of the trade group and even onto the 
General Executive Council of the union.  These leading stewards usually held a dual 
role, elected to both the Liverpool Dock Shop Steward Committee and the District 
and National Docks Lay Committee of the TGWU.  As a consequence, by the mid-
to-late seventies Union policy began to reflect that initiated at the local and National 
                                                     
21 For more detail on inter and intra-union strife in the dock industry see: Chapter 2 of this thesis; 
Hunter, B. They Knew Why They Fought: Unofficial Struggles and Leadership on the Docks, 1945-
1989 (London: Index Books, 1994); Phillips, J. ‘Democracy and trade unionism on the docks’ in J. 
McIlroy, N. Fishman & A. Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The High 
Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 291-310; Pennington, B. ‘Docks: 
breakaway and unofficial movements’ International Socialism, No. 2, Autumn 1960, pp. 5-11. 
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Port Shop Steward Committee levels.  Indeed, conflict at the national and district 
levels of the trade group began to evaporate, instead replaced by a new dynamic 
created by the terminal decline of the industry and subsequently, local inter-section 
conflict with clerical workers.  These developments highlight the distinctive nature 
of the progress of representation and further serve to demonstrate the differences 
between labour organisation in the dock industry and other sectors. 
Directly related to the relationship between RDWs and their union are 
differences in structure and function between dock and clerical organisation at the 
port.  As noted above, because of the historical development of labour relations in 
the local industry, the Dock Shop Steward Committee became the foundation of 
rank-and-file dockworker representation, often in conflict with the centralised 
machinery of the Union.  However, the fissure between the official and rank-and file 
movement did not occur in the clerical section.  This was because the relatively new 
experience of clerical organisation was developed under the influence of industry-
wide rationalisation.  Its character was derived from an immediate necessity to 
defend against redundancies and the erosion of manning levels.  The ACTSS 6/567 
Branch was formed specifically for this reason and as a result, once established and 
operational, its goals and outlook reflected those of its stewards and members.  There 
was no internal power struggle like that which occurred in the Docks section in the 
early seventies, based on years of antagonism and mistrust.  Although this study 
explicitly distinguishes between the Union and the Dock Shop Steward Committee 
throughout because of these factors, there was little cause to differentiate between 
the Clerical Port Shop Steward Committee and the local ACTSS branch as the two 
organisations acted in almost complete harmony.  These perspectives have added to 
the historiography relating to shop steward and local organisation and the internal 
politics of particular sections within the TGWU. 
The growth of clerical organisation and activism from 1972 did indeed bring 
a new dynamic to labour relations.  This thesis contributes to the existing academic 
discourse by examining the hitherto neglected experience of clerical staff at the port 
alongside that of their more historically illustrious dockworker colleagues.  Chapter 
Six documented the growth of clerical unionism and the somewhat atypical 
ideological and organisational tendencies of these ‘white-collar’ workers.  ‘White-
collar’ workers are often characterised as identifying with an individualistic outlook 
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towards industrial relations in contrast to their ‘blue-collar’, ‘collectivist’ 
counterparts.  Certainly, prior to the 1970s, clerical unionism at the port was 
extremely limited and bore many of the hallmarks associated with archetypal ‘white-
collar’ attitudes.  However, amidst the broader trend of trade union growth and 
influence in the late sixties and the explosion of militancy at the docks, staff workers 
gradually began to assert their right to workplace representation and bargaining. 
The changing composition of recruitment to the ‘office’ on the dock estate 
assisted enormously in this process.  As older, more typical clerical workers retired 
from the industry they were increasingly replaced with ex-RDWs or young recruits 
straight from school, often with relatives already working on the docks.  Indeed, 
once recruitment to the register (as a RDW) was stopped altogether in the early 
seventies, employment in the office became the new route for nepotism in the local 
industry.  This was a major contributory factor in the evolution of industrial attitudes 
and the progress of the Branch as young staff workers, indoctrinated with the 
traditional ‘blue-collar’ values of their families, came into contact with seasoned ex-
RDW trade unionists, beginning to organise in the office. 
The structurally industry-inherent dynamics and local factors that 
predisposed Liverpool’s dockers to increased strike-proneness post-1967 also 
coloured the perceptions of their clerical colleagues.  The fate of clerical workers 
was inextricably linked to that of the RDWs and the rationalisation of the dock 
industry.  However, clerical workers were even less secure in their jobs without the 
protection of the NDLS and the A-J agreement.  The Smith-Coggins dispute, 
detailed in Chapter Six, undoubtedly proved to be a watershed for clerical unionism 
at the port.  In addition to revealing the industrial influence that the clerical workers 
could wield, it also demonstrated to the significant majority of ‘none-ers’ the 
necessity and benefit of union representation, leading quickly to one hundred per 
cent membership thereafter.  Without the short, sharp shock of the Smith-Coggins 
dispute, clerical unionism probably would have continued to plateau at a relatively 
low percentage of the workforce.  Even amongst those remaining clerical staff with 
more traditional attitudes towards workplace organization and managerial 
prerogative, the widespread threat of redundancy acted as a forceful wake-up call to 
the cold realities of the industry in this period of extreme and continuing 
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rationalisation, exposing the nature of paternalistic employment relationships to 
scrutiny. 
As noted in Chapter Six, the awakening of clerical unionism was not 
necessarily welcomed by dockers.  Historically, both sections of worker had treated 
one another with a degree of disdain and suspicion, particularly since ACTSS 
represented the supervisory grades, and attitudes were slow to change.  Increasingly, 
in the context of the escalating decline of the industry, the pursuit of defensive 
sectional policies and strategies by clerical workers was perceived by some in the 
Docks section as potentially compromising their control over the industry, and 
indeed their livelihoods, creating tensions across the labour force.  The growing 
sense of fatalism in the context of the terminal decline of the port encouraged 
militancy from both sections of workers and also exposed historically-rooted 
divisions between dockers and clerical staff.  In addition to the historic schisms 
between the two sections of workers, Hyman hypothesises that sectionalism can also 
be accentuated by strong workplace organisation.22  This sectionalism was at its most 
acute during the 1985 Isle of Man Steam Packet dispute where ACTSS’ defence of 
its no compulsory redundancy policy was confronted with indifference from the 
Docks section and hostility from the MDHC. 
Furthermore, tensions and divisions between dock and clerical workers, 
between them and the centralised union machinery and also the fundamental 
dichotomy between workers and management emphasise the complexity of 
workplace relationships at the Port of Liverpool.  This dynamic of intra-union 
tension has provided a unique perspective from which to consider labour relations at 
the port because this type of approach to port-wide labour relations is conspicuously 
lacking in the existing historiography.  Prior to this study, the significance of clerical 
workers to port-wide industrial relations had been largely overlooked.  Therefore, 
this thesis has expanded the parameters of the academic discourse by identifying and 
properly documenting the complexities of workplace relations through focusing on 
the experiences of, and relationship between, the two main categories of worker in 
the local industry.  It has also demonstrated, through a close examination of the 
action and strategies of the clerical workers and their representatives, that ‘white-
                                                     
22 Hyman, R. ‘The politics of workplace trade unionism: Recent tendencies and some problems for 
theory’, Capital & Class, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1979, p. 55 (pp. 54-67). 
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collar’ workers can inversely exhibit organisational, behavioural and ideologically 
collectivist tendencies that might be more closely and traditionally associated with 
‘blue-collar’ workers because of prevailing local factors such as the location and 
nature of recruitment, job insecurity and the influence of other work groups within 
the same work environment.  In summary, this study concludes that ‘white-collar’ 
workers can organize in a manner more associated with traditional trade unionism if 
structural factors and workplace circumstances create and sustain it. 
So, in the context of the maturation of clerical unionism and the presence of 
two active and well-organised trade groups at the port, Chapter Seven considered the 
changing dynamics of labour relations between 1973 and 1989.  There were several 
distinctive features of labour relations during this period.  The nature of workplace 
relationships, labour organisation and conflict at the port is explored in the context of 
a trend of increasingly hostile and defensive sectionalism in the late seventies and 
eighties caused by the inexorable decline of the industry.  Containerisation and 
mechanisation precipitated a terminal rundown of manning levels, a trend which was 
accelerated in the eighties via an extremely lucrative state-sponsored voluntary 
severance scheme.  This chapter of the thesis documents how Liverpool’s 
dock/clerical workers and their representatives went about defending manning levels 
and custom and practice at the port in the face of a variety of pressures and factors.  
In particular it highlights how they cajoled and pressurised port employers, road 
haulage and container companies into guaranteeing and reserving container-related 
work for RDWs in the early years of containerisation and how they later fought 
against further rationalisation of the industry in the form of manning cuts, changes in 
work practices and voluntary redundancy schemes. 
 The dichotomy between the two trade groups and their attitudes towards 
employers was also reflected upon in the context of the unfavourable contemporary 
political and trade union environment.  By considering the scope and effectiveness of 
industrial action taken by dockers and clerical workers in the eighties, the study has 
also sought to test existing assumptions regarding the impact of Conservative 
employment legislation and the ‘assault’ on trade unionism.  The conclusion is that, 
whereas unions in other major industries witnessed severe restrictions on their ability 
to mobilise effectively as a result, statutory regulation of the industry and the strong 
labour organisation that had developed meant that dock workers remained insulated 
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from the broader trend towards the reassertion of managerial authority and the 
growth of ‘new realism’ in the eighties, at least until the abolition of the Scheme in 
1989.  This perspective is shared with Turnbull’s study and challenges the traditional 
assumption that Conservative employment legislation had a major impact of the 
efficacy of trade union organisation across the country.23 
Clerical workers also remained relatively sheltered from the experiences of 
trade unionists in other sectors at this time, despite effectively being subject to a 
standard employment relationship.  Because of the essential role some grades of 
clerical worker played in the running of the port and the strong organisation 
established by ACTSS, enshrined in its ‘no compulsory redundancies’ doctrine, 
management proved reluctant to impose compulsory redundancies or use new 
employment legislation to its advantage.   Even as late as 1988, when employers 
were lobbying hard for the abolition of the Scheme and normalisation of the 
employment relationship in the industry, the MDHC declined to use the opportunity 
to impose compulsory redundancy on those Liverpool Maritime Terminal clerical 
staff who refused to go voluntarily.  As detailed in Chapter Seven, rather than 
instigate industrial strife over such a small number of jobs, the MDHC instead took 
the most unusual step of effectively re-opening the RDW register to accommodate 
the men.  Such events underline the unique position of the dock industry in the 
British economy and the trade union movement more broadly and demonstrate how 
RDWs and clerical staff at Liverpool enjoyed significant employment protection 
because of a combination of statutory and de facto protection and a reputation and 
tradition of strong workplace organisation. 
To summarise, by examining labour relations at the port of Liverpool from a 
‘bottom up’ and historical perspective, this study has highlighted the value of such 
an approach and some deficiencies in the existing historiography.  Several accounts 
of the dock industry consider labour relations from a solely institutional standpoint 
or in reference to the operation of the NDLS.  As has already been documented 
above and elsewhere, local steward-led organisation was the dominant force in 
worker representation on the docks post-1967 and any perspective which discounts 
or underplays this dynamic is fundamentally flawed.  This is not to disregard the role 
                                                     
23 Turnbull, P. ‘Docks’ in A. Pendleton & J. Winterton (eds.) Public Enterprise in Transition: 
Industrial Relations in State and Privitized Corporations (London: Routledge 1993), pp. 185-210. 
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played by various institutions in bargaining, regulation and administration of the 
industry, rather to emphasise the importance of rank-and-file organisation in labour 
relations.  In fact, this study has taken a dual approach.  It has focused on rank-and-
file organisation but in the broader context of political, economic and institutional 
forces. 
Even more universal has been the tendency towards producing industry-wide 
surveys of work culture and labour relations.  Certainly, there are inherent 
characteristics in the nature and experience of dock-work which are encountered and 
shared by all dockers, wherever located.  Nevertheless, industry or occupation-wide 
assumptions should be perceived as extremely problematic when the complex, 
sometimes contradictory, often highly contingent influences of local custom, practice 
and work culture are properly considered.  This thesis has identified and interpreted 
these local nuances, revealing the extent to which they influenced the distinctive 
nature and character of labour organisation at the Port of Liverpool in the decades 
after 1967.  Of course, as noted above, because of the relative scarcity of studies with 
a similar approach it is impossible to be definitive, although the interpretation 
offered here is highly suggestive that the character of labour relations at the port was 
intricately structured and hence exceptional in many small but important aspects.  
The introduction of a piecework payment system, the particularly rapid decline of 
the local industry, the emergence of strong clerical organisation and the influence of 
local identity and culture were unique to the port and all contributed to differentiate 
the experience of Liverpool’s port workers from those elsewhere.  
However, even in relation to Liverpool’s waterfront workers, the author is 
aware that more research is needed.  This study has focused on the two largest 
sections of workers at the port but there were several other, smaller groups of 
workers – shoregang, shipwrights etc. – who were well-organised and fought their 
own battles against rationalisation of the industry, the dissolution of skill divisions 
and the rundown of manning levels, further adding to the rich and complex dynamics 
of labour relations on the waterfront.  Similarly, a section of the clerical workforce 
was employed at the town offices of major shipping lines but is omitted from this 
study as they formed a different branch of the TGWU.  They too faced 
rationalisation-based employment challenges but apparently exhibited completely 
different ideological and organisational tendencies from their counterparts on the 
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dock estate, indeed those more commonly associated with archetypal ‘white-collar’ 
workers.  It is imperative that more work of the sort undertaken for this thesis is 
initiated, not only to add to our knowledge and understanding of a largely under-
researched labour force but also to assist in interrogating the interpretation offered 
here and to provide new frameworks, questions and evidence for future academic 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
262 
 
Appendix I 
Below is an alphabetised list of those interviewed for this thesis and their 
employment details/background: 
 
Mike Carden 
Started in the dockside offices in 1970.  Trained as a ‘counter-off’ from 1972. 
Chairman of MDHC Clerical Stewards’ Committee in 1983 until 1988.   
 
Patrick Craig 
Joiner’s labourer and TGWU union activist who worked at various building sites 
across Liverpool between the late 1950s and early 1980s.  
 
Jimmy Davies 
Started on Liverpool docks in 1960 as a Registered Dock Worker, aged eighteen.  
Shop steward at the MDHB/MDHC from 1969 until 1982, Pier Head area of the 
dock.  Resigned from the Committee in protest at changes to gang manning strengths 
and flexibility in 1982, re-elected in the late eighties.  A member of the various 
workers’ side joint regulatory bodies in the industry and the district and national 
trade group committees of the TGWU. 
 
Larry Dowling 
Registered Dock Worker 1965-1989 across various areas of the port, initially for 
Smith Coggins and later for the MDHC.  Shop steward 1969 until 1982.  Resigned 
from the Committee in protest at changes to gang manning strengths and flexibility 
in 1982, left the industry shortly after the abolition of the NDLS in 1989.  A member 
of the various workers’ side joint regulatory bodies in the industry and the district 
and national trade group committees of the TGWU. 
 
Greg Dropkin 
Worked for an independent production company, Open Eye Film & Video, in 
Liverpool 1983-1990.  Open Eye made ‘Namibia Nuclear Reactions’, a film about 
the dockers’ blockade of Namibian Uranium Hexafluoride at the Port of Liverpool.  
Also an active anti-Apartheid campaigner and member of the Namibia Support 
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Committee throughout the eighties. 
 
Andy Dwyer 
Joined the dock workforce as a trainee storesman in May 1962, aged fifteen.  
Worked for Liverpool Maritime Terminals until it went bust in 1988, when he 
transferred to the MDHC where he worked until 1995.  Elected shop steward for 
Huskisson Dock storesmen at LMT in 1970 until 1988. 
  
Frank Lannigan 
Started on the docks as a Registered Dock Worker in 1970 for Raes Bulk Handling.  
Elected as shop steward 1978, remained on the Committee until 1995.  A member of 
the various worker’s side joint regulatory bodies in the industry and the district and 
national trade group committees of the TGWU. 
 
Tony Nelson 
Came to the docks straight from school in 1973 as a clerical grade timekeeper for 
T&J Harrisons.  Elected shop steward in 1978, transferred to the MDHC when 
Harrisons withdrew from the Port.  Remained on the Clerical Port Shop Steward 
Committee until 1989. 
 
Eddie Roberts 
Union activist at Dunlop’s Speke Plant in the early sixties until he joined Ford’s.  He 
quickly became a steward and later Convenor for the Paint, Trim and Assembly 
workforce in Ford’s.  In July 1970, he became District TGWU Official for ACTSS, a 
position which lasted until 1977 when he became Regional TGWU Organiser for 
District 6 (Merseyside).   
 
Billy Taylor 
RDW at Garston Docks from the late fifties until 1976 when he took voluntary 
redundancy from the industry.  
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Terry Teague 
Joined T&J Harrisons dockside clerical workforce in 1967 straight from school as a 
messenger boy, later became a clerical Quayside Foreman.  Elected as shop steward 
in 1972.  Transferred to the MDHC when Harrisons withdrew from the port in 1980.  
Elected as Chairman of the Clerical Port Shop Steward Committee 1982.  Remained 
at the MDHC until 1995 when it dismissed its entire dock workforce. 
 
Mick Tighe 
Started on Liverpool docks in 1973 as a Registered Dock Worker for the MDHC.  
He was one of very few recruits to the register after 1972 and was given his father’s 
book under special circumstances.  Worked on the docks until 1995. 
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Appendix II 
Interview Questionnaires 
Below is a sample list of questions/themes explored in all initial interviews with 
former Registered Dock Workers. 
 
1: Introduce yourself – what years did you work on the docks?  What years were you 
steward (if applicable)?  Which part of the dock did you work in? 
2: Did you have family members working on the docks? 
3: Did you live near the docks?  What are your recollections of your neighbourhood?   
4: Discuss your recollections of the casualised pre-Devlin system of employment and 
recruitment (if applicable) – gangs, occupational identity, sectarianism? 
5: How did you feel when Devlin was implemented (if applicable)?  How did you 
feel about it later? 
6: What about the impact of containerisation on the industry? 
7: Relationship between dockers and the TGWU, influence of the ‘Blue’ (NASDU) 
in Liverpool/elsewhere?  Impact of the introduction of shop steward system as part 
of Devlin? 
8: Opinion of organisation and solidarity at Liverpool compared with other ports in 
1970s and 80s. 
9: Recollections of major disputes (where applicable) e.g. 1967 Devlin Phase One; 
1969 Aintree Containerbase; 1972 strike wave; 1980 withdrawal of Harrison’s; 
decline of the industry 1980s to abolition of NDLS 1989; Campaign against 
abolition, 1989 national dock strike. 
10: Relationship with clerical stewards, attitude towards clerical unionism? 
11: Liverpool in the 1980s – Labour/political militancy; the impact of Thatcherism 
on labour organisation. 
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A similar set of questions/themes were explored in initial interviews with all clerical 
workers, although with several tailored to the major disputes and milestones of the 
Branch.  See sample below. 
 
1: Introduce yourself – what years did you work on the docks?  What years were you 
steward (if applicable)?  Which part of the dock did you work in? 
2: Did you have family members working on the docks? 
3: Did you live near the docks?  What are your recollections of your neighbourhood?   
4: What was the initial reaction of employers to clerical unionism?  What about 
dockers? 
5: Impact of the appointment of Eddie Roberts as official? 
6: Reflect on growth of the Branch in the 1970s 
7: Recollections of the Smith-Coggins dispute 1972 and the final settlement; the 
withdrawal of Harrisons 1980; 1985 Isle of Man Steam Packet dispute. 
8: Labour relations in the eighties – relationship with Docks section. 
9: Recollections of 1989 NDLS abolition and strike 
10: Liverpool in the 1980s – Labour/political militancy; the impact of Thatcherism 
on labour organisation. 
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Appendix III 
Outline descriptions/definitions of duties attached to different categories/grades 
of dock/clerical workers 
 
Stevedores and dockers 
Both category of worker are often subsumed under the generic title of ‘dockers’, 
particularly after decasualisation minimised skill divisions.  However, prior to 
decasualisation, stevedores were considered the labour aristocracy of the dock 
workforce.  Broadly, the difference between the two centred on the location of their 
work and aptitude at certain tasks.  Stevedores worked on the ship handling and 
organising cargoes in the hold.  These duties generally required advanced 
organisational and handling skills and hence they were often the most sort after and 
experienced section of the workforce.  Dockers worked on the quayside preparing 
and organising cargoes to be painstakingly hand-loaded into a sling and winched 
aboard, at least prior to modernisation and mechanisation of the industry.  
 
Wharfinger  
This category of worker was effectively manager of clerical staff involved in the 
loading of a ship.  He was responsible for making sure all the documentation was in 
order once the cargo was loaded (e.g. manifests, bills of loading, ship’s plans etc).  
He also liaised between the shipping agents and the stevedoring company. 
 
Counter-offs 
 A ‘Counter-off’ (or Tally Clerk as they were called in London and elsewhere) 
essentially performed the same duties as a Wharfinger.  The only difference between 
the two was that Counter-offs were solely employed on discharging imported 
cargoes from a ship, whereas Wharfingers were concerned with the loading of export 
cargoes.  
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Wharfinger’s Clerk   
This category of worker was concerned with compiling the ship’s manifest and 
signing-off shipping notes and other related documentation.  
 
Tonnage Clerk  
A Tonnage Clerk kept a daily record of proceedings in a particular berth or area of 
the port.  This included recording the type of cargo shipped and the weight of the 
cargo as well as calculating the piecework bonuses of dockers working at a particular 
ship.  
 
Window Clerk  
A Window Clerk checked in cargo brought by road haulage to a particular ship or 
dock shed.  He would receive shipping notes from the haulage driver and then pass 
them onto a Checker who would sign-off the cargo as received and stow it until 
ready for loading onto the relevant ship. 
 
Timekeepers  
Timekeepers were employed to record RDW work patterns and movements at the 
quayside.  Their duties included documenting the hours worked by dockers on 
different ships/berths and calculating wages, bonuses etc.   
 
Ship’s Planners 
Ship’s Planners or ‘Plan men’ were particularly prominent prior to containerisation 
and subsequently on remaining general cargo areas.  Their main job was to document 
which cargoes had been loaded onto the ship and whereabouts in the hold they were 
located, often this took the form of a diagram called the ship’s plan.   
269 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
 
Archival and Unpublished sources 
 
Government Papers 
 
Report of a Court of Inquiry Concerning Transport Workers’ Wages and Conditions, 
Cmnd 936/937, 1920. 
 
Report of a Committee of Inquiry on Port Labour, Ministry of Labour, 1931.  
 
The Merseyside Plan 1944, London: HMSO, 1945. 
 
Report of a Commission of Inquiry into the London Dock Dispute, Ministry of 
Labour and National Service, March 1945. 
 
Report of a Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Operation of the Dock 
Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1947, Cmnd. 9813, London: HMSO, 
1956. 
 
The National Plan, Cmnd. 2764, London: HMSO, 1965. 
 
Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry under the Rt. Hon Lord Devlin into certain 
matters concerning the Port Transport Industry, Cmnd. 2734, August 1965. 
 
House of Lords debate, 24 November 1965, Hansard, Vol. 270, cc. 938-1024. 
 
Report of Inquiry into the Locally Determined Aspects of the System of Payment and 
Earning Opportunities of Registered Dock Workers in the Port of Liverpool 
(including Birkenhead), London: HMSO, October 1967. 
 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, In Place of Strife: A Policy for 
Industrial Relations, Cmnd. 3888, London: HMSO, 1969. 
 
Department of Employment Press Release, ‘National Dock Strike – Statement by the 
Secretary of State for Employment, Robert Carr’, 16 July 1970. 
 
Pearson Inquiry Report, 28 July 1970. 
 
Department of Employment, ‘Containerisation dispute - Notes of meeting between 
Secretary of State for Employment and Employers concerned’, 17 May 1972. 
 
Joint Special Committee on the Ports Industry [The Aldington-Jones Committee], 
‘Interim Report of the Joint Special Committee on the Ports Industry’, 25 July 1972. 
 
House of Commons debate, 8 August 1972, Hansard, Vol. 842, cc. 1580-627. 
270 
 
 
Department for Employment Press Release, ‘Proposal to extend the Dock Labour 
Scheme announced today’, 15 July 1974. 
 
House of Commons debate, 25 July 1974, Hansard, Vol. 877, cc. 1978-88. 
 
Department for Employment, ‘The Dock Work Regulation Act 1976’. 
 
House of Commons debate, 10 November 1976, Hansard, Vol. 919, cc. 487-602. 
 
House of Commons debate, 10 March 1988, Hansard, Vol. 129, cc. 521-33. 
 
The Department for Employment, ‘Employment in the ports: The Dock Labour 
Scheme’, Cmnd. 664, April 1989. 
 
 
 
Trade Union Records 
 
Dock Labour Joint Committee, ‘Port of Liverpool – Principal provisions of 
agreements governing hours of work, rates of pay and conditions applicable to 
Registered Dock Workers’, September 1967. 
  
Jack Jones’ speech to TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference 1969, TGWU Biennial 
Conference Report 1969. 
 
Trades Union Congress, ‘Report of meeting between the Secretary of State for 
Employment and representatives of the TUC – Re: Dock Dispute’, 15 July 1970. 
 
Telegram from Frank Deegan (Treasurer, Liverpool Port Shop Steward Committee) 
to Jack Jones, 16 July 1970. 
 
Letter from Jack Jones to Home Secretary Reg Maudling, 22 July 1970. 
 
TGWU letter to the TUC, ‘Re: Complaint of unfair industrial practice under Section 
101 of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 – Heaton’s Transport (St. Helens) Limited’, 
19 April 1972. 
 
Jack Jones’ report to the General Executive Council of the TGWU, ‘Re: Incidents 
associated with the Docks Delegate Conference on August 16th, 1972’. 
 
Statement by the TUC to the National Ports Council Enquiry into Non-Scheme 
Ports, 17 October 1972. 
 
Letter from Tom Cronin (TGWU National Docks and Waterways Secretary) to M. 
Wake (Department for Employment), ‘Re: NAPE’s paper on the drafting of a new 
Dock Labour Scheme under the 1976 Act’, 28 May 1980. 
 
TGWU National Docks & Waterways Circular (Number 78985), ‘Re: Severance 
Arrangements’, 16 April 1982. 
271 
 
 
Letter from John Connolly (TGWU National Docks and Waterways Secretary) to 
Norman Tebbit (Secretary of State for Employment), ‘Re: Draft of a new Dock 
Labour Scheme to replace 1967 Scheme’, 7 October 1981. 
 
Letter from John Connolly (TGWU National Docks and Waterways Secretary) to 
Norman Tebbit (Secretary of State for Employment), ‘Re: Draft of a new Dock 
Labour Scheme to replace 1967 Scheme’, 22 April 1982. 
 
TGWU National Docks & Waterways Circular (Number 79068), ‘Re: Proposed 
Industrial Action 10/05/82 – Dock Labour Scheme’, 4 May 1982. 
 
Letter from John Connolly ‘To Docks and Waterways Committee members and 
members of the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry’, 2 September 
1983. 
 
Letter from Jimmy Symes (TGWU District Secretary, District 6 Docks and 
Waterways Section) to John Connolly, 13 September 1983. 
 
Letter from John Connolly to Michael Fenn (London Port Shop Stewards’ 
Committee), 7 October 1983. 
 
TGWU Central Office Inter-Departmental Memo from John Connolly to the General 
Secretary, ‘Re: Hunterston/Ravenscraig – Miners’ Dispute’, 21 May 1984. 
 
TGWU Memorandum, ‘To TGWU Parliamentary Group, Re: Docks Dispute’, 23 
July 1984. 
 
TGWU Circular (Number 841099), ‘Re: National Dock Strike’, 25 July 1984. 
 
TGWU Circular (Number 841273/A), ‘Re: M.V. Ostia – Hunterston (Ayeshire), 29 
August 1984. 
 
TGWU Circular (Number 85155), 21 October 1985. 
 
TGWU Circular (Number 85166), 7 November 1985. 
 
Press statement by John Connolly (National Docks and Waterways Secretary) ‘Re: 
Ballot for national strike over TUR use’, 24 July 1987. 
 
TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee meeting minutes, 21 January 
1988. 
 
TGWU Circular (Number 881157), ‘To all Docks and Waterways Officers, the 
National Docks and Waterways Committee and Dock Shop Stewards’, 18 August 
1988. 
 
TGWU Ballot Returns Records, 7 October 1988. 
 
TGWU Press Release, 7 October 1988. 
272 
 
 
TGWU Circular (Number 881649) ‘Port of Glasgow dispute – Dock Labour Scheme 
– Use of non-registered labour’, 15 December 1988. 
 
TGWU Press Release, ‘Abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme’, 6 April 
1989. 
 
TGWU correspondence to Nicolas Finney (Director of NAPE) signed by Ron Todd 
(General Secretary of the TGWU), 19 April 1989. 
 
TGWU correspondence ‘To all registered port employers’, 24 April 1989. 
 
TGWU correspondence ‘To all registered dock workers’, 24 April 1989. 
 
Letter to Jimmy Symes from Trevor Furlong (Managing Director and Chief 
Executive of the MDHC), 26 April 1989. 
 
Letter to Bill Morris (TGWU Deputy General Secretary) from Bernard Cliff (Port 
Operations Director MDHC), 27 April 1989. 
 
TGWU Memorandum, ‘TGWU Ballot’, 27 April 1989. 
 
TGWU correspondence ‘To all Regional Secretaries – Re: Ballot of registered dock 
workers’, 28 April 1989. 
 
TGWU National Committee minutes, 19 April 1990. 
 
 
Port Employer Records 
 
EAPL meeting minutes, March 1965 – March 1988. 
 
NAPE Press Release, 15 July 1970. 
 
EAPL Committee of the Association meeting minutes, December 1970 – August 
1971. 
 
EAPL Annual General Meeting minutes, May 1971 – August 1985. 
 
Dock Labour Joint Committee – Standing Sub-Committee meeting minutes, 19 July 
1972. 
 
EAPL Policy Committee minutes, November 1973 – April 1979. 
 
EAPL – TGWU Seaforth Grain Committee meeting minutes, June 1974 – September 
1974. 
 
EAPL – ACTSS Joint Negotiating Committee meeting minutes, February 1979 – 
February 1988. 
 
273 
 
EAPL – TGWU Local Modernisation Committee meeting minutes, October 1981 – 
February 1988. 
 
National Association of Port Employers, ‘The case against the Dock Labour 
Scheme’ (London: NAPE 1988). 
 
British Ports Association, ‘Report on manpower in the UK ports industry, 1987’, 
1988. 
 
NAPE Press Release, 7 October 1988. 
 
The National Port Employers Association, ‘The History of the Dock Labour Scheme 
– NAPE campaign timetable’, April 1989. 
 
ABP Press Release, 6 April 1989. 
 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Company Press Release, 11 April 1989. 
 
The National Association of Port Employers, Letter to Ron Todd signed by Nicolas 
Finney, 18 April 1989. 
 
The National Association of Port Employers Press Release, ‘No new Dock Labour 
Scheme say employers’, 18 April 1989. 
 
NAPE Press Release, ‘Local talks should go ahead say employers’, 7 June 1989. 
 
Letter from Trevor Furlong (Managing Director and Chief Executive of the MDHC) 
to Ron Todd, 26 July 1989. 
 
 
 
Other Industry-Related Records 
 
Letter from James Walker to Sir Jack Scamp, 16 October 1967. 
 
Letter from Sir Jack Scamp to the Editor of The Institute of Personnel Management 
detailing the final pay deal at Liverpool, 15 December 1967. 
 
Letter from Scamp to the Editor of The Institute of Personnel Management detailing 
the final pay deal at Liverpool, 15 December 1967. 
 
National Dock Labour Board, ‘NDLB statistics 1967-1988: Surplus Labour’ 
 
National Industrial Relations Court, ‘Complaint of unfair industrial practice under 
section 101 of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 – Heaton’s Transport (St. Helens) 
Ltd: Details of compensation for Traffic Lost sought under paragraph 3 of the 
Complainants Application for Relief’, April 1972. 
 
Road Haulage Association, ‘Memorandum submitted to the Department of 
Employment, Re: the NDLS’, 8 May 1972. 
274 
 
 
CBI Circular to members entitled ‘Container Dispute’, 10 May 1972. 
 
Court of Appeal, ‘Heaton’s Transport (St. Helens) Ltd. v Transport and General 
Workers’ Union; Craddock Bros. v TGWU; Panalpina Services Ltd. and Another v 
TGWU and Others’, 13 June 1972, Managerial Law, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 1973, pp. 1-
47. 
 
Correspondence to the Department for Employment (regarding the 1976 Dock Work 
Bill) from Christian Salvesen (Cold Storage) Ltd, 9 Jan 1976. 
 
Correspondence to the Department for Employment (regarding the 1976 Dock Work 
Bill) from The Institute of Freight Forwarders, 20 Jan 1976. 
 
Cargo Systems International, ‘Container technology, volume 5: Proceedings of the 
5th Container Technology Conference held in London 4-6th December 1984’. 
 
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry, ‘Re: Severance arrangements 
London and Liverpool’, 1 September 1983. 
 
NPSSC statement in reply to NAPE’s proposals, 3 October 1983. 
 
NJC (Workers’ Side) meeting minutes, 15 April 1989. 
 
Associated British Ports and others v Transport & General Workers Union [1989] 
Industrial Relations Law Reports, 291.  
 
ABP v TGWU [1989] Industrial Relations Law Reports, 305.  
 
ABP v TGWU [1989] Industrial Relations Law Reports, 399.  
 
 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
 
 
The Economist, 2 April 1955 - 24 March 1956 
 
Liverpool Echo, 16 September 1967 - 7 August 1989 
 
Financial Times, 18 November 1967 - 1 September 1988 
 
Lloyds List, 18 November 1967 - 1 September 1988 
 
The Sunday Times, 26 March 1972 
 
The Times, 14 June 1972 - 9 June 1989 
 
The Guardian, 14 June 1972 - 8 June 1989 
 
275 
 
Big Flame, September 1972 
 
Daily Mirror, 11 October 1982 
 
Liverpool Daily Post, 6 June 1984 
 
Counter Information, No. 19, May/June 1988 
 
 
 
Published Works 
 
 
Inns of Court Conservatives and Unionist Society, A Giant’s Strength: Some 
thoughts on the constitutional and legal position of trade unions in England – A 
study, London: Inns of Court Conservatives and Unionist Society, 1958. 
 
The Conservative Party, Action Not Words: The New Conservative Programme, The 
Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, 1966. 
 
The Conservative Political Centre, ‘Fair Deal At Work – The Conservative approach 
to modern industrial relations’, 18th Conservative Trade Unionists’ Annual 
Conference, Birmingham, 7 June 1969. 
 
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, ‘The consequences of the abolition of 
the Dock Labour Scheme – Employment and Output’, June 1988 
 
 
 
Electronic and miscellaneous sources 
 
 
http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/our-solutions/academic/librarians/uk-newspapers/ 
 
http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/store/uk/Industrial-Relations-Law-Reports/Brand 
 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/ 79/contents/enacted 
 
http://safalra.com/other/historical-uk-inflation-price-conversion 
 
http://www.whatsthecost.com/historic.cpi.aspx 
 
BBC News, 30 December 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
276 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
 
Books 
 
Adeney, M. & Lloyd, J. The Miners’ Strike, 1984-5: Loss Without Limit (London: 
Routledge 1988). 
 
Allen, V.L. The Militancy of British Miners (Shipley: Moor 1981). 
 
Ayers, P. The Liverpool Docklands – Life and Work in Athol Street (Liverpool: 
Docklands History Project 1987). 
 
Bain, G.S., Coates, D. & Ellis, V. Social Stratification and Trade Unionism 
(London: Heinemann 1973). 
 
Basset, P. Strike Free: New Industrial Relations in Britain (London: Papermac 
1987). 
 
Batstone, E., Boraston, I. and Frenkel, S. Shop Stewards in Action: The Organisation 
of Workplace Conflict and Accommodation (Oxford: Blackwell 1977). 
 
Beaumont, P.B. The Decline of Trade Union Organisation (London: Routledge 
1987). 
 
Belchem, J. Merseypride: Essays in Liverpool Exceptionalism (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press 2000). 
 
Belchem, J. Irish, Catholic and Scouse: The History of the Liverpool Irish, 1800-
1939 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2007). 
 
Beynon, H. Working For Ford (Wakefield: E.P. Publishing 1973). 
 
Booth, C. Life and Labour of the People of London 1889-97, Series 1 & 2 (London: 
Macmillan & Co 1902). 
 
Braddock, J. & Braddock, B.B. The Braddocks (London: MacDonald 1963). 
  
Brocken, M. Other Voices: Hidden Histories of Liverpool’s Popular Music Scenes, 
1930s-1970s (Farnham: Ashgate 2010). 
 
Burgess, K. The Origins of British Industrial Relations (London: Croom Helm 
1975). 
 
Cairncross, A. The British Economy since 1945: Economic Policy and Performance 
(London: Wiley-Blackwell 1995). 
 
Castle, B. The Castle Diaries 1964-70 (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson 1984). 
 
277 
 
Clegg, H.A., Fox, A. & Thompson, A.F. A History of British Trade Unionism since 
1889, Volume 1 (Oxford: Clarendon 1964). 
 
Clegg, H. The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford: 
Blackwell 1979). 
 
Crick, M. The March of Militant (London: Faber & Faber 1986). 
 
Cronin, J.E. Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain (London: Croom Helm 1979). 
 
Cronin, J.E. Labour and Society in Britain 1918-1979 (London: Batsford 1984). 
 
Darlington, R. The Dynamics of Workplace Organisation: Shop Stewards’ 
Organisation in Three Merseyside Plants (London: Mansell 1994). 
 
Davies, S. Liverpool Labour: Social and Political Influences on the Development of 
the Labour Party in Liverpool, 1900-1939 (Keele: Keele University Press 1996). 
 
Davies, S. et al (eds.) Dockworkers: International Explorations in Comparative 
Labour History, 1790-1970 (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000). 
 
Davis, C. Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers, 1946–61 
(Illinois: University of Illinois 2003). 
 
Deegan, F. There’s No Other Way (Liverpool: Toulouse 1980). 
 
Dempster, J. The Rise and Fall of the Dock Labour Scheme (London: Biteback 
2010). 
 
Denning, A. (Lord), The Closing Chapter (London: Butterworth 1983). 
 
Flanders, A. British Trade Unionism (California: Bureau of Current Affairs 1948). 
 
Durcan, J. W. McCarthy, W. E. J. and Redman, G. P. Strikes in Post-War Britain 
(London: George Allen & Unwin 1983). 
 
Franzosi, R. The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Post War Italy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995). 
 
Glass, D.V. Social Mobility in Britain (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1954). 
 
Goldthorpe, J.H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F. & Platt, J. The Affluent Worker Vols. 
1-3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968-1969). 
 
Goodman, G. The Awkward Warrior: Frank Cousins, His Life and Times (London: 
Davis-Poynter 1979). 
 
Gospel, H.F. Markets, Firms and the Management of Labour in Modern Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992). 
 
278 
 
Green, A. British Capital, Antipodean Labour: Working the New Zealand Waterfront 
1915-1951 (Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago Press 2001). 
 
Hair, P.E.H. The Atlantic Slave Trade and Black Africa (London: Historical 
Association 1978). 
 
Hatton, D. Inside Left: The Story So Far (London: Bloomsbury 1988). 
 
Heath, E. The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London: Hodder & Stoughton 
1998). 
 
Hill, S. The Dockers – Class and Tradition in London (London: Heinemann, 1976). 
 
Hinton, J. The First Shop Stewards’ Movement (Surrey: Allen & Unwin 1973). 
 
Hinton, J. Labour and Socialism: A History of the British Labour Movement 1867-
1974 (Brighton: Wheatsheaf 1983). 
 
Hunter, B. They Knew Why They Fought: Unofficial Struggles and Leadership on 
the Docks, 1945-1989 (London: Index Books, 1994). 
 
Hyde, F.E. Liverpool and the Mersey: An Economic History of a Port 1700-1970 
(Newton Abbot: David & Charles 1971). 
 
Hyman, R. Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (London: Macmillan 1975). 
 
Hyman, R. & Price, R. The New Working Class: White-Collar Workers and Their 
Organisations (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1985). 
 
Jackson, M.P. Labour Relations on the Docks (Farnborough: Lexington 1973). 
 
Jensen, V.H. The Hiring of Dockworkers and Employment Practices in the Ports of 
New York, Liverpool, London, Rotterdam and Marseilles (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1964). 
 
Jones, J. Union Man: An Autobiography (London: Collins 1986). 
 
Kelly, J. Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long 
Waves (London: Routledge 1998). 
 
Klandermans, B. The Social Psychology of Protest (Oxford: Blackwell 1997). 
 
Knight, F.W. & Liss, P.K. Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture and Society in the 
Atlantic World 1650-1850 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee 1991). 
 
Lane, T. & Roberts, K. Strike At Pilkingtons (London: Fontana 1971). 
 
Lane, T. Liverpool: City of the Sea (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1997). 
 
279 
 
Lavalette, M. & Kennedy, J. Solidarity on the Waterfront: The Liverpool Lock-Out 
of 1995/96 (Birkenhead: Liver Press 1996). 
 
Leonard, M. & Strachan, R. (eds.) The Beat Goes On: Liverpool, Popular Music and 
the Changing City (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2010). 
 
Liverpool Black Caucus, The Racial Politics of Militant in Liverpool: The Black 
Community’s Struggle for Participation in Local Politics 1980-1986 (Liverpool: 
Merseyside Area Profile Group/Runnymede 1986). 
 
Lockwood, D. The Blackcoated Worker: A Study in Class Consciousness (Oxford: 
Clarendon 1958). 
 
MacGregor, I. The Enemies Within: The Story of the Miners’ Strike, 1984-85 
(London: Collins 1986). 
 
Mankelow, R. Deregulation and Privitisation: The Case of the London Dockers 
(London: Institute of Employment Rights 1996). 
 
Marriner, S. The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside (London: Croom 
Helm 1982). 
 
Martin, R. Bargaining Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992). 
 
McCarthy, T. (ed.) The Great Dock Strike 1889 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
1988). 
 
McCarthy, W.E.J. & Ellis, N.D. Management By Agreement: An Alternative to the 
Industrial Relations Act (London: Hutchinson 1973). 
 
McIlroy, J. The Permanent Revolution: Conservative Law and the Trade Unions 
(Nottingham: Spokesman for the Society of Industrial Tutors 1991). 
 
McIntyre-Brown, A. Liverpool: The First 1000 Years (Liverpool: Garlic Press 
2001). 
 
Mellish, M. The Docks After Devlin (London: Heinemann 1972). 
 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Company, Port of Liverpool Handbook and Directory, 
1991-1992 (Liverpool: Mediafine 1992). 
 
Middlemas, K. Power, Competition and the State, Vol. 2 (London: Macmillan 1990). 
 
Moran, M. The Politics of Industrial Relations (London: Macmillan 1977). 
 
Muir, R. A History of Liverpool (London: Williams & Norgate 1907). 
 
Murgatroyd, L. et al, Localities, Class and Gender (London: Pion 1985). 
 
280 
 
Neal, F. Sectarian Violence: the Liverpool Experience 1819-1914 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 1987). 
 
Parkinson, M. Liverpool on the Brink: One City’s Struggle Against Government Cuts 
(Hermitage: Policy Journals 1985). 
 
Phillips, G. & Whiteside, N. Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the 
Port Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon 1985). 
 
Pilger, J. Hidden Agendas (London: Vintage 1999). 
 
Pitt, M. The World On Our Backs: The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart 1979). 
 
Price, R. Masters, Unions and Men: Work Control in Building and the Rise of 
Labour 1830-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
 
Price, R. ‘Re-thinking labour history: The importance of work’ in J.E. Cronin & J. 
Schneer (eds.) Social Conflict and the Political Order in Modern Britain (London: 
Croom Helm 1982). 
 
Roberts, A. The Rossling File: The Inside Story of Britain’s Secret Contract for 
Namibian Uranium (London: Namibia Support Committee 1980).  
 
Sexton, J. (Sir), Agitator – The Life of the Dockers’ M.P. (London: Faber & Faber 
1936). 
 
Simey, T.S. The Dock Worker: An Analysis of Conditions of Employment in the Port 
of Manchester (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1956). 
 
Smith, H.L. & Nash, V. The Story of the Dockers’ Strike (London: Fisher Unwin 
1889). 
 
Taaffe, P. & Mulhearn, T. Liverpool: A City That Dared to Fight (London: Fortress 
1988). 
 
Taplin, E. Liverpool Dockers and Seamen, 1870-1890 (Hull: Hull University Press 
1974). 
 
Taplin, E. The Dockers’ Union: A Study of the National Union of Dockworkers 
1889-1922 (Leicester: Leicester University Press 1986). 
 
Taplin, E. Near to Revolution: The Liverpool General Transport Strike of 1911 
(Liverpool: Bluecoat 1994). 
 
Taylor, R. The Trade Union Question in British Politics (Oxford: Blackwell 1994). 
 
Taylor, R. The TUC: From the General Strike to New Unionism (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave 2000). 
 
281 
 
Thompson, E.P. The Making of the English Working-class (London: Victor Gollancz 
1963). 
 
Thompson, P. R. The Voice of the Past (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000). 
 
Tillett, B. History of the London Transport Workers’ Strike 1911 (London: National 
Transport Workers Federation 1911). 
 
Tilly, C. & Shorter, E. Strikes in France 1830-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1974). 
 
Tilly, C. From Mobilisation to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill 1978).  
 
Tosh, J. The Pursuit of History (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Ltd 2000). 
 
Towers, B. Waterfront Blues: The Rise and Fall of Liverpool’s Dockland (Lancaster: 
Carnegie 2011). 
 
Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. & Kelly, J. Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in 
Britain’s Ports (Aldershot: Avebury 1992). 
 
Trawer, S. (ed.) Place, Writing and Voice in Oral History (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011). 
 
Undy, R., Fosh, P., Smith, H. & Martin R. Managing the Unions: The Impact of 
Legislation on Trade Unions’ Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996). 
 
Walker, K.F. Australian Industrial Relations Systems (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1956). 
 
Waller, P.J. Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of 
Liverpool 1868-1939 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1981). 
 
Webb, S. & Webb, B. The History of Trade Unionism 1666-1920 (London: 
Longman 1920). 
 
Weekes, B.C.M., Mellish, M., Dickens, L. & Lloyd, J. Industrial Relations and the 
Limits of the Law: The Industrial Effects of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 
(Oxford: Blackwell 1975). 
 
Williams, G. History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque With An 
Account of the Liverpool Slave Trade, 1744-1812 (Montreal: McGill-Queens 
University Press 2004). 
 
Williams, P.H. Liverpolitana (Liverpool: Merseyside Civic Society 1971). 
 
Wilson, D.F. Dockers: The Impact of Industrial Change (London: Fontana/Collins 
1972). 
 
282 
 
Winterton, J. & Winterton, R. Coal, Crisis and Conflict: The 1984-85 Miners’ Strike 
in Yorkshire (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1989). 
 
Zeigler, P. Wilson: The Authorized Life of Lord Wilson of Lord Rievaulx (London: 
Weidenfield & Nicolson 1993),  
 
 
Articles 
 
Allen, P.T. ‘The class imagery of “traditional proletarians”’, The British Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 1984, pp. 93-111. 
 
Anderson, B.L. & Cottrell, P.L. ‘Another Victorian capital market: A study of 
banking and bank investors on Merseyside’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 28, 
Issue 4, November 1975, pp. 598-615.  
 
Anderson, B.L. & Richardson, D. ‘Market structure and profits of the British African 
trade in the late 18th century: a comment’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 43, 
Issue 3, 1983, pp. 713-721. 
 
Ayers, P. ‘The making of men: Masculinities in interwar Liverpool’ in M. Walsh 
(ed.), Working Out Gender (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 66-83. 
 
Ayers, P. ‘Work, culture and gender: The making of masculinities in post-war 
Liverpool’, Labour History Review, Vol. 69, Issue 2, August 2004, pp. 153-167. 
 
Bacon, N., Blyton, P. & Morris, J. ‘Among the ashes: Trade union strategies in the 
UK and German steel industries’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 34, 
Issue 1, March 1996, pp. 25-50. 
 
Bain, G.S. & Price, R. ‘Union growth and employment trends in the United 
Kingdom, 1964-70’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, Issue 3, 
November 1972, pp. 366-381. 
 
Batstone, E. ‘Bureaucracy, oligarchy and incorporation in shop steward 
organisations in the 1980s’ in O. Jacobi, B. Jessop, H. Kastendiek & M. Regini 
(eds.) Technological Change, Rationalisation and Industrial Relations (Kent: Croom 
Helm 1986), pp. 137-160. 
 
Bean, R. ‘Employers’ associations in the Port of Liverpool 1890-1914’, 
International Review of Social History, Vol. 21, 1976, pp. 358-382. 
 
Bean, R. & Stoney, P. ‘Strikes on Merseyside: A regional analysis’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 17, Issue 1, March 1986, pp. 9-23. 
 
Blackburn, R.M. & Prandy, K. ‘‘White-collar’ unionization: A conceptual 
framework’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1965, pp. 111-122. 
 
283 
 
Blank, S. ‘Britain: The politics of foreign economic policy, the domestic economy 
and the problem of pluralistic stagnation’, International Organisation, Vol. 31, Issue 
4, September 1977, pp. 673-721. 
 
Blyton, P. ‘Steel: A classic case of industrial relations change in Britain’, Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 5, September 1992, pp. 635-650. 
 
Bohstedt, J. ‘More than one working-class: Protestant-Catholic riots in Edwardian 
Liverpool’ in J. Belchem (ed.) Popular Politics, Riot and Labour: Essays in 
Liverpool History 1790-1940 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1992). 
 
Brown, W., Deakin, S. & Ryan, P. ‘The effects of British industrial relations 
legislation, 1979-1997’, National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 161, No. 1, July 
1997, pp. 69-83. 
 
Bunyan, T. ‘The police against the people’, Race & Class, Vol. 23, No. 2-3, October 
1981, pp. 153-170. 
 
Burton, V. ‘Liverpool’s mid-nineteenth century coasting trade’ in V. Burton(ed.), 
Liverpool Shipping, Trade and Industry: Essays on the Maritime History of 
Merseyside 1780-1860 (Liverpool: Trustees of National Museums and Galleries on 
Merseyside 1989). 
 
Carter, C. Clegg, S. Hogan, J. & Kornberger, M. ‘The polyphonic spree: The case of 
the Liverpool dockers’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 34, Issue 4, October 2003, 
pp. 290-304. 
 
Castree, N. ‘Geographic scale and grass roots internationalism: The Liverpool dock 
dispute 1995-1998’, Economic Geography, Vol. 76, Issue 3, July 2000, pp. 272-292. 
 
Claydon, T. ‘Union Derecognition in Britain in the 1980s’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 27, Issue 2, July 1989, pp. 214-224. 
 
Collins, M. ‘The Bank of England at Liverpool, 1827-1844’, Business History, Vol. 
14, Issue 2, 1972, pp. 144-165. 
 
Cook, F.G., Clark, S.C., Roberts, K. & Semeonoff, E. ‘Are white-collar trade 
unionists different?’ Sociology of Work and Occupations, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 1978, 
pp. 235-245. 
 
Cooper, P. ‘Competing explanations of the Merseyside riots of 1981’, British 
Journal of Criminology, Vol. 21, Issue 1, January 1985, pp. 60-69. 
 
Connell, R.W. ‘Live fast and die young: The construction of masculinity among 
young working-class men on the margin of the labour market’, Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, August 1991, pp. 141-171. 
 
Crompton, R. ‘Approaches to the study of white-collar unionism’, Sociology, Vol. 
10, No. 3, 1976, pp. 407-426. 
 
284 
 
Cronin, J.E. ‘The “rank-and-file” and the social history of the working-class’, 
International Review of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp 78-88. 
 
Darlington, R. ‘Shop stewards’ leadership, left-wing activism and collective 
workplace union organisation’, Capital & Class, Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 
95-126. 
 
Davies, R.S.W. ‘The Liverpool Labour party and the Liverpool working-class, 1900-
1939’, North West Labour History Society Bulletin, Vol. 6, 1979-1980, pp. 2-14 
 
Davies, S. ‘History in the making: The Liverpool docks dispute, 1995-96’, North 
West Labour History Journal, Vol. 21, 1996/7, pp. 67-72. 
 
Davies, S. ‘Liverpool Labour Party and Trades Council: A Brief Introduction to the 
Microfilm Edition of Liverpool Labour Party and Trades Council Records, 1862-
1986’, Microform Academic Publishers, 1999. 
 
Davis, D. ‘Clear the Decks: Abolish the National Dock Labour Scheme’, Centre For 
Policy Studies, Policy Study Number 101, November 1988. 
 
Deery, S. ‘Industrial relations on the Australian waterfront: a policy of laissez-faire’, 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1977, pp. 93-97. 
 
Disney, R. ‘Explanations of the decline in trade union density in Britain: an 
appraisal’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, Issue 2, July 1990, pp. 
165-177. 
 
Finney, N. ‘Repeal of the National Dock Labour Scheme: Britain’s ports in an era of 
industrial relations change’, Employee Relations, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1990, pp. 10-16. 
 
Fox, A. ‘Industrial sociology and industrial relations’, Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers’ Associations, Research Paper No. 3, 1966, pp. 2-15. 
 
Fox, A. & Flanders, A. ‘The reform of collective bargaining: From Donovan to 
Durkheim’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, Issue 2, July 1969, pp. 
151-180. 
 
Freeman, R. & Pelletier, J. ‘The impact of industrial relations legislation on British 
union density’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, No. 2, July 1990, pp. 
141-164. 
 
Grant, L. ‘History broke Liverpool and it broke my heart’ in Grant et al, Shrinking 
Cities: Manchester/Liverpool (Working Papers – March 2004), pp. 137-139. 
 
Green, A. ‘Spelling, go-slows, gliding away and theft: Informal control over work on 
the New Zealand waterfront, 1915-51’, Labour History, No. 63, November 1992, pp. 
100-114. 
 
285 
 
Grele, R. J. ‘Movement without aim.  Methodological and theoretical problems in 
oral history’ in R. Perks & A. Thomson (eds.) The Oral History Reader (London: 
Routledge 1998), pp. 38-52. 
 
Halpern, R. ‘Oral History and Labour History: an historiographical assessment after 
twenty-five years’, The Journal of American History, Vol.85, September 1998, 
pp.596-610. 
 
Hamling, W. ‘A short history of the Liverpool Trades Council, 1848-1948’ in J. Dye 
(ed.) 150 Years of Struggle: The Liverpool Labour Movement, 1848-1998, 
(Liverpool: Liverpool Trades Council 1998), pp. 21-39;, pp. 53-77. 
 
Hanson, C. ‘Time to end the National Dock Labour Scheme’, Economic Affairs, 
June/July 1988, pp. 34-36.  
 
Hay, C. ‘Narrating crisis: The discursive construction of the “Winter of Discontent”’, 
Sociology, Vol. 30/2, May 1996, pp. 253-277. 
 
Hikins, H. ‘Origins of working-class politics: Liverpool 1756-1791’ in H. Hikins 
(ed.), Building the Union: Studies on the Growth of the Workers’ Movement, 
Merseyside 1756-1967 (Liverpool: Toulouse 1973). 
 
Hikins, H. ‘Liverpool dockers, 1967’ in H. Hikins (ed.) Building the Union: Studies 
on the Growth of the Workers’ Movement, 1756-1967 (Liverpool: Toulouse 1973). 
 
James Hinton’s review of Richard Price’s Labour in British Society: An 
Interpretative History (London: Croom Helm 1986) in Bulletin of the Society for the 
Study of Labour History, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1986, pp. 36-40. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. ‘The forward march of labour halted?’ in M. Jacques & F. Mulhearn 
(eds.), The Forward March of Labour Halted (London: MLB 1981), pp. 1-19. 
 
Hyman, R. ‘Rank-and-file movements and workplace organization, 1914-1939’ in 
C.J. Wrigley (ed.) A History of British Industrial Relations, Vol. 2: 1914-39 
(Brighton: Harvester 1987), pp. 129-158. 
 
Hyman, R. ‘The politics of workplace trade unionism: Recent tendencies and some 
problems for theory’, Capital & Class, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1979, pp. 54-67. 
 
Hyman, R. ‘The sound of one hand clapping: a comment on the “rank and filism” 
debate’, International Review of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp. 309-326. 
 
Inglis, I. ‘The Beatles are coming! Conjecture and conviction in the myth of 
Kennedy, America and the Beatles’, Popular Music and Society, Vol. 24, Issue 2, 
2000, pp. 93-108. 
 
Inikori, J.E. ‘Market structure and the profits of the British African trade in the late 
18th century’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 41, Issue 4, 1981, pp. 745-776. 
 
286 
 
Johnson, A. ‘Militant and the failure of “acherontic” Marxism in Liverpool’ in C. 
Barker & P. Kennedy (eds.) To Make Another World (Aldershot: Avebury 1996), pp. 
139-173. 
 
Joyce, P. ‘Labour, capital and compromise: a response to Richard Price’, Social 
History, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 1984, pp. 67-76. 
 
Kanya-Forstner, M. ‘Defining womanhood: Irish women and the Catholic Church in 
Victorian Liverpool’, Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 18, Issue 2-3, 1999, pp. 168-
188. 
 
Kearns, G., Laxton, P. and Campbell, J. ‘Duncan and the cholera test: public health 
in mid-nineteenth century Liverpool’, Transactions of the Historic Society of 
Lancashire and Cheshire, Vol. 143, 1993, pp. 87-115. 
 
Kelly, J. ‘Trade unions through the recession 1980-1984’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 25, Issue 2, July 1987, pp. 275-286. 
 
Kerr, C. & Siegel, A. ‘The inter-industry propensity to strike – an international 
comparison’, in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin & A.M. Ross(eds.), Industrial Conflict 
(New York: McGraw-Hill 1954), pp. 189-212. 
 
Lane, T. ‘The Unions: caught on the ebb tide’, Marxism Today, September 1982, pp. 
6-13. 
 
Lawton, R. and Pooley, C.G. ‘David Brindley’s Liverpool: an aspect of urban 
society in the 1880s’, Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and 
Cheshire, Vol. 126, 1975, pp. 149-168. 
 
Lawton, R. ‘From the port of Liverpool to the conurbation of Merseyside’ in W.T.S. 
Gould & A.G. Hodgkiss (eds.) The Resources of Merseyside (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press 1982). 
 
Lindop, F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 1: Shop stewards 
and containerisation’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 5, Spring 1998, pp. 
33-72. 
 
Lindop, F. ‘The dockers and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, part 2: the arrest and 
release of the Pentonville Five’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 6, 1998, 
pp. 65-100. 
 
Lockwood, D. ‘Sources of variation in working-class images of society’, The 
Sociological Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1966, pp. 249-267. 
 
Longstreth, F.H. ‘From corporatism to dualism?  Thatcherism and the climacteric of 
British trade unions in the 1980s’, Political Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 3, September 
1988, pp. 413-432. 
 
Lyddon, D. ‘Glorious summer, 1972: the high tide of rank and file militancy’ in J.  
 
287 
 
McIlroy, N. Fishman & A. Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial 
Politics: The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 
326-352. 
 
Machin, S. ‘Union decline in Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 
38, Issue 4, December 2000, pp. 631-645. 
 
Mangan, J. ‘Casual employment and conflict on the docks’, Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1979, pp. 56-62. 
 
McGovern, T. ‘Why do successful companies fail? A case study of the decline of 
Dunlop’, Business History, Vol. 49, Issue 6, 2007, pp. 886-907. 
 
McIlroy, J. ‘The first great battle in the march to socialism: Dockers, Stalinists and 
Trotskyists in 1945’, Revolutionary History, Vol. 6, 2/3, pp. 105-159. 
 
McIlroy, J. & Campbell, A. ‘The high tide of trade unionism: mapping industrial 
politics 1964-79’ in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman & A. Campbell (eds.), British Trade 
Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 
(Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 93-132. 
 
Meegan, R. ‘Paradise postponed: The growth and decline of Merseyside’s outer 
estates’ in P. Cooke (ed.), Localities: The Changing Face of Urban Britain (London: 
Unwin Hyman 1989). 
 
Mercer, D.E. & Weir, D.T.H. ‘Attitudes to work and trade unionism among ‘white-
collar’ workers’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 2, June 1972, pp. 49-60. 
 
Metcalf, D. ‘Transformation of British industrial relations?  Institutions, conduct and 
outcomes, 1980-1990’, Centre For Economic Performance London School of 
Economics, CEPDP 151, 1993. 
 
Misselwitz, P. ‘Liverpool city profile’ in Grant, Murden et al, Shrinking Cities: 
Manchester/ Liverpool (Working Papers – March 2004) pp. 114-117. 
 
Moore, K. ‘This Whig and Tory ridden town: Popular politics in Liverpool in the 
Chartist era’ in J. Belchem (ed.) Popular Politics, Riot and Labour: Essays in 
Liverpool History 1790-1940 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1992), pp. 38-
67. 
 
Murden, J. ‘Timeline: Liverpool 1699-2004’ in L. Grant, J. Murden, R. Meegan, P. 
Misselwitz, P. Keiller, A. Kidd, D. Haslam,  A. Brown, J. O’Connor, S. Cohen, R. 
Mellor, E. Ferrari, J. Roberts, A. Power, K. Mumford, C. Wong, M. Baker & N. 
Gallent, Shrinking Cities: Manchester/Liverpool (Working Papers – March 2004), 
pp. 118-129. 
 
Nicholson, N. ‘The role of the shop steward: an empirical case study’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 1976, pp. 15-26. 
 
288 
 
Noon, R. ‘Liverpool Love Lane Refinery Lives’, North West Labour History, No. 
32, 2007-2008, pp. 40-50. 
 
Pennington, B. ‘Docks: breakaway and unofficial movements’ International 
Socialism, No. 2, Autumn 1960, pp. 5-11. 
 
Phillips, J. ‘The Postwar Political Consensus and Industrial Unrest in the Docks, 
1945-55’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1995, pp. 302-319. 
 
Phillips, J. ‘Decasualization and disruption: Industrial relations on the docks 1945-
1979’, in C.J. Wrigley (ed.), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 
(Cheltenham: Elgar 1996), pp. 165-185. 
 
Phillips, J. ‘Democracy and trade unionism on the docks’ in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman 
& A. Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of 
Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 291-310. 
 
Pooley, C.G. ‘The residential segregation of migrant communities in mid-Victorian 
Liverpool’, Transactions of British Geographers, New Series 2, 1977, pp. 364-382. 
 
Portelli, A. ‘The peculiarities of oral history’, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 12, 
Issue 1, 1981, pp. 96-107. 
 
Power, M.J. ‘The growth of Liverpool’, in J. Belchem (ed.) Popular Politics, Riot 
and Labour: Essays in Liverpool History 1790-1940 (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press 1992), pp. 21-37. 
 
Price, R. ‘“What’s in a name?” Workplace history and “rank and filism”’, 
International Review of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp 62-77. 
 
Reid, A. ‘Labour and society in modern Britain’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 25, 
1982, pp. 489-500. 
 
Rodrigues, J. ‘The riots of 1981’, Marxism Today, October 1981, pp. 18-22. 
 
Rosewell, R. ‘Locked in a time warp – Must we keep Britain’s docks as an industrial 
museum?’ Aims of Industry, September 1988. 
 
Sadler, D. ‘Works closure at British Steel and the nature of the State’, Political 
Geography Quarterly, Vol. 3, Issue 4, October 1984, pp. 297-311. 
 
Sapsford, D. & Turnbull, P. ‘Dockers, Devlin and industrial disputes’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 21, Issue 1, March 1990, pp. 26-35. 
 
Saundry, R. & Turnbull, P. ‘Melee on the Mersey: Contracts, competition and labour 
relations on the docks’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 27, Issue 4, December 
1996, pp. 275-288. 
 
289 
 
Savage, M. ‘Sociology, class and male manual work cultures’ in J. McIlroy, N. 
Fishman & A. Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The 
High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 23-38. 
 
Schruver, N.J. ‘The UN Council for Namibia v Urenco, UCN and the state of the 
Netherlands’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 1988, pp. 25-47. 
 
Shallice, A. ‘Orange and Green and militancy: Sectarianism and working-class 
politics in Liverpool, 1900-1914’, Bulletin of the North West Labour History Society, 
Vol. 6, 1979-80, pp. 15-32. 
 
Shaw, E. ‘The Labour party and the Militant Tendency’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 
42, No. 2, 1989, pp. 180-196. 
 
Smith, J. ‘Labour tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool’, History Workshop Journal, 
Vol. 17, 1984, pp. 32-56. 
 
Taplin, E. ‘False dawn of New Unionism? Labour unrest in Liverpool 1871-1873’ in 
J. Belchem (ed.) Popular Politics, Riot and Labour: Essays in Liverpool History 
1790-1940 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1992), pp. 135-151 
 
Taylor, A. ‘The Conservative party and the trade unions’ in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman 
& A. Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of 
Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 151-186. 
 
Taylor, R. ‘The trade union “problem” in the Age of Consensus 1960-1979’ in B. 
Pimlott & C. Cook Trade Unions in British Politics (London: Longman 1991), pp. 
175-199. 
 
Terry, M. ‘How do we know if shop stewards are getting weaker?’, British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol. 24, Issue 2, July 1986, pp. 169-179. 
  
Thomas, J. ‘“Bound in by history”: The Winter of Discontent in British politics, 
1979-2004’, Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 29/2, March 2007, pp. 263-283. 
 
Thornley, C. ‘Labour Market Policy and Inequality in the UK’, in D. Coffey and C. 
Thornley (eds.) Industrial and Labour Market Policy and Performance: Issues and 
Perspectives (London: Routledge 2003) pp. 83–108. 
 
Thorpe, A. ‘The Labour party and the trade unions’ in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman & A. 
Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of 
Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999), pp. 133-150. 
 
Turnbull, P. ‘Dock strikes and the demise of the dockers’ ‘occupational culture’’, 
The Sociological Review, Vol. 40, Issue 2, May 1992, pp. 294-318. 
 
Turnbull, P. ‘Docks’ in A. Pendleton & J. Winterton (eds.) Public Enterprise in 
Transition: Industrial Relations in State and Privitized Corporations (London: 
Routledge 1993), pp. 185-210. 
 
290 
 
Turnbull, P. ‘Capitalist restructuring and socialist strategies for the port transport 
industry’, Capital & Class, Vol. 18, 1994, pp. 61-88. 
 
Turnbull, P., Morris, J. & Sapsford, D. ‘Persistent militants and quiescent comrades: 
Intra-industry strike action on the docks, 1947-1989’, Sociological Review, Vol. 44, 
No. 4, 1996, pp. 710-45. 
 
Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘Why did Devlin fail? Casualism and conflict on the 
docks’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 29, Issue 2, June 1991, pp. 237-
257. 
 
Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘A sea of discontent: the tides of organised and 
“unorganised” conflict on the docks’, Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 291-
309. 
 
Turnbull, P. & Sapsford, D. ‘Hitting the bricks: An international comparative study 
of conflict on the waterfront’, Industrial Relations, Vol. 40, No. 2, April 2001, pp. 
231-257. 
 
Turnbull, P. & Wass, V. ‘The greatest game no more – Redundant dockers and the 
demise of “dock work”’, Work, Employment & Society, Vol. 8, 1994, pp. 487-506. 
 
Undy, R. ‘The TUC: From the General Strike to New Unionism’, Employee 
Relations, 2001, Vol. 23/ 3, pp. 290-302. 
 
Waller, P.J. ‘The riots in Toxteth, Liverpool: A survey’, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 3, 1981, pp. 344-353. 
 
Warren, A. ‘The challenge from below: An analysis of the role of the shop steward 
in industrial relations’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1971, pp. 52-60. 
 
Whiteside, N. ‘Public policy and port labour reform: the dock decasualisation issue, 
1910-1950’ in S. Tolliday & J. Zeitlin(eds.) Shopfloor Bargaining and the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 75-107. 
 
Wilkinson, F. & Tarling, R. ‘The Social Contract: Post-war incomes policies and 
their inflationary impact’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 1, 1977, pp. 395-
414. 
 
Wilks-Heeg, S. ‘From world city to pariah city? Liverpool and the global economy, 
1850-2000’ in R. Munck Reinventing the City: Liverpool in Comparative 
Perspective (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2003), pp. 36-52. 
 
Willman, P. ‘Leadership and trade union principles: some problems of management 
sponsorship and independence’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 
November 1980, pp. 39-49. 
 
Zeitlin, J. ‘“Rank and filism” in British labour history: A critique’, International 
Review of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp.42-61. 
 
291 
 
Zeitlin, J. ‘“Rank and filism” and labour history: A rejoinder to Price and Cronin’, 
International Review of Social History, Vol. 34, 1989(b), pp. 89-102. 
 
Zeitlin, J. ‘From labour history to the history of industrial relations’, Economic 
History Review, 2nd series, XL, Issue 2, May 1987, pp. 159-184. 
 
 
Theses and dissertations 
 
Boston, J. ‘The theories and practice of voluntary incomes policies with particular 
reference to the British Labour government’s Social Contract 1974-1979’, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 1983. 
 
Carden, M. ‘Staff  trade unionism and industrial decline: the ACTSS 6/567 Branch 
and the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company’, Unpublished MA thesis, University 
of Warwick, September 1983. 
 
Carden, M.J. ‘Union democracy and incorporation: A case study of the Transport 
and General Workers’ Union, Merseyside Division, with particular reference to the 
dock industry’, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Liverpool, 1993. 
 
Chapman, P.W. ‘Industrial relations in the port of Liverpool: A study of the major 
developments affecting relations between employers and registered dock workers 
since 1970’, Unpublished MA thesis, The University of Warwick, 1981. 
 
Critchley, D. ‘Working practices and malpractices in the ports of Liverpool, London 
and New York, with special reference to the period 1945 to 1972’, Unpublished PhD 
thesis, Liverpool John Moores’ University, 2003. 
 
Grant, L.M. ‘Women workers and the sexual division of labour, 1890-1939’, PhD 
thesis, The University of Liverpool, 1987. 
 
Wells, C. ‘The industrial relations of the port of Liverpool since 1967’, Unpublished 
MA thesis, The University of Warwick, 1986. 
 
 
 
 
